BIN LADEN’S NIGHTMARE IN EGYPT
The Mubarak Regime has collapsed and the voice of the people has been heard. The
ramifications for Egypt and for the Middle East will be more powerful than the impact of
Arab-Israeli wars. But even with the uncertainty about the future one thing is certain: We
are witnessing Osama bin Laden’s nightmare.
What comes next is, first and foremost, for Egyptians to decide, and whatever happens, it
is the Egyptian people who will have to live with the consequences.
Understandably, however, Americans are watching events with awe mixed with concern.
We are divided between the exhilaration of watching peaceful public empowerment in
pursuit of the values Americans hold dear and fear of the consequences for U.S. interests
in the Middle East. The future of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, the Israeli-Egyptian
relationship and the power and design of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have
consumed the lion’s share of the debate about U.S. interests.
But the biggest of all interests has been largely ignored: The power and pride that the
peaceful masses exhibit in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities are Bin Laden’s
worst nightmare. Peaceful masses, not the murder of innocents, overthrew a regime most
thought was entrenched. If the demonstrators fail to fulfill their aspirations, it will be
America’s nightmare.
Consider this: For at least two decades, we have known of the widening gap between
governments and the public in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. The puzzle was
never “When will people have reason to revolt?” but always “Why haven’t people
revolted already?”
In seeking to overthrow Arab governments, long before the 9/11 horror, Al Qaeda
leaders, including the second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor, told the
Arab people to take on the seemingly overwhelming power of the state — with bloody
attacks against its symbols. The Al Qaeda leadership insisted that militant Islam was the
way. No one else seemed to have an answer.
Enter the Tunisian people and now the Egyptian people — in some of the most
extraordinary peaceful non-ideological revolts in history. If they succeed, Al Qaeda may
remain a force, but its public appeal will ring hollow. If they fail, the energy, the
mobilization, the taste of pride and empowerment, will not go away — but could be
channeled somewhere else. These forces could turn into Egypt’s and the world’s
nightmare.
Even aside from the compelling moral stance, the United States has every interest, first
and foremost, in making sure that uprisings and the military response to them remain
peaceful, and second, to see that legitimate public aspirations are met.
The most important national security threat to the United States remains Al Qaeda and its
allies; and the outcome of the Egyptian uprising will have a decided bearing on
energizing or weakening these groups and their message.
Looking ahead, we are facing the unknown — and no one can trust analysts’ predictions
in revolutionary times. Analysts, social scientists among them, are trained to predict the
future on the basis of the patterns of the past. That’s precisely how social science is
conducted. That’s why most analysts fail to predict profound change in history — by
definition a break from the past. It also explains why no one saw the scale or timing of
the events in Tunisia and Egypt. And no one can predict with confidence the outcome of
the Egyptian revolution.
An era has ended for sure, but what the new era will look like remains a mystery.
But a few things are clear. First, public empowerment is here to stay as the information
revolution is only expanding and its impact is increasingly clear. No future government
of Egypt can fully ignore its public sentiment or take it for granted — whatever form it
takes.
Second, the Egyptian military institution will likely continue to play a central role in
Egypt through the transition and beyond. It remains trusted by most Egyptians — though
this could be tested in the coming days —, in part because it will be needed for state
security, and in part because Egyptians have a sense of a leadership role in the region that
they cannot envision without a strong military.
Whoever ultimately emerges on top politically in Egypt will likely have to co-exist with a
strong military—akin to Turkey in years past. The military will likely be the most
important thread connecting Egypt to national security policies — which are likely to
remain anchored in a cooperative relationship with the U.S. and maintaining the peace
with Israel, since this is a mutual beneficial arrangement.
What is most likely to change is that Israeli-Egyptian relations will not be collaborative
as in recent years, because the Egyptian public remains angry with Israel over the
Palestinian issue. Any new Egyptian government is less likely to give automatic support
for U.S. policies in the region—in the same way that Turkey, our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ally, responded to its public opinion in refusing to cooperate with the
United States in the 2003 war in Iraq.
As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they are obviously neither the diver nor the central
player in the unfolding uprising, which has taken on the theme of “Egypt above all.” Like
any political group in Egypt, they are likely to look for their opportunities. No one can
tell how successful they may be in a truly open electoral competition. Though it is clear
they could have done better if the choice was merely between them and the ruling
National Democratic Party than with far more choices.
What is clear is that, whoever governs Egypt, and whatever their aims and preferences,
they will have to co-exist with a military that will likely remain strong and a newly
empowered public that’s at the core seeking liberty.
Looking ahead, we are facing the unknown — and no one can trust analysts’ predictions
in revolutionary times. Analysts, social scientists among them, are trained to predict the
future on the basis of the patterns of the past. That’s precisely how social science is
conducted. That’s why most analysts fail to predict profound change in history — by
definition a break from the past. It also explains why no one saw the scale or timing of
the events in Tunisia and Egypt. And no one can predict with confidence the outcome of
the Egyptian revolution.
An era has ended for sure, but what the new era will look like remains a mystery.
But a few things are clear. First, public empowerment is here to stay as the information
revolution is only expanding and its impact is increasingly clear. No future government
of Egypt can fully ignore its public sentiment or take it for granted — whatever form it
takes.
Second, the Egyptian military institution will likely continue to play a central role in
Egypt through the transition and beyond. It remains trusted by most Egyptians — though
this could be tested in the coming days —, in part because it will be needed for state
security, and in part because Egyptians have a sense of a leadership role in the region that
they cannot envision without a strong military.
Whoever ultimately emerges on top politically in Egypt will likely have to co-exist with a
strong military—akin to Turkey in years past. The military will likely be the most
important thread connecting Egypt to national security policies — which are likely to
remain anchored in a cooperative relationship with the U.S. and maintaining the peace
with Israel, since this is a mutual beneficial arrangement.
What is most likely to change is that Israeli-Egyptian relations will not be collaborative
as in recent years, because the Egyptian public remains angry with Israel over the
Palestinian issue. Any new Egyptian government is less likely to give automatic support
for U.S. policies in the region—in the same way that Turkey, our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ally, responded to its public opinion in refusing to cooperate with the
United States in the 2003 war in Iraq.
As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they are obviously neither the diver nor the central
player in the unfolding uprising, which has taken on the theme of “Egypt above all.” Like
any political group in Egypt, they are likely to look for their opportunities. No one can
tell how successful they may be in a truly open electoral competition. Though it is clear
they could have done better if the choice was merely between them and the ruling
National Democratic Party than with far more choices.
What is clear is that, whoever governs Egypt, and whatever their aims and preferences,
they will have to co-exist with a military that will likely remain strong and a newly
empowered public that’s at the core seeking liberty.
It’s a risk worth taking when you consider that failure to try will make Bin Laden’s case.