Chahnaz Kherfi
The Egyptian liberal constitutional party during the inter-war (1919-1937)
Abstract
The purpose of my research is to study of the group of actors and intellectuals who
created the Liberal Constitutional Party in Egypt during the inter-war years. My research
is not only an analysis of a political party but also a group of actors. It is a sociohistorical approach to this group: its evolution and progress, its social role and function in
Egyptian society during the inter-war years. I want to evaluate why and how this group
sought to import the liberal European political “model” to Egypt and what sort of
political and intellectual influence the group had during the period. I selected the period
from 1919 through the 1930s because I would like to analyse the genesis of this group
and party. It should be noted that many intellectuals who would later create Liberal
Constitutional Party belonged to the Wafd (delegation in Arabic) in the midst of the
independence movement in 1919. In 1930 some Liberal Constitutionalists began to write
on Islam not in critic terms, but contrarily employing an extremely apologetic view of the
period of Muhammad (for example Hayat Muhammad Muhammad’s life, written by
M.H.Haykal,).1 Numerous interpretations still attempt to explain this change. Was it a
real "crisis of orientation" (Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community...), a
"shift" (Charles D. Smith, The shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects...) or an
incorporation and an instrumentalist use of Islamic dimension by Liberal constitutional as
a defensive mode of struggle against Wafd accusations of atheism?
My problematic explores the motivation and belief system that lead this group to
vehemently defend, even in the context of an independence struggle, the importing and
the application of the European ‘model’ in a political and social context for Egypt? How
did they construct this model? How did this group legitimate its project in the Egyptian
context?
1
Prior to this they believed that Islam should be relegated to the private sphere. Religion should not
interfere with the raison and political dimension.
Is very interesting to see the impact of the action and ideas of this group and party in
Egyptian collective memory after the revolution of 1952 and today. The existence today
of a neo-wafd party (wafd al-gadid) that connects itself to the old and famous wafd party
(in many articles the prefix neo disappears today). Therefore, is very interesting
particularly if we examine the composition for example of this party for the most part
landowners and lawyers (cf. Wahid ‘Abd al-Magid, Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, April 25th
1988). Even if the Liberal Constitutional Party no longer exists, we advance the
hypothesis that some ideas and policies are of continued relevance. It is remarkable to
note the nostalgia for an Egyptian liberal age, a great period of intellectual and potential
development. Although the Liberal Constitutional Party has apparently been forgotten,
some of its ideas remain relevant in contemporary political practices and projects.
I
The European Model
The European referent between yesterday and today: Model or universal archetype?
The European model seems to be imperative, as a right of entry into modernity with all
this term means : technical development, political development, social welfare, individual
liberties and so on. The frontier between the notion of model and universal archetype is
very tenuous even if this notion implies an externality and therefore a plurality of social
models. The occidental model is implicitly perceived as the unique one. The notion of
model moves implicitly to the notion of universal pattern since is regarded as the only
credible one.
What is the reason for this shift from “model” to universal archetype? Why is the
European model is so "omnipotent"? The response is of course linked with European
history. History in terms of internal development and in term of European propagation
beyond its borders. But, European self-representation of specificity isn’t particular.
Indeed, others societies can have the same representation. The link between an exclusive
and therefor sole legitimate referent isn’t the unique to European societies. Muslim
expansion occurred on the same resorts and motivation concerning the veracity of the
religious model. More recently, Soviet domination of its neighbours border countries was
constructed on the similar idea of the exclusive model. So, where is the fundamental
differentiation?
The diffusion of the European model was enforced by modern technology. The reference
to religion or to an ideology was present but no so primordial. Its diffusion and the
imposition were clearly conducted by technological instrument. It permitted the
development and preservation of European economical interests. It was a real element of
differentiation, of characterisation of Occidental power. By the end of nineteenth century,
the desire wasn’t really the possession of the occidental secret of advance given that
technology, the key of its domination was palpable, the desire was rather the way to
control and reproduce this technology. The main objective of many non-European rulers
at the end of nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth was by the
acquisition of technology to emancipate them from the European ascendancy. The import
was supposed to be only a tool.
In the earlier era the importation process in Egypt (Muhammad 'Ali politic) concerned
mainly skill, technology (military and industrial techniques). Regarding domains in
which Occidental powerful were patent. Then the shift to the importation of other
technological resources proceeded rapidly, especially via education. The main target was
the command of European know-how, the "instruction manual" of its “superiority.” It
was necessary to form new generations for this project, to send students to Europe to
import and diffuse European knowledge. These students involved in new disciplines (not
only technical ones) especially Humanities: philosophy, law and literature. These
students accorded a real importance to their task. They realised how their position was
innovative. They imposed themselves as the ‘predicators’ of a European modernity.
The shift from the notion of model to the notion of universal pattern came out as a result
of a common incomprehension, misunderstanding on both sides; European and nonEuropean. Indeed, for the first borrowers the occidental model was just a way to reach
progress. Impermeability between the model and the users seems evident. They don’t
perceive how this importation implies hybridisation and compromise. For Europeans,
progress liberty and other liberal notions are universal but at the same time these notions
are just a European creation.
The European “model” appears universal and at the same time reversible. The states,
democracy, the notion of frontier, the positive law appear to be valid for all societies.
But, if we examine the genesis of these notions we realise that they developed in Europe.
For example as N. Elias demonstrates in The Civilising Process, the occidental notion of
frontier was elaborated in feudal period in Europe. Furthermore there were other social
organisations, others relations between political actors and society beside the Occidental
model. For example, in the Ottoman Empire, the notion of Millet means that the main
reference was religion but not territory.
Were these notions exported through the colonial administration? The capitulation system
for example is an exportation of a universal model but also the recognition of the
difference between European people and the others. The process of exportation gave way
to to the process of importation. Two references were taken as a caution and an implicit
affirmation of Occidental universality. The first are technology and literature. The
movement of reading and translating of many books written by European intellectuals
since the French revolution is very remarkable. In the cross between the technology and
the literature there is science. This discipline formulates universal laws.
Occident was very attractive and fascinating for the non-European intellectuals who had
been in Europe. Hence, in Egypt the writing of al-Afghani, of Muhamad 'Abduh, and
later, Lutfi as-Sayyid, M. Husayn Haykal, Taha Husayn are very elogious. The
fascination that produces science in mind of the non-European intellectuals is I think
related with the role and the specificity of scientific actors in Europe. Scientists
paradoxically doubt and at the same claim universals laws by using a human faculty;
reason. This faculty doesn’t allow for an intellectual who is impregnated by Islamic
precepts in which science is valorous and reason has to submit to the divine law. We can
appreciate this fascination through the impact of the evolution theory of Darwin on some
Muslim intellectuals. It’s also very remarkable that the first and most important reformers
were ulama (religious men) cf. Muhammad 'Abduh, 'Ali 'Abd el Razzeq for example.
One explication is that at this time the intellectuals came from the religious was because
it was the sole educated group. It was also because of the suspicion towards the use of
reason in this traditional education and also by the place of science in Islamic society.
Science had long been developed by Arabic civilisation (astronomical, mathematics). It
was without any complex and with the certitude to act in coherence with their own
precepts that some Egyptian, ulama and then many intellectuals expected the synthesis
between the European model and the universal pattern. The link was the use of reason.
The logic’s of transfer and the fields of transfer
The logic’s of the state in terms of transfer differ from the individual logic (cf. B Badie,
l'Etat importé) even if it can recover some times the same motivation and expression. For
example about the affirmation of territorial nationalism. Synthesis and frictions exist
between these two approaches. The main domains of transfer are normative and formal
organisation (law and state). We want to specify that Egypt isn't an isolated case. The
importation of the European “model” by non-European elite was also undertaken in the
Ottoman Empire, in Iran and in Asian countries such as China and Japan in the same era.
But what about the Liberal Constitutional Party’s project for Egypt and about their quest
for political position in Egyptian society? What model did they propose for Egypt? They
refereed in term of thought and literature to many European intellectuals and politicians
such as Le Play, A. Comte, S. Mill, Darwin, Rousseau, Guizot, Taine (not only liberal
thinkers). What is the link and coherence in terms of thought and project between these
references? Their project was it really liberal or a way to access political position as a
new elite in Egypt? The membership of these actors in the "enlightened" elite is
constructed on their common experience of Europe, their social origin and their career
path. Their liberal project was the social and political motor of this group. The
importation of the European political model, critical reason and the conceptual tools
valued in Europe would permit them to access and to control part of power handled by
the traditional elite: ulama and turco circassien. Liberal Constitutional actors valorise the
European mode of individualisation. They have a non-legitimate discourse regard to the
traditional elite especially the ulama and also mass society. Thus they had trouble
situating themselves. Their own process and ‘logique de distinction’(analysed by P.
Bourdieu), produce marginality of the group since most of Egyptian society couldn’t
recognise itself in the Party. The paradox is that they did not have an explicit aristocratic
position, which implies this gap. They balance between their landowner bourgeois origins
and their intermediate elite position (lawyers and journalists for the most part). They
propose for example, in the constitution of 1923, universal suffrage. This consideration
leads them to tempt those who they despise (masses) or to contradict their own liberal
precepts in defending autocracy and revoking the constitution.
II
Egyptian Receptacle
Egypt during the 1920 in search of identity. Egypt was balanced between the Ottoman
experience and British control; should it remaining inside the Ottoman Empire (the
position of Mustapha Kamel) or claim complete independence? Its very interesting to
examine how the reference to the European model, and to some extent to the British
political organisation, is legitimatised by Liberal Constitutional Party members? How is
this reference compatible with the claim of Egyptian independence? Egyptian
intellectuals during this time try to define Egypt’s identity even if they want to adopt the
European “model”; They explore Egyptian pharaonic history as opposed to its Arabic
culture as a manner to distinguish Egypt from the others Arabic countries. Some others
take into account the geographic situation and the historical background of Egypt as a
Mediterranean country in order to legitimise the European link. They affirm that
Mediterranean sea is a common substrate with Europe. Taha Husayn develops this idea in
his book The Future of Culture in Egypt (Mustaqbal al-Taqafa fi Misr) He refers to
ancient Egypt; its link with Greek and Roman civilisation.
What about the Islamic dimension: Was it a limit or a political tool?
Islam is perceived by the Liberal constitutionals as a tradition limiting progress; a
religion dominated by superstitions. Furthermore, because the ulama didn’t want to
introduce reason as a critical tool to study religious texts, the Liberal Constitutionals
thought of Islamic education as more a way of regress than progress. For them, Islam had
to be limited to the private sphere, limited in the training and excluded from political
organisation. (Cf. The book written by `Àli `Àbd al Razeq, The Political Foundation in
Islam (al usul al-hikm fi islam).)
But, the Liberal Constitutionals were due for many reasons (a search of legitimacy, their
struggle with the Wafd and the king) to take into account the Islamic dimension of their
discourse not only in negative terms but also as a specificity of Egyptian society. Hence
they began to write on Islam during the 1930s on Mohammed’s life, on the era of the first
califes. In the same time they had to confront themselves with the Wafd accusation of
atheism and the emergence of new actors and groups which reacted against the occidental
project (the Muslim brothers, the Young Egypt )
The liberal constitutionals project as a practice
Between thought and action, where do the Liberal Constitutional situate themselves? We
have to analyse the gap between their discourse and their political action. We also have to
show the incoherence and the contradictions as a result of their opponent position. We
want to examine their passionate (attractive and repulsive) relation with the Wafd party
due to the similarity of their political and school career, to their political project but also
due to their different impression upon Egyptian public opinion. The relations between the
two parties were essentially conflictual but at times they were allied. We also have to
show their concrete political achievements.
Conclusion
In conclusion we can say that this research on the Liberal Constitutional Party entails
much information on the Egyptian political framework. I think that the representation of
an European model and of importation remains relevant, not as it was in 1920 but today
an example is the European Union’s “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Project”. As such
it is interesting for me to examine the Liberal Constitutional Party experience: a
construction of an ideal Europe for Egypt.