June 2010
SECESSION AND GREAT POWER RECOGNITION DATASET
(1931-2000)
Version 2.0
Bridget Coggins
A Note to Users:
This is the codebook for the Secession and Great Power Recognition Dataset, Version 2.0.
Users of the data should use the following citation:
Coggins, Bridget (2011) Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of
States from Secessionism. International Organization 65:3 (July), 433-67.
Comments or inquiries regarding this dataset should be directed to:
Bridget.Coggins@Dartmouth.Edu.
Definition of a Secessionist Movement:
A secessionist movement is a nationalist group that is attempting to separate from an
existing state in order to form a newly independent state.
A secessionist movement is operationally defined as any group that formally declared
independence before 1931 and continued on through 1931 or that began after 1931. In order
to be considered a secessionist movement the group must have all of the following
characteristics:
1) a formal declaration of full-independence and intended separation from their
home state (in many cases these declarations are UDIs, or unilateral declarations
of independence, signifying that they do not (yet) have the consent of the former
governing state),
2) a national flag,
3) a claim to both territory and population over which the movement presides, and
4) the movement must last at least 7 (24 hour) days, include at least 100 individuals
and claim at least 100 square meters of territory.
A movement is not considered to be secessionist if it has any of the following
characteristics:
1) it proclaims independence short of national self-government (e.g. autonomy
within a state government, independence from other colonial territories short of
independence from the colonial government, or other internal civil rights
movements).
2) it claims jurisdiction over the entirety of the home state as in the cases of
revolution or coup d‘etat.1
3) it attempts to join another pre-existing state (this is irredentism).2 In addition,
irredentism is often initiated by the state government hoping to annex a portion
of another state, rather than by the individuals within the territory itself.3
4) a federation of which it is a part formally dissolves without any contest. One of
the two (or more) parties must desire unity under a governing regime in order for
a secession to take place.
5) it does not declare independence, but instead is granted it unilaterally (as in the
case of the South African Bantustans or the Japanese puppet state of
Manchukuo).4
6) a claim to territory is made without a population (e.g. artificial/platform islands)
or a claim to population is made without a claim to territory (e.g. pirate states).5
An attempt to secede is considered to have begun on the earlier date of any of the following
acts:
1) formal declaration of independence
2) violent conflict between a group and the home state begins with the stated
demand of full independence for the group. A formal declaration of
independence must follow. Coding is retroactive in this case.
3) non-violent action is taken on behalf of the secessionists with the stated demand
of full independence from the home state. Some examples of this might include
the formation of separatist political parties and their participation in elections
(e.g. the Quebecois in Canada or Lega Nord in Italy) or peaceful public
Consistent with Fearon and Laitin (1999) this dataset asserts that the important distinction between civil
conflicts lies not in the ethno-religious versus ideological dimension that many scholars use, but rather between
wars of autonomy and secession and wars for control of the state apparatus as in elite or social revolutions.
2 The two exceptions to this rule are the cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland’s separation from the UK.
Although many within Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) demanded independence in order that a later association with
Greece might be achieved, independence was required prior to a voluntary association. In this case the demand
was not straightforwardly irredentist, but rather secessionist. Northern Ireland is now classified as a secession
because the Irish government has dropped its claim to the territory.
3 Horowitz in Moore (Ed.)(1998)
4 For the purposes of this project, the emergence of a new state agreed to by a colonial government prior to its
declaration of independence or demand for independence will be not be considered in order to remain true to
the topic. Colonial units that unilaterally declare independence will be considered attempts at secession,
however.
5 These criteria are essential to distinguishing real claims to independence from insincere claims like those based
upon tax and/or legal escapism; for example, the Kingdom of Minerva. Established in 1972, Minerva was
envisioned by its libertarian founders as a taxless nation. It was located on a Pacific reef off the coast of Tonga
only visible above water at low tide. Its founders built up the state’s landmass, minted approximately 10,500
Republic of Minerva, $35 dollar coins (Dispatch, 6/19/2005), and established a cabinet. Unfortunately, Minerva
was invaded and occupied by Tonga, which had claimed the “land” for itself. Beginning in 2003, a group based
in South Carolina revived the Minervan independence cause, changed the governmental structure to a
principality (22 year-old law student, Prince Calvin presides over the government-in-exile), and they now sell
“Free Minerva” t-shirts and memorabilia on-line. Though the group has an admittedly impressive Web site,
Minerva has no population and therefore does not qualify as a secessionist movement. (Additional curiosity
may be sated at minervanet.org.)
1
demonstration (e.g. Tibetans in China). A formal declaration of independence
must follow. Coding is retroactive in this case.
A secessionist movement is considered to have ended when any of the following occurs:
1) it formally renounces its claim of independence. The date of renouncement is the
end date.
2) it agrees to a settlement short of full-independence implying the renouncement
of its secessionist ambition. The date of agreement is the end date.
3) five years pass without reported secessionist activity (protests, militarized
disputes with the home government, negotiations, external appeals for support,
etc.). The date of the last recorded activity is the end date.
4) the home government (or occupying government) formally agrees to grant the
secessionists independence or grants a plebiscite to determine independence. The
date of the agreement is the end date where independence is granted. The date of
the referendum, if in favor of independence, is the end date. If the vote is not in
favor of independence, an end date will not be assigned unless one of the
qualities above also obtains.
Within the dataset, abbreviations in captions correspond to political parties or activist
organizations associated with the secessionist movement. Captioned words may also
correspond to current place names of states or regions or to particular ethnic or regional
groups associated with the movement.
Definition of Great Power:
The definition of great power employed in this data comes from the Correlates of War
(COW) identification of "major power" states:
At one end of the status or power spectrum, a political entity may have most of the
earmarks of statehood but not qualify for system membership, or it may merit inclusion
in the system but remain peripheral enough in activity, power, or importance to fail of
inclusion in the central system prior to 1920. At the other end of the spectrum, all
students of world politics use, or appreciate the relevance of, the concept of "major
power." Sharing that appreciation and recognizing its relevance for establishing a wide
range of war data categories, we add this smallest sub-system to our classification
scheme.6
Operationally, Great Powers appearing within the timeframe for this dataset were:
Great Britain (1931-2000)
United States (1931-2000)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1931-1991)
which continued as Russia (1991-2000)
More information is available in the COW appendix: "State System Membership List, Frequently Asked
Questions (Version 2002.1) at http://www.correlatesofwar.org or in Small, Melvin and J. David Singer (1982)
Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
6
China (1950-2000)
France (1931-1940) and (1945-2000)
Germany (1931-1945) and (1991-2000)
Italy (1931-1943)
Japan (1931-45) and (1991-2000)
Variables in the Secession and Great Power Recognition Datasets
Domestic Data
1. case: The unique dataset I.D. number for the secessionist conflict. There are 256
secessionist movements.
2. name: The longhand name for the conflict dyad. Where a conflict between a secessionisthome state dyad recurs or where more than one distinct secessionist movement exists within
the same ethnic or geographic region, then roman numerals serve to distinguish the
movements (e.g. China-Tibet I, China-Tibet II) or place name in parentheses (e.g. FranceFrench West Africa (Guinea), France-French West Africa (Mauritania)).
3. homestate: The state from which the secessionist movement is attempting to secede. In
some cases a single secessionist movement attempts to secede from a number of home states
as in Kurdistan. Each secessionist-home state dyad is coded as a separate instance of
secession (e.g. Iraq-Kurds, Turkey-Kurds, etc.) because it is theoretically possible for one
group to succeed in its goal of independence while another does not (or fail or compromise
while the other does not). Coded using the Correlates of War (COW) country code for the
home state.7
4. cow: The three letter Correlates of War Data abbreviation for the home state (actor1).
5. ccode1: The three number Correlates of War Data country code for the home state
(actor1).
6. year: The calendar year for which observations were coded.
7. distinct: A variable indicating the extent of linguistic and religious differences between the
secessionist group and the home state majority. If the two share a language family, the
indicator is coded 0; if different, then 1.8 Religious dissimilarity compares the majority’s
religion to the secessionists’.9 If the two shared a religion, the indicator is coded 0; if
different, then 1. The indicators were then summed together.
CCODE corresponds to the Correlates of War Country Code for the home state where available. For coding
rules see Correlates of War 2 Project. (2003) “State System Membership List, v2002.1.” http://cow2.la.psu.edu
8 Language families, of which there are 128 worldwide, were identified using the Ethnologue database (Gordon
2005). If the majority did not share a common language, the national language or language of government was
used.
9 Differences were judged among the five major world religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and
Judaism. This operationalization is close, but not identical, to Huntington’s measure of civilization (1993). An
additional religion variable, measuring smaller distinctions like those between Sunni, Shia and Sufi Islam or
7
0) group shares both language and religion with majority
1) group is distinct from the majority on one dimension: religion or language
2) group is distinct from the majority on two dimensions: religion and language
8. mar: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionist group is found within the
Minorities at Risk (MAR) data in a given year.10 "At risk" minority groups are those that
number at least 100,000 or constitute 1% of their home state’s total population, suffer
discrimination due to their minority status, and are politically mobilized in order to advance
or defend the group’s interests.11 1) Minority at Risk, 0) Not a Minority at Risk
9. colony: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionist movement is a colony of
the home state during each conflict year. Operationally, a colony is defined as a jurisdiction
(people and territory) governed by a state or agents of a state which is neither geographically
contiguous nor within 100 miles of its shoreline. Secondary secessions, i.e. secession
attempts where the home state is a former colony itself, are not coded as colonies even
though they reside within units that once were. Emblematically, Bangladesh’s secession from
Pakistan and Biafra’s attempted separation from Nigeria were not considered anti-colonial.
1) Colony 0) Not a colony
10: ethnicfed: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionists have a state within an
ethno-federal union during each conflict year.12 EthnicFed follows Philip Roeder’s (2007)
coding but drops all colonial units. For example, Slovenia was a member of an ethnic
federation, Yugoslavia, whereas Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. 1) Ethno-federal
union member, 0) Not an ethno-federal union member
11. vlevel: The level of violence experienced annually in a given secessionist-home state
dyad. The variable comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). In a given year, the variable codes
0) no armed conflict
1) between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths
2) at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.13
Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and other forms of Christianity was also created, but was not statistically
significant.
10 Minorities at Risk Project 2008
11 For additional criteria, see the Minorities at Risk website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp.
Although it is possible for a MAR group to be politically advantaged by its status, this was not the case for the
groups in this study.
12 Roeder (2007) considers colonies to be a form of ethnic segment state. Unfortunately, combining the two
types of units in this way raises construct validity problems. Colonial administrations were not typically
representative of the people, therefore the posited theoretical mechanism underlying segment state emergence,
namely disproportionate bargaining leverage with the state, can not function in the manner it does in ethnic
federations. Further, alternative explanations for the disproportionate success of anti-colonial groups and
ethno-federal groups exist, distinct from Roeder’s, making them equifinal. Consequently, this analysis treats the
two as distinct.
13 UCDP/PRIO 2008.
12. warwin: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement defeats
its home state in a war for independence. Taken from the COW intrastate war data. 1)
Secessionist war win, 0) Conflict is ongoing, ends in a stalemate, or ends in a loss.14
13. UN: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement becomes a
full member of the United Nations (UN). 1) UN membership, 0) Not a member
14. cowsys: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement
becomes a member of the COW System Membership Data. 1) COW membership, 0) Not a
member
International Data
1. case: The unique dataset I.D. number for the secessionist conflict.
2. name: The longhand name for the conflict dyad. Where a conflict between a secessionisthome state dyad recurs or where more than one distinct secessionist movement exists within
the same ethnic or geographic region, then roman numerals serve to distinguish the
movements (e.g. China-Tibet I, China-Tibet II) or place name in parentheses (e.g. FranceFrench West Africa (Guinea), France-French West Africa (Mauritania)).
3. actor1: The state from which the secessionist movement is attempting to secede (referred
to as the home state in the domestic dataset). In some cases a single secessionist movement
attempts to secede from a number of home states as in Kurdistan. Each secessionist-home
state dyad is coded as a separate instance of secession (e.g. Iraq-Kurds, Turkey-Kurds, etc.)
because it is theoretically possible for one group to succeed in its goal of independence while
another does not (or fail or compromise while the other does not).
4. cow: The three letter Correlates of War Data abbreviation for the home state (actor1).
5. ccode1: The three number Correlates of War Data country code for the home state
(actor1). 15
6. year: The calendar year for which observations were coded.
7. ccode2: The three number Correlates of War Data country code for the great power state
(actor2). 16
8. dyadid: A unique ID number for each secessionist conflict-great power dyad.
Secessionist conflicts often remain ongoing after combat ceases.
ccode corresponds to the Correlates of War Country Code for the home state where available. For coding
rules see Correlates of War 2 Project. (2003) “State System Membership List, v2002.1.” http://cow2.la.psu.edu
16 ccode corresponds to the Correlates of War Country Code for the home state where available. For coding
rules see Correlates of War 2 Project. (2003) “State System Membership List, v2002.1.” http://cow2.la.psu.edu
14
15
9. colony: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionist movement is a colony of
the home state during each conflict year. Operationally, a colony is defined as a jurisdiction
(people and territory) governed by a state or agents of a state which is neither geographically
contiguous nor within 100 miles of its shoreline. Secondary secessions, i.e. secession
attempts where the home state is a former colony itself, are not coded as colonies even
though they reside within units that once were. Emblematically, Bangladesh’s secession from
Pakistan and Biafra’s attempted separation from Nigeria were not considered anti-colonial.
1) Colony 0) Not a colony
10: ethnicfed: A dummy variable indicating whether the secessionists have a state within an
ethno-federal union during each conflict year.17 EthnicFed follows Philip Roeder’s (2007)
coding but drops all colonial units. For example, Slovenia was a member of an ethnic
federation, Yugoslavia, whereas Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. 1) Ethno-federal
union member, 0) Not an ethno-federal union member
11. vlevel: The level of violence experienced annually in a given secessionist-home state
dyad. The variable comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). In a given year, the variable codes
0) no armed conflict
1) between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths
2) at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.18
12. warwin: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a secessionist movement defeats
its home state in a war for independence. Taken from the COW intrastate war data. 1)
Secessionist war win, 0) Conflict is ongoing, ends in a stalemate, or ends in a loss.19
13. challengers: A count of the number of ongoing secessionist challenges against the given
Great Power (actor2) in a given year. Data collected from this dataset.
14. challengeh: A dummy variable indicating whether a Great Power (actor2) has an
unusually high number of secessionist challengers during a given year. The variable was
created by taking the number of secessionist challenges for each Great Power home state in
each year of the dataset and coding 1 for cases in the 90th percentile and above, which
included those Powers with between 10 and 21 challengers in a conflict year. 1) Unusually
high number of challenges, 0) Not an unusually high number of challenges
15. vchallenge: A variable indicating the cumulative level of violence reached in a Great
Power's (actor2) domestic secessionist challenges in a given year. The intensity of violence
Roeder (2007) considers colonies to be a form of ethnic segment state. Unfortunately, combining the two
types of units in this way raises construct validity problems. Colonial administrations were not typically
representative of the people, therefore the posited theoretical mechanism underlying segment state emergence,
namely disproportionate bargaining leverage with the state, can not function in the manner it does in ethnic
federations. Further, alternative explanations for the disproportionate success of anti-colonial groups and
ethno-federal groups exist, distinct from Roeder’s, making them equifinal. Consequently, this analysis treats the
two as distinct.
18 UCDP/PRIO 2008.
19 Secessionist conflicts often remain ongoing after combat ceases.
17
was measured by summing the levels of violence from the PRIO dataset for each Great
Power’s domestic secessionist challenges in a given year.20 The resulting variable ranges from
0 (none) to 6 (violence equivalent to 3 full-scale civil wars).
16. cwmid: A dummy variable indicating whether a Great Power (actor2) and a home state
(actor1) initiate a militarized interstate dispute during a given year. The variable is taken from
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data. 1) MID initiated, 0) No MID initiated
17. mutualdem: A dummy variable indicating that both the Great Power (actor2) and the
home state (actor1) were stable democracies during a given year. The variable is derived
from scores provided by the Polity IV Data. Consistent with accepted practice, states with
Polity scores above 7 were considered democracies. 1) Mutual democracy, 0) Not mutual
democracy.21
18. mutualaut: A dummy variable indicating that both the Great Power (actor2) and the
home state (actor1) were stable autocracies during a given year. The variable is derived from
scores provided by the Polity IV Data. Consistent with accepted practice, states with Polity
scores below -7 were considered autocracies. 1) Mutual autocracy, 0) Not mutual
autocracy.22
19. prec: A dummy variable indicating that at least one Great Power had previously granted
recognition to a given secessionist movement. Collected from this dataset. 1) Previous
recognition, 0) No previous recognition
20. precs: A count variable indicating the number of Great Power recognitions granted to a
given secessionist movement as of that conflict year.
21. gprecpro: A variable measuring the proportion of the total number of Great Powers that
have granted a secessionist movement recognition as of a given conflict year.
22. recyear: A dummy variable indicating the year in which a given Great Power (actor2)
grants formal recognition to a given secessionist movement.
No armed conflict (0), 25-999 battle-related deaths (1), 1,000 or more battle-related deaths (2). The intensity
of violence measure is rather crude. For example, two conflicts causing three hundred battle-related deaths
would be coded identically to one conflict with over 1,000 battle-related deaths. Unfortunately, no better
algorithm is readily available.
21 One or both of the states had Polity scores between -10 and 6, -66, -77, or -88.
22 One or both of the states had Polity scores between -6 and 10, -66, -77, or -88.
20