#3-484
Editorial Note on the Conference at Casablanca
January 13–24, 1943
Swift Allied victory in North Africa following the TORCH landings had failed
to occur for many reasons, including overextended supply lines, rapid
reinforcement by the Germans and Italians of the positions they had seized in
northern Tunisia, and adverse weather conditions.
Nevertheless, Allied leaders were confident of a successful outcome,
despite temporary delays. The strategic question facing Roosevelt, Churchill,
and their military advisers at the end of 1942 was what offensive action to
undertake after the conquest of North Africa.
Prime Minister Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had concluded,
after considerable debate among themselves during the autumn of 1942, that the
Allies did not have the requisite shipping, troops, or air forces to sustain a crossChannel invasion until German military power had been further worn down, which
very likely would not be in time for a landing in 1943. Consequently, they
decided that for the war's next stage the Allies should concentrate all available
forces against Italy in the hope of forcing it to sue for peace, thereby obliging the
Germans to assume Italian commitments in the Balkans, Greece, and various
Mediterranean islands, further straining Germany's overtaxed resources. As
1942 ended, the British Chiefs of Staff had not decided whether the next Allied
offensive should be aimed at Sardinia (Operation BRIMSTONE) or Sicily
(Operation HUSKY). (Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, volume 4, August 1942September 1943, a volume in the History of the Second World War [London:
HMSO, 1972], pp. 225–36.)
President Roosevelt was sympathetic to British strategic opinions, but his
military planners, while not entirely unified, generally were not. Marshall believed
that the North African operation had been a strategic detour and that its
completion meant that fresh impetus should be given to BOLERO—i.e., the
accumulation of troops and materiel in Britain preparatory to launching
ROUNDUP, an assault landing in France, probably on the Brittany peninsula. By
December 21, Roosevelt and Churchill had arranged a conference for midJanuary 1943, this time in Casablanca, Morocco. While this gave United States
military planners more time to prepare than they had been allowed for the three
previous heads-of-state meetings, they were, the army's official history notes, just
beginning to appreciate how well prepared they needed to be in order to meet
the British on equal terms in the discussions. Moreover, President Roosevelt
limited his chiefs of staff to a handful of conference assistants. (Ray S. Cline,
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, a volume in the United
States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1951], pp. 214–15.)
The final preconference meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
their commander in chief took place in the White House on the afternoon of
January 7, two days before the chiefs were scheduled to leave. Roosevelt asked
Marshall if the military were united in agreement to advocate a cross-Channel
operation. Marshall replied that they were not, especially the planning staff. The
minutes record the chief of staff as saying that he "regarded an operation in the
north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an
open one.” Further, of the two most likely Mediterranean operations—Sardinia
and Sicily—the latter, while more difficult, was more desirable. "He said that he
personally favored an operation against the Brest peninsula. The losses there
will be in troops, but he said that, to state it cruelly, we could replace troops
whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the BRIMSTONE
Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations
against the enemy in the near future.” While ROUNDUP would also entail
losses, Marshall said, there would be "no narrow straits on our lines of
communications, and we could operate with fighter protection from the United
Kingdom.” When the North African operation was completed, the president
noted, the Allies would have a half million surplus troops there; where were they
to be employed? Marshall "pointed out that we were already training divisions for
the BRIMSTONE Operation in case a decision was made to mount it." (Foreign
Relations, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, pp. 509–10, 512. The
minutes of the January 7 meeting and of all the formal J.C.S. and C.C.S.
meetings at the Casablanca Conference are printed in this volume. The army
history of the conference is Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare, 1943–1944, a volume in the United States Army in World War II
[Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 18–42.)
Marshall, King, Arnold, and their party (except Admiral Leahy, who was
traveling with the president's party but had to return home because of illness) left
Washington on January 9 in two C-54s, reaching Casablanca—via Puerto Rico,
Brazil, and Gambia—on the morning of January 13. Marshall later described his
journey to his sister; see Marshall to Singer, February 1, 1943, Papers of George
Catlett Marshall, #3-494 [3: 526–27]. Albert C. Wedemeyer, then a brigadier
general and the chief army planner, gave an account of the trip, the setting in
Casablanca, and his opinions of the conference in Wedemeyer Reports! (New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), pp. 169–92.
The first of twenty formal meetings in which Marshall participated—fifteen
of them with the Combined Chiefs of Staff—began on the morning of January 14
in the Anfa Hotel just outside Casablanca. During the first four days, the
conferees discussed the broad outlines of strategy. Both heads of state and their
military chiefs reaffirmed during the conference that Germany was the primary
and Japan the secondary enemy; likewise, all were agreed that the enemy must
not be allowed time to recuperate from recent Allied blows or to reinforce their
defenses. The differences among them arose over what this meant
operationally.
Marshall told the British that the Allies should double the proportion of their
total resources allocated to the Pacific theater (which included China and
Burma). The Japanese had repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities,
and they must not be permitted to regain the initiative or to create a stronger
defensive network; thus the Allies could not rely on a static defense in the Pacific
but had to continue an aggressive offense. Pacific operations were extremely
expensive in terms of merchant shipping and fighting vessels. To reduce this
burden, Japan and its shipping had to be attacked more vigorously; an important
way to do this was by increasing Allied air power in China. To support this, more
supplies had to be sent to China; and to accomplish this, Burma had to be
recaptured (Operation ANAKIM) and the supply route reestablished. In addition,
given the conditions of the naval war there, the Pacific struggle was "fraught with
the possibility of a sudden reverse and the consequent loss of [Allied] sea
power.” Execution of Operation TORCH had once been threatened by Pacific
difficulties, Marshall asserted; if ANAKIM were not undertaken, "a situation might
arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States
regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater. . . . The
United States could not stand for another Bataan." (Foreign Relations,
Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, p. 603.)
The British military chiefs feared that United States efforts in the Pacific
would drain resources from the battle in Europe. Germany, which British opinion
held was already showing signs of military weakness, was still too strong in
northern France, and had too great an ability to reinforce its position there, for the
Allies to risk a cross-Channel invasion soon. Moreover, to attempt ROUNDUP
would necessitate a massive shifting of Allied troops from North Africa and the
United States to Britain, and the shipping shortage and consequent time required
to accomplish this meant that the Germans would have nearly six months to
recover from their Russian and North African losses. If an operation were
launched in the Mediterranean, the British chiefs argued, shipping demands
would be reduced, a major operation could be launched during the late spring or
summer of 1943, there was a good chance of eliminating Italy from the war, and
Germany would have difficulty reinforcing its positions in southern Europe.
Every diversion from the cross-Channel operation served as a "suction
pump" which drew in more and more Allied resources, Marshall declared at the
January 16 C.C.S. meeting; but he did admit that "operations against Sicily
appeared to be advantageous" given the number of Allied troops that would
remain in North Africa after victory there. That evening the J.C.S. met with
President Roosevelt. It was clear that the British would not cooperate in a crossChannel invasion before 1944 unless the Germans showed signs of weakening,
Marshall stated. The joint chiefs had concluded, therefore, that Operation
HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, should be undertaken. The British had not yet
been informed of this, Marshall noted; he hoped first to obtain their agreement on
Pacific strategy. (Ibid., pp. 583, 597.)
Compromise with the British concerning Pacific operations proved to be
more difficult than Marshall had anticipated. The British chiefs were reluctant to
commit themselves to ANAKIM and to approve United States plans to seize the
Gilbert, Marshall, and Caroline islands, seeing these as deviations from the
Germany-first strategy. The minutes record Marshall as insisting that he did "not
propose doing nothing in the Mediterranean or in France.” But he was "opposed
to immobilizing a large force in the United Kingdom awaiting an uncertain
prospect, when they might be better engaged in offensive operations which are
possible. . . . He was most anxious not to become committed to interminable
operations in the Mediterranean.” Moreover, the United States could not
continue conducting Pacific operations on a "shoe string.” At the end of the
morning C.C.S. meeting on January 18, Marshall proposed a compromise in
which U.S. Pacific operations would be conducted without asking for additional
forces but "with the resources available in the theater.” The British accepted this,
with minor modifications, on January 19. Three days later the military leaders
had agreed that HUSKY should be launched in late July. Both Roosevelt and
Churchill wished the landing to take place earlier, but specific plans were left to
Eisenhower and his staff. (Ibid., pp. 618–19, 622, 637, 684.)
Once the key strategic decisions were made, the C.C.S. filled in details
and worked through a succession of papers (most submitted by British planners)
during the final six days of meetings. No one doubted, for example, that "a first
charge on the resources of the United Nations" must be the war against German
U-boats, which at this time was not being won. (Ibid., p. 774.) Somewhat related
to this was the conduct of the Combined Bomber Offensive (Operation
POINTBLANK) against the Germans. Marshall agreed that the British would
exercise overall strategic direction, but the U.S. Army Air Forces would maintain
control over the methods it would use (e.g., daylight bombing). (Ibid., pp. 781–
82.) Further, no one doubted that supplies should continue to flow to the Soviet
Union. The chief concern was the cost in Allied ships of the dangerous northern
route to Murmansk; Marshall "said that he does not believe it necessary to take
excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr. Stalin
placated." (Ibid., pp. 632–33.) Bringing Turkey into the war on the Allied side
was an agreed goal, implementation of which was left to the British. (Ibid., pp.
649–52, 659–60.) Nor was the question of rearming the French forces available
in North Africa—estimated to be 250,000 men—a divisive issue. Although the
service chiefs would not discuss the details of the amount or timing of such aid,
they applauded General Giraud's statement to them of French confidence and
determination. (Ibid., pp. 639, 652–55.)
At the final press conference on January 24, President Roosevelt told
reporters that the Allies would demand "unconditional surrender" of the Axis
powers; this meant, he said, not the destruction of their peoples but "the
destruction of the philosophies of those countries which are based on conquest
and the subjugation of other people." (Ibid., p. 767.) Despite its military
implications, the president had not discussed this announcement with his chiefs
of staff, although he had used the phrase in passing at the preconference
meeting on January 7. (Ibid., p. 506.)
The British Chiefs of Staff were pleased with having accomplished most of
their conference agenda. U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces leaders also had
reason to feel that their roles and strategic views had been enhanced by the
meetings. U.S. Army planners, however, especially Albert Wedemeyer, believed
that superior British preparation and unity had defeated the United States by
concentrating on the Mediterranean and placing preparations for the crossChannel invasion far down the priority list. One consequence of this attitude was
that army planners would come to future conferences better prepared. (Howard,
Grand Strategy, 4: 278; Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! pp. 191–92, 210–17.
See Marshall Memorandum for General Wedemeyer, April 6, 1943, Papers of
George Catlett Marshall, #3-594 [3: 634–35].)
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I.
Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall
Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett
Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 513–
518.