#4-085
Editorial Note on Pacific Issues at the First Quebec Conference
August 14-21, 1943
While serious discussion of Pacific issues at the Quebec Conference had
to await resolution of Europe-Mediterranean problems, General Marshall and
Admiral King announced the U.S. position on the first day—August 14. Marshall
insisted upon the strategic linkage between the European and Pacific theaters,
emphasizing the important role China was to play in defeating Japan and the
consequent importance of reconquering Burma in order to succor China. King
put the British chiefs on notice that the Pacific theater needed greater materiel
support. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and
Quebec, 1943, pp. 857–59.) The U.S. was planning a two-pronged thrust toward
the Philippines during the next sixteen months: General MacArthur's forces were
to continue driving up the north coast of New Guinea to the Vogelkop; Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz (commander in chief, Pacific Fleet) was to lead an attack from
Hawaii through the Gilbert and Marshall island groups to Palau in the Central
Pacific. (Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 427–31.)
On August 17, Field Marshal Brooke initiated the British response on Far
Eastern matters by suggesting that the New Guinea thrust be curtailed, thereby
releasing forces and equipment for OVERLORD. Neither Marshall nor King was
willing to accept this suggestion. At the meeting on the twentieth, Marshall
reiterated his contention that major ground operations had to be undertaken to
liberate Burma so that China could be effectively supplied for significant air
operations against Japan. The British were also dismayed at the American
insistence that the Combined Chiefs of Staff commit themselves to defeating
Japan within twelve months after Germany's surrender, which was assumed
would occur in the autumn of 1944. Such a time limit, British planners argued,
meant assaulting Japan without first securing bases in China or Formosa. (Ibid.,
pp. 877, 977–78.)
The accumulated Pacific problems led to what Brooke called a "heated"
meeting on August 19 in which the chiefs of staff closeted themselves without
their staffs to resolve their differences off-the-record. Little was accomplished on
the twentieth, as the British chiefs desired first to achieve an understanding
regarding strategy with Prime Minister Churchill, who was opposed to operations
in lower Burma and favored an invasion of northern Sumatra. (Bryant, Turn of
the Tide, pp. 584–85.)
Finally, on August 21, the British chiefs of staff presented a compromise
document, which the American chiefs studied privately; further discussion,
Brooke noted, "broke the final difficulties of this Conference and practically
completed our work." (Ibid., p. 585.) The conferees adopted no long-range
strategic blueprint for the Pacific war—that was left for a future conference—but
the United States was given a free hand to launch its drive through the Central
Pacific. The well-defended Japanese base at Rabaul was "to be neutralized
rather than captured"—the first official pronouncement of what was to become
the island-hopping strategy. The air route to China was to be improved and
vigorous steps taken to defend it through operations in Burma. The urgency the
U.S. felt to end the war quickly was ratified by adopting the goal of victory over
Japan within a year of victory over Germany. (Foreign Relations of the United
States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 1125–28.)
The Quebec Conference also ratified the creation of the Southeast Asia
Command. The tangled command structure in the region, the endless trials of
pursuing the war in that difficult climate and terrain, and the need for a fresh
point of view had prompted Prime Minister Churchill to announce on June 18
that a new Allied command would be created separate from the command in
India. The British wished to model the command on Eisenhower's Allied Force
Headquarters in North Africa. But General Stilwell's situation did not fit that
model, as he had to combine the functions of chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek
and commander of U.S. and Chinese forces in the area with his new duties as
deputy supreme commander in Southeast Asia. When the command was
discussed at the August 18 C.C.S. meeting, Marshall observed that the
organization would of necessity be "abnormal." Stilwell's duties as deputy
supreme commander would be limited; his main task was to see that Chinese
forces and the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force played their parts in Burma operations.
(Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and
Quebec, 1943, p. 883; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's
Mission to China, a volume in the United States Army in World War II
[Washington: GPO, 1953], pp. 355–60; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare, 1943–1944, pp. 237–40.)
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon
Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic
version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, “Aggressive and Determined
Leadership,” June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), pp. 94–95.