Rokkansenteret – Bergen
Migrasjon og velferdsstat 19.10.2007
Does Immigration undermine the
Solidarity of the Welfare state?
Or Does the Welfare State mobilise
Solidarity with Immigrants?
Jørgen Goul Andersen
Aalborg University
www.ccws.dk
1. Culture hypothesis:
Cultural homogeneity = precondition of
welfare solidarity (Alesina & Glaeser 2004)
Europe becomes similar to US
Deservingness criteria (van Oorschot 2006):
• Control
• Need
• Identity
• Attitude
• Reciprocity
2. Alternative: Institutional hypothesis:
• Institutions matter
• Temporal order matters
1. Institutions matter
→ Type of welfare state matters
• residual welfare state targeted to the poor
= vulnerable (welfare recipients not like ”us”)
• institutional welfare state covering social
risks and providing services for the entire
population = much less vulnerable
2. Temporal order matters
→ What comes first: Welfare state or
cultural diversity?
• may be difficult to build a welfare state
• far less difficult to maintain a welfare state
• may even mobilize solidarity with immigrants
• (But could also become less inclusive
→ welfare state chauvinism?)
Taylor-Gooby (2005):
No direct link between ethnic/racial diversity
and social spending
Politics is intervening (mediating) variable
And Politics is crystallized as welfare
institutions
Denmark as test case
“worst case”:
• Unsuccessful labour market integration
• Political mobilisation of anti-immigration
sentiments
• Attitudes to immigration at least as important for
political identities and party choice as economic
left-right position in 2001 and 2005.
• → If solidarity deteriorates anywhere, it should
deteriorate in Denmark
Worst case: Electoral support for
the Progress Party and the Danish people’s Party, 1973-2005.
Percentages
Tax protest party
Populist party
Anti-immigration party
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005
Danish
People’s
Party
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.4
12.0
13.3
Progress
Party
15.9
13.6
14.6
11.0
8.9
3.6
4.8
9.0
6.4
6.4
2.4
0.6
-
New
Right
Total
15.9
13.6
14.6
11.0
8.9
3.6
4.8
9.0
6.4
6.4
9.8
12.6
13.3
Percentages mentioning immigration among most important problems politicians should handle
Per cent
1971-1984
0
Feb.1986
4
Sep.1986
26
Aug.1987
11
Sep.1987 (election)
8
May 1988 (election)
3
May 1989
4
June 1989
5
Dec.1990 (election)
7
Oct.1994 (election)
17
March 1998 (election)
35
Feb.2000
38
Feb.2001
32
Nov.2001 (pre-election)
44
Nov.2001 (election)
51
Nov.2003
21
Nov.2005 (pre-election)
24
Does multiculturalism lead
to erosion of solidarity?
• Pure Culture argument: Multiculturalism → negative
impact on solidarity
• Culture/institutions argument: Differences in work ethics undermine system with weak economic incentives?
• Rational self interest argument: Competition over jobs?
Welfare?
• ”Collateral damage”/Demobilisation argument: Indirect
effect via mobilisation of neoliberal anti-immigration parties
and demobilisation of labour movement (Kymlicka)
Institutional hypothesis: None of these.
But institutional hypothesis does not rule out negative attitudes
towards foreigners
Welfare state attitudes in Denmark,
1994-2007. Percentages
A: Social reforms have gone
too far
B: Social reforms maintained
A: Prefer tax relief
B: Prefer improved welfare
services
Agree
mostly
with A
Agree
mostly
with B
Don’t
Know
1994
26
63
9
100
35
1998
30
63
7
100
33
2000
25
69
6
100
44
2001
34
58
8
100
24
2005
20
74
7
100
54
2006
17
79
4
100
62
1994
47
44
9
100
-3
1998
41
54
5
100
13
2000
40
55
5
100
15
2001
45
51
4
100
6
2003
34
61
5
100
27
2005
35
61
4
100
26
2006
27
70
3
100
43
2007
22
73
5
100
51
Total
Net majority
Pro-welfare
Attitudes towards welfare
spending 1990-2005
Balance of opinion:
Spends too little minus - too
much
2005: The state
spends…
Too
Little
Appro Too
1990 1994 1998 2001 2005
priate much
Health care
68
30
2
+61
+73
+77
+67
+66
Old age pension
38
60
2
+57
+51
+42
+46
+36
Education
61
38
1
+45
+42
+39
+46
+60
Unempl.benefits*)
17
74
9
2
0
-7
-1
+8
Social assistance*)
18
66
16
-11
-11
-19
-13
+2
Aid develop countr.
25
54
21
-26
-35
-40
-32
+4
Immigrants/refugees
20
49
31
-30
-35
-41
-33
-11
*) Level of support to the individual.
Source: Danish election surveys
Conclusion:Attitudes towards
welfare spending areas
• No decline in support for Social Assistance, even
though immigrants constitute a rapidly increasing
proportion of recipients
• Decline in support for Public Pensions, even though
these are received almost exclusively by Danes
• Policy-dependent attitudes to spending for immigrants
(changes happened between 2001 and 2003,
immediately following change in policy)
→ Not even change in support for programmes de facto
targeted more and more towards immigrants
Attitudes towards
scope of government
Definitely
should be
Probably
should be
Should
not be
Don’t
know
Tot gov.
Resp.
Health care
84
14
3
0
98
Decent stand living for the old
71
26
3
0
97
Child care for everybody
53
35
12
0
88
Decent housing for ev.bdy
39
45
15
1
84
Decent stand living for unempl
33
48
18
1
81
Integrate immigrants
38
40
20
2
78
Leisure facilities for childr.
32
46
21
1
78
Provide job for everyone
19
44
35
2
63
Reduce income differences
19
27
52
2
46
2000
Source: Danish Welfare Values survey, 2000 (ISSP format)
Mobilization of solidarity: Association
between considering immigration salient
problem and attitudes to immigrants
”Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our
national character”
year
immigration salient
problem
1998
Agree
DK
Disagree
Yes
53
14
33
-20
No
34
15
51
+17
Effect of saliency
2001
-37
Yes
46
13
41
-5
No
34
18
48
+14
Effect of saliency
2003
-19
Yes
45
1
52
+7
No
37
3
52
+15
Effect of saliency
2005
Balance of
opinion:
Disagree minus
agree
-8
Yes
42
4
54
+12
No
40
9
51
+11
Effect of saliency
+1
Implications of culture
hypothesis:
• Most generous/institutional welfare states
should be most reluctant to grant equal rights to
immigrants
Or:
• Most generous welfare states should have
strongest requirements about cultural conformity:
The more people pay, the more they should
expect recipients to be like themselves
→ Test on ESS 2002
Attitudes towards equal
treatment and requirement
of cultural conformity
High value =
Equal right /
Low conformity
(ESS 2002)
Equal treatment:
Should immigrants
be treated equally
100=yes 0=no
Assimilation:
Assimilation:
Better for country if Immigrants should
everyone share
be committed to
customs & traditions way of life in society
100=no 0=yes
100=no 0=yes
Sweden
76
73
22
Norway
73
70
34
Denmark
72
71
32
Average Scand.
73
70
27
Netherlands
75
72
21
Germany
61
72
21
UK
64
71
26
Italy
69
65
27
All countries
66
65
25
A note about
rational self-interest
Competition over jobs?
Competition over welfare?
→Country differences?
→Part of the explanation of support for
anti-immigration parties?
Job competition and
welfare competition
High value =
Low competition
(ESS 2002)
Job competition:
Average wages
brought down by
immigrants
100=no 0=yes
Job competition:
Unemployed
immigrants should
be sent home
100=no 0=yes
Welfare comp.:
Immigrants harm
econ. prospects of
the poor
100=no 0=yes
Sweden
60
67
56
Norway
64
51
53
Denmark
62
61
54
Average Scand.
59
57
51
Netherlands
59
47
49
Germany
49
40
40
UK
48
43
43
Italy
52
48
48
All countries
49
42
42
Welfare competition
and support for
anti-immigration parties?
• Until 2005 election no indications at all
• In 2005 over-representation of Danish People’s Party
among disability pensioners (about 25 %) and
unemployed (> 15%)
Alternative explanations:
• Educational & class composition: Profile equivalent to
Social Dem. (but more working class)
• Interest politics: Attempted issue ownership on
improvements for disability pensioners
Collateral damage/
demobilisation of labour
movement → erosion welfare?
Socialist parties
Lib, Cons., DPP
1966
1990
2001
2001
1966
2001
2005
Manual workers
81
71
42
42
14
52
52
White collars
42
48
39
33
42
49
52
Self-employed
14
13
11
15
73
83
71
All voters
50
50
38
35
40
53
53
→ The premise of ”damage” strongly confirmed!
But there was a price
to be paid !
• Liberal / Conservative had to appear as welfarefriendly
(spin: appear as lavish as possible.
Tax relief = politics of obfuscation)
• Danish People’s Party has transformed itself to an
ardent supporter of welfare
With emphasis on ”classical” Social
Democratic welfare issues
Against tax relief, but willing to compromise
”Traditional welfare”
spending attitudes
Balance of opinion = Spend more minus spend less
Old age
pens.
Health
care
Home
help
Early
retirement
Average
of these
Immigrants
(N)
Left wing
36
64
60
0
40
63
37
Social Dem
52
56
79
19
51
10
117
Centre Parties
19
46
55
-34
22
37
51
Lib + Cons.
38
46
71
-12
36
-13
193
Danish People’s P
67
66
79
36
62
-58
57
Cultural/instutional:
Problems with work ethic?
Danish welfare state: High minimum protection
means that work does not pay much for the
lowest skilled and lowest paid workers
• Danish UB almost flat rate
→ Extremely high compensation for those
receiving low pay – and having few
psychological gratifications from work
• Social assistance comparatively high and also
almost flat rate (but means-tested)
• Vulnerable to moral hazard
Immigrants are low paid
→Job incentives rather weak
Work orientations, by
mother tongue 1999
Work commitment did not appear to be a
problem in 1999. (Later findings slightly more
ambiguos).
Unemployed
Danish or EU
language
Others (N=62)
Want a job
81 %
85 %
Looked actively for a job
71 %
73 %
Willing to move for a job
25 %
37 %
Willing to take job in another industry
20 %
36 %
(Source: Danish Marginalisation survey 1999)
The government didn’t
know or didn’t care:
Emphasis on make work pay
- Always
→
→
De facto restrictions in access to
social protection for immigrants
without work
Particularly strong effects for families
with children
Restrictions in access to
social protection for
immigrants (de facto)
1. Restrictions on immigration
2002: Immigration package:
• Family reunion only for > 24 years old
• Attactment requirement: strongest to Denmark
• Support requirement: Person residing in Dk. must be able to
provide; not receive SA last year
• Collateral requirement: Bank guarantee € 7.500
• Housing requirement: 20 sqm pr. person
• Stronger requirements for receiving citizenship
• Applies also to Danish citizens returning from non-EU countries
Restrictions in access to
social protection for
immigrants (de facto)
2. Labour market policy
2002: Immigration package:
• Start assistance / integration allowance for 7 years.
• Reductions 35-50 % compared to SA
• Least generous SA in Northern Europe
Restrictions in access
to social protection for
immigrants (de facto)
More people to work (2002)
• Lower SA after 6 months if both spouses receive SA
• Lower ceiling to SA for families with high expenses
• SA replaced by Spouse supplement if spouse is
considered a homemaker
A New Chance for All (2005)
• SA for married recipients conditional on 300 hours of
work in a two year period except for ”matching group 5”
– those considered completely unemployable
Welfare Reform (2006)
• Spouse Supplement Abolished
Restrictions in access
to social protection for
immigrants (de facto
Other restrictions than those applying to
unemployed:
• (1973 – EU): Restrictions on access to old
age pensions (40 years of residence)
• Otherwise: Increasing inclusion de facto
The beginning of a new
path or exhaustion?
• Exception to inclusiveness or
”dualization of social rights?
• The limits are recognized by the Ministry of
Employment (former Ministry of Labour)
• Increasing acceptance of equal social rights for
immigrants
• (source of success of Danish People’s Party
increasingly to be found in the party’s very
traditional welfare policies)
Attitudes to equal social
rights for immigrants
”Refugees and immigrants should have the same right to social security as Danes even
if they are not Danish citizens”
Completely/
partly agree
Neutral/
don’t know
1994
27
9
24
41
-38
1998
27
15
25
33
-31
2001
27
17
29
27
-29
2005
31
20
27
22
-18
Source: Danish Election surveys.
Partly Completely
disagree disagree
Balance of
opinion
CONCLUSION
• Overall support for (institutional) welfare state not
affected at all + not likely that it will be
• No measurable decline in support for social protection
that is de facto targeted increasingly to immigrants
• Some evidence of mobilization of solidarity with
immigrants
• Collateral damage: Permanent bourgeois majority but
only because they (appear to) accept the welfare state
(new social political majority of odd bedfellows who
dislike sleeping together)
• The path towards a dual welfare state seems almost
exhausted
• But strong restrictions on non-labour force immigration is
likely to remain
Sources:
Based on:
Jørgen Goul Andersen (2007). ”Restricting Access to Social
Protectionfor Immigrants in the Danish Welfare State”.
Benefits, vol.15 no.3, pp. 257-69.
Jørgen Goul Andersen & Jacob Jepsen Pedersen (2007).
”Continuity and Change in Danish Active Labour Market
Policy, 1990-2007. The Battlefield between Activation
and Workfare”. Paper submitted for publication.
Jørgen Goul Andersen (2006). Immigration and the
Legitimacy of the Scandinavian Welfare State. AMID
Working Paper no. 53. (a revised version under way
towards publication)