#4-237
Editorial Note on Strategy in the Pacific
January-February 1944
American strategic direction of the war against Japan in the Pacific had
retained a general policy of flexibility through 1943, shifting the weight of forces
committed as the Japanese reacted, between concurrent offensive operations in
the Southwest Pacific Area—commanded by General Douglas MacArthur,
centered on the New Guinea front—and the island advances made with forces of
the Central Pacific Area commanded by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The capture
of the Gilbert Islands in the Central Pacific Area and preparations for the
continuation of the island campaign into the Marshall Islands for early 1944
clearly indicated the necessity for more specific decisions regarding overall
strategy in the Pacific war. The leaders at the Cairo Conference in December
1943 had approved a general advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area;
however, aside from the general outline of operations, they had agreed to few
specifics. Questions centered on future operations following the campaign in the
Marshalls. The Mariana Islands might be next, bypassing the great Japanese
naval base at Truk in the Caroline Islands, with the intention of commencing B-29
strategic bombing operations against the Japanese homeland from the Marianas.
This option tended to downplay the importance of General MacArthur's
operations. The alternative was a drive through the Caroline Islands after the
occupation of the Marshalls, either taking Truk by assault or bypassing it and
capturing the Palau Islands. The result in the latter scenario would be direct
support of General MacArthur's drive toward the recapture of the Philippines.
The high-level discussions over the course American strategy should follow for
1944 in the Pacific was complicated by real disagreement, strong personalities,
and service rivalries. (Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare,
1943–1944, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington:
GPO, 1959], pp. 453–55.)
Admiral Nimitz submitted his operational plan for 1944, code-named
GRANITE, to Washington on January 13, 1944. Nimitz's objective was to "obtain
positions from which the ultimate surrender of JAPAN can be forced by intensive
air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary.” He
proposed the occupation of the Marshall Islands through assaults on Kwajalein
and Eniwetok, and control of the Caroline Islands by capture of the Mortlock
Islands, invading or bypassing Truk as circumstances dictated. Saipan and
Tinian islands, and ultimately Guam, would be invaded in the Marianas with the
general objective of basing very long range aircraft (B-29s) and submarines for
offensives against the Japanese home islands. Admiral Nimitz suggested that
the capture of the Palau Islands might be necessary to assist General
MacArthur's operations, and he stated his acceptance of an ultimate juncture with
MacArthur's forces in the Philippines. "The reoccupation of the PHILIPPINES is
essential to the attainment of the ultimate strategic objective," but the plan also
indicated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943 had given priority
to operations in the Central Pacific whenever conflicts in timing and allocating
resources existed. (Campaign Plan GRANITE, January 13, 1944, NA/RG 165
[OPD, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43)].)
General MacArthur had submitted his plan for operations in the Southwest
Pacific Area to reoccupy the southern Philippines, code-named RENO III, in
October 1943; but he had not presented a plan since the Cairo Conference, as
Nimitz had. MacArthur intended initially to bypass the Japanese base at Rabaul
on New Britain Island with the capture of Hansa Bay in New Guinea, Kavieng on
New Ireland, and the Admiralty Islands. The plan called for further operations in
the northern and western areas of New Guinea and operations against
Halmahera Island and northeastern Celebes, with the ultimate objective the
invasion of Mindanao in the Philippines by February 1945. MacArthur
recognized the necessity for operations against the Japanese in the Caroline
Islands. (Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, pp. 314–
15. RENO III, October 20, 1943, is printed in Louis Morton, Strategy and
Command: The First Two Years, a volume in the United States Army in World
War II [Washington: GPO, 1962], pp. 686–92.)
Representatives of the Southwest Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, and
the Central Pacific Area commands held a conference on January 27 and 28,
1944, at Pearl Harbor to discuss overall Pacific strategy for 1944. Major General
Thomas T. Handy, assistant chief of staff of the Operations Division, reported to
General Marshall that the consensus of opinion of the conferees suggested the
occupation of the Marshalls; support for MacArthur's advance through New
Ireland, the Admiralty Islands, and New Guinea; bypassing Truk through the
capture of the Palau Islands, all with the ultimate invasion of Mindanao by the
end of 1944. In addition, there was some discussion as to whether the B-29
program could be better employed in the Marianas or along the New GuineaMindanao axis. Handy wrote that "although the B-29's could attack Japan proper
from the Marianas, the range is long, thus cutting down the bomb load; and the
operation would in no way be decisive.” The conferees generally agreed that
Japan would be defeated from bases in China, and the most effective way the
Allies could reach China was by way of the Philippines. No decisions were
reached at the conference, but there was general expression of support for
MacArthur's program for 1944. (Handy Memorandum for General Marshall,
February 7, 1944, and Colonel William L. Ritchie Memorandum to General
Handy, February 4, 1944, NA/ RG 165 [OPD, 334.8, Case 125]; Lieutenant
General Robert C. Richardson to Marshall, February 2, 1944, GCMRL/G. C.
Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
On February 2, General MacArthur sent a message to General Marshall in
which he urged the War Department to concentrate forces, following operations
in the Marshalls, along the New Guinea route to the Philippines. "All available
ground, air and assault forces in the Pacific should be combined in a drive along
the New Guinea-Mindanao axis supported by the main fleet based at Manus
Island and other facilities already available in these waters. This axis provides
the shortest and most direct route to the strategic objective and is the only one
that permits of an effective combination of land, sea and air forces.” MacArthur
pointed out that the B-29s could be more effectively supported logistically and
used more effectively with full bomb loads against the Japanese while operating
from his theater. He was willing to accept a British naval presence in his theater
and advocated a unified Allied naval command operating in the Southwest
Pacific Area under Admiral William F. Halsey. MacArthur advocated a single
unified drive aimed at the recapture of the Philippine Islands, rather than
dissipating Allied strength in "two weak thrusts which can not attain the major
strategic objective until several months later resulting at best in the delay of
future operations that would entail conflict with the rainy season in the Philippines
with a consequent overall delay in the conduct of the war of 6 additional months.”
MacArthur insisted that time constraints made a final decision regarding Pacific
strategy imperative, and that he was sending his chief of staff, Major General
Richard K. Sutherland, to Washington to express his views to General Marshall
more completely. (MacArthur to Marshall, Radio No. C-1217, February 2, 1944,
NA/RG 165 [OPD, TS Message File (CM-IN-1443)].)
Admiral Ernest J. King responded to General MacArthur's statements in a
memorandum to General Marshall on February 8. King admitted that in the
immediate future B-29s might be profitably employed in General MacArthur's
theater; nonetheless he stated that his understanding was that ultimately the B29s would be employed in a strategic bombing offensive against Japan from
bases in the Marianas. Admiral King argued that unless the British Royal Navy
task forces were prepared to support themselves logistically, the alternative
being taking resources from the support of U.S. carrier groups, they were best
deployed in the Indian Ocean diverting Japanese forces from the Pacific. At the
recent conference, "adequate carrier forces in addition to surface forces were
allocated to the 7th Fleet for carrying out the impending operations in the
Southwest Pacific.” He saw no reason to create a joint naval command in
MacArthur's theater, and he insisted that "the economic employment of naval
forces in the future will require that the strategic control of the Pacific remain the
responsibility of a single naval commander, and that the naval support in the
Areas be adjusted from time to time as required by the operations underway.”
King stated his understanding that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had already
decided "that the advance in the Pacific shall be simultaneous along both axes
and shall be mutually supporting, that when conflicts in timing and allocation of
means exist, due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the
Central Pacific promise at this time a more rapid advance toward Japan and her
vital lines of communication.” Admiral King also stated that "the people in the
Southwest Pacific are unduly optimistic about the rate of their advance in the
New Guinea theater.” In addition, King commented on the staff organization in
the Southwest Pacific, which he considered unsatisfactory, and gave his opinion
that "we will eventually require a combined staff in this area and that we should
now have a joint staff along the lines of the one we have established in the
Pacific Ocean Areas." (King Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
February 8, 1944, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
On February 10 General Marshall sent the following reply to Admiral King
(Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #4-238 [4: 280–82]).
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon
Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic
version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, “Aggressive and Determined
Leadership,” June 1, 1943–December 31, 1944 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), pp. 276–280.