POL550: International Organization
Spring 2009
Christina Davis
229 Bendheim Hall
Phone: 258-0177
Email: cldavis@princeton.edu
Office hours: Thursday 2-4pm
Monday 1:30-4:20
Corwin 126
Course description
The number and scope of international organizations continues to expand so that there are few
areas of international politics that are not regulated in some way by an international institution,
whether informal norms or a formal organization. Why do states establish institutions and what
determines their design and evolution? Do these institutions merely reflect underlying power
and interests? These are some of the questions we will be asking in this course. It is an advanced
research seminar that will introduce theories of international institutions, evaluate critical
perspectives, and examine applications in security, economic, and environmental policy areas.
Course requirements
1) Participation in seminar discussion. 15 percent
2) 1-2 page response papers, due by 9am on the Monday when the seminar will address the
readings discussed in the paper. The papers should provide a synthesis and/or critique of
selections from 2 or more readings assigned for the week. Six papers are due over the semester.
35 percent
3) Choice of two 10 page papers on themes from main topic areas; or a 20-30 page research
paper/detailed research proposal, due on Dean’s date (those who choose the latter option should
discuss their topic with me and submit a 1 page proposal before spring break). 50 percent
Books on reserve at Firestone library:
Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons ed. International Institutions: An International Organization
Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). Note that these IO reprints are available
individually through JSTOR.
Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998.
Haftendorn, Helga, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander. Imperfect Unions: Security
Institutions Over Time and Space. Oxford University Press 1999.
Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (1997). [note this book is recommended, but not assigned as required reading]
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Week 1 Introduction (Feb 2)
Krasner, Stephen. “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening
variables,” and “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables” in
International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 1-22, 355-368. (also available
through JSTOR as International Organization 36, no. 2 Spring 1982)
Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," In
International Institutions.
Recommended:
Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 1-22.
Week 2 Theories on the Creation and Effect of International Institutions (Feb 9)
Keohane, After Hegemony, chps. 1, 4-7 (pp. 5-17, 49-132)
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. “Managing the Evolution of
Multilateralism,” International Organization, 52:2 (April 1998), 397-419.
Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, “Delegation Under
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory.” Chapter 1 in
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp.
3-38.
Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” in
International Institutions
Johnston, Alastair Iain, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,"
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 487-515
Recommended:
Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp.23-224.
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions” International Security 19:3
(Winter 1994/95), 5-49.
Week 3 Theories of Institutional Design (Feb 16)
Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," in International Institutions
Morrow, James. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus
Information," International Organization 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 387-423.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International
Institutions," International Organization 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 761-99
Koremenos, Barbara. “Contracting Around International Uncertainty,” American Political
Science Review. 99, no. 4 (November 2005): 549-565.
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"The Concept of Legalization," and "Hard and Soft Law" in Legalization and World Politics
special issue, International Organization 54 no. 3 (2000).
Recommended:
Lipson, Charles. “Why Are Some Agreements Informal?” International Organization 45, no. 4
(Autumn 1991): 495-538.
Week 4 Theories of Compliance (Feb 23)
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. ``On Compliance.'' In International Institutions.
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?" in International Institutions
Fearon, James. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International
Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 269-305
Dai, Xinyuan. “Information Systems in Treaty Regimes,” World Politics 54 (July 2002): 405436.
Keohane, Robert, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Legalized Dispute
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational” in Legalization and World Politics special issue,
International Organization 54 no. 3 (2000): 457-488.
Recommended:
Simmons, Beth. “Compliance with International Agreements,” Annual Review of Political
Science, 1 (1998): 75-93.
Week 5 Overlapping Institutions (March 2)
Aggarwal, Vinod K. “Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting,”
Chapter one in Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages and Nesting.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) pp. 1-31.
Drezner, Daniel. “A Typology of Global Governance Processes,” Chapter 3 in All Politics is
Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp.
63-88.
The Politics of International Regime Complexity Symposium, Perspectives on Politics (2009)
forthcoming. Selections by Alter and Meunier, Davis, Helfer, Betts, and Hofmann [readings will
be provided].
Recommended:
Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, "Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International
Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992," In International Institutions.
Kingsbury, Benedict. Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic
Problem? New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 31 (1999):679-696.
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Raustiala, Kal, and David Victor. The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources.
International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004):277-309.
Week 6 The Nexus Between Domestic and International Institutions (March 9)
Allee, Tod and Paul Huth. “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings and
Domestic Political Cover.” American Political Science Review, 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 219-234.
Pevehouse, Jon. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and
Democratization.” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 515-549.
Mansfield, Edward and Jon Pevehouse. “Democratization and International Organizations.”
International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 137-167.
Kelley, Judith. “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal
Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements.” American Political Science Review, 101, no. 3
(2007): 573-589.
Dai, Xinyuan. “The Power of Weak International Institutions,” “Conclusion” Chapters 5 and 6 in
International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 100151.
Week 7 Regional Integration (March 23)
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional
Statecraft in the European Community," International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 956
Frieden, Jeffry, “The Impact of Goods and Capital Market Integration on European Monetary
Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 29:2 (April 1996), 193-222.
McNamara, Kathleen. “Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in European
Monetary Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (September 1999).
Alter, Karen. ``Who are the `Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the European
Court of Justice.'' In International Institutions.
Kahler, Miles. “Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case.” International Organization,
54, no. 3 (2000): 549-571.
Dominguez, Jorge. “International Cooperation in Latin America: The Design of Regional
Institutions by Slow Accretion,” chapter 3 in Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 83-128.
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Recommended:
George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism
and Supranationalism in the European Union," International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring
2001): 357-90.
Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter. “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration” International Organization 47 no. 1 (1993): 41-76. responses by Geoffrey Garrett
and Mattli/Slaughter, International Organization 49:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 171-190.
Week 8 International Trade (March 30)
Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Mike Tomz. “Institutions in International Relations:
Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade,” International Organization
61, no. 1 (2007): 37-67.
Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of GATT 195094," World Politics 57, no. 4 (2005): 453-478.
Davis, Christina. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural
Trade Liberalization,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004): 153-169.
Maggi, Giovanni. “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation,” The
American Economic Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 190-214.
Kono, Daniel “Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation.”
The Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (August 2007): 746-759.
Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. “Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” in Kennedy, Daniel and James Southwick ed. The Political
Economy of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) pp. 457481.
Recommended:
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. ``The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.'' Economics
and Politics 2, no. 1 (1990): 1--23.
Rosendorff, Peter and Helen Milner. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions:
Uncertainty and Escape.” International Organization 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 829-857.
Rose, Andrew. “Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?” American Economic
Review 94, no. 1 (2004): 98–114.
John Barton, Judith Goldstein, Tim Josling, and Richard Steinberg. The Evolution of the Trade
Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO. Princeton University Press,
2006.
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Week 9 Monetary Policy and International Financial Institutions (April 6)
Ikenberry, John. “Creating Yesterday’s New World Order: Keynesian ‘New Thinking’ and the
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.” In Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane ed. Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
1993) pp.57-86.
Drezner, Daniel. “Club Standards and International Finance,” Chapter 5 in All Politics is Global:
Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp.119-148.
Simmons, Beth. ``International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs’’ American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 819-835.
Also recommended: critique article by Jana von Stein and response published in APSR 99, no. 4
(2005): pp. 611-631.
Broz, Lawrence and Michael Brewster Hawes. “Congressional Politics of Financing the
International Monetary Fund” International Organization 60, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 367-399.
Thacker, Strom Cronan. “The High Politics of IMF Lending” World Politics 52, no. 1, (October
1999): 38-75.
Recommended for background on financial institutions:
Eichengreen, Barry and Peter Kenen. ``Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods
System: An Overview.'' In Peter B. Kenen ed. Managing the World Economy: fifty Years After
Bretton Woods. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994. pp.3--82.
Week 10 Environment (April 13)
Nielson, Daniel and Michael Tierney. “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.” International Organization 57 no. 2 (Spring
2003): 241-276.
Haas, Peter M. ``Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution
Control,'' International Organization 43, no. 3. (Summer 1989): 377--403.
Young, Oran and Marc Levy. “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes” In
Oran Young ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections
and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999) pp. 1-32.
Mitchell, Ronald. “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance.” In
International Institutions, pp. 103-136.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998. pp. 121--164. Introduction chapter also recommended.
DeSombre, Elizabeth R. Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry
Environmentalists, and U.S. Power. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000. pp. 1--17, 171-191.
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Week 11 Human Rights (April 20)
Krasner, Stephen. “Rulers and Ruled: Human Rights” chapter in Sovereignty: Organized
Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. pp. 1-42, 105-126.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and
Western Europe.” European Journal of International Relations. 1, no. 2 (1995): 157-189.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998. pp.79-120.
Hathaway, Oona. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” The Yale Law Journal 111
(2002): 1935-2041.
Morrow, James. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” American Political Science Review
101, no. 3 (August 2007): 559-572.
Week 12 Security Institutions (April 27)
Wallander, Celeste and Robert O. Keohane. ``Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions.'' In
Imperfect Unions, pp.21--47.
Gelpi, Christopher. “Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control.” Imperfect Unions, pp.
107-139.
Hemmer, Christopher and Peter Katzenstein. “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective
Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism.” International Organization 56, no. 3
(summer 2002): 575-607.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the
ASEAN Regional Forum.” Imperfect Unions, pp.287-324.
Thompson, Alexander. “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of
Information Transmission.” International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): pp. 1-34.
Fortna, Page. “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects,” World
Politics Vol. 56, No. 4 (July 2004): 481-519.
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