M A D I I S S E R T A T I I O N
SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
IN
OMMUNICATIONS
2007
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A c k n o w l l e d g e m e n t t s s
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
1- Introduction……………………………..………………………………..6
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1.1
Globalized Media Worlds and Identity…...……………………………...6
1.2
Purposes and Justifications for Research.…………………………...........7
2- Literature Review……………………………………………………......12
2.1
National Identity: Egypt between the National and the Transnational…..12
2.2
The Media, Nation-State and Local Identities.……………………..........14
2.3
A Brief History of Television in Egypt..………………………………...18
2.4
Youth Turned Off: Egyptian Mediascapes Lose Out Against the Global.20
2.5
Egyptian Youth and Global Media: Between Imitation and negotiation...23
2.6
Egyptian Opposition to the Global: Resistance or Incorporation?…….....26
3- Methodology……………………………………………………………..30
4-Discussions and Analysis…………………………………….…………..35
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………... ….…………......35
4.2 Media Consumption patterns amongst Egyptian Youth ……………......36
4.2.1 Channels and Programmes Preferred………………………….37
4.2.2 Avoiding Terrestrial Television……………………………….40
4.2.3 Summary: Egyptian Mediascapes Lose Out in the Global
Media Arena ………………………………………………………..44
4.3 National Identity and Egyptian Youth………………………………….47
4.3.1 To Be Egyptian or not to be Egyptian: How Youth Regard Their
National Identity……………………………………………………47
4.4 National Identity and the Media……………………………………….51
4.4.1 Westernization in Egypt……………………………………..55
4.5 Summary: TV Must be Regarded in Context………………………….60
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5 Conclusions…………………………………………………………….62
6- References…………………………………………………………….68
7- Bibliography…………………………………………………………..76
Appendices……………………………………………………………….82
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1
1.1-Globalized Media Worlds and Identity.
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Society is now in the midst of globalisation's mighty embrace: borders have become increasingly porous as images, information and people are being exported with ease and speed across and beyond territorial boundaries. According to Baylis and Smith, globalisation is the process of: “increasing interconnectedness between societies, such that events in one part of the world, more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away.” 2
This interconnectedness is facilitated by modern and sophisticated communications networks that have allowed information and ideas to be carried rapidly and instantaneously from one corner of the world to another. Thus, our communications activities have become increasingly internationalized bypassing the traditional boundaries of nation-states as satellite links, internet highways and fiber optic cables have become a global feature. Such revolutions in technology have created a "global compression of the world, "
3 allowing the universe to enter into new conditions of neighborliness and interaction.
According to Anthony Giddens, our mediated world has come to transcend the constraints of clock time and geographical location as communication and interaction now take place instantaneously between distant locations. He used the term "empty space"
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referring to a separation of space from place .
In other words, place can be understood as the physical setting of any social activity situated in a specific geographical location. In pre modern times, space and place were mainly one, as the spatial dimensions of social life were dominated by localised activities in a particular place. However, according to
Giddens, the advent of modernity has changed this: sophisticated technological capabilities and more intense transnational communication networks have meant that space and place are no longer dependent on one another as relations now take place between 'absent' others and are not pre-conditioned by faceface interaction. Thus, as a consequence of modernity, Giddens highlights place to have become increasingly phantasmagoric
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, meaning that locales are now shaped in terms of social influences that may occur many miles away. David Morley and Kevin Robins raised a similar point when they suggested that we are witnessing a disorientation of global space: “globalisation of image flows and spaces is fundamentally transforming spatiality and sense of space and place.” 6
In this light, they raise the important question: “how do we position ourselves within the new global cultural space? How do we reconcile our cognitive existence in hyperspace, in the virtual space of electronic networks, with our bodily existence in localised space?” 7
Within this hyperspace, international media organizations are conveying images and representations to global audiences, making distant issues become events of local importance for local cultures. Every one of us witnessed this with the events of 9/11: a day we were told would change the world forever. An event that occurred in a distant city- that the majority of us have probably never seen- had repercussions in the world as a whole thanks to the media. What we saw on our TV screens and read
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in our newspapers united the world with the belief that terrorism has become a real threat to us all, whether we live in London or Lahore.
Thus as national boundaries have become increasingly permeable, susceptible to the outside influences of global information networks, this no doubt has an impact upon identities and communities sustained across space.
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Myria Georgiou focused specifically on the Greek-Cypriot diasporic community and how their sense of identity is shaped in the context of highly mediated everyday worlds.
She highlighted how: "mediascapes...bring images of distant cultures close....they allow the reappropriation of the distant in relation to the immediate, they represent and mediate meanings of localities, diasporas, homelands and communities."
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Thus, the growing availability of communications technologies and ongoing processes of media consumption have allowed a growing interconnection between distant locations, and increased interaction between disparate social groups. These patterns have become central factors in processes of identity construction for members of a global community.
1.2- Purposes and Justifications for Research
In light of the above developments, an important question that must be raised is: what are the consequences of this reconstitution and redefinition of space and spatial relations
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on our everyday social and cultural lives? Such a question is at the centre of my research project, which will attempt to investigate the role of global television broadcasting in influencing national identities in the Egyptian context. I will focus particularly on Egyptian youth between the ages of 18-25, and will attempt to uncover in what ways they relate to and consume global media, and how such consumption patterns may influence their sense of national identity. The issue of national identity has become a topic of central importance in contemporary media literature as there is a growing global concern about the effects of media globalisation and its impact upon local cultures and identities. A large body of research has investigated the economic processes, i.e. production and distribution, which has uncovered patterns of vast inequality: the majority of media output is produced and delivered from the West where it dissipitates to media consumers across the globe.
Consequently, concerns have been raised about the threat posed to the existence of local, indigenous cultures; concerns that were embodied in discussions of cultural imperialism . Third-World or non-Western countries were believed to be doomed to a fate of subordinance as they were bombarded with Western media messages with no mechanism for a reciprocal response. In wake of such worrying
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trends, global fears were being voiced about the unprecedented growth and influence of American-style commercial culture: "the rise of American economic, political, and military supremacy coincided with an intense wave of American cultural influence that flooded the world in the shape of Hollywood films and
American TV series, American-style food and drink...."
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However, important as these studies are, how does the picture change when attention is switched to the process of consumption? How do international audiences in different cultural contexts interact with the media they are exposed to? We cannot simply regard viewers as passive beings who will unquestioningly absorb what they are exposed to in the media; rather, we have to look more closely at how they actively use the media to construct their own meanings. Sonia Livingstone attempted to demonstrate this with her research on soap opera audiences. She discovered that the textual openness of texts permitted audiences to make multiple readings: they were able to challenge the dominant interpretation offered by the text and to construct their own meanings and interpretations. As
Livingstone points out, in one Coronation Street narrative about adultery, 10 different explanations of the storyline were offered by viewers.
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Thus, although the media product can be packaged and delivered in a standardised manner, its meaning cannot as it differs from one receiver to another. According to
Silverstone and Hirsch, therefore, studies of consumption have been important in shedding light on the social, and social-psychological dynamics of the appropriation and use of media technologies.
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My research project will follow on from this fresh and invigorating approach to studying media audiences, which has moved away from the " top-down hypodermic-injection needle assumptions of cultural imperialism," towards a " 'bottom up resistance through indigenization and assumptions of cultural bricolage and hybridization."
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I will attempt to bring to light how Egyptian youth consume, interact with, and relate to international television broadcasting, and the implications of this on their sense of national identity.
The reason I have chosen to focus my research of Egyptian national identity on youth in particular, is due to their social and cultural flexibility, which allows them to move easily between different cultural repertoires. Where as older people are usually more attached to tradition and prone to that which is more 'familiar,' could we assume that the young find it increasingly easier to transport themselves between alternative social and cultural contexts? Georgiou seems to agree with this point when she suggests: "younger generations enjoy most of the spatial, communicational and cultural mobility and flexibility. For the young technology-literate generations a playful mobility in and out of
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their ethnicity and between diasporic and non-diasporic mediascapes and virtual scapes is a daily experience."
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Imad Karam, who conducted a comparative study in four different Arab countries including
Egypt, believes it is important to research the media consumption practices of Arab youth for two reasons. Firstly, they spend many hours a day watching television, most of it beamed by satellite. The reason for this, according to Karam, is that Arab youth have plenty of free time- either because they are jobless or still at school. Secondly, research has proven that Arab youth are "less resistant to messages received via satellite channels than they are to messages coming from state television, from school or from the family."
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In this context, television, and especially satellite television, is a central activity in the lives of Arab youth, thus raising questions about its cultural effects; to what extent can their constant exposure to visual images and information coming from the outside influence their sense of identity? My research will confirm these findings by uncovering how Egyptian youth spend most of their free time consuming television, and particularly satellite television. The assumption, however, that media can directly influence a sense of national identity will be proven a very simplistic claim: media work in conjunction with other social, political and religious institutions to construct national identity, and thus one cannot uncover the media’s true cultural impact without understanding its relationship to the other cultural establishments in society.
Why have I selected Egypt in particular as the focus of my study? As Farha Ghannam noted, many regions of the world have long remained on the edges of scholarly interest, as although they clearly embody the paradoxes and contradictions of globalisation, they represent 'other' places in alien regions
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whose study seems fruitless as it won’t enhance or improve 'our' immediate context. Such academic research has usually grouped Third World nations together into one receptive lump; few studies have actually carried out in-depth investigations in to the nature of media consumption in nations such as Egypt, Lebanon or India. For this reason, my project aims to focus the spotlight of international communications on Egypt, a largely neglected but very much significant part of the global media arena.
From the early 20 th
century, Egypt has gained a unique cultural and political position between the Eastern Islamic world and Western modernity. It represents an important cultural, political and historical region of our world, and as an established 'ally' of the West, Egypt characterizes a significant link between the West and the Muslim East. Recently, especially in post-911 times, Egypt’s delicate cultural in-betweeness has caused an explosion of tensions and persistent phenomena of hybridity.
Egyptian youth have widely embraced Western media cultures, while simultaneously remaining
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committed to religious Islamic and Arabic cultural practices. Halim Barakat, a prominent writer on Arab identity captures this paradox when he suggests: "the need to confront the West has coexisted with the emulation of Western models and paradigms." 18 A BBC report investigating the impact of Western media formats on Egyptian lives uncovers how the pervasive infiltration of Western values and lifestyles through TV screens, has pushed Egyptian culture towards an increasingly more liberal model.
Participants in the investigation mentioned how ‘free relationships’ between the sexes and revealing, more daring clothing for women, are now becoming permanent and even desired features of contemporary Egyptian society; features that are openly contradicting the conservative, Islamic essence of traditional Egyptian culture.
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For this reason, excessive Western cultural penetration can often result in a “boomerang effect”
20 ; a rejection of Western values leads to an aggressive embracement of more local, traditional identities.
In Egypt this has taken place through renewed Islamic attachments, as the adoption of traditional Islamic morals and the diffusion of Islamic dress has become widespread in Egyptian culture. As suggested by
David Morley and Kevin Robins, there has been a “reclamation or re-imagination of a sense of referential identity, the revaluation of concrete and particular experience.” 21 Thus as a response against the spread of virtual media spaces characterized by globalised information and image flows, individuals have re-attached themselves to more grounded aspects of their indigenous identity.
According to Barakat, Islamic society in general, and Egyptian society in particular, are culturally defensive
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; their strong cultural legacy underpinned by the use of the Arabic language has long been a source of great pride. As Hussein Amin suggested, however, "the sudden visual impact of popular Western mores as projected in much television programming, intensified these defenses."
23
Thus caught in a position where access to cultural repertoires from both East and West are abundant, the way young Egyptians construct identities in a highly mediated and diverse environment is at the core of this project. As this research will uncover, the way Egyptian youth respond to global media is not standard, but differs across class and gender. Working class youth use their strong religious faith as an important filter which neutralizes the culturally opposing aspects of global media: although they may adopt aspects of Western culture, they only take that which can be incorporated in to their pre-existing cultural and religious beliefs. Moreover, religion can often be actively adopted as a reaction against the infiltration of Western values.
I must make clear that as a large country with a massive population of almost 70million citizens,
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Egypt is characterized by a noticeable divide between the urban elite and the rural poor. Those living in rural villages are very unlikely to have the financial capabilities, technological infrastructure or educational skills to own a television set and a satellite dish, and more so, to watch global programming.
The situation in the capital Cairo, however, is quite different. With a population of over 16million, a quarter of all Egyptians live there. As the great majority of “publishing houses and media outlets and nearly all film studios are there, as are half of the nation's hospital beds and universities,” 25
Cairo is regarded as the centre of Egypt. For this reason, I have chosen to focus my research on urban youth living in the capital, as they are most likely to have the financial, technological and educational capabilities to consume global television.
Following chapter 1, the introduction, this dissertation will be divided into 3 main sections.
Firstly, the literature review, which will attempt to outline some of the key research that has explored the issue of media and national identity. I will begin with a general discussion of some of the most important landmark studies in this area, and will then narrow down the discussion to a more specific overview of the situation in Egypt. Firstly, I will offer a brief summary of television’s history in Egypt, and will then proceed to a discussion of how global television content has impacted upon Egyptian culture. The next section, which is the methodology, will outline the rationale for my choice of methods. Lastly, the final section will present the main research findings, and will analyse them in light of the theories outlined in the literature review.
2.1-National Identity: Egypt between the National and the Transnational
Before I begin my analysis of how global media forms have influenced an Egyptian sense of national identity, we must define what we are actually referring to when we talk of 'national identity.'
According to Anthony Smith, it is predominantly a spatial or territorial conception: "nations must possess compact, well defined territories. People and territory must, as it were, belong to each other...."
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Thus to feel part of a national community, citizens must share a common culture, ideology, a set of common understandings, ideas and aspirations that are all encapsulated within a well-marked
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geographical arena, uniting them with the sense of one joint homeland. Such a traditional conception of national identity is very much an inclusive definition underpinned by a need for geographical place. As
Georgiou confirms: "once ethnicity was bounded, or forced to be bounded, in place. The ownership of specific bounded space was a key element for sustaining identity and community space."
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However, in addition to well-defined boundaries, national communities are also sustained by more abstract commonalities such as "historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions,"
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that are shared by a particular group of people.
In the Egyptian context, Egypt is located at the heart of the Arab world and, thus the history and
‘myths’ of the pan-Arab region are integral to Egyptians’ sense of national identity. Nevertheless, Egypt is also characterized by its own unique Egyptian identity which distinguishes it from its fellow Arab nations. According to William Polk, the fact that Egypt was compressed into the Nile Valley, cut off from other Arabs by great distance, and ruled by a national (not Arab) government after 1805, then by a
British government after 1882, meant that Egypt was to achieve “an awareness of itself as a separate entity.” 29
As Milad Hanna confirms, Egypt, unlike its Arab counterparts, has long been a melting pot uniting various different civilizations.
Over many centuries, four distinct and unique civilizations have accumulated in Egypt forming its special character: Egyptian pharaohs, the Greco-Roman civilization, the Coptic Christian civilization, followed lastly by the Islamic civilization, which came about with the arrival of the Fatimids.
Furthermore, Hanna believes that Egypt’s unique geographical positioning adds another three pillars to its identity: it lies at the heart of the Arab world; it is part of the Mediterranean basin where the old civilizations emerged; and lastly, it has a special positioning on the African continent. Thus Egypt’s modern sense of national identity has been influenced by time (the four historical pillars) as well as space (the three geographical pillars), giving it “its flavour, making it culturally different from the other
Arab and Islamic countries.” 30
The Arab conquest of Egyptian lands in 642 established Islam as the dominant religion in the country, and positioned Egypt as an integral affiliate of the Arab world. Thus contemporary Egypt is very much entrenched and defined by the notion of Arab nationalism, which is supported by a glorious civilization and a grand history. According to Youssef Choueiri: "the Arab nation came in to being with the gradual elaboration of Arabic as a language of communication and the advent of Islam as a new culture and set of institutions."
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A common language and shared religion, therefore, have united the dispersed peoples of this region into one joint community, and have constituted the cornerstone of their
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sense of a homeland. Although most Arab citizens have probably never had any contact with neighbouring Arab nations, they feel united by the "myths, memories, symbols and values of Arab civilization," 32 of which they feel a part of. Thus, although Egyptians are characterized by a strong sense of national identity, which is underpinned by a majestic non-Arab past of 4000 years, bought to peak with the exciting archaeological discoveries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they are also deeply part of a pan-Arab transnational identity which unites peoples of this region with a shared language, common culture and symbols. As Fred Halliday suggested, “there remains a co-existence of pan-Arab and state-centred nationalism.” 33
2.2-The Media, Nation-State and Local Identities.
Benedict Anderson's seminal work Imagined Communities , confirms how the need for common myths and symbols are the foundations that sustain any form of national belonging. Anderson's analysis adds an important dimension to the study of national identity- that of the mass media. As Smith suggested: "the task of ensuring a common public, mass culture has been handed over to the agencies of popular socialization,"
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and so in this sense, "sharing common media has advanced and underpinned a sense of belonging in a common project- that of the nation."
35
According to Anderson, even though members of a nation will never know, hear of, or see fellow-members of their community, "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." 36 This was made possible by the advent of the printing revolution that allowed readers speaking in various local dialects to understand each other, as newspapers and novels were printed in the same language.
In this light, the media, through their creation of a "shared symbolic space"
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that allowed absent others to engage in a “joint, public ritual,”
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helped epitomize the sense of a national consciousness.
However, according to Philip Schlesinger, Anderson's analysis can be criticized for singling out the newspaper as the most important factor underpinning the 'imagined community' of the nation, and not updating his argument to take in to account the later, but substantial effects of radio and television. As
Schlesinger notes: "Anderson does not push the argument further to take account of later, post-
Gutenberg media technologies, and to try and examine their implications for the consciousness of nationhood."
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Nevertheless, the nation must not only be recognized as a cultural construction, but also as an important political entity – as the nation-state . Where as nation refers to a group of people who
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recognize each other as sharing a common identity, the nation-state is a political community in which the state claims legitimacy on the grounds that it represents the nation.
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It is a political community where comprehensive and supreme authority is exercised within a designated territorial domain. The media have been one of the main tools utilized by the state to impose a condition of unity and uniformity upon the nation. For instance, Paddy Scannell’s research into the BBC demonstrates how broadcasting can be conceived by the state as a public good allowing them to maintain a sense of order and stability. As
Scannell suggests: “broadcasting created, in effect, a new national calendar of public events.
Unobtrusively threaded through the continuing daily output was the cyclical reproduction…of an orderly and regular progression of festivities, celebrations and remembrances.”
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Thus the media have not only been important in maintaining the cultural ties that bind a national community together, but also in providing the tools that allow states to maintain uniformity and control within a specific political community. As Anderson noted, the nation-state is not natural, but is a political entity and a cultural artefact.
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As Anderson’s analysis focuses on a specific historical period, we can give it more contemporary relevance by mentioning the changes that have come about with the advent of the information revolution: the development of modern and sophisticated communications channels mean the media's ability to sustain a sense of common identity across space has increased many folds. As Silverstone highlighted, in today's media age, a "sense of identity and authenticity, can be found not in the world of face-to-face relationships...but in the displacement of the real by the electronic and the virtual." 43 Today, the context is one of intense transnational interconnection: rather than solely receiving symbols, myths and cultural images specific to their particular national community, people are exposed to foreign values and traditions from distant locations that invade their private sphere's via mass media outlets. In light of such developments, I aim to investigate how young Egyptians, exposed to such a diverse media environment, formulate their sense of national identity and belonging; is it shaped more through screens, digits and wires than through nationally shared experience? If this is so, then how relevant are the social and religious particularities of the Egyptian nation in shaping their sense of identity?
The reason I have chosen television as the focus of my project, is due to its ever-present nature in our daily existence. As suggested by Roger Silverstone: " how is it that such a technology and medium has found its way so profoundly and intimately into the fabric of our daily lives? How is it that it stays there?"
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Thus, unlike other communications technologies, television has become so deeply embedded and entrenched in our daily routines, that it functions as "a kind of national calendar which organizes,
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coordinates and renews a national public social world."
45
According to Karam, young people in the Arab world spend on average more time watching satellite broadcasts then they spend in school or with their families.
46 More specifically, in the Egyptian context, television is an almost inevitable and taken for granted feature of daily life to the extent that even those barely living above Cairo's poverty line, in most cases, own a television set; the rooftops of some of Cairo's poorest districts are decorated with television antennae and satellite dishes.
As Tourya Guaaybess confirms, “most Egyptians have access to television since this entertainment medium is of a collective nature and television screens are found in many public venues.” 47
Thus television has a powerful hold over Egyptian people, providing them with entertainment, information and culture. The birth of Egyptian television came in 1960 with the launching of its first Channel 1. Channel 2 appeared after 1 year, and although it shut down 6 years later, it was dominated by foreign programming reflecting a desire to open Egyptian television to the outside world.
The third channel, Channel 3, was launched later in 1962, and was more culture orientated focusing on urban areas. Officially, there are now 8 national Egyptian television channels in Egypt and most of the programming schedules are dominated by local and Arab productions.
48
Farha Ghannam's research in to how local identities in Cairo are informed and constructed via the global, provides a vivid example of the extent to which TV invades the private spheres of working class Egyptians, and has become a pivotal source in their forging of a sense of collective identity. In
Anderson's terms, TV in Egypt became a means of constructing an 'imagined' projection of the home. As
Ghannam describes: "Amal's images of the desired home are constructed, as is the case with many other children, from global images transmitted to them through TV programmes....Her dreams, as well as those of her sisters,....are informed by the movies and soap operas that they like to watch."
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However, to truly grasp the pervasive and ever-present nature of television in Egypt, and to understand the nature of its audiences, I will go beyond the technology itself and underscore some of the social and historical factors that have shaped its present existence. As Silverstone confirmed: "it is because it is so deeply embedded, and because political, economic and social factors are themselves so powerfully interwoven in TV's existence that we need to give even greater attention to the medium as a complex and multiply determined force in modern society."
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A landmark study in this respect was David Morley's The Nationwide Audience, which attempted to investigate how the complex and divergent backgrounds of audiences who consume the current affairs program influences the meanings they give to it. Morley began by highlighting three positions that
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audiences can take in relation to an encoded message: the dominant code is where the audience take the proposed meaning of the text fully, while with negotiated decoding , he/she takes the meaning broadly but can modify or partially inflect the given preferred meaning. The third position is an oppositional decoding where the audience member brings to bear an alternative frame of reference which sets the encoded framework to one side.
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Morley showed two Nationwide programs which dealt with political or controversial topics to 29 groups of people, and recorded the subsequent conversations that took place afterwards. There were four main groups, differentiated on the basis of socio-economic position: there were managers, students, apprentices and trade-unionists.
The results were quite 'path-breaking'
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as they demonstrated just how complex responses to the media can be. Managers, for example, tended to manifest a dominant coding, while shop stewards tended to be actively critical, seeing Nationwide from a radical working-class perspective. With respect to international television, this study demonstrated that the way audiences consume the media is a far from straightforward process: "Western news programs would be decoded by audiences according to their own cultural backgrounds in ways which would undercut the ideological effect of Western news within other cultures." 53 This study confirms how media consumption is a complex process which goes beyond the media text itself, and as audiences are characterised by differing demographic characteristics, this will no doubt influence the meanings they attach to television programs.
2.3-A Brief History of Television in Egypt
In order to truly grasp the nature of television audiences in Egypt, I must highlight some of the most significant social, political and economic particularities of contemporary Egyptian history that will no doubt have affected both the content of television and patterns of consumption. Egypt's broadcasting products are the most popular and influential in the Arab world, which has established the Egyptian accent as the lingua franca of the Middle East.
54
From the 1920s onwards, Egyptian cinema dominated the Arab market and became the second most important source of national income.
55
As Lila Abu Lughod noted, Egypt must be recognized as a "unique cultural centre, dominant in the Arab region. As the premier producer of film and television in the Arab world, Egypt played host in
1995 to the first Arab Television Festival." 56 Since its introduction in the 1960's, Egyptian television, modelled on a public service ideology, has been centralized and linked to the state, and thus, has always been a strong vehicle for maintaining national pride. As Abu-Lughod suggests, it has become "one of the
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richest and most intriguing technologies of nation building in Egypt, because it works at both the cultural and socio-political levels..."
57
However, significant changes that occurred in Egypt's economic and political history in the
1990's were to change this: in an attempt to solve Egypt's economic and financial problems, President
Sadat suspended relations with the Soviet Union and instead directed his efforts towards the USA. He turned to the Americans for political support in the conflict with Israel, and for aid in the economic and technological development of the country.
58 Consequently, in 1974, Sadat declared the infitah or economic 'open-door policy,' reversing president Abdel Nasser's Egyptianization and nationalization of all large industrial firms, all banks and insurance companies, and a great number of trade and service establishments.
With the spread of economic liberalization, therefore, Egypt was opened up to foreign investment, and new laws were passed to grant much greater concessions to foreign investors.
59
The increased presence of multinational companies brought about a rapid growth in the world of consumption, which extended the impact of globalization into the everyday lives of people in Egypt.
Thus, since the start of Sadat's open-door policy, "Cairo has witnessed the introduction of new forms of communication, more emphasis on international tourism, increasing the importance of consumer goods, and a growing flow of ideas related to civil society, democracy and political participation."
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These trends were reflected in the media, as television's reorientation towards the West, and particularly
America, was a direct reflection of the Egyptian government's change of international political orientation.
61
Billboard images and TV screens used rap-music to sell Coca-Cola, while film stars were used to capture female consumers for competing brands of laundry detergent manufactured by Unilever and Proctor and Gamble.
62
Thus, since the 1970's, the media, as other institutions in Egyptian society, were forced to adapt themselves to the new global economic milieu based on Western models: there was a growing presence of foreign multinational companies and increasing patterns of privatization. Similarly, as an aftermath of the 'open door' economic policies, there was a rapid commercialization of public service television during the 90's, and with the growing proliferation of the satellite dish, "millions of Egyptians gained access to images of what was happening in the remotest corners of the earth."
63
As confirmed by Sonia
Dabbous, the media in Egypt are very much a political child which reflect "the turbulence, the changes, and the different landmarks the rulers of Egypt have left behind."
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From the 1960’s, the content of Egyptian television was very much influenced by the West: foreign and especially American material was commonly dubbed or subtitled in Arabic for Egyptian consumption. Programs such as I Love Lucy and The Fugitive hooked Egyptian viewers 2 or 3 times a week, while after the 1973 war with Israel, popular programs like Ikhtarna Lak broadcast large segments of US entertainment programs, talk shows and weekly series such as Six Million Dollar Man and The
Bionic Woman . Moreover, since the beginning of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in 1981, even more foreign programming has appeared on Egyptian television, while the growing ownership of satellite television has increased the exposure to Western material many folds: Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) means material was able to bypass government broadcast institutions and reach Egyptian homes directly. The uncensored programming available has been at the centre of much controversy in the country: MTV especially, has received much criticism for exposing Egyptian viewers to large doses of sex and violence. It also had a strong impact on Egyptian music as several music clips were shot that displayed foreign, scantily clad women dancing liberally. Consequently, such clips were banned by the censors as the gestures and mode of dress of the models were regarded as highly obscene and contradicting to
Egyptian culture.
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For these reasons, television in Egypt has been at the centre of much national discussion;
Egyptians have expressed concern about information that is being broadcast from the West and the rapid influx of alien values. “They view the constant flow of Western pop culture as a threat to their civilization and culture….the sudden and addictive impact of Western popular cultural products….has intensified the defensiveness of the Arab world.” 66
For this reason, censorship has been severely applied to Egyptian media: the first law of censorship was introduced in 1975 where censors were given the freedom to remove scenes conflicting with religion and national security, social ethics and traditional norms. Thus sex scenes in foreign series like Falcon Crest were removed, while others that dealt with taboo subjects such as divorce were eventually banned from screen.
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It seems, therefore, that early on since its conception, TV in Egypt has very much been influenced by Western models and Western media content. In this context, as images of foreign cultures have, for a long time, been transferred directly to the private spheres of Egyptian homes, what are the consequences of this on their sense of national identity?
2.4- Youth Turned Off: Egyptian Mediascapes Lose Out Against the Global.
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To uncover the media’s influence on an Egyptian sense of national identity, we must begin by asking what the patterns of media consumption are amongst Egyptian youth: are they preferring
Western, or locally made productions? After conducting a much needed study on television consumption in Egypt during 1998, Hala Abdel Rahman highlighted that there were an estimated 750,000 C-band dishes in Cairo alone. Her study, which investigated the viewing habits of 310 satellite viewers in Cairo, displayed some interesting results: 57.4 percent of the total number of viewers reported watching more international satellite TV services than Arabic satellite TV services, while 36.8 percent of the total respondents preferred Arabic satellite TV services. Additionally, 89% of the sample reported that they watch satellite TV to understand what's going on in the world and 81% watch satellite TV to learn from things happening in the world.
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A proponent of the cultural imperialism theory would suggest that these statistics are perfect proof that a cultural imposition is taking place; satellite media bombarded with
Western images and alien values are penetrating and diluting the cultural identities of Egyptians.
However, this is an extremely simplified explanation of these trends, and Abdel Rahman offers a more viable interpretation.
Abdel Rahman believes Egyptian viewers are preferring Western media not as a replacement of their own cultural identities and allegiances, but rather, as a replacement of the poor quality programming that Egyptian national TV has to offer: "one of the most noticeable differences between
Eastern channels and Western ones is that the Western channels have a higher level of sophistication in their use of graphics and advanced technology." 69 When participants were asked specifically about the motives that drive them towards international satellite television, the most popular response among heavy viewers, with 93 percent, was that they watch satellite TV “to understand what’s going on in the world.” Diversity is the next highest motivation for heavy viewers in the satellite TV households; 92 percent reported that they watch satellite TV "because there is a wide variety of channels."
70
Indeed, it could be that national programming is unable to fulfil the requirements of these viewers: as I regularly watch Egyptian television myself, I am well aware of the standardisation of its programming and the lack of choice in what is covered.
Broadcasting systems in Egypt, according to Hussein Amin, are absolute monopolies: they are considered strategic political tools that preserve national unity, and are thus centralized under direct government supervision.
71
All foreign-registered publications are subject to government censorship, and those that are registered as Egyptian, censor themselves, avoiding issues that are taboo or involve government criticism.
72
Referring back to Scannell’s analysis of the BBC, the Egyptian case confirms how media are often used by states as vehicles of political control to maintain a sense of uniformity and
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order. Thus, to overcome this lack of diversity, and to gain a more rounded and accurate picture of world events free of government control, it is no wonder that viewers turn to Western based media to satisfy their needs. As the results of this research will demonstrate, Egyptian youth turn to satellite television to compensate for the poor quality of national broadcasting: it provides the pleasure, freedom and diversity they can’t otherwise find in their local productions. Interestingly, however, the majority of youth I interviewed preferred programmes broadcast on regional Arabic channels in the Arabic language, although there was a strong preference for such programmes to adopt a Western format. It appears, therefore, that when presented with a choice, Egyptian youth will prefer media content that is as close as possible to their own social and cultural particularities. Additionally, Western media were almost subordinated as the participants maintained that they only consumed them in the areas where their own national media have failed.
Karam's research on Arab youth (17-26 years) in four different Arab countries, uncovers how
Arab media are regarded by them as inefficient, failing to effectively address young people's concerns and aspirations including employment, education or marriage.
73
Although programs which cover international politics or discuss the region's political/economic instability are abundant, "there remains a need for programmes that address the issues still considered largely taboo in Arab society , such as relationships between boys and girls.”
74
As one 19 year old male participant commented: "it hardly happens that I find serious programmes, and when I do, the presenter would be a very old man....We need to see and hear young people. We would love to hear ideas and problem solving from young people.”
75
Thus the fact that Arab broadcasting has largely ignored the problems and issues facing their youth, may have forced them to direct their consumption practices elsewhere, turning to 'other' media as a more adequate replacement.
Daniel Miller, in his study of Trinidadian culture and how it has been influenced by global programming genres, found similar results. He believes the reason why many Trinidadians turn to foreign soaps, is due to the poor quality nature of local television: "there is considerable concern with the quality and significance of locally made television and a ready tendency to contrast it unfavourably with imports."
76
In this context, Trinidadians have turned to the imported programme which has the potential to articulate aspects of the 'local,' which locally produced programming has failed to incorporate. My research will confirm this point by uncovering how working class youth turn to Western media, which are able to translate and represent aspects of Islamic values that Egyptian productions have failed to do.
Thus, both the Trinidadian and Egyptian examples highlight that viewers don’t passively turn to international broadcasting due to its cultural superiority, but rather, they make an active choice to
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consume it as it plays more of a complementary role by filling in the gaps where national media has failed.
2.5- Egyptian Youth and Global Media: Between Imitation and Negotiation.
An important point that must be stressed, is that when consumers are exposed to Western media, they aren’t passive in the process. According to Martin-Barbero: "people first filter and reorganise what comes from the hegemonic culture and then integrate and fuse this with what comes from their own historical memory."
77
In an attempt to test this, Marie Gillespie conducted a study on how British youth of Indian origin consume British television. According to Gillespie: "...their immediate, local concerns are projected on to such soaps and the cultural specifities of Punjabi family life inflect their readings."
78
Thus, these youth consume global media in ways which conform to and often reassert their traditional cultural values.
Parents used soaps such as Neighbours to alert their children to the temptations and mistakes they may fall into, such as drug taking or smoking, while in some families, moral standards were firmly maintained as children were required to change the channel if there was a kissing scene. Therefore, rather than taking a linear imperialistic approach and suggesting that national culture has been dissipated in favour of the global, it seems that the relationship between the two is not so clear-cut. As Gillespie noted, the exposure of British Punjabi youth to culturally diverse programming, "heightens an awareness of cultural differences, intensifies the negotiation of cultural identities and encourages the expression of aspirations towards cultural change." 79
In light of such processes of 'negotiation,' an article discussing the extent of an 'identity crisis' in
Egypt has uncovered how young Egyptians feel they can be part of modernity, while maintaining some of the most important aspects of their faith and culture. As one respondent said: "a modernist knows what's going on - the developments - and who can always associate between his own background and his own faith with the new challenges of the modern world, of today's world."
80
Livingstone raises a similar point when she suggests that active audiences don’t necessarily have to engage in ritual, creative or resistant readings of media texts; people can be active in their interpretation of programs without completely resisting them or "being counter-normative in the meanings they construct." 81 In this light, as
Egyptian youth refuse becoming carbon copies of the West, they will only accept from foreign media
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that which suits them and fits into their already existing allegiances and cultural norms, while anything else is discarded. For example, Zen TV, launched in 2001 as the first ever Arab channel to cater to a youth audience, was dismissed by youth for being overtly Western, offering a diet of daring topics and
Western style aesthetics. According to Karam's research, although 65.5% of his respondents acknowledged that Zen existed, only 30% chose to watch it.
82
In this context, one can agree with Gillespie who stated: "local identities are indeed being redefined under the impact of global media, in being re-contextualised; but that is not to say that they are being weakened."
83
Identities may be changing and adapting to the new global reality, but they are not necessarily being eroded or overtaken by a single global culture. According to David Morley, the way we perceive identity in the context of globalisation must change. Rather than viewing our cultural landscape as a global mosaic of separate entities, it is more accurate to view it as a complex system of images, goods and people that have enmeshed to create a kaleidoscope of unstable identities.
84
An interesting investigation was conducted by the BBC into how the lives of young Egyptians have been influenced by Westernized popular entertainment genres. What becomes apparent is that
Egyptian youth are indeed influenced by global media forms, and as one participant suggested: "I love
Ruby (a raunchy Egyptian singer). She's reflecting how our culture is now changing. Our community is a closed community, but now people are starting to wear really tight stuff - and they are going out to nightclubs. When society sees someone saying the truth, people don't want to admit the change." 85
However, as cultural imperialist theories would propose, is this the result of a subordination by
Egyptians who have no choice but to accept these foreign images and values due to an inability to respond back? Another quote by a young male provides an answer to this: "I think we are very, very bored of everything that's being produced - music, literature and politics," he says. "It's like eating food which is half-chewed. We want to experiment - we want something new."
86
Again, similar to the choice to watch international satellite TV over Arabic channels, it appears that Egyptian youth are making an active and conscious choice to engage in Western forms of popular entertainment as it provides a much needed change to the tedious and unstimulating localised formats; they watch it because they enjoy it.
According to Galal Amin, to call the American cultural wave which flooded Egypt a cultural invasion is inaccurate as it conceals an important aspect of the truth: "the spread of the American lifestyle (is) not simply the invasion of one particular culture by another, but also as a natural outcome of the desires of ordinary men and women. .....American lifestyle grants ordinary people an easy material
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life and caters to their tastes."
87
Ien Ang, who conducted a landmark study on the topic of media and national identity, confirmed this. Using the globally popular and successful serial Dallas , she attempted to highlight how audiences do not necessarily internalise and absorb the Western lifestyles and
American-style commercial culture they are exposed to, but rather, audiences are active choosers who pick particular programs to watch based on what they enjoy .
Ang demonstrates how the success of Dallas was tied with "expressions of concern over the steadily growing influence of American consumer capitalism on popular culture. Dallas was regarded as yet more evidence of the threat posed by American-style commercial culture against 'authentic' national cultures and identities."
88
However, Ang challenges this deterministic view that non-Americans are
'disturbingly susceptible' to American media products and suggests: "in the millions of living rooms where the TV set is switched on to Dallas, the issue is rather one of pleasure."
89
Thus, Egyptian audiences can more accurately be described as active choosers who are able to negotiate with, rather than internalise the media texts they are exposed to, and chose what to consume based on what offers them most pleasure and fulfills their needs. My research will validate this claim by uncovering how youth turn to Western movies for the simple reason that they enjoy them: as their own national productions are perceived as un-engaging and so poorly produced, they felt that Western media provided a viable and much desired alternative. In this context, the infiltration of Western values was not regarded as a cultural invasion enforced upon them, but as something that they enjoyed and actively chose to consume.
Although my research has been informed by the above work of Ien Ang and Daniel Miller, it offers more than a simple reproduction of their studies; I aim to add a new dimension to their investigations in to global media and local identities. Where as Ang only used written responses from her participants in the form of letters, I aim to carry out interactive focus-group sessions and in-depth interviews to probe my participants into giving me richer, more detailed descriptions of their media consumption practices. In the context of a dynamic group discussion, I will be able to experience a wide range of divergent views, while one-one interviews will allow me to delve deep into the thoughts and inner-feelings of participants, and thus gain a more rounded picture of the link between national identity and media. Additionally, Miller restricts his analysis to foreign soap operas only. However, I will take a broader approach by leaving my choice of genre open. As is clear from the title, I have chosen to focus on global television, but will not confine my investigation to a particular genre or format. I will go in to the discussions and interviews with a flexible mind-frame, and from them, I will be able to deduce what is the most popular type of programming according to the viewing preferences of my participants.
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2.6- Egyptian Opposition to the Global: Resistance or Incorporation?
The above analysis demonstrates that globalisation is a lot more complex than a simple one way process of corroding identities. According to Stuart Hall, there are three possible consequences of globalisation on cultural identities: erosion, strengthening, and the emergence of new identities or 'new ethnicities.'
90
This last category is important as often, in reaction to the global dominance of American based models and styles, there have been vital currents of resistance that have attempted to fight back and assert their thirst for cultural self-expression.
91
As Barker noted, there has been a re-emergence of the politics of place .
92
Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi demonstrated this in their seminal research on the media's role within the Iranian Revolution. According to the authors, the period of Reza Shah's rule was dominated by a vigorous programme of modernization expressed in widespread celebration of Western popular culture. The media became vital weapons in this modernization programme: the two main television channels were dominated by imported programming, while an entire television channel and one of radio were devoted only to English broadcasts. Even programmes that were home-produced, were based on foreign formats and genres such as consumer-orientated quiz shows.
93
In this context,
"modernization came to be synonymous with Westernisation, and broadcasting reflected the increasing foreignness of the general environment. Western housing styles, interior design, clothing, cuisine, and food habits were all evident."
94
According to Mohammadi et al, this foreign cultural content contradicted the nationalistic agenda that was being simultaneously promoted by the regime. Consequently, a hybrid internationalized phenomenon arose "undermining any sense of Iranian identity."
95
In response to this, and what is often missing from theories of cultural imperialism, is the "boomerang effect" 96 that can result from excessive
Western cultural penetration: rather than passively internalising the material they are exposed to, and as a defence mechanism against the infiltration of alien cultural values, Iranian citizens aggressively returned to a central, more traditional religious identity- that of Islam. It was through 'small media'
(cassette tapes and leaflets), according to Mohammadi et al, that Iranians were able to counter the 'big media's' Westernizing tendencies, and to disseminate a revolution that re-asserted their sense of national identity. As suggested by the authors: "small media based on contemporary media technologies, promoted an indigenous identity and opportunities for participation, unlike the despotic state and its mass media." 97 This example demonstrates how media consumers do not only actively interpret and
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construct meanings from the media they are exposed to, but additionally, they can reverse the purposes intended by the media distributors, using the technology as tools to affirm their cultural values and sense of identity.
Egypt has been no exception to this ‘boomerang’ trend: opposition to an increasingly unified global culture dominated by American models, has taken the form of renewed Islamic loyalties. Islam, rather than nationalism, has become the new banner uniting people on the basis of a common religion; it creates a common ground or a 'safe' space where Egyptians can connect together on the basis of trust and rootedness.
98
Taking this point in to consideration, it is important to ask what the relationship between religion and the nation is; can allegiances to a nation-state simultaneously exist with religious loyalties?
It has often been highlighted that nations, nation-states and nationalisms are incompatible with Islam, which requires loyalties that extend beyond national particularity. As Fred Halliday suggests: “religions are not in the main associated with national entities, not least because religions pre-date nationalism and make claims that cut across or defy the prime claim of that state which lies within nationalism.” 99
Thus religious transnationalism may be seen to contradict or go against the essence of state-centred nationalism. This is particularly so with Islam, which has often denied the legitimacy of states on the basis that they have failed to meet the ethical or scriptural expectations which the religion lays down.
100
Consequently, Muslims have attempted to extend their faithfulness beyond particular geographic territory, developing an Islamic Ummah or nation, that unites all Muslims everywhere on the basis of the word of God.
As one participant in the BBC investigation said: "Arabs culturally have been pulled in two different directions for the last 50years. On one side their religious (Islamic and Christian) background preaches modesty and conservatism, and on the other are Western ideals which preach freedom and expression."
101
It is believed that the revival of Islamism began at the end of the 1960’s when Egypt lost the war against Israel, and pan-Arabism suffered a serious blow as a result. With the fear that Egyptian culture was being eroded by global political events, Islam was portrayed as the solution: Nasserism and supporters of Arab nationalism were suppressed at universities, replaced by Islamic groups. “Egypt thus shifted from the ideology of pan-Arabism to that of the various Islamic currents….so that the whole region leaned towards Islam.” 102
More contemporarily, the last decade witnessed the success of the
Islamic Brotherhood Party in parliamentary elections, while the popularity of Islamic clerics and the demand for new ‘Islamic’ signers has been a divergence from the appeal of American movies and MTV.
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As globalization has advanced speedily in to the Arab region, therefore, Egyptian culture has become susceptible to two diverging trends: alongside, and even as a response to the increasing influence of a consumerist American life-style, there is a growing presence of an Islamic identity. Thus, we cannot assume that all Egyptian audiences have been passive receivers who absorb foreign media values they are exposed to, but rather, with the fear that their culture is being threatened by powerful external pressures, they have attempted to fight back and assert their presence. In this context, rather than a linear process of replacement, the "Other is becoming more identified with the self in complex ways."
103
Maha Abdel Rahman, however, looks at the rise of Islamism from an interesting angle. She begins by confirming that the last few decades in Egypt have seen a huge market for goods “marketed, sold, and consumed under the banner of Islam.” 104
Such ‘Islamic’ goods include: ‘Islamic’ nail-polish,
‘Islamic’ elevators or ‘Islamic’ DJs, which are marketed on the basis that they are not only useful, but fit in to the pious lifestyle of a practicing Muslim. Interestingly, Abdel Rahman points out that such products and services form a parallel yet identical market to the non-Islamic consumer market: if one wishes to withdraw from a culture bombarded with Western forms and values, then the practicing
Muslim can engage in a world complete with shopping malls, websites and satellite channels that are all neatly tailored to an Islamic lifestyle.
Thus, such a world “offers practicing Muslims the opportunity to express their piety without necessarily having to abandon a consumerist lifestyle.” 105 In this light, Egyptians have reached a negotiated position: they don’t engage fully with a unified global culture, and at the same time, they don’t completely resist it; rather, they negotiate to create a more flexible cultural attachment that fits somewhere in the middle. In Silverstone's terms, it appears that populations are both local and global at the same time: they may be local in the sense that they are living in particular places, but their sources of cultural construction have reached beyond this and extended in to the global.
106
As Chan and Ma confirm, we are not witnessing the imposition of one culture by another, but more accurately, we are experiencing a process of ‘give and take’ among encountering cultures.
107 Thus, we could say that specific cultural identities have not altogether disappeared, but have been replaced with new hybrid identities
: “globalization has increased the range of sources and resources available for identity construction allowing for the production of hybrid identities….where bounded societies and
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states, though very much still with us, are cut across by the circulation of other global cultural discourses.” 108
It seems, therefore, that Egyptian citizens, bounded by their own cultural/religious allegiances, but faced with an open and exciting world of American-style consumerism, have hovered between the two worlds and managed to settle for a middle-ground position.
Georgiou's research into the media practices of Greek-Cypriot diasporic community supports such a claim as she pointed to the emergence of a hybrid imagined community . "This imagined community is hybrid, as it is decentralized and its decentralization challenges the taken-for-grantedness of the nation and of nationalism. It is hybrid because in its transnationality it recognizes the inescapable multiple belonging of its members that are no longer members of a single community."
109
Thus, as media consumption is at the heart of our everyday practices, and as our everyday lives are lived in local, national, and transnational spaces, 110 people are shaping and adapting their identities to an increasingly transnational cultural arena characterised by porous boundaries.
I adopted a qualitative approach to my research, with focus-groups and in-depth interviews as my chosen methods. I believe a qualitative framework is the most appropriate for my investigation, as it has not only allowed me to uncover what type of media young Egyptians prefer to consume, but more importantly, why this is so. As Darlington and Scott, discussing research on human services suggested: “the reasons why this might be so cannot be so easily investigated using quantitative methods, however, and qualitative methods may have a place in exploring how people define their needs and why and how they seek assistance in certain places.” 111
Qualitative research, therefore, is not about identifying trends or making generalizations, but about penetrating the thoughts of individual actors, understanding their experiences and the motives behind their actions.
Qualitative approaches belong to the interpretive paradigm, which is interested in observing the internal factors that move people, and as David Machin suggested, it is "a powerful method of revealing why people do the things that they do."
112
According to this qualitative logic, each person
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is a unique figure who displays a different subjective experience from the next, and who places their own personal interpretations upon various different social phenomena. In this light, research must not treat people as puppets on a string; rather, as live actors who live by making interpretations. The central aim of this research, therefore, is to study people’s interpretations so we can better understand the meanings they use to guide their behaviour.
113
This is a contrast to positivist social science, which believes individuals are directed through universal laws of behaviour, and thus aims to establish causal relations between different observable phenomena.
As Marie Gillespie importantly noted, the problem with such traditional models of research is that they have "failed to approximate the lived experiences of audiences and to deliver the kinds of insights required to understand the complexities of TV and of its audiences embedded in wider social, political and economic contexts." 114 Thus to overcome these shortcomings, I felt interpretive methods to be the most appropriate framework of study for national identity, which is a profoundly perplexing concept, deeply intertwined in people's social, cultural and political allegiances.
For this reason, I selected rigorous methods that allowed me to unravel and get closer to the inner thoughts and attitudes of my young Egyptian respondents, and to gather detailed, rich and in-depth qualitative data about their activities and attitudes.
115 Firstly, I used extended focus groups , which involved administrating brief questionnaires to participants during the focus group sessions. This was important as it allowed me to obtain necessary demographic information about them such as gender and age, while additionally, I was able to collect basic information about their media consumption practices, including programming preferences and approximate viewing hours. (see appendix 3) According to Barrie Gunter, this should be done before the session, as it allows the moderator to draw out and focus on minority opinions as well as majority ones, while it will help participants to develop a commitment to a position before the group discussion begins.
116
However, I chose to administer the questionnaires after the session. The reason for this is that if a respondent adopts a particular viewpoint in the questionnaire, then they may feel uncomfortable to openly go against it in the group session, and could thus feel obliged to stick to their already stated opinions.
Additionally, I was worried that as a moderator, I may go in to the session with a particular bias or emphasis towards certain participant’s whose view I am in favour of.
The reason I selected focus groups is that they are supported by a high degree of ecological validity: a focus group can very much resemble the dynamics of a spontaneous conversation that occurs amongst young people in an every day context. As Bloor et al suggest: "focus groups provide a valuable resource for documenting the complex and varying processes through which group norms
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and meanings are shaped, elaborated and applied."
117
This is pretty much what occurred during my research, as the animated group discussions meant that serendipitous points occurred frequently: participants enthusiastically seized upon arguments raised by fellow members- arguments they probably wouldn't have thought of themselves- and built upon them. Known as the snowball effect ,
Wimmer and Dominick describe it as a situation where: "one respondent's remarks tend to simulate others to pursue lines of thinking that might not have been elicited in a situation involving just one individual." 118
Moreover, the open-ended nature of the questions allowed the research to be directed by the participants who had ample opportunity to expand on issues or freely make their own comments.
119
Although I had a list of the broad issues that needed to be covered, the sessions mainly followed the participants and their train of thoughts. (see appendix 2 for a rough list of questions) Thus, as I was directed by such a complex concept as national identity that couldn’t be deduced through rigid, close-ended questions, the type of spontaneous conversation possible in a focus group allowed me to easily follow up points of importance and relevance raised by participants.
Additionally, this method allowed me the opportunity to make comparisons between different social groups in order to gain a more thorough understanding of how the relationship between young
Egyptians and the media differs across gender and social class. As Barker noted: "the processes of meaning construction and the place of television in the routines of daily life alter from culture to culture and in terms of gender and class, within the same cultural community." 120


My research project consisted of 4 focus groups (see appendix 1 for a list of participants):

6 working class females

6 working class males
6 middle class females
6 middle class males
As Bloor et al have noted, "the success of the group depends, at least in part, on the dynamics between individuals within groups." 121 After giving much thought to this issue, I decided to conduct
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group sessions where participants don’t previously know each other, or have at least had very little contact. I was worried that any previous acquaintance would stop certain group members from speaking openly and honestly about their experiences, as group influences may distort individual opinions. Thus in a situation where group members don’t really know each other, there will be little danger that lingering thoughts of what friends will think of them after the session, will influence and constrain what is said during the session.
Taking this point into account, and being well aware of the fact that participants may shy away from voicing certain opinions in front of other people, I decided to combine focus groups with a second method: in-depth interviews . I selected this method for the wealth of detail it provides; it will be a good opportunity for those participants who have reservations about talking honestly in front of a group, to speak more openly about their inner-thoughts. As the interviews took place on a one-one basis, it allowed a rapport to develop between myself as the interviewer, and the participants, making it easier to approach and speak in more detail about sensitive aspects of the research.
122
As Arthur
Berger suggested, in-depth interviews “are conducted to get matters such as hidden feelings or attitudes and beliefs that may not be aware of or that are only dimly in their consciousness.” 123
Thus an interview that takes place exclusively between two people affords a lot more flexibility to the data collection process: different areas can be more freely explored, directing the discussion towards numerous undiscovered paths.
124
In this context, depth interviews progressed nicely from the focusgroups as they allowed me to ask follow-up questions and pursue topics of interest that were raised during the group discussions- but in a lot more detail and depth.
Another important advantage of these interviews is that they provided a lot more focus. In a dynamic group situation, time limitations, as well as the sheer size of the group make it impractical to constantly stop and clarify any ambiguous issues or points raised. However, with the one-one interviews, opportunities were opened up to clarify, repeat and further discuss any misunderstandings- either on the side of the interviewer or interviewee. In this light, Holstein and
Gubrium talk of interviewing as an active, meaning-making process: “both parties to the interview are necessarily and ineluctably active. Meaning is not merely elicited by apt questioning, nor simply transported through respondent replies; it is actively and communicatively assembled in the interview encounter.” 125
From each focus-group I selected 1 participant who I felt can offer me more insightful information, and with whom I can undergo a one-one interview where we can build upon, and further interrogate important issues raised during the group discussions.
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4.1- Introduction
According to chapter 2, the claim that media may directly influence a sense of national identity is a simplistic assumption that fails to take in to account the social, economic and political particularities that surround the media. Rather than passively internalising what they see in the media, it appears that viewers are able to undergo a process of negotiation where they actively select what is appropriate to adopt based on what can be incorporated in to their pre-existing cultural allegiances.
In order to examine the relationship between the media and national identity, I adopted a qualitative approach to my research conducting four focus group discussions differentiated by class and gender, and four in-depth interviews. In this chapter I will present the results of my fieldwork, and will offer an analysis of these results in an attempt to uncover patterns of media consumption amongst
Egyptian youth between the ages of 18 and 25, and the implications of this on their sense of national identity.
This chapter will be divided in to 3 sections. I will begin by outlining the media consumption patters of Egyptian youth, from where I will then proceed on to a brief discussion of how the participants viewed the state of national identity in Egypt. The last section will talk more specifically about the link between national identity and global media broadcasting.
Before I begin my analysis, I would like to briefly clarify the basis on which I differentiated participants in to the two social classes. According to the Human Development Report, the E gyptian
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average income was $1,220.
126
Therefore, those who have an annual income below this number, were considered to be working class. Those whose income was higher, were classed as middle class.
4.2- Media Consumption Patterns Amongst Egyptian Youth
A point I must begin with is the importance of television in Egyptian culture; all the groups confirmed how it is an integral part of their everyday lives and dominates most of their free time when they are not in work or study. According to all the respondents, they watch at least 3 hours of television on a daily basis. As Seham, a 21 year old working class nurse suggests:
I think television has become a fact of life for many Egyptians- no home can exist without it.
The centrality of TV in Egyptian homes was also confirmed by the middle class participants.
Mehrinaz, a 25 year old female PhD student and consultant in the USAID, pointed out the importance of television for all Egyptians regardless of class, age or gender. She believes for the working class it is an important tool of awareness; a tool requiring no reading or writing skills. For the middle classes, on the other hand, television is an important window on to the world that brings major international events, global entertainment and Western lifestyles to their living rooms. As Mehrinaz suggested:
Television is very important in the Egyptian context. Half of the population are illiterate and can’t read or write- they have very limited resources. Thus television is the only option for them to find out about their religious duties or important events taking place in the country. At the same time, middle classes require it to be exposed to the wave of globalisation that is taking place across the world.
Additionally, what was very interesting was the extensive spread of satellite technology as nearly all the participants, regardless of economic class, had satellite channels at home. Middle class participants tended to own a private dish, while those of lower economic status who lived in the poorer districts of
Cairo, were more likely to have the wasla system. This is a system of communal sharing where one person in the apartment block or area would buy the satellite dish, and the remaining residents would link it up to their house via a cable in exchange for a minimal monthly charge. This system has drastically reduced the costs of satellite technology, allowing many more Egyptian homes to access it.
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Also, television is widely available in many public venues in Cairo, as most coffee shops have a satellite dish where youth can go watch TV and have a drink at the same time for a minimum fee.
Although there were differences in the types of programmes and channels consumed, a common factor of agreement amongst all the groups, regardless of gender and class, was the preference for satellite television over national broadcasting. All the participants confirmed that they watch national broadcasting on a very irregular basis, and that most of their consumption time is devoted to satellite programming. As I will explain in more detail later on in the analysis, national television programmes are mainly consumed during special religious and national occasions only.
4.2.1- Channels and Programmes Preferred.
In terms of the specific programmes consumed, most of the participants seemed to prefer ones that adopted a rooted Western format such as talk shows and daring political programs, although, importantly, it was preferred by all the groups that that they be Arab produced programmes broadcast on regional Arabic channels in the Arabic language. The only purely Western produced genre consumed in
English was American movies, as in all the groups, those who did watch movies, preferred Hollywood productions. Even lower class participants who spoke little or no English did so, but required Arabic subtitling. In the few instances where English-language channels were consumed, these were almost always specialised channels devoted to a particular genre: participants would usually switch to them to watch something specific like a movie on Show-Time or a news broadcast on BBC World.
Generally, however, and what I found most interesting, was that all participants across the different groups devoted most of their consumption time to regional Arabic broadcasting; the differences lied in the specific channels and genres consumed. i)Working class females mainly preferred Islamic orientated channels; most of them referred to Al
Nass (Egyptian channel) and Iqraa (Saudi Arabian channel). Additionally, Arabic films and serials were popular amongst the girls with preferences for channels such as El Mehwar, El Hekayat and MBC3 dedicated to Arabic drama. In terms of specific programmes, religious themed ones where viewers could phone up and talk to an Islamic scholar about any problems they are facing seemed to be very popular.
My in-depth interview with Marwa, a 23year old supermarket checkout operator, highlighted how there is also a trend of watching Western programmes that feature Arabic subtitles. She referred to
Hell’s Kitchen and Oprah Winfrey as the most popular. Nevertheless, none of the girls mentioned that
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they consume purely Western channels; the obvious language barrier makes this difficult, and thus, means they are confined to Arabic channels and Western programmes with Arabic subtitling. ii)Working class males highlighted sports programmes as their favourite. ART Sports and MBC were mentioned as the most popular channels amongst males. Additionally, there seemed to be a liking of Arabic serials. The majority of them watched English movies; Arabic ones were watched infrequently or when a particular film received extensive advertising and a lot of media attention. Unlike the girls, religious programmes/channels were watched on an irregular basis and didn’t compromise a large part of their viewing time. Additionally, none of them mentioned that they watched any Western made programmes other than movies.
My in-depth interview with Hamed, a 22 year old male supermarket checkout operator, revealed how the media consumption practices of youth often clash with those of their parents. For instance, Hamed likes to watch American movies, while his parents insist on watching religious channels such as Al Nass.
For that reason, Hamed tends to watch television either late at night, or goes to the ‘ahwa’ (an Egyptian café) and watches television in a group gathering. This is another pattern that occurred amongst working class youth: rather than watch television individually in the privacy of their homes like females, TV viewing tends to be a group activity that is usually undergone with their friends and neighbours. i)Middle class females tend to prefer light-entertainment programmes and dramas. Cooking programmes appeared to be very popular amongst this group as the channel Fatafeet , dedicated solely to different cooking programmes, was mentioned more than once. Additionally, this group was especially characterised by a preference for Western programmes such as Friends ,
Hell’s Kitchen
and Oprah
Winfrey broadcast on the Arab regional channel MBC4 .
Similarly, they appeared to like Egyptian made programmes that adopted a Western format: all participants in this group agreed that Sabahak Sokkar Zeyada , a morning show broadcast on Egyptian owned OTV , was excellent as it was able to mimic well made, good quality Western talk shows. In terms of channels viewed, again, they were all regional Arab broadcasters: MBC4, Orbit, Al-Mehwar and OTV .
No mention was made of any Western channels. ii)Middle class males had a strong and obvious trend towards news channels, and additionally, this was the only group that had a strong inclination towards purely Western channels. Although they all liked Al-Jazeera , they also watched CNN and BBC on a regular basis, while MTV was also mentioned.
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As this group spend most of their day at work, they have little time to watch dramas or programmes that are broadcast at a regular time everyday, and so they watch the odd news broadcast when they are free.
Additionally, they appeared to like mainly Hollywood movies (Arabic movies were mentioned by only one participant)
It appears, therefore, that satellite television is the most commonly viewed type of broadcasting amongst Egyptian youth regardless of class and gender. Most of the participants preferred to watch regional Arabic channels, and it was only middle class males who mentioned that they consume Western broadcasting channels, although on an irregular basis. Moreover, very few participants regularly watch
Egyptian national broadcasting, and in the few times they do so, they are targeting a particular programme at a particular time that they cannot otherwise find on satellite. A number of participants mentioned that terrestrial TV is watched only during special occasions, and particularly the holy month of Ramadan. As Ayman, a 25 year old male supermarket checkout operator suggested:
Ramadan is the only time of the year where terrestrial television is decent enough to watch: they have a lot of engaging serials on at the time.
Additionally, May, an 18 year old female student of Art at the German University in Cairo highlighted:
I never watch terrestrial television- maybe during Ramadan as it has become a kind of family tradition. We spend most of Ramadan at my grandmother’s house so it has become normal for me and my family to spend hours in front of Egyptian television watching the dramas and serials.
4.2.2- Avoiding Terrestrial Television
As the above analysis has demonstrated, terrestrial TV is purposefully avoided by all participants.
According to my findings, the reasons why Egyptian broadcasting was avoided varied mainly according to class. i)Middle class participants tended to resent Egyptian television media for its censorship and lack of freedom in what is broadcast. These groups tended to take a political stance: they saw Egypt as a dictatorship, a police state ruled by a corrupt regime, which is reflected in how the media operate. For instance, Hesham, a 22 year old male pharmacy student at 6 th
October University said:
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All that is broadcast is what government or those in positions of power want us to know- so I don’t bother watching terrestrial TV.
The remaining males in the group very much agreed with this view and saw Egyptian media as no more than government mouth-pieces that attempt to restrain the Egyptian people by controlling what they do and don’t know. Thus news in particular was the genre that gained a lot of criticism: participants in both male and female groups highlighted how news is so controlled and affiliated with the government that it’s pointless to watch it.
Additionally, Egyptian talk shows were badly criticized as due to the heavy censorship placed on them, they very rarely raise any topical discussions of political or cultural importance. Various issues such as the elections are perceived as taboo and so cannot be openly talked about. As Sameh, a 24 year old male employee in an international computing firm noted:
Egyptian people are beginning to feel suffocated that they are given no channel or adequate platform from which to express their thoughts or feelings. Our media are not giving us a space to honestly speak out about how we view our country, the government, or the political system.
Therefore, in order to watch a decently made political talk show that discusses issues relating to their nation, religion or region, satellite TV appears to be the only resource. Nevertheless, what must be noted is that participants are choosing to watch regional Arabic talk shows and political discussions rather than
Western ones, as these offer a more accurate and in-depth reflection of their local cultural concerns.
Having said so, however, both male and female participants in the middle class groups still preferred that such Arabic talk shows adopt a Western format, which is seen as more adequately produced to a better standard. Sameh (23) confirmed this when he suggested that we can only produce good-quality talk shows by mimicking the West, as they are more successful in producing interesting, engaging and civil discussions. Paddy Scannell’s work discussed in chapter 2, notes how broadcasting can often become a tool used by governments to impose uniformity and control upon the state (see reference 41), and in the Egyptian context, this has become so palpable that youth have avoided Egyptian news broadcasts altogether. As a result, participants have turned to satellite news channels with Al-Jazeera being by far the most popular. Only the male group referred to Western news channels, and even then, they were watched alongside Al-Jazeera as an ‘extra’ news source from a different perspective.
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ii) Working class participants showed some very similar patterns. However, rather than political reasons for not watching Egyptian national TV such as state censorship and government control, their reasons seemed to be more related to the economic state of the country. For them, the economic situation in Egypt is so bad and so repressive that everyday is a struggle for survival. Most of these participants, both male and female, work as supermarket checkout operators where they barely make enough money to get them through the month. Additionally, most of them support their families, which is an extra financial burden.
To make matters worse, the cost of basic items of survival such as flour, sugar or bread is constantly rising while wages remain as they are. As Tarek (25, male) said:
I used to buy my cigarette packet for 1 pound, 35 piasters. Now it costs 3 pounds! Prices are going up and getting more and more expensive- except for our wages, they have been the same for a long time.
In this context, their main concern is that the media don’t reflect the hardships that they are facing: the poor economic situation and the struggles they are having to endure on a daily basis are never mentioned or openly discussed on TV. As Shaimaa (25, female) noted:
What turns youth away from national TV is that very few productions actually solve any of the problems facing youth. They may raise them and make us aware of them, but very few actually attempt to solve.
Thus feeling that their own national media do not reflect issues and concerns facing them, they have felt more inclined to turn their attention towards satellite broadcasting. As Shaimaa continued:
At least they (Western broadcasting channels), can honestly and openly talk about the problems facing youth- more than we ever can. They are not afraid to broadcast talk shows where they freely and comfortably criticise the aspects of their country that they find dissatisfying .
As well as the mentioned political and economic factors, an additional reason why Egyptian youth avoid terrestrial broadcasting, common amongst both classes, is the poor quality of Egyptian
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broadcasting. This was especially so with dramas and films: according to all the participants, Egyptian productions were perceived as so bad and so poorly made that they turned to satellite television to be able to access Hollywood films as an alternative. As Noora, a 20 year old female student of Marketing at the American University in Cairo stated:
If I’m going to watch films, then I prefer Western movies as I’ll usually find something new that I haven’t seen before. The storylines tend to be very interesting and innovative.
Thus across both class and gender, it was agreed that locally produced dramas couldn’t match up to
Western productions, whose sophisticated production techniques and massive budgets allows them to produce highly satisfying and engaging material.
An important point of concern was the fact that Egyptian films were generally regarded as imitations of Western productions- and bad imitations at that. As Tarek (25, male) stated:
Arabic films are the worst; the thing is, our films just copy the West, but in their own way- in a very stupid way in fact. So why not just watch the original first hand?
Accordingly, the fact that Egyptian films are regarded as identical, but inferior versions of Western productions, has been another factor pushing youth away from national broadcasting. For this reason, all the participants enthusiastically stated that they only consume American movies.
Poor quality of production was not limited to Arabic films, but rather, extended to all of Egyptian media. There was a general consensus amongst the participants that Egyptian media in general is so poor that they don’t bother watching it. As Batoul (18, female) suggested:
They (Egyptian television) pay very little attention to detail. For instance, the children’s programme ‘Alam el Atfal’ is very poorly made: the presenter usually doesn’t fit the general atmosphere of a children’s programme as she tends to wear too much make up and an old fashioned suit that appears to have come from the 1930’s.
Western media, in comparison, were regarded with higher esteem as they have the capabilities, skills and financial backing to create higher quality programmes that manage to capture the attention of their viewers.
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4.2.3- Summary: Egyptian Mediascapes Lose out in the Global Media Arena
To summarise the above findings, it is clear that regardless of gender or class, Egyptian youth mainly consume satellite broadcasting and very rarely turn to national television. Nevertheless, the type of genre preferred, and the particular satellite channels viewed, varied according to gender and class.
What is common amongst all the groups, however, is a strong preference for either Egyptian or regional
Arabic satellite channels. Additionally, although participants seem to favour Arabic programmes broadcast in the Arabic language, they prefer ones that adopt a Western format as they are characterised by the sophistication and elegance that their national media have failed to maintain. Only the middle class males mentioned that they watch Western channels, although on a very irregular basis. Even so, they only consume specific channels like the BBC or CNN that largely complement the areas where
Arabic broadcasting has failed, such as state-controlled news.
Based on the above analysis, I can argue that Egyptian youth are turning their attention to satellite broadcasting as this is their only alternative: the fact that their own national media is so poorly made and so weakly financed, and that the issues they regard as important and topical are not raised, has made them concentrate their consumption practices elsewhere. This ties in with the study carried out by
Hala Abdel Rahman, which I mentioned in chapter 2 (see reference 68). Whereas Abdel Rahman uncovered that viewers watch more international satellite than Arabic satellite channels, my results indicate that participants do in fact watch more regional Arabic channels, although they are preferring programmes that adopt a Western format. It could be that in the ten years since Abdel Rahman conducted her study, more better quality Arabic channels have been launched that have become an alternative to Western broadcasting.
Nevertheless, similar to her conclusions, it appears that the superior quality of Western broadcasting, and the fact that it’s more adequately financed and is characterised by more prestigious production techniques, has made it very favourable in the eyes of Egyptian youth. As Abdel Rahman noted, one of the reasons why youth are engaging with global TV is that it offers more of a diverse menu than national television: youth are not watching global television genres or channels to be exposed to foreign cultures of lifestyles, but rather, to have access to a diverse menu of different channels.
Moreover, these findings support Ien Ang’s research on Dallas referred to in chapter 2. She uncovered that participants watch Dallas for no more than the simple reason that they enjoy it- they make an active
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choice to consume it as it gives them a pleasurable experience (see reference 89). Similarly, it appears that Egyptian youth are pursuing Western movies and Western media forms as they enjoy to do so; they provide much more pleasure, diversity and excitement than their own national broadcasting.
Having said this, however, I can confirm from my findings that youth still prefer media content that conforms with their own cultural and linguistic allegiances. Although the majority of the participants constantly made comparisons with Western broadcasting and regarded it as more favourable, they expressed a desire for such programmes to be made in Arabic. For instance, Gehad, a 19 year old female student of Mass Communications at the German University in Cairo, highlighted how a big proportion of youth in Egypt are now increasingly consuming OTV, a purely Egyptian made channel.
Particularly popular is a morning talk show that openly discusses important events that take place in the country. As Gehad described:
It’s a talk show just like the ones made in the West: the presenters are young and stylish, they speak very freely and informally with very little censorship. They feature many topical discussions that will benefit youth- they even have a yoga session in the morning. The best thing about it though, is that its sleek, stylish- and purely Egyptian!! At last, an outlet that discusses our issues and our concerns.
A recent article discussing the phenomenon of OTV, regarded it as a ‘revolution’ in Egyptian satellite channels. It is the first channel to improvise the idea of using mass media rather than political or religious agendas to solve the problems facing the new Egyptian generation. As the article suggests:
“OTV spotlights the areas of pain, so that we can find the remedy. By communicating we can understand and be understood.” 127
As it is owned by the Egyptian business mogul Naguib Sawiris, it is very well financed unlike other Egyptian channels. Thus by combining a big budget, sophisticated production techniques and young fresh talent, OTV has been regarded as a landmark in Egyptian broadcasting; one that has so far proven to be very successful and very popular with youth.
Thus the simplistic assumption made by cultural imperialists that international audiences happily welcome or even demand cultural material that stems from the West, is very much a primitive explanation of media consumption. As Joseph Straubhaar confirms, consumption is in fact driven and bounded by audience desire for programming which caters to their own cultural specificities and preferences.
128 In this context, even though Egyptian youth are turning away from national broadcasting, they are nevertheless pursuing media that is culturally proximate: either Egyptian or regional Arabic satellite channels broadcast in the Arabic language. Thus what we can conclude from this is that
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Egyptian youth are not desiring Western media content, but rather, they are demanding locally produced programmes that imitate Western media forms. Participants in this study constantly expressed the want for media content that is as close as possible to their own local concerns and cultural beliefs, although they prefer Western formats which are characterised by better production techniques and more adequate attention to detail. In other words, what youth are demanding is a local reproduction of Western aesthetics and production techniques, not Western values and lifestyles.
In this context, rather than completely dismissing the cultural imperialism thesis as irrelevant, it can be understood in a new light: although the US does have an enduring and universal influence, the legacy of the US was not in its domination of local media schedules or the global spread of its ideological beliefs, but in its implantation of a systematic media model for others to emulate.
129 Thus, as private, commercial, entertainment-orientated stations and networks
130
are spreading to different parts of the world, then rather than a widespread imposition of imperialistic values, what we are witnessing is the global diffusion of Western formats that are being adapted to local taste and relevancy. In the Egyptian context, the success of OTV is an excellent example of this: it illustrates that Egyptian youth are searching for an outlet that discusses and portrays their own cultural beliefs and indigenous values, but while adopting sophisticated production values and attractive aesthetics, which characterise Western TV channels.
4.3- National Identity and Egyptian Youth
After uncovering patterns of media consumption amongst Egyptian youth, it is clear that although there is a preference for regional Arabic channels, there is still a high demand for such channels to adopt an increasingly Western style. There appears to be a strong assumption amongst most of the participants that what comes from the West is of better or higher quality. However, to what extent is this only confined to the quality of media production? Is the exposure to Western lifestyles and values either though Hollywood movies or Arabic programmes adopting Western formats, having a wider cultural effect? Is it influencing an Egyptian sense of national identity? These are the questions I will attempt to address in the next section.
4.3.1- To be Egyptian or not to be Egyptian: How Youth Regard their National Identity
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I was very intrigued to discover how Egyptian youth perceive their national identity: are they characterized by a positive sense of national allegiance, and a strong attachment to cultural particularities? If so, is this in fear of being diluted by the media? Asking the groups ‘what does it mean to be Egyptian?’ proved to be a very difficult question- most of them struggled to give me an answer.
The topic of national identity seemed to instantly arouse very negative connotations. All participants were characterised by a strong attitude of self criticism towards their country- they all enthusiastically claimed that there is no such thing as an Egyptian identity, it no longer exists. As Gehad (19, female) mentioned:
I think we’ve lost our sense of culture. There’s a perception that anything which comes from the
West is better…..everything just comes from the outside and we ‘Egyptianize’ it.
Sayed, a 24 year old male supermarket assistant confirmed this when he said:
There is no style that is specific to Egypt, I don’t know what the particulars of Egyptian culture are…Egyptian identity? I don’t think we have one!
An interesting trend I discovered from my research, was that national identity had diverse connotations to the different groups. Although gender didn’t really affect it, the question of what
Egyptian national identity entails differed between the two social classes.
Where as middle class participants tended to talk in terms of a strictly Egyptian identity, lower class participants had a much wider conception of national identity in which religion was regarded as an integral component. When I asked these groups about their thoughts towards national identity, it was instantly linked to religion. For instance, Ayman (25, male) suggested that despite the Westernization trend,
We still strongly hold on to our Egyptian morals. We all pray and perform our religious duties on time.
Thus national identity for those of lower economic status appears to have a direct link to a wider religious identity.
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As was highlighted in chapter two, nationalism in Egypt has recently been seen in the light of a religious transnational identity which is not confined by specific geographical boundaries. The girls group were also in favour of such a view as they constantly referred to the need to combat the influence of Western cultures by passionately embracing Islamic values, and having a sense of loyalty towards the umma- Islamic nation- of which Egypt is a part. As I mentioned in the literature review, therefore,
‘national identity’ is very much a flexible and wide encompassing term that may conjure up various meanings to different people depending on their socio-economic and cultural background. As Fred
Halliday suggested: “nationalism as an ideology allows of no fixed state.” 131
A common point of agreement amongst all the groups, however, is that the most important aspects of Egyptian national culture are highly disregarded. Mehrinaz (25, female) raised a very important point that illustrates the extent to which national identity is not appreciated in Egypt. She highlighted how the word ‘balady’ is very commonly used by Egyptians to refer to something as tacky or of poor quality. In proper Arabic, balady means ‘my country,’ and thus my country, i.e. Egypt, is automatically associated with being distasteful and tacky. As suggested by Mehrinaz, this demonstrates how the state of national culture in Egypt is deeply unappreciated, and is automatically associated with very negative connotations. According to the participants, there are two specific symbols of national identity whose absence from Egyptian culture has made them regard their sense of identity in a very pessimistic light. i)Dress : all participants highlighted how Egypt no longer has a national dress. There is the gallabeya or melaya laff, but they are mainly worn by those of lower economic status who live in villages or the poor and slum districts of Cairo. During my in-depth interview with Hamed (22, male), I asked him what he believes the traditional Egyptian dress is. He replied mockingly:
The suit which has four large buttons at the centre and two pockets on the side. Or those trousers even which are tight at the top and really baggy at the bottom- like the liquorice seller. (laughs) Or if you want something even more Egyptian there’s the gallabeyya.
Thus even the thought of wearing traditional dress seemed very laughable. ii) Language : The middle class group highlighted how a lot of the youth in Egypt cannot speak
Arabic to the degree of efficiency expected. According to them there is a perception in Egyptian society
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that speaking English, or demonstrating that you can speak the language by including a few English words in the sentence, accords one a higher social status. As Sameh (24, male) confirmed:
You have to include one or two English words while you’re speaking to demonstrate you belong to a high social class.
As most of them have attended American or British schools, the emphasis of their education has been on the English, not Arabic language. In the girls group, there was a dynamic discussion of how OTV is watched by a lot of youth as it broadcasts its programmes, and even the news, in colloquial Egyptian and not in proper Arabic, thus making it a lot easier to understand. As May (19, female) suggested:
I can’t really speak proper Arabic efficiently. I’ve been in a British school all my life and so all my education was in English. It’s not something I’m very proud of, but it’s a fact. That’s why I find OTV very appealing: it makes Arab media a lot more accessible to youth like me who find it difficult to follow channels such as Al Jazeera because of the language.
Even the lower class groups mentioned how there is now a big emphasis on them to learn English in the shop where they work.
Accordingly, as the presence of these two important national symbols are vanishing from
Egyptian culture, this has made youth feel that their nation is characterised by a very weak cultural base: they struggled to locate or uncover a unique sense of identity particular to their country. As was mentioned by Anthony Smith in chapter 2, national communities are sustained by abstract commonalities such as "historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions." (see reference 28) In this context, national dress and language are two symbols of great importance to the participants, and their diminution has made them feel they have no unique sense of national identity particular to their country.
The fact youth struggled to identify any specific cultural symbols unique to Egypt, therefore, has made them feel like a weak target; the frail cultural foundations that sustain the Egyptian nation has left its people highly vulnerable, and with no adequate guard against the influx of outside cultural influences. Sayed (23, male) confirmed this when he noted:
The reason a lot of youth are loyally copying Western culture is due to the absence of their own culture. If they felt that there is something positive and solid to follow in their own nation they would feel
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no need to look elsewhere. Instead of constantly blaming the West and saying they are culturally
‘invading’ us, we should look to ourselves and question why this is happening.
Feeling they have nothing positive or adequate to embrace in their own culture, therefore, Egyptian youth are constantly searching for alternative sources of cultural pleasures. In this context, can the media, which expose viewers to an array of alien values and foreign influences, shape the national identity of Egyptian youth?
4.4- National Identity and the Media
Having established that Egyptian youth are dissatisfied with the state of Egyptian culture, can we assume the media are to blame for this? Has the increasing exposure to Hollywood movies or programmes with a Western format made youth desire a style of clothing, language or culture that doesn’t belong to them? The simple answer to this is no. Although the media may be the window that expose Egyptian youth to alternative lifestyles and cultures, I discovered that there are underlying national socio-political and economic factors which drive youth to adopt such lifestyles as an alternative to their own. The media may be the vehicle that allow them to do so, but what is the driving factor? Why is it that they have such a strong self criticism towards their nation? The answer to this differed across both class and gender. i) Middle class females : They discussed how Egyptians are scurrying away from their own culture and are adopting aspects of a foreign culture which doesn’t belong to them. For instance, May
(19, female) made reference to the fact that veiled women are not allowed to work as presenters on television, even though the veil is supposed to be part of the national dress. When asked about the reasons for this, the main answer seemed to centre around education: most middle class youth in Egypt are educated in foreign schools and universities, whose curriculum’s focus on Western history and culture rather than the Egyptian. As May suggested:
I think education is playing a very big role. As education is changing, the culture is changing with it. 15 years or so ago, there was no such thing as the American diploma or the IGCSE in Egypt.
Nowadays these are very common.
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Thus the increasing exposure to education systems coming from the outside has meant that very little emphasis is placed on learning either Arabic or religious education. Even when Egyptian history is taught, it is taught form the point of view of the British or the American. In other words, the participants felt they were being given a filtered or diluted version of their national culture.
As well as the education system, participants in this group also felt that family upbringing is very important. According to Sarah (25, female):
The solution is to incorporate aspects of our culture in to our upbringing from a young age.
Children should be taught to be proud of their country, their language and their religion.
Therefore, the fact that children are not indoctrinated from a young age with the aspects of their national culture, has made them develop a sense of disregard to it. In light of this, the females believe that better parental upbringing as well the development of a more adequate Egyptian education system, will allow youth to experience a more positive sense of connection to their country. ii) Middle class males: again they seemed to talk from a purely political point of view. To them, the fact that Egypt is so politically unstable, and that the government is severely corrupt establishing a police state which imposes control on its people, has made them develop no sense of loyalty to their country. Also, in terms of global politics, Egypt has become a subordinate follower to superpowers such as America and Britain. According to the males, Arab youth in general are feeling oppressed and demoralized that no justice is being carried out against the wrong doings taking place in their countries by foreign powers. As Salem (24, male) angrily stated:
I think it’s all political. I think the problem is that America is scared of the Arabs becoming a powerful force. They know that if the Arabs become well educated they will become an important world power.
In this context, the fact that Egyptian youth feel so dismayed by the political situation in their country, and feel they are given no opportunity to voice their opinions or engage in the political process, has suffocated them and made them distance themselves from any sense of national belonging and from the values, myths and symbols and characterise their sense of national identity.
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iii) Working class males and females: to them national identity was very much intertwined with religion. Their belief that Islamic values have become so diluted and almost non existent in Egypt, is a major reason why feelings of national attachment are so low in the country. As Shaimaa (25, female) suggested:
I think the issue of national identity goes back to a person’s upbringing and whether religion was a big part of their family life. If they were brought up with Islamic morals and traditions a part of their everyday life, and if they pray on a regular basis, then I’m positive they will have a strong and stable sense of identity.
Abeer went on to explain how youth’s weak faith is a main factor why they may be easily shaped by negative outside influences. Those who have a strong faith in God will stick to their traditions and morals. The same pattern was repeated with the male group: when asked whether they believe their sense of national identity is low, they replied in a very shocked manner:
Of course not- we pray and perform our religious duties on time! So how can it be low?
Another important critique of Egyptian culture, was the poor economic situation in Egypt. The fact that a lot of youth are unemployed, or even when they are in jobs, are earning next to nothing, has left them in a state of extreme frustration. As Tarek (25, male) made clear:
I don’t think that anything in Egypt is useful to anyone….This is what makes youth look up to the
West and feel it to be better than their own country. If I was given a job offer outside of Egypt, I would go for it without any hesitation.
The feeling that youth are not able to establish themselves in Egypt or earn enough money to live a basic decent life, has made them develop feelings of hatred and dissatisfaction towards the country.
Nevertheless, after establishing that Egyptian youth have a very strong sense of criticism towards their national culture due to the various social, political and economic reasons mentioned, we must ask where do the media fit in to all of this? Have the media caused youth to become attached to a globally spreading Western culture at the expense of their own national identity? After undergoing this research project, I can say that the media play a very superficial role: they act as the windows that expose an already disheartened youth to an alternative world of alien values and lifestyles. Thus as attachment to
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Egyptian national culture, for the socio-cultural and political reasons discussed above is unstable prior to their media consumption activities, youth feel they are becoming vulnerable and susceptible to the foreign values they are exposed to. In this context, the media aren’t the reason why youth have a negative sense of national identity, but they almost offer them an alternative option; another exciting cultural world that replaces their own. All the groups agreed strongly with this point. As Salem (24, male) noted:
How can we ever see our nation in a positive light! While our media portray everything bad in the country, Western media offer us a world of pleasure and excitement.
There was a general consensus that while Egyptian media portray all the negatives of Egypt and don’t give youth the opportunity to see anything encouraging, Western media offer them hope and present them with a world of freedom, opportunity and equality. In other words, it gives them something to look up to that they can’t otherwise find in their own culture.
What has become clear from the discussion so far, is that participants have developed a cynical self criticism towards Egypt, and are enthusiastically criticising aspects of Egyptian culture, politics and economics. However, what are the implications of this on their sense of national identity? As we will see in the next section, we cannot make an oversimplified assumption that the national identity of youth has weakened just because they are adopting aspects of a Western culture. The margins of national identity are not static; rather, youth are constantly undergoing processes of negotiation and redefinition to the boundaries that sustain their national identity as they actively select what is, and what isn’t appropriate to incorporate. Living in a globalised world order where exposure to an array of alternative cultures and lifestyles has become a fact of everyday life, people aren’t necessarily disregarding their cultural ties, but are undergoing processes of cultural shopping where they pick and chose what is suitable to embrace without disregarding the most essential aspects of their own identity.
4.4.1- Westernization in Egypt
The West was regarded by the participants as a source of all the positive attributes they wished their nation to uphold; it compromised the technological advancement, scientific developments and the political freedom they are unable to locate in their own country. For this reason, all the participants agreed that there is a strong Westernization trend in Egypt, as due to the mentioned social, economic and political corruption that characterizes Egyptian society, youth have felt a strong desire to distance
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themselves from a sense of national attachment. All the groups made reference to famous Egyptians like
Ahmed Zuweil who won a Nobel Peace Price in physics, or the famous surgeon Dr Magdy Yaqoub who only became successful when they left Egypt and headed for Western countries. Thus Egypt was almost regarded as an inadequate atmosphere for any person to succeed or make something out of their lives.
For this reason, it was highlighted that youth turn to Western movies or prefer programmes with a
Western format as they portray the pleasure, freedom and sophistication that they can’t otherwise find in their own media, or their own culture. In other words, Western media, and, indeed, Western culture, provide a form escapism for a dispirited and dissatisfied youth.
For the lower classes, however, Western media did more than provide a rosy world of equality and pleasure: Western media were in fact able to translate aspects of Islamic identity, seen to be integral to their Egyptian national identity, which Egyptian media failed to do. As Shaimaa (25, female) said,
‘akhla’ahom men deenena,’ which means ‘their manners are from our religion.’ In other words, the West are seen to better uphold the mannerisms that Muslims are supposed to have, but unfortunately won’t maintain. According to the lower class groups, civilized discussions, well mannered negotiations and respect for all regardless of sex or class are integral aspects of the Islamic faith; aspects that are not observed in Egyptian media. Several references were made to local talk shows that feature guests talking in raised voices and insulting one another, or the fact that veiled women are prohibited to appear on
Egyptian television as presenters.
Western media, however, are seen to more adequately incorporate these aspects in to their broadcasting policies: guests are always civilized and well spoken, while presenting roles are open to all regardless of sex, race or even disability. Thus it appears that Egyptian youth, and especially the lower classes, may view Western media in a favourable light as they are able to translate characteristics essential to their sense of identity, more than the poor quality national media are able to do. This links back to the Study of Trinidadians and Western media conducted by Daniel Miller. He uncovered that the reason why many Trinidadians turn to global programming, is that they have the ability to articulate aspects of the ‘local’ culture, which locally produced programming has failed to do (see reference 76). In the same light, Egyptian youth are turning to Western programming which has played a complementary role by filling in the gaps where national media has failed.
Nevertheless, to suggest that this exposure to Western media will negatively influence a sense of national identity amongst Egyptian youth, is a very simplistic claim. As I discovered from my research, media consumption is in fact guided by what is acceptable according to a person’s social and religious
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framework. With the lower class groups in particular, there were two strong barriers which allowed them to neutralize the negative effects of alien Western values that they are exposed to in the media. i)Islam : their strong religious affiliation almost acts as a filter which counters the infiltration of foreign values. The fact that they have strong faith in God and complete their daily duties on time, is enough to ensure that they are in no way negatively influenced by any influx of alien values. As Marwa
(23, female) pointed out:
You have to be aware that you’re talking with a poorer section of the population. With the higher classes, religion is not so important to them, and so they may be more influenced by or more susceptible to messages coming from another culture. But with the lower classes, they turn to religion more; they feel that only God can stand by them and help them in the problems they face.
Thus, as religion is such an important part of their daily lives, it provides them with a rigid moral framework which almost acts as a barrier to other cultural influences. Hamed (22, male) mentioned how his father demands that any Western movie or TV channel be turned off during the Islamic call to prayer as he considers a ‘devil’ to be in the house.
It appears, therefore, that lower class groups are able to differentiate between media as a pleasurable social activity and as a cultural artefact to be imitated. Ien Ang’s study referred to in chapter
2, highlighted how people consume American media because they simply enjoy watching it and not because they want to observe an alternative lifestyle or cultural framework. Nevertheless, the participants maintained that even when there was a desire to imitate, it is a purposeful choice; they actively pick out what to imitate based on what will adapt to their principles. One female even mentioned that she adopted Islamic clothing as an active reaction against the infiltration of foreign values. As Shaimaa (25, female) suggested:
I wear the Isdal (long black cloak) as I want to assert my presence as a Muslim. I also want to show that there are alternatives to the superficial Western values that Egyptian youth are passively turning to. ii) Family: Many of the participants in the lower class groups had strong family objections to
Western television. For example, my in-depth interview with Hamed (22, male) uncovered how
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Egyptian families can often be very weary of foreign programming, assuming it will have a directly negative influence on their children. As he went on to explain,
To reduce his worries, my father just got Nilesat as it only broadcasts Arabic channels and doesn’t feature any European ones. He said that as our house is dominated by youth he doesn’t want to take any risks.
Additionally, if a foreign movie or programme was watched, strict measures of censorship were applied: if any scenes of nudity, violence or swearing appeared, then the television had to be immediately switched off, or the channel changed. Ayman’s (25 male) family have even banned television altogether in the house.
These lower class groups tried to constantly reinforce the fact that although they have been touched by aspects of Western culture, they are still able to maintain and observe the most sacred features of their identity. When asked if they believe Egyptian youth are upholding Western morals more than Egyptian, Sameh (23, male) replied with a very firm no!
We are still 100% Egyptian. If a girl was harassed in the street, for example, I could guarantee that most of the guys around her would come to her rescue. We still have the nobility and dignity of real
Egyptians- something which the West do not have!
This was even echoed amongst the middle class groups, and as Gehad (19, female) suggested,
I think that no matter how much we take from Western culture, there comes a point where we stop ourselves, where we say ‘no, this is not acceptable and doesn’t fit in with our culture.
In this light, youth are able to select which cultural aspects to adopt according to what will fit in to their own indigenous values. As Marie Gillespie uncovered in her study of how British youth of
Indian origin consume British media, they consume global media in ways which conform to and reassert their traditional cultural values. For instance, parents used soaps to alert their children to the dangers of drug taking and early pregnancies, while if any inappropriate scene was broadcast, families warned their children to turn the channel (see reference 78). In this context, when Western media is consumed, it is done so in the light of local concerns and cultural beliefs: indigenous values are not wiped out or diluted by the global, but they are incorporated within it.
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According to both the middle class and lower class groups, those of higher economic status are more likely to be affected by the Westernization trend: as the majority of them have been educated in private, foreign schools and universities, they are exposed to Western cultural influences on a daily basis. According to Michael (24), the media have a very important role to play in this process as they
‘spread the word.’ Advertising makes people look to the screen and imitate: they convince you that a certain product is good or that a particular brand is ‘cool.’ There are plenty of adverts for Nike, Adidas,
Guess etc, but there are never any adverts for any Egyptian products. Thus, this creates the perception that anything coming from the West will be of higher quality, while any Egyptian-made products will never be able to compete.
Again, however, participants have stressed the point that the reason for this is that Egyptian culture is so weak and the economy is so poor that there are no Egyptian brands to compete with whatever is coming from the West. In this light, youth have no choice but to embrace it. As Sameh (24, male) made clear:
The problem is, we as Egyptians don’t have a strong culture, and thus it becomes easy for a superpower like America to invade us culturally- and they have been doing so for a long time. Burgers,
McDonalds, jeans- they are all part of American culture….However, the problems is with us, we should resist and filter this invasion.
Western culture, therefore, was not perceived as a damaging influence enforced upon Egyptian youth, but rather, they regarded it as a viable and exhilarating alternative to their own disappointing culture. As Galal Amin mentioned, the influx of Western culture should not be seen as a cultural invasion that is forced on people, as those who adopt it, consciously chose to do so as they enjoy it- it provides a pleasurable diversion from what they are accustomed to (see reference 87). Interestingly, participants didn’t recognize their adoption of alien values as Westernization, but rather, they saw themselves as partaking in globalization; borrowing from a universal culture in which a global citizenry is involved. As Sayed (24, male) suggested:
Egyptian style now is just the same as Western- it’s a global thing I guess, everyone is involved in it.
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Additionally, they believe that if anyone is to blame for the negative consequences of alien values then it is themselves. Participants highlighted that those who consume Western media should do so with their defences up; they should have the ability to select that which is suitable to their own cultural beliefs and ignore that which contradicts it. Many comparisons were made to Pakistanis or nations of the Gulf area: they were greatly admired as although they were greatly advanced technologically and scientifically, they were still able to maintain important aspects of their identity. For instance, Pakistanis wear their traditional dress in parliament, while people of the Gulf, despite their immense wealth, still also wear their traditional form of dress.
Once again, therefore, it is clear how youth are undergoing a process of negotiation to the boundaries that compromise their national identity; with their own cultural and religious basis in mind, they are actively able to select what to adopt and what not. As Gillespie suggested, the exposure to culturally diverse programming "heightens an awareness of cultural differences, intensifies the negotiation of cultural identities and encourages the expression of aspirations towards cultural change."
(see reference 79). Thus in a situation where the exposure to a diversity of cultures is an everyday practice, what we are witnessing is the emergence of hybrid identities that speak of the complex interconnectedness of both global and local identities.
4.5- Summary of Discussion: Television Must be Regarded in Context
In light of the above analysis, it is clear that television cannot be regarded as a negative force that has shaped an Egyptian sense of national identity. As was mentioned by Roger Silverstone in chapter 2,
TV is deeply embedded in the social, political and economic particularities of a nation, and thus one cannot understand the exact role and consequences of television without understanding the sociopolitical and economic contexts which surround it. In the Egyptian case, youth appear to have adopted a strong sense of self criticism towards their country due to the social, political and economic dilemmas that have, for a long time, characterised their nation. Thus feeling dissatisfied and frustrated with the state of their country, Egyptian youth have felt a strong desire to distance themselves from a sense of national attachment. More specifically, the diminution of two particular symbols of national culture- language and national dress- has made youth feel they have no unique identity to embrace which is exclusive to their nation.
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Consequently, in light of what they consider to be such a flimsy cultural base, and due to the economic, social and political dilemmas facing Egyptian culture, youth have been left feeling estranged in their own country and unable to develop any feelings of attachment or security to their nation. For this reason, they are finding themselves forced to search for alternative cultural sources. This is where the media come in: where as Egyptian TV offer viewers all the negatives of their country, participants saw
Western media as offering them a world of endless possibilities; an alternative cultural world of pleasure, freedom and equality. Thus feeling disheartened and dissatisfied with their own cultural identity, Egyptian youth have begun to place their hopes and dreams on the ‘other.’ In this context, the media act as the window that expose Egyptian youth to an alternative world of cultural satisfaction.
This process takes place, however, to differing degrees. It appears that middle class youth are more likely to adopt Western ways for an obvious reason: their higher economic status means they have the money to buy an alternative lifestyle. Additionally, the fact that many of them have travelled abroad and have been educated in foreign schools and universities, means a Western way of life has become commonplace. Nevertheless, they stressed that at the end of the day they are living in a culture characterised by particular religious and cultural values which must be respected. With the lower class groups, the two barriers of religion and family objections mean they are not affected by the
Westernization trend to the same degree. They constantly maintained how religion is such a big part of their daily life, and so they only adopt what fits in with their pre existing values and religious faith.
Importantly, the influx of Western, and particularly American cultural values, was not regarded by participants as a cultural invasion; it is something that they choose to consume because they simply enjoy it. It is also interesting to note that although many of the lower class participants viewed the West in general with contempt, and saw many aspects of its culture as ‘evil’ and contradicting the essence of their religion, they were still able to differentiate between that which is acceptable and that which defies their principles. Thus, it appears that media consumption is an active-meaning making process where viewers are able to delete, adapt and select from it as they wish. In this context, rather than saying the media have weakened the national identity of Egyptian youth, it would be more accurate to say that the media have given them the opportunity to restructure the boundaries that sustain their sense of identity and to renegotiate its content. According to Georgiou, what we are witnessing today is the advent of new multiple belongings (see reference 109): identity is no longer an exclusive concept restricted by geography or place, but the increasing proximity of local, national and transnational media spaces, has afforded people the flexibility to actively share and borrow from multiple cultural resources.
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In light of the above analysis, it is clear that the relationship between media and national identity is a lot more complex than cultural imperialists would have us believe. According to theorists such as
John Tomlinson, global media today are the prime carriers of cultural meaning, which have helped spread a Western culture to a global citizenry, while local indigenous identities have become diluted and homogenised.
132
However, can we simply assume that national identity will be automatically erased by the exposure to other alien values? My research project, focusing specifically on Egyptian youth, was an attempt to more closely investigate this point: I wanted to uncover the media’s role in constructing and influencing Egyptian national identity.
Firstly, I attempted to highlight the types of media Egyptian youth are exposed to. The common factor amongst all the groups was a preference for satellite TV over national broadcasting. Additionally, participants seemed to have a very strong inclination towards regional Arabic channels in particular.
Only the middle class male group made reference to Western TV channels. In terms of programmes consumed, there was a general request for ones that adopted a Western style in aesthetics, topics covered and presenting style. However, participants across all the groups stressed enthusiastically that such programmes be broadcast on regional Arabic channels in the Arabic language. The only purely Western genre consumed in the English language was American movies (lower class groups watch them with
Arabic subtitles).
It appears, therefore, that participants are preferring media which is proximate to their own indigenous culture and national language. Thus the claim made by cultural imperialists that global media consumers will be negatively affected by foreign media, which will wipe out localised authentic cultures, is a simplistic assumption based on the premise that they will prefer to consume Western media in the first place. However, as this research has uncovered, people are in fact preferring to consume that which corresponds as much as possible to their own cultural background.
When probed about why they prefer American movies in particular, or Arabic programmes in general to adopt a Western format, participants constantly referred to the poor quality of national productions. Egyptian media were regarded as so bad and so poorly produced that another media source
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was required to offer them a higher standard of both entertainment and news. For this reason, youth turned to regional Arabic broadcasting as an alternative. There were also various political, social and economic reasons why Egyptian media were considered so negatively, which differed across class and gender. For all the groups interviewed, however, Western movies and Western media formats offered youth the pleasure, excitement and diversity that Egyptian media failed to do. In this light, it appears that
Egyptian youth are not directed by a love for the global, but a dissatisfaction with the national.
Although there appears to be a strong preference for regional Arabic channels and productions broadcast in the national language, there is still an exposure to Western lifestyles through both media form and content. Nevertheless, as my research project has attempted to demonstrate, the media are one cultural artefact amongst many others in society; we cannot look at the media alone without taking in to consideration the social, political and economic particularities of any specific nation. The media don’t operate in a vacuum, but work in conjunction with other socio-cultural factors to shape national identity.
In the Egyptian context, the poor economic state, the country’s subordinate position in global affairs, and the oppressive regime are all important factors that have influenced how youth negotiated their sense of national identity. Accordingly, when probed about the state of national identity in Egypt, negative images were instantly conjured up, and participants appeared to have a very strong sense of self criticism towards their country.
All the groups pointed to an absence of two important symbols of national identity in Egypt: language and national dress. This, along with the sense of frustration and dissatisfaction felt towards the country for the various socio-political reasons they named, has made them feel there is a very weak cultural foundation in Egypt on which to base an adequate sense of national identity. According to the participants, the lack of a solid cultural base in Egypt has made them feel highly vulnerable and susceptible to any influences coming from the outside. This is where the media’s role is of high significance: they act as the porthole that expose a disheartened youth to an alternative world of freedom, pleasure and excitement- a world that is very different, and of no comparison to their own.
Thus once again, it is important to highlight that Egyptian youth are not directed by a love for the foreign, but by a disregard for the local. However, does this mean that Egyptian youth will adopt alien values infiltrating from the West as a replacement of their own? With the middle classes, they were more likely to be influenced by the Westernization trend for the simple reason that they have the money to do so. Their education in foreign universities, the fact that they travel to the West regularly, as well as their
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ability to ‘buy’ themselves a foreign lifestyle means they are exposed to Western ways on a daily basis.
With the lower classes, however, there are two barriers which reduce the negative impact of the influx of
Western values: religion and family objections. Thus unlike the middle classes, the importance of transnational Islam to their sense of identity has provided a strong barrier against the dangers of outside influences.
In this context, we cannot see the effects of the media as uniform and influencing people in an identical manner. As this research has brought to light, social class and gender are two important social characteristics that dictate the ways in which people read the media, and consequently, the effects that the media can have upon them. As David Morley demonstrated in his study, The Nationwide Audience , responses to the media are extremely complex and go beyond the media text itself: as audiences are characterised by differing demographic characteristics, this will no doubt influence the meanings they attach to media output (see reference 51).
Importantly, participants in the study maintained that they are able to differentiate between the media as something they simply enjoy to consume, and the media as exporters of cultural values to be imitated. Although most of them had a strong preference for Western movies and programmes with a
Western format, they were still able to highlight and criticise aspects of Western culture which they regarded as highly contradicting to their own. Thus, it seems that one can embrace American media and
American cultural products, while at the same time withstanding Americanization and actively criticising
American policies. Moreover, when participants did attempt to emulate aspects of Western lifestyles, it was done with their own cultural and religious barriers in mind: they would select only that which fits in to pre-existing religious and cultural framework. For instance, participants highlighted that they may dress like Westerners or want to develop team work skills like them or have a strong economy like they do, but this doesn’t stop them from maintaining the most scared and important aspects of their national identity.
As was mentioned in chapter 2, David Morley believes the way we perceive ‘identity’ in the context of globalisation must change. What we are faced with is not a cultural landscape of separate entities, but a complex system of images, people and information that have enjoined to create a kaleidoscope of unstable identities (see reference 84). Thus in the context of a globalised world order, national identity cannot be regarded as boxed concept that is restricted by rigid geographical boundaries: by being constantly exposed to different cultural repertoires, individuals are likely to undergo a
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processes of ‘pick’ and ‘choose,’ where they select the values they wish to adopt and disregard any others. Myria Georgiou made a similar point when she suggested we are witnessing the emergence of a hybrid imagined community (see reference 109). As media consumption is at the heart of our daily practices, and as our everyday lives are lived in local, national and global spaces, people are shaping their identities to fit an increasingly borderless transnational arena.
In the Egyptian context, national identity is not being eradicated by global media broadcasting, but in a situation where youth already have a strong feeling of pessimism and dissatisfaction towards the state of their country prior to media consumption, it appears that what they are seeing on their screens is helping them to aspire towards change, to redraw the boundaries that define their national identity. They are carefully selecting the aspects of Western culture that can fit in and be incorporated into their own indigenous values: they are undergoing a process of negotiation between what they want and what is culturally acceptable.
Consequently, global media should not be perceived as malicious forces that are diluting and homogenising local identities, but rather, I believe media consumption can actually be regarded as a healthy and maybe even necessary component of how one formulates their identity. By acting as the window that expose a global audience to an array of alternative cultures and lifestyles, the media are allowing individuals to demand cultural change, to remap the boundaries that maintain their sense of national identity in a way that makes it more acceptable to them. Thus, rather than arguing that the media are weakening national identity, it could be more appropriate to claim that the media are offering a global citizenry another resource from which to define and construct their sense of identity. As participants in this study demonstrated, in a situation where Egyptian youth have a strong attitude of self criticism towards their nation, their daily exposure to global satellite television has allowed them to discover new ways and news sources of negotiating the content that compromises their national identity.
As this research has uncovered, Egyptian youth are characterised by a strong aversion towards their national media; it is the poor quality of national broadcasting that has driven them towards global
TV channels. In this context, we cannot talk about reducing the ‘threat’ facing local indigenous cultures by eliminating the global; rather, the national and the local must be enhanced and improved in ways that will meet the satisfaction of its people. In the Egyptian context, participants in this research highlighted how they want to see more of Egyptian products adequately produced to a high standard. This accounts for the success of OTV, which although is a purely Egyptian channel, is made to match the sophisticated
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production values of Western broadcasting. Therefore, I believe further research should focus on how national media can engage Egyptian youth and gain their satisfaction. Intense group discussions and indepth interviews should be carried out to discover how youth envisage their national media to change and be enhanced in a way that will attract them.
6-References
Introduction
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71

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
Appendix 1- List of Participants.
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Middle Class Participants
Males
1. Aly : 25 years old. Trainee in the UN, Cairo. Graduate of Political Science from the American
University in Cairo.
2. Sameh : 24 years old. Works in an international computing firm. Graduate of Engineering from an academy in Cairo.
3 . Salem: 24 years old. Also works in an international computing firm. Graduated from computing from an academy in Cairo.
4. Mohammed : 25 years old. Works in a multi-national pharmaceutical company. Graduated from medicine, University of Cairo.
5. Hesham : 22 years old. Student of Pharmacy at 6 th
October University, Cairo.
6. Michael : 24 years old. Works in a computing firm. Graduate of Engineering from Cairo
University.
Females
1. Mehrinaz : 25 years old. Works as a consultant at the USAID, Cairo. Graduate of Political
Science from Cairo University. Also holds a Masters degree in Gender Studies from the American
University in Cairo. Currently doing a split site PhD programme at Leeds University.
2. Batoul : 18 year old student of Mass Communications at the American University in Cairo
73

3. Noora : 20 year old student of Marketing at the American University in Cairo.
4. Gihad : 19 year old student of Mass Communications at the German University in Cairo.
5. Sarah : 25 year old English Teacher. Graduate of English Literature from the American
University in Cairo. Also has a Masters Degree in English Literature from Leeds University.
6. Mai : 24 years old. Works as a geologist at British Petroleum, Cairo. Grafuated from Geophysics,
Ain Shams University- Cairo.
Working Class Participants
Males
1.
Sameh : 23 years old. Works as a supermarket checkout operator. Holds the equivalent of the
British GNVQ- specialised in Plumbing.
2 . Mohammed: 21 years old. Supermarket checkout operator. Third year student of Education at
Ain Shams University, Cairo.
3.
Tarek : 25 years old. Works as a supermarket checkout operator. Holds the equivalent of the
British GNVQ- specialised in Marketing.
4.
Hamed : 22 years old. Works as a supermarket guard. Holds the equivalent of the British GNVQ- specialised in Marketing.
5.
Ayman : 25 years old. Works as a supermarket guard. Holds the equivalent of the British GNVQ.
6. Sayed : 24 years old. Works as a waiter in a restaurant. Graduate of Leisure and Tourism from the
University in Cairo.
74

Females
1. Shaimaa : 25 years old. Works as a supermarket checkout operator. Holds the equivalent of the
British GNVQ.
2. Hayam : 21 years old. Works in a café. Holds the equivalent of the British GNVQ.
3. Abeer : 22 years old. Works as a supermarket checkout operator. Graduated from a computing academy.
4. Seham : 21 year old Nurse. Holds the equivalent of the British GNVQ- specialised in marketing.
5. Marwa : 23 years old. Works as a supermarket checkout operator. Holds the equivalent of the
British GNVQ- specialised in Marketing.
6. Mona : 24 years old. Works in a clothes shop. Graduate of Arabic Literature from Cairo
University.

Appendix 2- Focus group and interview questions.
The following questions were only used as a very rough guide of the general areas I wanted to approach. Each focus group and interview was a unique session characterised by a diversity of different discussions. The sessions were mainly split in to 2 sections.
Media Consumption
1.
So tell me, is their anything in particular that you watch regularly on TV?
2.
What programmes do you usually prefer to watch? In what language?
3.
Which channels do you consume the most? Why?
4.
What are your thoughts towards your own national media?
75

National Identity
1.
A lot of programs on television are talking about the political influence that America is having over us in light of the Middle East crisis, and that Egypt’s position is very weak. What do you think about this?
2.
Similarly, in terms of culture, is Egypt’s position also as weak?
3.
What does it mean to you to be ‘Egyptian?’
4.
Do you feel that the influx of alien values seeping through the media is affecting Egyptians and their sense of national identity?
5.
What are your strategies for dealing with this?

Appendix 3- Post session questionnaire.
This questionnaire was administered to the participants after the focus group sessions. It was intended to gather basic demographic information about their media consumption practices.
1.
Name
2. Age
3.
Qualifications gained
4.
Where do you live in Cairo
5.
Religion
6.
Which television channels do you consume the most
76

7.
Approx. how many hours of television do you consume everyday
8.
Which specific programs do you watch the most
9.
Do you have satellite channels in your home
77