JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
Study Guide for IMUN 2011
Joint Crisis Committee: The Berlin
Airlift (1948-1952)
East German Cabinet
IMUN @ AC 2011
Yours Sincerely,
Harold Seah
Class of ‘11
Dear Delegates,
My name is Harold Seah, and I am a
senior here at Anglo-Chinese School
(Independent) and I am excited to be
your chair at this year’s IMUN@AC.
Last year I was in the crisis room, having
only appeared before you as a political
actor or as a interim chair, for those of
you that were in this council last year,
but this year, I will be playing the role of
Otto Grotewohl, the Prime Minister of
the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), situated the Soviet Bloc in post
WWII Germany.
Just some of my background, I am
currently pursuing an IB diploma in
ACS(I)’s world-renowned IB Diploma
Programme and I will be graduating in
November. I currently major in History,
Economics and Chemistry, and I am
finishing a mini-thesis on the
Unification of Germany. Being a fervent
Deutsche-phile, I speak German and am
interested in all things Germany, from
its history to engineering.
Please do scrutinize this guide to gain an
understanding of the crisis at hand and
to appreciate the complexity and the
mechanics of this critical period in Cold
War history.
I look forward to seeing you in June,
and I wish you all the best in your
research and learning about this topic, I
do hope and expect for a high level of
debate and creativity. Remember, the
JCC is not about historical accuracy,
rather it is your chance to remake
history as you see fit. Go with whatever
ideas you have and do not forget to have
fun while doing so. 
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JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
I.
Introduction
The Cold War was a period in history
after WWII when the world thought
that the brinkmanship between the two
great powers of the time, the United
States of America (USA) and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or
Soviet Union was going to cause the
world to descend into yet another global
conflict, but this time, with the
unfettered use of nuclear weapons,
which would cause widespread nuclear
fallout in every corner of the globe. It
seemed very likely, looking at the
relatively quick succession of WWI by
WWII that the Cold War was going to
degenerate into a ‘hot’ full-on war.
The conflict between the USA and the
USSR was catalysed by the defeat of
Germany in 1945, creating a power
vacuum in Europe and a dispute in
regards to the German question.
Germany had been the primary
aggressor in both World Wars, and the
USSR was keen to prevent a repeat of
Stalingrad, which despite being a Soviet
victory, it had taken a huge toll on
Russian resources. Stalin, the Russian
leader, was trying to prevent the
establishment of a powerful and
prosperous state in West Germany, and
therefore formed a blockade of West
Germany to stop the capitalist advance.
Berlin in 1948, like Germany, was
divided into Allied and Soviet zones.
The Soviet Blockade of West Germany
prevented the Allies from accessing
West Berlin without entering Soviet
territory. This dilemma seemed at first
glance a victory for Stalin and a defeat
of Allied policy on the German
question. If the Allies were to ram down
the blockades placed across the Eastern
frontier of West Germany, Stalin would
see this as an act of war, something he
knew the Allies were not too prepared
to risk. However, the Allies saw this as a
test of will, and were well aware of the
consequences of capitulating to Stalin1.
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“WE REFUSED TO BE FORCED OUT OF THE CITY
OF BERLIN. WE DEMONSTRATED TO THE
PEOPLE OF EUROPE THAT WE WOULD… ACT
RESOLUTELY, WHEN THEIR FREEDOM WAS
THREATENED… THE BERLIN BLOCKADE WAS A
MOVE TO TEST OUR ABILITY AND OUR WILL TO
RESIST.” –PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN, 1949
This prompted the Allies to launch one
of the most ambitious initiatives in
history: the Berlin Airlift and for ten
months, planes loaded with supplies
landed in West Berlin every three
minutes, that is a whopping 144,000
planes coming into Germany, making a
total of 288,000 trips to and from West
Germany. The Berlin Airlift was the
beginning of the real possibility of a
third World War breaking out between
the USA and the USSR, a war which
would have led to the destruction of the
entire world as we knew it.
II.
Russia Before WWI (1855 –
1914)
Imperial Russia was backward and
obsolete compared to the progressive
nations of Western and Central Europe.
For a long time, it had remained in a
oppressive autocratic system, complete
with slavery and lack of freedom of
expression and of the press.
However, when Alexander II (ruled:
1855-1881) emancipated the Serfs under
the Emancipation Act of 1861, and
relaxed controls over the press and
universities, he created two potential
problems: an uneducated, debt-ridden
peasantry which mutually held the
governing classes and the aristocracy in
contempt and the development of an
intelligentsia with the increased freedom
of expression. Alexander II held the
belief that reform should be introduced
from above to prevent revolution from
below, but was not wholly committed to
his policies. Being an autocrat, he was
worried that his position of power
would come under contest with the
growing intelligentsia. As such, he
reversed his reforms and continued the
Tsarist policy of oppression. Such a
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move brought about his assassination by
dynamite in 1881.
Such a reaction seemed to affirm the
view of the Russian rulers that reform
was harmful and that oppression of the
dark masses was the only suitable means
of governance. When Alexander III
came to the throne in 1881, his regime
earned the title of ‘The Reaction’ in light
of the extreme oppression characteristic
of it2.
When Nicholas II succeeded Alexander
III in 1894, he had been indoctrinated
with the teachings of an ultrareactionary
tutor,
Konstantin
Pobedonostsev. He had every intention
of continuing the oppressive tradition of
the Tsars, but had no idea as to how to
modernize the backward Russian
economy to compete with her Western
competitors.
Also,
unlike
his
predecessors, he was not as strong or as
iron-fisted as they had been. He was a
weak ruler in comparison and could not
therefore maintain a tight rein on the
increasingly enlightened population.
Nicholas II’s reversal of popular policies
instituted by Alexander II increased
opposition towards the Tsarist system.
Also, his continuance of Russification, a
severely enforced policy of restricting
the influence of the non-Russian
national minorities and emphasizing the
superiority of all things Russian3 created
disunity and disaffection amongst the
myriad of races that populated the
Russian Empire. Such policies were ill
advised and undermined the support
base of the Russian ruling classes.
As oppression from the Tsars
continued, the intelligentsia was
flourishing amongst the restrictions and
the repressive policies. Political parties
mushroomed up all over Russia,
particularly in the major cities of St
Petersburg and Moscow. One of the
major political parties that arose out of
this controlled enlightenment was the
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Social Democrats (SD). The Social
Democrats were a leftist party that had
the aim of achieving revolution
according to the ideas of Karl Marx.
Such a revolution, according to Marx,
was to be a class struggle, (Get diagram
of the Marxist Dialectic) a process
that operated throughout history
whereby those who did not possess
political power would rise up against
those who did4.
However, divisions soon appeared in the
party. Some of the members led by
George Plekhanov felt that membership
into the party should be freely granted
to as many anti-Tsarist elements as
possible, this view was opposed by
supporters of SD spokesman, Vladimir
Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, who
felt that the party should consist of a
small, tightly-knit community of
professional revolutionaries
“IT IS BETTER THAT TEN REAL WORKERS
SHOULD NOT CALL THEMSELVES PARTY
MEMBERS THAN THAT ONE CHATTERBOX
SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY
TO BE A MEMBER.” - LENIN
For Lenin, the quality of members of
the party was more important than the
quantity. He was fervent in the belief
that the workers (masses) could not be
left to their own devices, as they simply
did not know enough about the
complex science that was revolution.
This division soon led to a split between
Plekhanov’s bloc and Lenin’s bloc.
Following a vote during the 2nd
Congress of the SD party, Lenin’s bloc
had earned the title of being the majority
or Bolsheviks; naturally Plekhanov’s bloc
adopted the title of minority or
Mensheviks.
Divisions within the party soon
degenerated beyond simple issues of
membership policy. For example, the
difference in opinion spread to
questions of the strategy for revolution.
Lenin’s stance was that conditions
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should be made worse for the
proletariat*, so that their fervour for
revolution would increase and the
uprising against the established Tsarist
system would be all the more intense.
He accused Plekhanov and his
supporters for pursuing a policy of
economism†.
Soon, both blocs were beginning to
disagree about the fundamentals of
Marxist teachings, interpreting the
Marxist dialectic differently from one
another. Lenin’s Bolsheviks argued that
although Russia was still in a backward
feudal system, the class struggle between
the bourgeois and the aristocrats and
between the proletariat and the
bourgeois could be telescoped into one
large
revolution.
Plekhanov’s
Mensheviks on the other hand, were
insistent on Russia’s unpreparedness for
Revolution and argued that the
revolution had to happen in stages, with
the bourgeois triumphing over the
aristocrats first. This was a deep-seeded
conflict between the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks, causing Lenin to accuse
Plekhanov of being undedicated to
revolution and siding with the
bourgeoisie.
Sentiment against the monarchy grew
from day to day as Nicholas II’s
continuation of Alexander III’s
repressive policies. It was hoped that
Nicholas II would be a progressive and
reforming monarch as Alexander II had
been, but his insistence on the
oppression of the dark masses caused
the newly formed intelligentsia to feel
betrayed and the rest of the people to
feel extremely disaffected, having
experienced freedom for a short period
of time, only to see the restoration of
the Tsarist oppression.
Proletariat: working or working class people
(often used with reference to Marxism)
† Economism: Putting the improvement of
workers conditions before the need for
Revolution
*
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Public opinion of the Tsars reached an
all-time low following the RussoJapanese War of 1904. The Russians had
lost in a conflict against what seemed to
be an inferior Asian power. A victory in
the Russo-Japanese War was crucial to
restore public confidence in the regime.
The defeat was detrimental to the
support base of the Tsars; all the token
reform efforts were exposed for what
they really were. The Trans-Siberian
Railway, supposedly the symbol of
Russia’s
modernization
proved
ineffective in the conflict against the
Japanese. The Russian Naval fleet, the
pride of the Imperial Military was blown
out of sea immediately when it reached
the warzone after 8 months of sailing.
The defeat came as a national
humiliation to the already disaffected
subjects of Tsarist Russia. By 1902,
Nicholas II had become paranoid about
the possible challenge to his reign and to
the power of the ruling family. In urban
areas, many innocent people were
incarcerated, the streets were swarming
with policemen and soldiers keeping the
cities on lockdown, ready to shoot
anyone on whim, censorship was
widespread, denying all forms of
religious and political expression while
in the countryside, the severe famine
was a source of peasant misery.
Everywhere, people were disgruntled
with the current administration, the
defeat of 1904 was the last straw, and
any misstep would result in total chaos.
As expected, revolution broke out in
1905 Russia following the events of
January 22, also known as Bloody
Sunday, when Imperial Soldiers shot a
village priest, Father Gapon, and his
supporters while the congregation was
on their way to present to the Tsar a
loyal petition, beseeching him to
alleviate their dire conditions. The news
of the ‘massacre’ spread like wildfire
causing disorder throughout the Empire
in the form of strikes and terrorism
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against government officials and
landlords. Peasants everywhere took
possession of their landlord’s homes, in
the fear that the government was going
to repossess their homes for not being
able to repay the usurious loans they
took during the post-emancipation5 (i.e
the Emancipation Act of 1861).
By autumn of 1905, the unrest in the
industrial areas had developed into a
united front. Workers formed amongst
themselves, a council made of elected
representatives or a soviet, headed by
Leon Trotsky who became the chairman
of the St Petersburg soviet and organizer
of several strikes in the capital. The
soviet was meant to represent workers’
demands for higher wages and better
working conditions6.
Despite the years of discontent that
culminated in the most violent uprising
in the history of the Russian Romanovs,
the 1905 Revolution blew over rather
easily. By October, although the Tsars
were facing the most united opposition
in Romanov history, a critical realization
dawned upon the Tsars that had been so
rigid in pursuing a policy of oppression
for so long. The Tsars realized that they
had to concede to giving the people
some freedom of representation in
policymaking. However, while the step
towards representative government
seems welcome, the Tsars intended for
this to divide the united opposition that
it once faced. To do this, they began
pleasing different political blocs within
the population.
The liberals were appeased by the
October Manifesto, issued by Tsar
Nicholas II following the events in the
earlier part of 1905, introducing (or
reintroducing) a range of civil rights
such as freedom of speech, worship and
legality of the trade unions. The peasants
had their mortgage repayments, one of
the major sources of misery, reduced
and subsequently abolished altogether.
In doing so, the peasants stopped
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seizing the homes of their landlords and
order slowly returned to the countryside.
The Soviets did not get any concession
from the Tsars, now with the liberals
and peasants appeased. The government
now felt confident enough to crush the
soviets. Raids were conducted on the St
Petersburg and Moscow soviet, the
latter being more violent than the
former. It was surprising that despite the
SD Bolshevik’s passion for revolution,
they played a relatively minor part in the
Revolution as compared to the
Mensheviks. On the other hand, the
Imperial Guard had arrested the
chairman of the St Petersburg soviet,
Trotsky, a Menshevik. However, it is
important to note that with the
exception of Trotsky, none of the other
Mensheviks had played any significant
role in the events of 19057.
Despite the uproar that the defeat of
Russia at the hands of the Japanese
created, the Tsarist regime remained
relatively intact after the 1905
Revolution, unscathed even. While the
October Manifesto sounds good on the
surface, with the creation of some form
of representative government in the
duma, the regime of the Tsars remained
absolute and was in no way limited by
the new Russian parliament. The troops
from the Far East may have mutinied
during the Russo-Japanese War, but
when civil war came in 1905, they were
loyal to the Tsar in suppressing the
protesters. The ease at which the liberals
and the peasants could be placated
through simple economic and political
bribes showed the general unwillngness
of the people for actual revolution. With
the
seemingly
comprehensive
destruction of the SRs, 1905 seems a far
cry away from Revolution.
“THE SOVEREIGN EMPEROR POSSESSES THE
INITIATIVE IN ALL LEGISLATIVE MEASURES.
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS MAY BE SUBJECT TO
REVISION IN THE STATE COUNCIL AND THE
STATE DUMA ONLY ON HIS INITIATIVE. THE
SOVEREIGN EMPEROR RATIFIES THE LAWS. NO
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LAW CAN COME INTO FORCE WITHOUT HIS
APPROVAL.”
- TSAR NICHOLAS II, PROMULGATION‡ OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, APRIL 1906
The above proclamation was timed to
coincide with the opening of the duma.
The Tsarist regime had no intention of
letting the concessions of the October
Manifesto reduce its absolute power.
With the announcement that the duma
would consist of 2 houses, the upper
and the lower house, where the upper
house had complete authority to veto
the bills of the elected lower house,
coupled with the promulgation of the
Fundamental Laws, the Tsar’s intentions
became clear to the liberals. In addition,
the Tsarist Regime had managed to
negotiate a loan from the French,
reducing any influence the duma had
over Tsarist finances8.
In two broad strokes, the Tsars had
managed to remove any power the
duma was supposed to have. The
betrayed liberals therefore met in
disappointment and bitterness in the
duma. They immediately voiced their
dissatisfaction against what they thought
was the Tsars going back on their
promises. They demanded for an
increase in the rights and powers of the
duma, to which the Tsars dismissed and
the Chief Minister, Ivan Goremykin,
said was “inadmissible”. Soon after,
Nicholas II ordered the duma to be
dissolved.
The Liberal Kadet and Labourist Parties
met exasperated in Vyborg, Finland,
where they drew up an Appeal to the
Russian people to defy the Tsars by
refusing to pay their taxes ad disobeying
conscription§ orders. The Appeal did
not invoke passive, non-violent
disobedience amongst the Russian
people, but scattered violence. This
Promulgation: put a law into effect by official
procalmation
§ Conscription: compulsory enlistment for state
service, mainly for armed forces.
‡
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provided Nicholas II with the excuse to
retaliate. He ordered for the arrest of the
Vyborg deputies and barred them from
re-election into the duma. In addition,
he appointed Peter Stolypin, as Chief
Minister and his resident strongman.
Stolypin began pursuing a policy of
severe repression: martial law was
proclaimed and a network of military
courts, with sweeping powers** to quell
disturbances wherever they appeared9.
From 1906 to 1911, over 2500
executions were carried out across
Russia, earning hangman’s noose, the
nickname “Stolypin’s necktie”.
Following the Vyborg fiasco, the Liberal
Kadets and Labourists had been
discredited, and more importantly
barred from re-election. As a result the
leftist SD and SR†† filled the empty seats
left by the ousted liberals, making the
new assembly strongly anti-government,
leaving the left and the right to quibble
amongst themselves in the duma. The
Second Duma was dissolved just as
quickly as the first as the SD and SR
parties directed an attack on the way the
army was organized and deployed. The
leftist deputies were accused for
subversion, and the duma was dissolved.
After the Second Duma, Nicholas II
was determined to prevent such attacks
against the tsarist policies in the duma.
The duma served as a symbol of
Russia’s gravitation towards democracy
for Russia’s new commercial allies:
France and Britain. An uncooperative
duma would look badly on the Russian
government.
As
such,
Stolypin
Sweeping powers refers to the ability of the
court to pass summary judgments without a fair
trial on whoever was on trial. Most likely used to
instill fear in the people, to prevent them from
rising up against the government or face the
severe consequences.
†† Social Revolutionaries (SR): A leftist party
wanting to see the end of Tsarist Russia. Was the
most popular party amongst peasants and the
middle-class alike until its existence was
outlawed by the Bolsheviks in 1917.
**
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JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
introduced new laws to restrict
representation only to the propertied
classes, resulting in the Third and
Fourth Dumas becoming strongly right
wing, and relatively less radical, allowing
Nicholas II to pursue his policies (e.g.
land
reforms)
without
much
10
opposition .
Despite appearances, the Third and
Fourth Dumas were not entirely
subservient to the Tsarist cause, they
continued to question ministers and
exercised their right over state finances.
The Fourth Duma was even accused of
creating tension in Russia through the
deputies’ asking of awkward and
searching questions of government
policy. They were not completely useless
either, having passed bills for social
reform such as schooling for poor
children and national insurance for
industrial workers.
The repression of the people only
worsened after Stolypin’s assassination
in 1911. His successors were
incompetent and could only continue
along the course of repression, causing a
marked increase in public disorder. By
1914, just before WWI, the number of
strikes had reached an all time high of
2401, compared with just 24 in 1911.
While the October Manifesto was
supposed to be the milestone for
increased political representation for the
Russian people, it marked the beginning
of a series of myopic policies that only
ignited the previously lukewarm
sentiments towards revolution. The
liberals had felt betrayed by the Tsars
for disenfranchising them from
representation in the duma, the leftist
had been silenced due to the restrictions
of enfranchisement to the propertied
classes, and even the moderates and the
right began to see the ineptitude of the
Russian government in dealing with
Russia’s problems. Alexander Guchov,
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leader of the Octobrists‡‡, warned that
the “blindness of the tsars” would only
succeed in moving the people closer
towards revolution.
The economic policies of Tsarist
Russia’s most capable ministers, Sergei
Witte and Peter Stolypin, coupled with
the introduction of the duma were not
enough to change the reactionary
character of the tsarist system. The
Great Spurt of the 1890s was a chance
for Russia to modernize itself, which
included not only economic progress
but political changes as well. To this
end, the Tsars refused to concede.
Nicholas II had failed to see Witte’s
potential and the effectiveness of his
policies in preventing revolution, and
albeit to a lesser extent, Nicholas II had
also underestimated the capabilities of
Stolypin. Had the tsarist government
supported both ministers in their efforts
to modernize the ailing Russian
economy, they might just have had been
able to prevent revolution.
However, by 1914, at the brink of the
greatest conflict the world had yet seen,
it seems that all hope for preventing
revolution had been lost. There was
widespread disorder as repression by the
ruling classes escalated, disaffection
among all echelons of society increased
and the left, with Lenin at the helm, was
preparing for revolution.
III.
WWI and the Bolshevik
Revolution
As the end of the first decade of the 20th
Century drew closer, Europe was
becoming increasingly polarized as the
newly formed Germany adopted a more
aggressive and dominant foreign policy,
instilling fear in its western and eastern
The Octobrists were a group of right wing
moderates who saw their role as fundamentally
being able to contribute to the rapid
establishment of a constitutional monarchy and
the convocation (assembly) of the State Duma,
on the basis of the October Manifesto12.
‡‡
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JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
neighbours,
France
and
Russia
respectively, prompting them to fend for
their borders. With Bismarck gone, the
complex system of alliances, which had
helped Germany maintain cordial
diplomatic relations in Europe, had
collapsed.
Now due to fear and
suspicion of German ambition to merge
with Austria, creating a formidable
power in Central Europe, the nations of
Europe had separated into two
encampments: the Triple Alliance,
consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary
and Turkey, and the Triple Entente,
consisting of France, Russia and Britain.
As these relations within the alliances
strengthened, and relations between
them froze, areas of conflict started to
become more significant. One example
would be the Balkan question. Both
Austria-Hungary and Russia wanted
control of these states, now with the
decline of the Ottoman Empire§§ so that
either of them could assume control
over the Bosphorous and Dardanelles, a
waterway where cargo ships could sail
through. Should either of them gain
control of the reason, it would mean
serious economic consequences for the
other11.
For Russia, the need to prevent Austrian
expansion into the Balkans was even
greater as the Russians regarded the
protection of the Slav Christian people
of the Balkans from the oppression of
their Turkish Islamic masters as their
traditional duty, and the Austrian
presence there would serve only to
diminish their capacity in doing so13.
Despite the huge stakes here, Russia was
still reluctant to mobilize. Russia’s
humiliating defeat at the hands of the
Japanese in 1904 prompted Nicholas II
to pursue a more cautious and defensive
foreign policy. War was to be avoided
where possible. However, the descent
The Ottoman Empire is also known as the
Turkish Empire. (thus, Ottomans = Turks)
§§
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into war was due to a series of events
that by the end of the first decade
seemed out of the Tsar’s control.
Where there had been a rather policy of
diplomacy under Wilhelm I and
Bismarck, under Wilhelm II, there arose
a hunger for German expansionism,
union with Austria and hegemony in
Europe. With German backing, AustriaHungary was in a position to challenge
Russia’s traditional right over states like
Poland and the Balkans, both of which
had a significant proportion of Slavs,
whom the Russians saw themselves as
protectors of14. Also, Poland acted as a
buffer state between Germany and
Russia, and with the newfound might of
the Germans, it seemed prudent to
protect the integrity of the PolishGerman frontier.
The Austrians continued to assert their
rights over the Balkan region by
annexing the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, causing Austro-Russian
ties to deteriorate from 1908 onward.
Russia, unwilling to accept Austrian
claims to the Balkans, condemned the
act of Austrian aggression and
demanded compensation. However,
Russia was unable to extract any form of
compensation from the Triple Alliance,
therefore turning to other means to
remove Austria from the region.
For the next few years leading to the war
of 1914, Russia and Austria were
involved in a continuous banter about
the Balkan question. Russia tried to
incite Balkan nationalism by persuading
the various nationalities in the region to
form a coalition against Austria-Hungary
while the Austrians continued to assert
authority over the region15. This led to a
series of conflicts known as the Balkan
Wars (1912 – 1913), a mixture of antiTurkish uprisings and quibbles about
the national boundaries of the territory
the newly established states had won
over from the Turks.
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The Russian’s tactic to drive the
Austrians from the Balkans seemed to
work, now that Serbia, one of the largest
states in the region at the time, saw
Russia as an ally and a protector.
However, there were underlying
international issues caused by the decline
of the Ottoman Empire and the rising
Balkan Nationalism that had not been
resolved.
Despite the state of inter-European
relations after 1908, none of the powers
felt ready enough to declare war. While
the Balkan conflict made Russia regard
German and Austrian ambitions with
deep suspicion and anxiety, Russia was
still reluctant to dive into a war against
Austria or Germany. It was only in 1914,
following the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand by Serbian Nationalists did it
become inevitable for the Russians to go
into a war against Austria-Hungary. A
month following the assassination,
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia,
forcing the Russians to join in the
conflict. The Russians had hoped to be
able to scare the Austrians out of battle.
The Germans and Austrians still
regarded the Russians as a formidable
enemy, with Russia’s large reserve of
manpower and hinterland of resources.
Nicholas II decided to use this
impression that the Austrians had of
Russia to force the Austrians out of war.
It was thought that the Russian
mobilization would be sufficient as a
deterrent for Austrian aggression16.
The Russian mobilization set off a chain
of events that precipitated in the greatest
war the world had yet seen. The
Germans, according to the Schlieffen
Plan, had to mobilise if the Russians did
to eliminate the danger of a two-front
war against both France and Russia;
Germany could not stall the Russians
from coming to its doorstep, it had to
act first.
As such, with the order for the Russian
mobilization sent out on 30 July 1914, a
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war between Europe’s greatest powers
was set in motion. On the 31st, Germany
declared war on Russia, and four days
after, so did Austria-Hungary.
The war effort changed the political
scene in Russia. With a common enemy
in sight, the Bolshevik party lost many
of its supporters who chose to commit
themselves to fighting off the external
enemies. Lenin condemned these people
as “class traitors”16, and called on all true
revolutionaries to transform the
‘imperialist war… into a civil war”.
However, his rallying cries went unheard
and the Bolsheviks were branded as
traitors, forcing him and his remaining
followers into exile.
However, due to the backwardness of
the Russian economy and the
unpreparedness of the Russian military,
Russia was unable to sustain the war
effort. Soon, the patriotic support of
August 1914 was replaced by resentment
and disappointment. The duma, which
had been voluntarily suspended by the
deputies at the start of the war in
support of the Tsar, now placed
pressure on him for the reassembly of
the duma.
The ineptitude of the tsarist regime was
not limited to military and economic
prowess but also in public relations.
During the war, the tsar and his
ministers had refused to cooperate with
the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of
Municipal
Councils.
These
two
organizations had been entirely willing
to work with the tsarist government at
the beginning of the war. Now, they had
formed an organization, Zemgor, whose
success revealed the failures of the
Government
and
ventured
the
possibility that there might be an
alternative to tsardom.
As the war progressed, Nicholas II and
his administration became increasingly
rigid towards appeals from the duma to
reform the current political system. The
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duma called for the replacement of the
tsar’s incompetent cabinet with a ministry
of national confidence, with members drawn
from the elected deputies of the duma.
However, the tsar rejected this proposal,
effectively losing the last opportunity of
support from the politically progressive
groups in Russia.
Nicholas II’s denial of the duma a voice
in national policy resulted in the creation
of a ‘Progressive Bloc’ consisting of
Octoberists and Kadets (Liberals),
Nationalists and the Party of Progressive
Industrialists. While the SR did not join
this bloc, they had supported all of the
bloc’s resolutions that pertained to the
criticism of the monarchy.
The Bloc tried to persuade Nicholas II
to make concessions, however, wanting
to create an image of firmness, he
stubbornly refused. He was simply not
willing to listen to the Bloc. Even the
ardent monarchists within the Bloc
remarked with sadness at the tsar’s
unwillingness to accept what the bloc
had to say; One such monarchist, Vasily
Shulgin, pointed out the tsar’s mistake in
viewing the bloc as an enemy rather
than a friend. The Bloc had tried to save
the tsarist government from revolution,
allowing them to focus on fighting the
war, however, Nicholas II’s obstinacy
towards public opinion coupled with the
growing revelation of the tsarist
government’s ineptitude soon made the
bloc into a source of political
resistance18.
During the war years, the tsarist
government became extremely desperate
to try and find a cabinet of ministers
that could successfully run Russia.
During the course of 1915 – 1916,
Russia had 4 prime ministers, 3
ministers of defence and 6 interior
ministers, all as equally incompetent as
the next. The state of affairs in Russia
was so abysmal that the British
ambassador to Russia in Petrograd
remarked of the Russian minister as
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“possessed of only a second-class
mind”, “distinguished [only] by his
capacity to flatter and his extreme
ambition.”19
Despite this, the Russians were not
particularly hateful of the tsar or his
ministers, but rather, they focused their
hatred for the tsarist system on the tsar’s
wife Alexandria and a rather crass
individual by the name of Gregory
Efimovich Rasputin. Alexandria had
been born to the house of HesseDarmstadt, and since marrying Nicholas
II, she had made a concerted effort to
assimilate into Russia. However, after
1914, her efforts counted for nothing as
the Russian people regarded her as a
German agent. This was exacerbated by
the introduction of Rasputin into court.
Rasputin had been regarded by
Alexandria as a “confidant” due to his
ability to alleviate her son, Alexei’s,
haemophillia to some extent. She
assumed that this was due to his magical
healing powers as a holy man from the
Russian steppes, and thus begged
Nicholas II to keep Rasputin at court20.
However, Rasputin’s background was
much less holy. His reputation of sexual
depravity preceded him in court. This
fascinated many fashionable women in
court who often boasted that they had
slept with him. Oddly enough, this
attraction was increased by his seldom
changing of clothes. His appearance in
court therefore outraged many ministers
who detested his appearance, but they
could not get rid of him due to royal
favour.
With Nicholas II in the battlefield
during the war, the government was to
be led by Alexandria and Rasputin,
whom the people regarded as “The
German Woman” and the debauched
monk21. As such, in a cry of outrage, a
group of aristocratic conspirators
brutally murdered Rasputin. While the
monk did have a rather raunchy private
life, his common sense and competence
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in administration outshone many of the
ministers at court, giving them another
reason to kill Rasputin.
However, tsardom was already beyond
saving by 1917 and Rasputin’s death
only showcased the severe problems
that plagued the tsarist system.
By February of 1917, political
suppression, prohibition of labour
meetings, the closing of trade unions,
persecution of men taking an active part
in sick benefit funds and suspension of
labour newspapers amongst a plethora
of other methods of oppression had
fired up tempers across all of Russian
society22. Reports of strikes came from
all over the country, startng on the 14th,
at the Putilov steel works located in
Petrograd (previously known as St
Petersburg before 1914). The strikes had
been sparked off by rumours of further
cuts in bread supplies. While current
sources reveal that there was enough
bread at the time to feed all the workers,
in a period of heated chaos, rumour and
fact are rarely distinguishable. Soon, on
the 23rd, another strike broke out in
Petrograd, this time by women
demanding for equal rights with men. By
the 25th, a general strike paralysed the
whole of Petrograd and the police who
were supposed to disperse the crowd
were becoming increasingly sympathetic
to the cause of the strikers. Even when
news of the strikes reached Nicholas II,
400 miles away, he and his generals were
unable to restore order to the city as the
soldiers, who had been so loyal back in
1905, were joining in the protests.
Things had deteriorated to such a state
that even the notices for marshal law
could not even be printed23. By the 26th,
150,000 garrison troops in Petrograd
had deserted to join the strikers,
seriously depleting the battalion of
troops sent to restore order.
In spite of the chaos, the tsar still
refused to make any concessions, and
called for the dissolution of the duma
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instead. Such a move was to be political
suicide as 12 members of the duma soon
reassembled to form the ‘Provisional
Committee’, creating the first instance of
open constitutional defiance towards the
tsar.
On the 27th, the Petrograd Soviet of
Soldiers’,
Sailors’
and
Workers’
Deputies’ (hereinafter referred to as the
Petrograd Soviet) was formed by the
Mensheviks and gathered in the Tauride
Palace. They spoke for the striking
workers and the rebellious soldiers and
together
with
the
Provisional
Committee formed the de facto
government of Russia. This was an
uneasy alliance that was to continue only
to October. It was at this time that the
Petrograd declared its determination in
their newspaper Izvestiya, to “wipe out
the old system completely”24.
The chaos in Petrograd prompted
Rodzianko, one of the ministers of the
ex-duma, to request for the tsar to
abdicate his throne to save the Russian
monarchy. However, Nicholas II
decided that he would return to
Petrograd instead, in the hopes that his
presence would have a calming effect on
the people. However, revolution had
become so widespread that the tsar’s
train was intercepted by mutinous
troops who forced the train to divert to
Pskov, 100 miles from Petrograd. Here,
even the generals in the Russian high
command, or stavka, requested for the
tsar’s abdication.
On the 4th of March, the tsar finally
abdicated, a day after the Provisional
Committee officially declared Russia in a
state of revolution and themselves as the
new Provisional Government. The
Romanov dynasty that had ruled Russia
for a tri-centennial just 4 years earlier
had been toppled from below. It was a
mixture of the tsar’s final loss of will to
survive, and the pressures of the
prolonged struggle of WWI that
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eventually brought the tsarist regime to
its knees.
country, which in a post-revolution
state, was going to be an uphill task.
RUSSIA WAS NOT ADVANCED ENOUGH TO
STAND THE STRAIN OF WAR, AND THE EFFORT
TO DO SO PLUNGED HER ECONOMY INTO CHAOS.
BUT ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS DID NOT
ALONE MAKE FOR REVOLUTION. THE ECONOMIC
Another issue was that of the Petrograd
Soviet. The presence of this contrasting
group in the government limited the
authority
of
the
Provisional
Government. The Petrograd Soviet was
there to protect the interests of the
soldier and the worker and ensure that
these interests are recognized in the
government. It was not hostile to the
Provisional Government but it did cause
the ministers to be unsure of their
authority. This led the Soviet to gain
prominence over the Provisional
Government26.
CHAOS CAME MORE FROM A CONTEST BETWEEN
THE OLD AND THE NEW IN THE RUSSIAN
ECONOMY. THERE WAS A CRISIS, NOT OF
DECLINE…
BUT
RATHER
OF
GROWTH.
- NORMAN STONE, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF THE
EASTERN FRONT
It is interesting that the Bolsheviks failed
to play a part in this revolution, most of
their leaders had been exiled; Lenin
himself was in Switzerland, and given
the communication difficulties created
by the war, there was a lack of reliable
information, thus the Revolution came
to the Bolsheviks as a surprise25.
With the tsar gone, what existed in
Russia was a dual alliance consisting of
the Provisional Government and the
Petrograd Soviet. Both represented
different groups of people, the former
representing the ex-deputies of the old
duma and the latter represented the
interests of the soldiers and the workers;
both sides enjoyed considerable
cooperation from one another for a
period of time, but having been formed
out of the chaos of revolution, the
arrangement had underlying issues
which undermined the stability of the
dual alliance.
One of the key issues was the nature of
the provisional government. The
ministers in this new government were a
group of rebellious deputies from the
old duma who had defied the tsar’s
orders to disband. They were not an
elected body and therefore lacked
legitimacy and authority and could not
claim upon the constitutional loyalty of
the Russian people. Thus, the
Provisional Government would be
judged only based on how well it ran the
Lastly, the Provisional Government
lacked full authority over the army.
Without control of the army, the
Government could hold no real power.
This was due to the declaration of the
‘Soviet Order Number 1’ by the
Petrograd Soviets as one of their first
acts as an organization.
“THE ORDERS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF
THE STATE DUMA ARE TO BE OBEYED ONLY IN
SUCH INSTANCES WHEN THEY DO NOT
CONTRADICT THE ORDERS AND DECREES OF
THE SOVIET.” –SOVIET ORDER NO. 1
What this meant essentially was that the
decrees of the Provisional Government
in relation to military affairs were only
binding if the Petrograd Soviet approved
them. This was a clear indication of the
Soviet’s ability to limit the powers and
the authority of the Government,
something that was to have a great
impact later.
After the Bolsheviks got word of the
tsar’s abdication, they started to return
from exile. Stalin and Lev Kamenev,
who had been exiled to Siberia, were the
first to return to the cities. They had
initially taken an anti-Leninist stance,
ignoring Lenin’s instructions not to
cooperate
with
the
Provisional
Government or the other political
parties and his push for turning the war
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into a class war that would bring about
the proletarian revolution that Lenin had
so desired. Instead, Stalin and Kamenev
saw cooperation with the Provisional
Government as necessary for the time
being, seeing as they were still trying to
fend off the remnants of the old regime.
Also, in regards to the war, both men
were calling for the Provisional
Government to call for peace talks at
once.
When Lenin returned to Petrograd on
the 3rd of April, he dismissed Stalin and
Kamenev’s initial approach to the events
of the February Revolution. He refused
to accept Kamenev’s and the other
Bolshevik’s stance of accomodationism,
where they cooperated with the
Provisional Government and the other
political parties. Instead, he denounced
the February Revolution as a genuine
revolution, and called for a second
revolution to overthrow the Provisional
Government.
In his work, The April Theses, he called
for the abandonment of all cooperation
with other parties, the working towards
true revolution entirely by the
Bolsheviks’
own
efforts,
the
overthrowing of the Provisional
Government, whom Lenin regarded as
the old class-ridden duma in disguise,
the passing of authority to the soviet
and the transfer of power to the
workers. In doing so, Lenin rejected
much of what the Bolsheviks, who had
arrived in Petrograd before him, had
done. He viewed the Soviets as a
potential power base, an essential part of
the structure of post-tsarist government.
The soviets offered Lenin’s Bolshevik
party the means by which they could
take over the state.
While it seems that Lenin’s cries for
another revolution would have gone
unheard, seeing that cooperation
between the Government and the Soviet
was going swimmingly well and that
even the Bolsheviks were trying to
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cooperate with the Government, we
must remember that the Government,
throughout its short existence, never
gained any form of constitutional
legitimacy nor did it gain the loyalty of
the Russian people. The only measure of
their legitimacy was in how well they
were dealing with Russia’s problems,
and at the time, the main problem was
the war. By 1917, the prolonged conflict
had already destroyed much of the
morale of the Russians and like Stalin
and Kamenev, many of them wanted to
enter into peace talks with the Germans
to end the war. However, for the
Provisional Government, the choice was
not so easy. Russia had been bankrupted
by the tsarist regime, leaving the interim
government reliant on foreign funding
through war credits, which would only
be obtained from the western allies if
Russia continued in the war. Without
this money, Russia could not survive.
But if Russia continued in the war, the
current government would not survive.
As such, the ministers of the Provisional
Government were placed in a stymieing
dilemma: for the survival of Russia in
the long-term, they had to persist in the
war, but in doing so, they destroyed
their chances of survival as the ruling
party27.
There was also an issue of the growing
divide in the Dual Alliance between the
Provisional Government and the
Petrograd Soviet. The Soviets were
calling for a peace without annexations
or indemnities, while the War Minister,
Milyukov, pledged that Russia would
fight in the war until Germany was
defeated. This caused the Soviet’s
address to appear as nonsense or worse,
deceit28, and undermined the credibility
of the Soviets, thereby causing further
divide in the Dual Alliance.
As tensions increased, causing a
government crisis, two key members of
the Provisional Government Milyukov
and Guchkov resigned in early May,
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allowing their replacement by Alexander
Krensky, the new Minister of War, and
the introduction of a few leading
Mensheviks and SRs. This was done in
the hopes for closer ties with the
Petrograd Soviets and the leftist political
factions in Russia. However, what was
intended to be a gesture for better
collaboration was viewed as a betrayal.
The socialists that had “defected” over
to the Provisional Government were
seen as collaborators with the Kadets, as
consorters with the bourgeoisie.
The Soviets and the socialists were not
entirely wrong. Kerensky continued to
push for the war against Germany,
trying to repaint the war as a necessity
for the survival of the Revolution. He
saw victory as a requirement for the
survival of Russia. However, by 1917,
Russia was in no condition to continue
the war. Morale was low and the Russian
position was deteriorating. In June 1917,
when a major operation on the southwestern front against the Germans
failed, the words of the Bolshevik
agitators got through to the troops who
finally staged a mutiny against the
Provisional Government, refusing to
obey orders and even setting up their
own government. These developments
laid the foundation for the Bolsheviks to
finally stage their own revolution, this
time, to bring down the Provisional
Government.
By July 1917, it was apparent that the
Provisional Government had lost
control of the country: the number of
soviets were spreading, the workers were
taking control of the factories, the
peasants were seizing land and
nationalist sentiments in minority areas
like the Ukraine were starting to form
their own governments. It was the
Ukrainian question that finally sparked
off the July Days Crisis. When the
Kadet Ministers in the Provisional
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Government learned that a deputation***
in Kiev had offered independence to the
people of Ukraine, they resigned in
protest, saying that only an all-Russian
assembly could decide such matters.
The July Days were a failure for the
Bolsheviks.
Kerensky
quickly
suppressed the uprising and arrested a
number of Bolshevik leaders for their
role in the chaos while Lenin managed
to flee to Finland. However, what was a
political defeat for the Bolsheviks turned
out to be an experiential bonus. The
failure revealed many of the faults of the
Bolshevik’s current administration. In
contrast, the successful suppression
raised the confidence of the Provisional
Government to the extent that it
bordered on complacency. As such,
from July to October, the Provisional
Government was to make two grave
miscalculations that were to cost it their
rule over Russia.
As the events from July to October
1917 are beyond the scope of this guide,
suffice to say that by October, the
Bolsheviks had recovered significantly
from the July Days, gaining considerable
ground in both the Petrograd and
Moscow Soviets. Additionally, ever since
his exile to Finland, Lenin had been
planning an overthrow of Kerensky’s
government. He correctly placed his
hopes on the growing incapability of the
Provisional Government and its
increasing reactionary governmental
style.
Ironically, it was Kerensky rather than
the Bolsheviks initiated the October
Revolution. Rumours had been
circulating around, telling of a possible
Bolshevik insurrection. Thus, when an
article by Bolshevik leaders Lev
Kamenev and Gregory Zinoviev seemed
like incontrovertible proof of plans for
Deputation: a group of people appointed to
undertake a mission or to take part in a formal
process on behalf of a larger group
***
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revolution, Kamenev ordered the arrest
of leading Bolsheviks and the closure of
Communist newspapers. Thus, in
response,
Lenin
mobilized
the
Bolsheviks in what is known as the
October Revolution.
The October Revolution was rather
anticlimactic. Contrary to Communist
propaganda, the conflict between the
Bolsheviks
and
the
Provisional
Government was a figurative walk in the
park. It is incomprehensible why
Kerensky would launch an offensive
against the Bolsheviks when he had
relatively no soldiers. As such, power fell
into the proverbial hands of the
Communists.
On 27 October 1917, the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets began their first
session. Many of the delegates were
stupefied by the rapidity of their ascent
to supreme control over power. At the
Congress, the 14 names of those who
comprised the new Sovnarkom†††, with
Lenin placed at the top of the list as
Chief Minister.
IV.
USSR-Allied Relations postWWI
Unsurprisingly, the Allies were not
thrilled at the prospect of Communist
Revolution in Russia. It was known that
the German Foreign Office had funded
Bolshevik activity in Russia before and
even after the October Revolution in the
hopes that with a Bolshevik takeover,
Russia would pull out from the war.
Thus, it was in Lenin’s best interests to
sign a treaty with Germany so as not to
endanger this lucrative source of
revenue. Additionally, by 1917, the
Russian forces had been exhausted an in
no position to continue the fight against
Germany. Thus, in December 1917, an
armistice was declared in the Polish
town of Brest-Litovsk where Russian
leaders, Lenin and Leon Trotsky, met
†††
Sovnarkom: Cabinet
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with Germany’s Chief Negotiator Field
Marshall Paul von Hindenburg to
discuss terms of a peace treaty.
However, rather than fair negotiations,
the terms of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk
were extremely humiliating. Russia was
forced to cede a huge slice of territory,
close to a third of European Russia to
Germans, an area stretching from the
Black Sea to the Ukraine, containing a
populace of 45 million people. This was
in addition to the hefty reparations
amounting to 3 billion roubles slapped
onto Russia by the German delegation.
The Allies took the Russian withdrawal
from the war as a betrayal of the Triple
Entente, a sentiment that was not to
dissipate in the near future. All resources
previously dedicated to the anti-German
effort in Russia was diverted to antiBolshevik campaigns. The Allies,
convinced that the separate peace
between Germany and the Bolsheviks
had undermined the Allied cause, were
determined to destroy the Bolsheviks.
Once the war ended in 1918, the Allies’
collective attention was directed towards
dealing with the Bolsheviks. This antiBolshevik sentiment was to characterize
Allied-Soviet relations for much of the
following decades.
V.
Post-WWII
and
the
beginnings of the Cold War
During WWII, the United States and the
Soviet Union placed aside their
differences to combat the threat from
the Axis Powers (Nazi Germany,
Militarist Japan and Fascist Italy).
However, the cooperation between the
two powers was notably less than
compared with that between the other
Allies. However such cooperation was
not to last after the war. The defeat of
Nazi Germany left a power vacuum in
the global balance of power, catalyzing
the conflict that was to arise from the
two powers’ ideological differences. By
the end of the Yalta Conference (4
February 1945), conflicts between the
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Soviet Union and the other Allies had
already begun to surface. British troops
raced into Mecklenburg in Northern
Germany to prevent a Soviet takeover
of Denmark and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill made a deal with the
Americans to take Berlin and Prague
and protect them from Communist
insurrection.
At
the
Potsdam
Conference (16 July), tensions rose
further with news of a successful atombomb trial in New Mexico. It has been
argued that the twin bombing of
Hiroshima (7 August) and Nagasaki (9
August) was a manoeuver by the
Americans to intimidate the Soviets.
Germany’s central position in Europe
and its potential military and economic
strength ensured that neither the
Western Allies nor the Soviet Union
would let the other get control of it.
Thus, it was agreed at the Potsdam
conference that all of Germany’s
territory east of the Oder-Neisse line be
given to Poland while the territory on
the west be divided into four occupation
zones, each controlled by one of the
Allied countries.
In the beginning, the Soviet Union was
actually more cooperative in efforts to
create a new democratic Germany. In
October 1945, the Russians had even
agreed to setting up a central German
transport ministry, a proposal that was
shot down by the paranoid French who
feared the revival of a Germany that
might return to dominate Europe.
However, such cooperation was not to
last. Many in West Germany regarded
the Soviet Zone as deadweight loss.
Additionally, there was tension between
the middle classes and the communists
in Eastern Germany as the Soviets relied
on the Communists within their zone
for administration and did not hesitate
to arrest anybody that got in their way.
This atmosphere of fear prevented the
successful merger between the revived
German Social Democratic (SPD) and
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Communist (KPD) parties without the
use of force. Even with the concessions
made initially by the KPD under duress
from the Soviets, the atmosphere of fear
disguised their extent and alienated
many SPD members. In 1946, a
referendum in Berlin was held to
determine the result of the merger.
While the Soviets managed to close
down polls in East Berlin, voting
continued in West Berlin, with a
whopping 82% of voters strongly
against the merger, heightening the
Western Allies’ suspicions of Soviet
intentions.
Other developments in post-WWII
Europe stepped up American antiCommunist efforts and heightened
American-Soviet tensions. When Britain
could no longer sustain her vast empire
in India, Palestine and Egypt, her
position in the Eastern Mediterranean
faltered, losing control over Greece and
Turkey. When Civil War broke out in
Greece in May 1946, American
President Harry Truman was fearful that
the Communists might launch similar
uprisings in Italy, and thus proceeded to
strengthen non-Communist forces in
the area. Thus on 12 March 1947,
Truman made an appeal to the
American Congress, asking for funds to
weed out the “seeds of totalitarian
regimes”. This speech was to be known
as the Truman Doctrine, and marked
the beginning of a new American policy
initiative.
This new stance led to the formation of
the Marshall Plan, named after General
George Marshall, who offered an aid
package to Europe which aimed at
bolstering the efforts for European
integration, thereby creating a large and
prosperous market which would curb
the spread of Communism. Stalin
suspected that the Marshall Plan was a
guise by the Americans to interfere with
European affairs. While American
credits were certainly welcome, the
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conditions they came with were not.
Thus, Stalin sent his protégé Vyacheslav
Molotov to Paris to discuss further the
details of the aid. However, at the
conference it became clear that the
Allies were adamant in pursuing
economic integration, a prospect that
Stalin feared would undermine Soviet
influence in Eastern Europe. Thus, on
Stalin’s orders, Molotov rejected the
conditions and left the conference.
Molotov’s
departure
from
the
conference marked the beginning of an
East-West divide between the Western
Allies and Soviet Russia. This rift was
only to widen as the years progressed. In
September 1947, Stalin invited members
of the Italian, French and Eastern
European Communist parties to
Szklarska Poreba in Poland to discuss
the creation of the Communist
Information Bureau (COMINFORM),
which would coordinate the policies and
tactics of the communist parties. From
here on out, it was agreed that
cooperation between moderate and
liberal parties would end and
Communist parties would have to seize
power themselves and create societies
and economies modeled on the Soviet
system.
“THE PRINCIPLE AND DRIVING FORCE BEHIND
THE IMPERIALIST CAMP IS THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA ALLIED WITH GREAT BRITAIN
AND FRANCE. THE ANTI-FASCIST FORCES
COMPRISE OF THE SECOND CAMP: THE USSR
AND
THE
NCAV
DEMOCRACIES.”
ALEXANDER
ZHDANOV,
STALIN’S
REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SKLARSKA POREBA
CONFERENCE (1947)
By the time of the London Conference
in November 1947, the gap between the
Soviets and the Western Allies was
virtually
unbridgeable.
Both
encampments had become bitterly
divided over the issue of European
integration and Soviet attempts to
disrupt the Marshall Plan merely served
to further entrench mutual suspicions
between the Americans and themselves.
IMUN @ AC 2011
The conference disbanded on 15
December amidst a myriad of
accusations and an atmosphere of
distrust. The Soviets alleged that the
Western Allies violated the terms of the
Postdam Agreement and denied them
their share of reparations while the
Western Allies rejected Soviet plans for
a central German government over fears
that such a government would fall under
Soviet control. This shattered all hopes
for a four-power cooperation and
turned the Allies towards a policy of
ensuring closer economic cooperation in
Western Europe and the creation of a
West German state, both of which relied
on military and political integration in
West Germany into a Western
European defence system linked to the
USA directed against the USSR.
However, while Britain and America
were supportive of the economic
reconstruction of Germany, France was
not. The French were still recovering
from the German Battle of France
(1940) and thus regarded the Germans
with much distrust. Thus, the British
came up with plans for a “Western
Union”, a theoretical framework for a
defensive alliance against Germany, but
in actuality served as a veneer for an
anti-Russian coalition. The Communist
seizure of Prague, Hungary on 22
February 1947 catalysed French
ratification of the alliance system.
Additionally, American occupation of
West Germany assuaged French
concerns over a return of German
aggression. Thus on 17 March, Belgium,
Britain, France, Luxemburg, and the
Netherlands signed the Brussels’ Pact. It
provided for “defence against an
aggressor from any quarter”, but it was
clear that the “aggressor” referred to
Russia.
The Russian position had also
strengthened significantly by this time.
By June 1948, the Cominform had
become a powerful instrument for
Page 17 of 19
JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
controlling the Soviet Bloc. Political
diversity in Eastern Europe was ended
and Communist hegemony in the region
was established. The East-West divide
was now clearly apparent and it seemed
as though another war was waiting to
happen.
IMUN @ AC 2011
Western Zones on 23 June 1948, the
Soviets seized the opportunity to declare
a full blockade of West Germany in
what was to be known as the Berlin
Blockade.
VI.
Closing Remarks
Delegates, we are now in a position to
force those American swine to concede
to our demands. Berlin is in our territory
and should be rightfully ours, as should
the rest of Germany. Join me now, as I
fulfill our destiny for global revolution.
This is the class struggle that our friend
Stalin in Moscow foretold. Rise! I say,
and crush these capitalist swine once
and for all!
The London Conference and the
Brussels’ Pact cemented Allied-Soviet
animosity. Stalin regarded both events as
Allied challenges to Soviet influence and
thus set in motion his plans to force the
Allies to reconsider their position on
Germany. Thus, he began to step up
efforts to control people and goods
flowing in and out of West Berlin to
West Germany. Stalin was cognizant
that West Berlin was heavily dependent
on supplies from West Germany which
were transported via a road and rail lines
that ran through the Soviet Zone. When
the Deutschemark was introduced in
Für den Kommunismus!
Otto Grotewhol
Prime Minister of the German
Democratic Republic
***
Page 18 of 19
JOINT CABINET CRISIS: EAST BERLIN CABINET (1948)
IMUN @ AC 2011
Endnotes:
1. Walsh, Ben. Modern World History 2nd Ed. © 2001 Hodder Education p.332
2. Lynch, Michael. Reaction and Revolution: Russia 1894 – 1924 3rd Ed. © 2005 Hodder
Education p. 9 – 10
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p. 21
5. Ibid p. 35
6. Ibid p. 38
7. Ibid
8. Ibid p. 44
9. Ibid p. 45
10. Ibid p. 47
11. Ibid p. 61
12. http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/17octprg.html [Author Unknown], The
Octobrists. © [Date Unknown] Last accessed: 26.12.10
13. Lynch, p. 61
14. Ibid
15. Ibid, p. 63
16. Ibid, p. 65
17. Ibid, p. 67
18. Ibid, p. 72
19. Ibid, p. 74
20. Ibid, p. 74 – 75
21. Ibid
22. Ibid, p. 77
23. Ibid, p. 78
24. Ibid, p. 79
25. Ibid, p. 80
26. Ibid, p. 91
27. Ibid, p. 95 – 96
28. Ibid, p. 96
Page 19 of 19