Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives),
Volume 29, May, 1983 Egypt, Page 32165
© 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved.
Internal security developments Economic situationForeign relations and arms supplies
Summary and key dates
Conviction of Mr Esmat Sadat on corruption charges (Feb. 14, 1983).
Dismissal of ministers implicated in trial proceedings (March 13).
Earlier extension of state of emergency (Oct. 3, 1982).
Trials of Moslem fundamentalists (December 1982-March 1983).
Amnesty International report alleging torture (Feb. 14, 1983).
Outline of proposals for 1983–87 five-year plan (November 1982).
US-Egyptian relations, responses to reported Libyan threat to Sudan (February 1983).
Signs of rapprochement with Soviet Union (December 1982-March 1983).
Relations with France, arms supplies (January 1982-February 1983).
Other arms purchases, foreign developments (July 1982-March 1983).
Appointment of new Naval Forces Commander (March 30, 1983).
Mr Esmat Sadat, younger brother of the late President Anwar al-Sadat [assassinated on
Oct. 6, 1981], was convicted on charges of corruption in February 1983, and in the
following month two of the three ministers implicated in the trial proceedings were
dismissed in a cabinet reshuffle.
Mr Sadat (58) and two of his 15 sons, Galal and Talaat, were brought to trial on Dec. 18,
1982 before the Court of Ethics [established under a law passed in April 1980—see
30586 A]. Mr Sadat, a former bus driver who had amassed considerable wealth since the
introduction of the “Open Door” economic policy in 1974 [see page 26581], pleaded not
guilty on a total of 24 charges including corruption, tax evasion, fraud, illegal property
dealings and “influence-peddling”.
During the trial the prosecution alleged that he had amassed a family fortune of £ E
124,000,000 (equivalent to about US $ 175,000,000) and accused him of organizing
protection rackets, and of using blackmail and death threats against business rivals, whilst
establishing himself in a privileged position through his relationship with the late
President. Mr Sadat, who claimed that the trial was politically motivated to denigrate the
late President Sadat's reputation, denied reports of personal extravagance and asserted
that his family's combined assets amounted to only £ E 1,800,000.
On Feb. 14, 1983, Mr Sadat and his sons were found guilty on all charges and sentenced
to 12 months” imprisonment. The court also ruled that all Mr Sadat's assets and those of
his immediate family were 9i) to be confiscated for a period of five years.
The extent to which President Sadat himself was involved in his brother's activities was
uncertain, although he was known to have imposed restrictions on the latter's freedom of
travel, barring him from the port of Alexandria and the country's duty-free zones. It was
also reported that President Sadat had contemplated having his brother arrested in 1978
on drug smuggling charges, but had been dissuaded by family pressure.
In a wider context, the trial was seen by many political observers both inside and outside
Egypt as representing an effort by President Mubarak's administration to distance itself
from the previous regime. Dr Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, one of Egypt's leading
journalists and political commentators [detained under President Sadat's administration
until his release in November 1981see page 31499], referring to the trial, commented that
“it is not Esmat on trial, but the late President and his style of government”.
Other members of President Sadat's family had also come under investigation for alleged
corruption and misuse of influence, including his brother-in-law Mr Ali Safwat Raouf,
whilst on Jan. 17, 1983, Mr Abdel Halim Ramadan, leader of the defence counsel in the
trial of the alleged assassins of President Sadat [see pages 31494-95], initiated a court
action demanding cancellation of Cairo University degrees held by Mrs Jihan Sadat (the
late President's wife) and her son Mr Gamal Sadat, on the grounds that the degrees were
awarded because of their close relationship with the President rather than their academic
merit.
Three cabinet ministers were named in a statement by the court on March 10 as having
“made it possible for the Sadats to carry out illegal activity”; the statement added that
those named “should be investigated in accordance with the provisions of the law”.
President Mubarak issued a decree on March 13, 1983, replacing two of the three as
follows; (i) Dr Mohammad Nagi-Shatlah (Governor of Kafr el-Sheikh) was appointed
Minister of Supply and Internal Trade vice Mr Ahmed Ahmed Nouh, and (ii) Mr
Mohammad Sayed al-Gharout was appointed Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources
vice Mr Fuad Ibrahim Abu Zaghla. However Mr Soleiman Metwali Soleiman, the third
minister named by the court, retained his post as Transport Minister.
The same decree also appointed Mr Saad Maamoun (Governor of Cairo) as Minister of
State for Local Government, which portfolio had been assumed on a temporary basis in
August 1982 by Dr Ahmed Fuad Mohieddin, the Prime Minister, following the dismissal
from the Cabinet of Gen. Mohammad Nabawi Ismail [see page 31786].
The People's Assembly (Parliament) approved on Oct. 3, 1982, a decree extending the
state of emergency for a further year “as a precautionary measure to fight extremism”.
The emergency regulations, originally introduced following the assassination of President
Sadat in October 1981, permitted the security forces to detain suspects for an indefinite
period without a court hearing. The Government continued, however, to release detainees
who were no longer deemed to be a threat to the security of the state; a total of 553 were
released between Oct. 14 and Dec. 23, most of whom had been held under emergency
regulations since shortly after President Sadat's assassination [see page 31494].
On Dec. 4, 1982, the trial opened in Cairo of 300 Moslem fundamentalists on charges of
conspiring to overthrow the Government following the assassination of President Sadat
(two others having died in detention since the indictment in May 1982-.
The majority of those accused (20 of whom were being tried in absentia) were young
male students in their twenties and early thirties, many of them members of the Al Jihad
(Holy War) group, which had allegedly attempted to stage an uprising in the town of
Asyut immediately after the assassination.
Among the accused were Mr Abboub Zumur, who had been found guilty of complicity in
President Sadat's assassination and sentenced in March 1982 to life imprisonment with
hard labour [see pages 31254; 31495], and Prof. Omar Ahmed Rahman, a blind
theologian who had been one of the two defendants acquitted on that occasion [ibid.].
It was announced on March 24, 1983, that a further 176 alleged members of Al Jihad had
been indicted for trial, accused inter alia of (i) conspiring to kill senior government
ministers, (ii) attempting to re-establish the Al Jihad organization in Jordan and North
Yemen following the arrest of many of its members in late 1981 [see pages 31494 and
31786], and (iii) planning attacks on the Egyptian embassy in North Yemen and on Tura
prison, south of Cairo, where other members of Al Jihad were being held.
Allegations by many of the defendants at the commencement of the December trial, that
they had been tortured in detention and that confessions had been extracted from them
under duress, led to a court order on Dec. 6 for medical examinations of 260 defendants
(the authorities being reportedly anxious to demonstrate thereby the fairness of the trial,
some of which was broadcast live on Egyptian radio and television). Further allegations
of human rights violations were made in a report issued by Amnesty International in
London on Feb. 14, 1983.
According to Amnesty International, incidents of torture of political opponents of the
Egyptian Government had increased significantly during the past year, and the report
cited specific cases of alleged beatings and burning with cigarettes. Details of these
findings had been sent to the Egyptian Government during 1982, but Amnesty
International said that it had received no response to its requests for a meeting to discuss
the allegations.
The Egyptian economy, already adversely affected in 1981, continued to face difficulties
during 1982. A decline in income from the main sources of foreign exchange (notably
revenues from oil, the Suez canal, tourism and cotton, together with remittances from
expatriate workers) led to an overall reduction in exports of 2 per cent during the 1981–
82 fiscal year (July 1 to June 30), more than offsetting a reduction in imports during the
same period. The annual rate of inflation was estimated to be approximately 25 per cent,
notwithstanding the Government's policy of maintaining subsidies on basic commodities
(ibid.), the cost of which, according to President Mubarak, amounted to the equivalent of
£ 1,387 million for 1982 alone.
With total foreign debt equivalent to £ 9,054 million, debt servicing amounted to 7 1/2
per cent of the gross national product. Loans received from the World Bank in fiscal
1981–82 amounted to the equivalent of $ 465,000,000, and it was indicated that this
could rise to as much as $ 600,000,000 during the year 1982–83.
On Nov. 6, 1982, Dr Mohieddin delivered a major speech on economic policy to the
People's Assembly, outlining inter alia the Government's proposals for the 1983–87 fiveyear plan (which was subsequently approved by the Assembly in January 1983).
The four main themes of the plan were to increase total investment, “in a manner which
will ensure productive work opportunities for all”, to $3E 35,200 million in all of which
$3E 26,800 million was earmarked for the public sector; (ii) to “return balance to the
economy” by achieving 9 per cent annual growth rates in the agricultural, industry,
energy and construction sectors, whilst limiting the growth of the services sector; (iii) to
reduce the balance-of-payments deficit by increasing exports at an annual rate of 8.3 per
cent, while securing a 4 per cent annual reduction in imports; and (iv) to increase
emphasis on the “social dimension of development”, with particular stress on raising real
living standards.
President Mubarak paid an official visit to the United States on Jan. 26, 1983, holding a
series of talks with President Reagan and calling for increased US pressure for the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. He also reportedly requested unsuccessfully
that US aid to Egypt be increased to a level comparable with that received by Israel.
However, an agreement was reached by which a greater proportion of aid would be
allocated by the Egyptian Government as it saw fit, rather than earmarked for specific
projects by the US Administration.
US assistance for modifications to the Soviet-built Aswan High Dam, involving in
particular the replacement of the 12 turbines, had been announced on April 12, 1982. It
was envisaged that the improvements would lead to an increase of at least 10 per cent in
the power output of the dam, which currently provided almost two-thirds of Egypt's
electricity needs. [The dam had been inaugurated in 1971—see24478 B]]
However, evidence of tension between the two countries over the aid issue had emerged
during the autumn of 1982, when the presence of US advisers in Egypt had come under
criticism in the Egyptian press.
In particular, an article in the economic weekly Iktisadi (published by the semi-official
newspaper Al Ahram) accused the US Agency for International Development of being an
“American shadow government in Egypt” which served as “a tool for American
penetration”, whilst it was also alleged that US citizens in Egypt who were ostensibly
working on economic and social resch projects were in fact engaging in intelligencegathering activities.
Further signs of a strain in relations between Egypt and the USA emerged in February
1983, over what the former came to regard as US over-reaction to reports of a Libyan
threat to Sudan. [For the signing of a joint defence agreement between Egypt and Sudan
in 1976, and of the Charter of Integration in October 1982,see 27883 A; 31809 A.]
After President Mubarak had reportedly warned the US Government of an impending
Libyan attack on Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, four US AWACS (airborne warning
and control systems) aircraft were sent to Egypt on Feb. 17.
The AWACS aircraft (whose transfer was officially described by both US and Egyptian
officials as part of a routine training programme, although a report in The New York
Times of Feb. 18 quoted a senior US official as stating that the move was a direct result
of concern over Libyan intentions) reportedly confirmed that Libyan troops were being
concentrated on the Sudanese border, and that Libyan fighters had violated Sudanese
airspace. Egypt's own response to the perceived threat included despatching fighter
aircraft to airfields close to the Sudanese border, and a squadron of transport aircraft to
Aswan, whence troops could be flown at short notice to Khartoum.
However, Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials denied any knowledge of another US
decision (also taken on Feb. 17 and also described as part of training and routine
exercises) to send the aircraft carrier Nimitz to a position off the Libyan coast in the
region of the Gulf of Sirte (the focus of earlier conflict between the US and Libya in
August 1981 and March 1982—31188 A; 31680B).
An American television report, that the aircraft had been sent at President Mubarak's
request to deter a Libyan attack on Sudan, was denied on Feb. 19 by the Egyptian
Government. On Feb. 20, after it had been announced that the AWACS aircraft and the
Nimitz were to leave the area, an (unnamed) senior Egyptian Foreign Ministry official
reportedly stated that his Government was “furious” at the US military response, adding
that the situation in Sudan was not sufficiently critical to justify it. On the same day, Field
Marshal Mohammed Abdel-Karim Abu Ghazalah, the Deputy Prime Minister and
Defence Minister, stated that he could not “see any sign of a crisis, or of Libyan
aggression against Sudan”.
Signs of some improvement in Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union were marked by
the announcement on Feb. 15, 1983, by Gen. Kamel Hassan Ali, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Egypt was prepared to restore full ambassadorial
relations with the Soviet Union (the Soviet ambassador to Egypt having been expelled by
the then President Sadat—see page 31253], so long as the latter undertook “not to violate
diplomatic norms”; Gen. Ali added on March 23 that such a restoration could take place
during 1983.
The Egyptian State Prosecutor General had on Dec. 14, 1982, ordered the release of 17
people detained since September 1981 on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. During
January 1983, several informal contacts between Egyptian and Soviet representatives had
been reported, including a meeting between Mr Anatoly Gromyko (the son of Mr Andrei
Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister) and Mr Osama al-Baz, an adviser to President
Mubarak; a report the same month in the weekly magazine Al-Mussawar claimed that the
Egyptian Government was willing to accept an increase in the number of diplomatic staff
at the Soviet embassy. On Jan. 26 it was announced that 66 Soviet technicians (who were
amongst those expelled by President Sadat in 1981-ibid.) would return to assist with a
variety of industrial projects, including the maintenance of the Aswan High Dam.
A number of agreements covering Egyptian purchases of combat aircraft, naval vessels
and other military equipment were concluded during 1982 with France, Spain and China.
Under an agreement signed in January 1982 during a visit to Cairo by M Charles Hernu
and M Claude Cheysson, the French Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs
respectively, France would supply Egypt with 20 Mirage 2000 combat aircraft, a joint
working group would be established on defence co-operation, and a number of Egyptian
officers, pilots and technicians would receive training in France. (The Egyptian Air Force
already included 60 French Mirage 5 aircraft, as well as Gazelle helicopters and Crotale
surface-to-air missiles, whilst under an earlier agreement Egyptian technicians were
assembling 30 French-designed Alpha Jet trainers.)
On Nov. 24–26, 1982, President Francois Mitterrand of France led a delegation on an
official visit to Cairo for discussions covering inter alia the Middle East and the situation
in Lebanon [see 31905 A; 32034 A], as well as the crisis in the Organization of African
Unity. Further talks between President Mitterrand and President Mubarak took place in
Paris on Feb. 3–4, 1983; Lt.-Gen. Abdel an-Nabi Hafiz, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian
Armed Forces, also visited France in February 1983 for further discussions on matters of
military co-operation.
In July 1982, Egypt concluded a major arms purchase agreement with Spain, providing
for the supply of naval vessels, including two corvettes, military trucks and armoured
personnel carriers. The agreement, which represented Spain's biggest ever military export
order, was worth the equivalent of £ 581,000,000.
Following a visit to Cairo by Mr Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese Prime Minister, it was
announced on Dec. 21, 1982, that China would supply Egypt with “60 to 80” F-7
fighters. The two countries had also reached an agreement in October by which China
would supply two Soviet-designed Romeo class diesel-electric submarines, as well as
providing technicians to assist in the refitting of similar submarines already in the
Egyptian Navy. [A military co-operation agreement had been signed between China and
Egypt in April 1976—see 27808]
Other developments in foreign relations between December 1982 and March 1983
included (i) an agreement announced in New Delhi on Dec. 1 at the conclusion of a twoday visit to India by President Mubarak, providing for the creation of a joint ministerial
committee to accelerate bilateral co-operation; (ii) a visit by President Mubarak to West
Germany on Dec. 13–14, during which he held talks with the Federal Chancellor, Dr
Helmut Kohl, on the subject of bilateral economic relations and the Middle East situation,
in the course of which it was reported that West Germany's aid to Egypt would be less
during 1983 than the previous year, due to the economic recession; (iii) a five-day visit to
Cairo by President Eanes of Portugal, this being the first occasion on which a Portuguese
head of state had visited Egypt; and (iv) a visit to London on March 2–3, 1983, by an
Egyptian delegation including President Mubarak, Gen. Ali and Dr Boutros BoutrosGhali, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to discuss Middle East peace initiatives
with British government and opposition leaders.
On March 30, 1983, a presidential decree was issued appointing Rear Adml. Mohammed
Tawfiq Jadd as Commander of the Naval Forces, in place of Vice-Adml. Mohammed Ali
Mohammed.—(International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Times - Guardian - BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - New York Times Neue Zürcher Zeitung)(Prev. rep. 31786 A; Arab-0Israeli conflict 31905 A, 32034A;
Sudan 31809 A))