How Do Civil Society Associations
Promote Deliberative Democracy?1
By Douglas Chalmers
Columbia University
Civil society organizations make (at least) five types of contributions to the
cognitive side of political deliberation2 –knowledge of the conditions of affected
groups, best practices, understandings of underlying factors, evaluations of
claims made and space for discussion. Whether or not these contributions are
significant in any particular case, or whether they promote democracy will
depend on, among other things, the informal institutions that link civil society
associations together, and to the polity.
Many believe that strengthening civil society in Latin American countries
will strengthen democracy. Others think that civil society associations weaken
and fragment the political parties and government institutions on which
democracy depends. In this paper I take both as serious possibilities, and look for
a way to discover what factors make the difference.
Those factors will surely include the overall political conditions (e.g., the
regime and whether it is legitimate), the size and resource base of the civil society
organizations themselves, and the quality of their leadership. In this short essay,
I want to highlight two other factors, the politically relevant structure of civil
society itself, and the institutions and practices which have evolved linking civil
society and the state. In this I am joining with many others who respond to the
question of whether civil society organizations are promoting democracy by
saying, “It depends on the political context.” I share the view that, with the
exception of situations of breakdown, civil society organizations cannot substitute
for the state or political parties. But on the other hand, I believe that in
contemporary circumstances, parties and government depend on civil society
associations. The issue at hand is to discover what sort of relationship between
them works.
Even narrowing the topic of democratizing factors to the self-organization
and political links of civil society, however, leaves an enormous agenda. In this
A sketch for framing the question, prepared for presentation at the Latin American Studies
Association convention, Washington D.C., September 2001
1
‘Deliberative politics” in current discussions in political theory places emphasis on moral
argument. In my usage here, the emphasis is on the cognitive dimensions of that argument. The
two are closely connected – to reason through a moral difference will no doubt involve
discussions of empirical facts and causal relations. At some point, perhaps, the argument
becomes merely a confrontation between moral positions. I am pointing to the cognitive side of
deliberation, which I believe is in fact a much greater part of deliberation than these theorists
seem to think.
2
paper I will deal with only one – but an important – aspect of the relationships of
civil society associations and politics. I start from the observation that civil
society associations’ positive and negative contributions to democratic politics
can’t be understood without discussing how they fit into the cognitive side of
deliberative politics. NGO’s, social movements, labor unions, special interest
groups, professional associations, think tanks, neighborhood organizations, self
help organizations, environmental groups and all the other formations in the
rapidly changing world of civil society organizations generate information and
ideas, and help (or hinder) debate and discussion. All political actors, including
those in civil society, do other things in politics – represent interests in political
bargaining, participate in election campaigns, have a share in implementing
policies, demonstrate to influence legislators, even riot to delegitimize power
holders. But another thing they do is to gather information, conduct research,
formulate strategies and debate with many others on what the real preferences of
actors are, what the circumstances are that shape opportunities, and what, in the
end, will work. It is my contention that without assessing the role of civil society
in this deliberative process, we will miss important contributions to democracy
made by civil society, as well as arenas where they may do the most damage.
A plea for including the cognitive side of politics
Highlighting the role of civil society associations in cognitive politics
requires not only changing our optic for observing civil society, but for politics
itself. The modern tools of political analysis have made impressive strides by
assuming ideas in the real world are simply at the service of interests, that
preferences can be assumed as given, and that knowledge of the situation is
known imperfectly but consistently. They have done so by assuming that
discussion, clarification, research, and thinking through problems happens
before ‘politics’, or somehow only on the periphery.
But it remains a fact that much of the activity of politics lies in figuring out
what to do, what lines of action actually might produce desirable outcomes, what,
in fact, desirable outcomes are, what are the concrete meaning of competing
abstract moral principles, and many other puzzles that we collectively work
through. It involves a constant flow of information and analysis, good and bad,
relevant and not, generated for various reasons: to buttress demands, as part of a
professional commitment, or to satisfy curiosity. Governments compile statistics,
parties conduct formal or informal polls to assess public mood, government
agencies and commissions put together talking points and analyses of problems
and potential solutions and many other products of data, processed into usable
form, which we call information.
I believe that assuming away these processes, or assuming that they take
place before, or on the periphery of ‘real’ politics may soon prove a costly
intellectual strategy. The enormous increase in available data, analytical skills
and the experimental and imaginative means to confront theories with
information will, I think, demand closer attention to those processes. The endless
half-truths and misstatements of politicians and officials, and the secrecy and
calculated ignorance surrounding important decisions, are being challenged. Not
necessarily by truth seekers, but by people with more information and more
ability to use it. Attention must shift from the question of how ideas are
strategically used – which is the tendency of much modern analysis of the politics
of ideas, to how this information, true and false, fits into a process of ascertaining
truth, testing ideas, and exploring possibilities.
If this cognitive side of politics is significant, then, I am arguing, assessing
any set of actors in politics, requires that we assess whether they are important in
this cognitive process. To say that an environmental group or an organization
concerned with micro-credit for women is playing a significant political role, we
may, and should, ask if the interests of the groups they identify with prevail in the
‘who gets what’ of politics. On the other hand, it is wholly possible, and even
likely, that their significant role may be to interject information which alters the
terms of the debate, provides analyses which lead groups to redefine their
preferences, make projections which affect how people think of the range of
possible actions, and other dimensions which may not even redound to ‘their’
group’s benefit. Significance should not always be measured by making some set
of interests prevail.
One way to looking at what I am calling cognitive politics is to ask if ‘ideas
are important’ in determining policy. That is a misleading formulation, however,
because it is only one form of importance to have a fixed idea which prevails.
Most of the civil society organizations and groups that play an important role, I
believe, do so by becoming involved in the process of gathering information and
participating in the many analytical, information and theory driven debates,
discussions, researches, explorations and investigations going on in the political
process. It is not just an idea prevailing, but rather participation in structuring
the ever changing ideas.
The reason for insisting on this additional dimension of politics, the
cognitive one, is not to promote a new reductionism. I don’t believe that one can
explain enduring social inequality, the conjunction of extraordinary strides in
productivity along with dramatic economic instability, or the persistent fragility
of democratic institutions without recourse to the play of interested power
holders, for whom the ‘search for truth’ may be simply a matter of hiring the right
experts. But the cognitive dimensions are important not only for understanding
outcomes, but also, and particularly for understanding the institutions of
democracy – the elements of that regime which make processes concrete and
predictable. Consolidation of democracy must include the arrangement of
institutions which will make good decisions based on good information. The
concern for democratic governance, for the strength and quality of institutions,
for all those elements which constitute the stable elements of a regime or a
political system, require attention to cognitive politics.
My purpose here, however, is not to rewrite institutional analysis, but
rather to suggest that on the topic of much discussion – on this panel and
throughout the profession and in society – the role of a growing civil society, I
believe we will miss perhaps the major element of its impact – good or bad – on
democratic governance, if we do not assess its role in that cognitive dimension of
politics. The weakness of civil society associations as well as its strength, I
believe, require including that dimension.
Civil society associations and cognitive politics
What role do the NGO’s think tanks, advocacy groups, local associations
and other civil society associations play? Here I wish to suggest five areas where
civil society organizations may have a significant contribution to make – or
significant mischief to perform. They are meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive.
These are
· the provision of knowledge of localities and population groups
relevant to policy
· information about ‘best practices’ or the way in which similar
problems have been addressed is other places
· understandings of the fundamental factors affecting success and
failure in this policy area, i.e., the relevant theory,
· on going assessments of the claims of other actors in the debate,
and
· provision of venues in which stakeholders and other important
actors can carry on the necessary deliberation.
All but the last may take the form of legislative proposals, manifestos to
the press, informal advice, memos to parties, legislators or government officials,
or in may other forms. In part this will depend on the practices and norms which
I will call second level institutions, which I will touch on after I discuss each type
of contribution briefly.
In this discussion, I want to highlight what appear to be advantages and
disadvantages a civil society association has over more central actors (political
parties, government officials, or legislators), more importantly, the advantages
and disadvantages that the ensemble of all the civil society associations have over
them, and the sort of pathologies that might result.
1. Knowledge of affected groups: NGO’s, neighborhood associations,
women’s movements, human rights groups or professional or commercial
associations claim, with considerable justice, to know the conditions of their
clienteles or constituencies better than government officials and local politicians.
If politicians and officials have been dealing with a problem affecting a groups for
a long time, they may have more or better information, and given their broader
responsibilities, better suited to work into legislation or policy. But in the
complexity of social life, there are almost certainly clusters of people, e.g., women
in the workplace, or residents along a waterway that crosses state boundaries, or
indigenous communities across a country, who have not and may never play the
kind of role in electoral politics or administrative activities which would have
made them subject of study by politicians or government officials. Such groups
do, however, become the object of legislation or policy.
Not certainly, but with some relatively high probability, civil society
associations which have been formed to deal specifically with that set of people
will be able to provide the necessary information about the attitudes, physical
conditions, and likely reactions of that set. Not only may they have worked with
such groups and acquired such information, but they may also be less inclined to
distort the information in the interest of some broader political agenda, or skew it
to fit some official government version.
But the issue is clearer if we look at it from the point of view of the political
system as a whole, and not just the relative merits of one politician, official or
NGO. Given the complexity and rapid change in policy problems, a rich and
complex array of civil society associations will be able to generate better
information than politicians or officials about groups that are constantly being
defined and redefines in legislation – such as teen mothers or those affected by
environmental regulations on land use in watersheds. Existing specialized groups
may be relevant, or groups or coalitions may form specifically for a policy debate.
Sometimes, it is true, the general view of the official or politicians will be crucial,
but often it will need to be matched with the precise information of suitably
organized groups.
This is not simply an argument for building affected people into the
decision making process. Democratic norms concerning deliberative democracy
often put emphasis on building in the those being affected into the process of
legislation. This is desirable for many reasons, in part because some things about
their own situation can only be really known by the people themselves. But it is
not always completely true that the command all the information about ‘their’
own experience. It is not always certain that a representative of the group, by
themselves knows the situation of the group best. If the group is dispersed, (such
as indigenous populations), or if it is newly identified (such as those affected by
pollution from a production process), or those affected by a ‘hidden’ social
process (such as the members of one or another underground economy), the
‘experts’ will often be as important as the participants in identifying the factors
which impinge on that population, and which are crucial for policy. Both expert
and participant information is needed to ground policies. It is plausible that the
need for that combination, and the increasing availability of the experts, is one of
the structural reasons for the emergence of the NGO sector.
Saying that they may have such information does not, of course argue that
all civil society associations do in fact have good information, or that they supply
it effectively. They may get it wrong, or deliver it in such a way that it inhibits the
decision making process or warps it away from democratic norms.3
At this point I should introduce a set of standards not only abut what makes a decision making
process smooth and efficient – which is relatively easy – but also what makes its unfolding and its
outcomes democratic – which is very difficult. Despite the recent explosion of thinking about
‘deliberative democracy’, I find the debate confused, and will here simply make the rather
3
A particular NGO may be comprised of professionals dropping in from
outside (even abroad) who may claim to know a some important things about a
group, but lack the depth of knowledge about local customs and conditions to
effectively understand what attitudes mean and what unexpected consequences
would flow from the adoption of a policy. Alternatively, they may be so tied to
their own political agendas, driven by donors or ideologically-inspired parent
organizations that the information is faulty.
Looking at the problem from the system as a whole, the range of NGOs,
think tanks, professional associations may, for all its plurality not ‘cover’ that
group, or more to the point, since the hallmarks of civil society associations are
their adaptability, they may, for some reason, not be able to generate the
appropriate focus. It might take a long time for civil society to generate the
combination of expertise and participants to provide information about the full
range of people affected by new policies regarding medical treatments
determined to be harmful, for example. Sensationalist media may make it more
likely that extremist opinions are actually heard on an issue, than what may be
more accurate representation of the total impact.
It seems plausible to expect that such local knowledge can often be better
provided by a rich arrays of civil society associations than by relying only on
government or politicians, but a desirable outcome is not certain and we will
return to ask about some of the arrangements which might make it more likely.
2. Best Practices: The second example of a type of information whose
generation and deployment may involve civil society associations is that of ‘best
practices’, that is the knowledge of the experiences in other places of the use of
policy instruments beings considered, and of the rates and circumstances of their
success and failure. Examples of such knowledge might be such things as the
techniques that have been used to abate river pollution, or knowledge of how
communities have been successfully organized to monitor such pollution. This
would include a knowledge of the currently fashionable strategies – at various
times, for example, micro finance schemes, building ‘social capital’, police
training schemes or (going back) land reform. But knowledge of best practices, if
it were to be ideal, would go beyond the fashion to a detailed knowledge of
experience in different parts of the country, or the world.
Discovering the relevant, potentially world-wide experience in dealing
with a particular problem is a complex challenge. On almost any policy topic, the
range of relevant experiences is very large, so the question here is not about
perfect knowledge, but about relative degrees of understanding. It needs to be
combined with the ‘local knowledge’ mentioned above to assess what would need
to be altered in the policy to make it locally effective. Further such knowledge of
best practices is not knowledge of a fixed set of ‘facts’ but rather being ‘up to
date’, and having such knowledge means having a way of conducting on-going
disingenuous claim that we will know a democratic deliberative process when we see it. It is
clearly a problem to be clarified.
monitoring of experiments and their results. And finally, the judgment of what
practice is considered ‘best’ will depend on the perspectives and interests of the
person doing the judging. Thus, the effectiveness of knowledge of best practices
includes an understanding of the points of view of others, and the possibilities for
satisfying the demands of a larger group than any one particular target group.
Acquiring knowledge of, and monitoring best practices goes on in
government agencies, in political party organizations (in some countries), and in
particular by the professionals in the policy making and legislative offices in
government. Individually, NGOs, policy think tanks, internationally organized
social movements and other civil society associations do not have the resources to
know practices on many issues in many locations that government officials are
likely to have have. That generalized knowledge, however, unless the issue is an
old one of high priority, is likely to be overshadowed in particular cases by the
specialized knowledge of some groups, and in its generality by the manifold
practices understood by the ensemble of civil society associations. Although it
may be easy to exaggerate, it is worth noting, too, that NGOs may also have the
advantage of reaching out to off-the-beaten track experiences, to provide a
needed element of innovation.
The relation between governments and civil society organizations is
complex, but it is worth noting that in most modern legislatures, a kind of
competitive-cooperative arrangement between the ‘special interest group’ and the
legislative staff develops, turning in part around the question of information.
Exactly what makes this sometimes contentious, sometimes perhaps too cozy
relationship work is again a matter of the informal practices that evolve to
regulate them.
Once again, all is not positive. This is not a functionalist argument that
because such information is provided, that it must be positively related to
outcomes. Much of the knowledge of practice provided by NGOs, think tanks,
international social movements and other civil society associations may well be
flawed. Knowledge of experiences in other places may be wrong, or insufficiently
understood to be adapted to new situations. Connections to sources of
information about experiences may be heavily colored by wishful thinking or
political ideologies. The understanding of the policies being proposed may be
imperfect, and thus the relevance of however perfectly understood experiences
may be minimal. These same ‘mistakes’ may characterize the work of government
agencies and legislative staffs, of course. But they might be more severe in civil
society, since civil society associations are not confronted daily with the task of
integrating policy proposals into broad government programs. Again, what
makes the difference will be the practices with which the information is ‘filtered’
as it enters the political process, and how well the civil society organizations
themselves police themselves to maintain integrity.
3. Understanding fundamentals: A third example of the kind of
knowledge civil society associations may generate and supply concerns the basic
factors at work in the society. For example, environmental policy at some level
must come to grips with the physical dynamics of global warming. Agricultural
policy is based, consciously or unconsciously on and understanding of the
biological characteristics of the products being promoted. Welfare reform aimed
at promoting family ties assume certain psychological and material processes
when women are put on or taken off welfare. The social dynamics involved when
indigenous communities are forced to change the meaning of ritual practices
needs to figure into policies about community autonomy.
For short hand, I will refer to this kind of knowledge as theory. While
theory may play an hidden role in policy making (see Keynes’ famous quote about
the influence of dead scribblers) the process of policy making can, and,
impressionistically, increasingly does, involve a conscious confrontation of policy
programs and proposals with what theoretical knowledge there is. Theories are
often competing and lacking certainty, but when choices are made, “theory” is a
way of describing our best efforts at being rational. Whether they are considered
as heuristics, or as simply piecemeal efforts to understand the dynamics of a
process which requires attention, introducing theories in an ongoing and timely
way, is a piece of cognitive politics.
Research organizations, universities and think tanks are the kinds of civil
society associations which generate theory in this sense. Some government
agencies may well have the research capacity, the time and the autonomy to reach
for such insights, but the common complaint of many bureaucrats is that such
time and resources are precisely what they do not have. Civil society associations
range from those completely preoccupied with practical implementation of their
programs, to those whose business it is to reflect on the underlying dynamics. It
is the diversity of the research and theory oriented entities in civil society which
are usually thought of as the best guarantee that a continuous process of
reflection will make possible the best possible adaptation of policy to new
situations. And, in the ideal case, theory generated from a wide range of sources
will promote the democratic ideal of taking into account the widest range of
citizens.
On the negative side, first of all there is an ‘ivory tower’ effect in which the
theory being developed in research centers is either not relevant to policy, or is
not communicated effectively. This is the sort of problem faced constantly by
universities, and I will not elaborate, except to note that building meaningful
bridges is a challenge. More dangerous, presumably is misleading or destructive
theory. This, also, is a large topic, involving a question of the role of ideology in
guiding policy, for example, or theories infected by one or another sort of
fundamentalism. Some form of linkage between civil society organizations and
politics allowing meaningful reflection on the applicability of theory and which
promotes meaningful competition between different perspectives is clearly a
desideratum, although not easy to achieve.
4. Evaluating claims
In the course of political debate, politicians and government officials use
rhetorical devices to further their goals. In a world awash in advertising where
half truths and manipulated information are taken for granted as legitimate
means of marketing, political campaigns rapidly acquire, perhaps always have
had a heavy dose of the same. One of the self proclaimed tasks of the media –
itself a part of civil society, to be sure – is to expose the deliberate falsehoods and
exaggerations of public figures. There are two difficulties with this scenario,
however. To begin with the media are obviously under their own compulsions to
shape the world of information. But rather than going into this, it is the second
problem which is more relevant here. Very few newspapers, television networks
or news magazines can support the kind of exhaustive examination of claims
about states of fact or allegations about causal relations, e.g., what relevance does
a tax plan have for correcting a downturn in economic activity, or what would be
the consequences of a plan to situate a major industry next to a certain river.
What the networks and reporters do, of course, when confronted with
government of party claims, is to consult the experts, who are often parts of civil
society.
The point is that one piece of a serious deliberation involves evaluating the
validity of assertions of fact and causal connections being made by the parties in a
political struggle or debate. Much argument in favor of policies relies on
assertions that certain actions will have, or have had specified results. As part of
significant deliberation, there must be processes in place for such assertions to be
challenged. Examples of one kind would be the assertions of politicians about the
likelihood of, say, a party’s platform proposal to increase policing to promote
public security, or to increase prosperity by reducing tariffs. Both of these might
hide considerable uncertainties and contrary evidence. Another type would be the
allegation of politicians that a certain public works project or privatization
scheme would improve society, while hiding the great personal profit that such a
scheme would net for the politician himself.
One condition of a serious democratic debate is that the actors take each
other’s positions seriously, but we know that taking someone seriously includes
not automatically assuming the validity of their factual arguments, however
much we might be constrained to grant them their right to their own moral
positions. With regard to factual and causal assertions, respect demands
assessment to show if and how they are wrong and how to make progress in
getting closer to a commonly agreed upon position, if possible. Symbolically and
psychologically, it may be difficult for politicians to grant the correctness of
factual criticism, but that, surely is part of what effective deliberation would
require.
Civil society associations are in a good position to play this whistleblowing, watchdog role, although the advantages are relative. It is not so much
the relative independence of NGOs and autonomous think tanks that would
guarantee the kind of purposive objectivity. After all, even if the commitment of
an NGO is ‘only’ to a foreign donor, or to a particular ethnic group, or to a
privileged community, those are commitments which makes it at least as likely
that their vision of the relevant facts and theories will be as skewed towards these
interests. Rather, it is a combination of first, having groups with competing
perspectives and interests who will have the incentive to challenge claims, and,
even more, the fact that civil society is diverse, multiple and constantly changing
which presents the possibility of serious evaluation of claims. A challenge to a
politicians promoting a policy he says will serve the poor will be more effective if
there are others who are able to either validate or modify that challenge.
The onslaught of critical evaluations from civil society may be destructive
as well. One of the hallmarks of contemporary political action is a widespread
cynicism about government. Collectively the media and civil society organizations
may be swept along in a wave of such cynicism, promoting the very problems
often, that the critics are criticizing. Civil society may be so divided – as in the
case of an ethnically divided society which has moved toward conflict, that the
drum beat of hostile civil society demands may accentuate an already difficult
situation.
I am now in territory where I would require a much more rigorous
definition of what one might call the ‘ideal political debate situation’ to determine
when the actions of civil society in holding politicians and officials to account for
the factual accuracy and theoretical adequacy of their statements promote or
inhibit good government and democracy. I think I can assume for the present,
however, that the impact of civil society’s critical evaluation can both be crucial
for an open society in which political half truths are exposed, and on the other
hand may be severely problematic. As with the other ways in which civil society
associations become involved in politics, the variation requires a look at the
institutions and regulations, formal and informal, which control their impact.
5. Providing space for debate
In a democracy, the form and location of political debate yielding
authoritative decisions are shaped by the institutions described in the
Constitution. The central institutions of legislature and executive and usually the
high courts are the venue of decision making which gains the sanction of law and
law enforcement. In liberal democracies, popular sovereignty is expressed
through elections of the actors in those institutions, and a legislature comprised
of people designated as representatives. The venue for authoritative deliberation,
as well as the more commonly analyzed bargaining, lies in those institutions. Civil
society associations may partake in those authoritative decision making processes
through either some kind of lobbying practice with the legislature and executive,
or through the grant of formal status on established councils or corporatist
chambers.
But the final authoritative decision process is only the tip of the iceberg, so
to speak, of deliberative processes in politics. Within the bureaucracy, in the
informal discussions among the staff of legislators, in party councils and
discussions, there are, of course, thousands of instances of deliberation among
the actors who are formally part of the final sovereign system, but conducted in
an informal, perhaps preparatory way.
Discussions in civil society are, of course also extremely numerous.
Ranging from relatively casual discussions among friends concerning the effects
of one’s vote, to the very many conferences and workshops and forums held in
Universities, policy research organizations or simply at the behest of a concerned
foundation, debate, discussion and deliberation with an intent to influence policy
is undertaken throughout civil society. Deciding whether any of these is an
important and positive piece of politics depends on first, on how its is structured,
second, on whether these discussion are connected with decision making and
thirdly on and second on an assessment of their impact.
Civil society organizations sometimes have an important role in bringing
together stakeholders who would not otherwise participate in a public debate.
Meetings at Universities or at think tanks can bring together, say, government
officials, environmentalist scholars and business interests who might not have
the opportunity otherwise. Private conversations often present the possibility of
‘open discussion’ where the constraints of the legislature or formal discussion are
absent.
Civil society sponsored discussions are sometimes connected to the policy
process through a straightforward impact on decision makers by their
participation in such discussions. At other times, the connection maybe through
the sponsorship of a debate which brings together opponents of current
government practices, and makes its connection through the public
demonstration of the validity of their positions. Much of the most successful
‘contentious politics’ is carried out by groups which organize discussions around
alternative venues which demonstrates the capacity to shape policies along
different lines. Much of the process of demonstrating is not particularly
deliberative, of course, and the confrontational style of, say, the protests against
globalization in recent years has been more of an effort at simple shaming
confrontation with moral positions, rather than the result of any coherent
rational dialogue within the anti-globalization movement, but we may be seeing a
process where the demonstrations in Seattle and Genoa might lead to an
intensification of an oppositional dialogue, which would fit into the model I am
considering.
Civil society associations may thus contribute to the cognitive side of
politics by making room for some of the complex debates which make up the
whole of the deliberative system of politics. There is, as always, a possible down
side as well as an up side to their impact. Hiving off discussions of public policy
into ‘private’ spaces may encourage secrecy and privilege the few. The claim of
politicians that the official public fora are more representative or more subject to
accountability needs to be taken into consideration, although it obviously can not
be taken for granted, given the imperfections of the party systems, elections and
legislatures. But it is nonetheless certain that private fora are at least, and
probably more capable of being abused. Also, delinking debate and formal
decision making power may be either frustrating or inefficient. Intensive
discussion may have no impact on legislation, for example, lacking some
mechanism of linkage. Or, debates among actors with particular agendas around
an ideological positions, separatist ethnic projects or particular economic
interests, may well spin off into an isolated and even self-defeating positions.
Once again, whether or not this ‘contribution’ of civil society to deliberative
politics is positive or negative, depends on the internal organization of civil
society, and especially on the way in which civil society organizations are linked
to the political process.
Second level institutions as conditions for civil society’s impact
In this short essay, I have tried to point out a limited list of impacts, both
positive and negative that civil society associations might have on the process of
deliberative politics. In each case, I think, the exploration of the potentials leads
to an awareness that positive impacts could only be expected if the situation is set
to process the inputs in positive ways. If the system is not in a process of
breakdown or major transformation, the institutions which emerge or are
collectively established will make the difference.
Civil society’s potential for strengthening democracy, will only be realized
if there are strong and responsible electoral systems, party systems and
legislative-executive arrangements. The latter have been the focus of many
studies of democratic consolidation. To a limited extent, the answer to the
question of what makes civil society’s contribution strong is the same as it would
be to describe what makes those institutions strong. An honest and effective
electoral system will mean that the politician critically evaluated for his or her
misleading statements may be held accountable at the next election. A President
who is able to mobilize a working majority in the legislature will be able to profit
from sophisticated understanding of basic dynamics of a policy problem and the
record of techniques used to deal with it supplied by NGOs and other civil society
organizations.
But the relationship is too complex and there are too many points of
contacts and channels of information flow to leave it to the chance of good
intentioned groups working with effective governors. In another paper4 I have
tried to lay out the logic of identifying an intermediate, or second level of
institutions, below the level of the main constitutional ones and the political
parties. Many of these are informal, but legal patterns are a part of all of them.
I will not repeat what I have said in that paper, only list the categories of
second level institutions I have identified with a brief note on the relationship of
each to the process of cognitive politics that has been the focus here.
“Civil Society’s Links to Politics: The Importance of Second Level Political Institutions” at
http://www.columbia.edu/~chalmers/CSLP.html
4
First, there are a set of rules which regulate access to decision
makers. these include lobbying rules, which perhaps should be considered part
of the rules of the legislature. But there are many other ordered ways in which
NGOs, neighborhood groups, and other civil society organizations regularly
interact. The phenomena of ‘policy fora’, whether organized by the government,
political parties, outside foundations or civil society organizations themselves,
constitutes an ‘institution’ of this kind. That is, they are provided one can show –
which I believe possible – that, in any one period in a particular country, there
are rules about which civil society organization are allowed to participate, which
ones sought out, the conventions about how to conduct discussions, and about
how the outcomes of the forums are utilized. Among these practices, norms and
rules, many of the questions raised about the impact of civil society organizations
on democratic governance will be answered.
Second, the rules and practices which regulate access to the
media will be of major importance in determining the impact of civil society
organizations. Not only is receptiveness to news and opinion from NGOs and the
like relevant, but the media practices in shaping the news. Very crudely, a
sensationalist press will probably distort the information and idea input from
civil society, as they do from politics.
Third, referring to the ‘internal’ organization of civil society itself, a
significant impact on the civil society role may be accomplished by the
development of professional sense of responsibility including the
representatives of civil society organizations. I believe the most logical
development of such a professional sense would cluster around those members of
these organizations who are specialized in some particular policy area, such as
environmental policy, or some piece of social policy, such as health delivery. Most
probably the membership of such a professional group would include specialists
in government, political parties, the universities, international organizations and
various specialized media. Bringing together all of these may fit with the
tendency in many countries for people to move from one of these ‘careers’ to
another, retaining their links with the policy area which is at the center of the
professionalization.
Like other professional organizations, such a group would form around a
body of knowledge, concerning relevant policy instruments, relevant theories,
relevant ways of aquiring and using the knowledge in that field. Although the
form might be imposed from without, the participants have a personal interest in
maintaining the integrity of that body of knowledge. Orthodoxy is enforced by
controlling training and access. In well developed professions such as medicine
and the law, this is well recognized, but even in the more informal cases of
specialists in social policy, there is a kind of enforcement mechanism by the ‘peer
reviews’ entailed in funding of grant proposals, invitation lists to conferences,
responsible membership in peer networks, and the like. As with all of these, it
should go without saying that such a professionalization of a policy sector can
enshrine elitist and/or out-of-date information or theories, depending on how
they are established, and what the rules and practice actually are.
A fourth set of ‘second level institutions’ concern the growth of a set of
organizations and businesses which provide the resources for group formation
and action, something I call the political service sector. Especially since the
civil society sector is made up not only of many, often small, groups, but also ones
that are constantly changing, the ready availability of advice, access, and
technical assistance is very important for the smooth operation of the system.
The special advantages of civil society organizations as a whole compared with
parties and government agencies, may be their ability to change rapidly, to
reformulate their structure, and to construct coalitions capable of assembling and
delivering information. The consultants, polling companies, management
consultants, media specialists and a whole range of service providers makes this
possible. This largely for profit sector (although many of these services are
provided now to NGOs by international foundations), and their ‘rhetoric’ style as
‘hired guns’ seem to contradict some people’s notions of the ‘third sector’. But
they are multiplying and are probably essential for the health of civil society‘s
impact on politics. By needing to make money, and thus favoring those who can
pay, the political service sector can push civil society organizations away from
effective and/or democratic inputs. But it is not certain, and, as usual, it depends
on the structure of this second level institution.
Finally, I will just mention the importance of the legal structure governing
non-profit and non-governmental groups. Non-profit status, restrictions on
political action (however defined), reporting and registration requirements, rules
enforcing transparency of transactions, rules governing the links with foreign
institutions and groups and other regulations, will clearly have a complicated
positive or negative effect on the activity of civil society associations.
Conclusion:
In this short essay, I have tried to focus on one small part of the equation
scholars will have to decipher in order to answer the question, “When does civil
society play a significant role in promoting democracy?” I have chosen to
emphasize the contributions that they may make in the cognitive side of the
deliberative process, selecting five categories of such contributions. It lacks a firm
criteria for what is, in fact, a democratic deliberative process, or more than a brief
indication of the institutional context, particularly at the ‘second level’ which
would make the difference between a positive and negative result. In part such a
partial approach is justified because we do not usually conceptualize questions of
democratic institution building and consolidation in terms of what I am calling
cognitive politics. It is my hope that this makes a very small step in making the
right connections.