Spring 2014
Johns Hopkins University/SAIS
SYLLABUS
SA 400.818.01
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
Wednesdays 6:00 to 8:30 in BOB 736
Professor:
Deborah Bräutigam
Office:
BOB 735
Tel:
202-650-5412
Email:
dbrautigam@jhu.edu
Office Hours: Tuesdays 2:30--6:30
Course Objectives: Why are some countries rich and some poor? Why is there so much diversity in
development strategies for countries at similar levels of development? This course explores the many
factors that affect the way states and their societies construct development strategies, and the impact
particular development strategies have on development outcomes: social development, environmental
sustainability, growth, income distribution, human rights, etc. Our cases will illustrate the interaction
between structure and agency: how do structural conditions (such as being a natural resource based
economy, or having a particular class configuration) affect the agency of government and societal
choices, and vice versa? We will be looking at three basic areas of development strategy: agriculture
and rural development; industrialization; and social policy. We will also be exploring the role of
institutions, social capital, globalization, and other important issues in comparative development. The
course assumes there are no easy answers to these questions. It also assumes a basic background in
economics.
Grading: The major output for this class is a policy research paper (or a policy brief): 80%
The paper will identify a particular policy, sectoral, institutional or organizational problem to be
addressed, and a specific country where it is to be addressed. The paper will include a diagnostic of the
country-level political economy dynamics and constraints that will affect any solution. It will propose an
option to address the problem that is feasible given the country-level, and sector or organizational-level
political economy dynamics. Explain why this solution is consistent with the existing realities of the
country’s political economy and institutions (not as we wish them to be).
Papers can be done in one, two, or three stages. If you deliver the first stages of the paper early, you will
have the opportunity for feedback, but this is optional. The finished paper should be approximately
5000-6000 words, and is due one week after our final class. Papers more than 6000 words will not be
accepted. Instructions will be posted on Blackboard. A good introduction to this kind of analysis can be
found at Verena Fritz, Kai Kaiser and Brian Levy (2009) “Problem Driven Governance and Political
Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework,” Washington, DC.
Class participation
20%
Class participation will naturally be affected by your presence in class. Attendance will be taken weekly.
As part of your discussion grade, each student will post 3 thoughtful and/or provocative discussion
questions (these can be more than one sentence, i.e. up to a paragraph) intended to stimulate
discussion about the readings, at least 5 times during the semester, on Blackboard, i.e. 15 questions.
Discussion about the readings on Blackboard is encouraged, and can help your participation grade. One
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absence is allowed without penalty or explanation, per semester. This includes the first day of class.
Please email me at least 24 hours before class if you know you will have to miss class.
SAIS Honor Code:
You are expected to be thoroughly familiar with the Honor Code, which is found on pages 6-11 of the
red Academic Procedures Manual and which provides guidance on when citation is required. All direct
quotations from other people’s work must be set off in quotation marks, and given proper attribution.
All ideas gleaned from others must be credited. Plagiarism -- not properly crediting material or ideas
taken from other work – is a serious offense. Assignments containing plagiarized material will receive an
F and the student will be reported to the Academic Dean.
Wk 1: Introduction: Development Strategies: as Politically Induced Structural Transformation
Gerschenkron; Schumpeter; F. List;
The Economist (2012) “Briefing: Bangladesh and Development,” November 3.
Alex de Waal (2009) “The Price of Peace,” Prospect Magazine, November 17, p. 165 (also read the two
comments that follow De Waal’s article).
A. Gerschenkron. 1962. “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in Economic Backwardness
in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 5-30
A. Krueger. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 63, 3
(June): 291-294 and conclusion: 301-303.
Brian Levy and Francis Fukuyama (2010), “Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and
Growth,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5196 (January).
Wk 2: Growth and Structural Transformation: The Basics
“Gerschenkronian collective dilemmas” – capital accumulation and investment in new industrial plant
“Kaldorian collective dilemmas” – upgrading productivity, lowering costs, improving quality of goods
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder, pp. 13-68
Moses Abromovitz. 1986. “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind,” Journal of Economic History
46, 2 (June 1986): 385-406.
C. Peter Timmer. 2007. “The Structural Transformation and the Changing Role of Agriculture in
Economic Development: Empirics and Implications,” Wendt Lecture, October 30, 2007 American
Enterprise Institute. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22133/Timmer_wendt_lecture.pdf
Lin, J. Y. 2012. From Flying Geese To Leading Dragons: New Opportunities and Strategies for Structural
Transformation in Developing Countries. Global Policy, 3: 397–409.
Wk 3: Political Economy Frameworks: Why States and Societies Do What They Do
From class to sectoral (rural/urban) issues; Marxist frameworks; Patron-client; side-payments; coalitions,
M. Lipton. 1977. “Introduction,” in Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias and World Development
Cambridge: Harvard University Press:
R. Bates. 1981. “Introduction,” in Markets and States in Tropical Africa : 1-10. “particular coalition
strategies result in different dynamics of rent-seeking behaviour.” How the rural sector is
organized.
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Joel Migdal (1988) “Conclusion,” in Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 259-277.
Kathryn Sikkink (1991) “Preface” and “Introduction,” in Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in
Brazil and Argentina Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. xi-xvi and 1-28. Role of ideas.
Mancur Olson, M. 1993. 'Dictatorship, democracy and development', American Political Science Review,
87 (Sept): 567-576.
Eduardo Silva. “Business Elites, the State, and Economic Change in Chile,” in Maxfield and Schneider,
eds. Business and the State in Developing Countries: 152-190.
Wk 4: History and Development Strategies: The Long Reach of the Past
A. Hirschmann, “The Political Economy of Import Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 (February 1968): 2-32.
A. Banerjee and L. Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: the Legacy of Colonial
Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review, 95, 4. (Sep.): 1190-1213.
S.L. Engerman and K.L. Sokoloff. 2005. Colonialism, inequality, and long-run paths of development. NBER
Working Paper 11057, Cambridge, MA. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9259.pdf
Alice H. Amsden. 2010. “Elites and Property Rights, WIDER Working Paper No. 2010/109. October.
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2010/en_GB/wp2010-109/
Wk 5: East Asia’s Developmental States/Embedded Autonomy/Systemic Vulnerability
Alice H. Amsden. 1979. "Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatism and a Challenge to Dependency
Theory," Modern China 5, n. 3 (July).
Evans, Peter B. 1989. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political
Economy of the Third World State.” Sociological Forum. 4, 4: 561-587.
Atul Kohli. 1994. “Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of
Korea’s ‘Developmental State’,” World Development 22, 9.
Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater. 2005. “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of
Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International
Organization 59, Spring: 327-361.
Wk 6: State and Business/Sector Analysis
Ben Ross Schneider and Sylvia Maxfield. 1997. “Business, the State, and Economic Performance in
Developing Countries,” in Maxfield and Schneider, Business and the State in Developing Countries,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 3-35.
Michael Shafer. 1997. “The Political Economy of Sectors and Sectoral Change: Korea Then and Now,” in
Maxfield and Schneider, Business and the State in Developing Countries, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press: 88-121.
Deborah Bräutigam, Lise Rakner, and Scott Taylor. 2002. “Business Associations and Growth Coalitions in
Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies Cambridge University Press, v. 40, n. 4
(December): 519-547.
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Richard F. Doner and Ansil Ramsey. 1997. “Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case
of Thailand,” in Maxfield and Schneider, Business and the State in Developing Countries, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press: 237-276.
Wk 7: Developmental & Patrimonial States: Rents, Rent-Seeking, and Economic Development
M. Khan and K. S. Jomo. 2000. Ch1 “Rents, Efficiency, and Growth,” in Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic
Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia New York: Cambridge University Press: 21-99.
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9842/1/Rents_Efficiency_and_Growth.pdf
R. Bates, “On the Politics of Property Rights,” Journal of Economic Literature, XLII (June 2004): 494–500.
Review of Stephen Haber, Armando Razo and Noel Maurer (2003) The Politics of Property Rights
Cambridge University Press.
Mushtaq Khan. 2013. “Bangladesh: Economic Growth in a Fragile LAO,” in North, Wallis Weingast and
Webb, In the Shadow of Violence: 24-69.
Sarah Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremicheal. 2011. “Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia,” Africa
Power and Politics Research Report http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110822-appprr02-rethinking-business-politics-in-ethiopia-by-sarah-vaughan-mesfin-gebremichael-august-2011
Wk 8: Politics and Social Policy
Jeremy Shiffman (2004) "Political Management in the Indonesian Family Planning Program,"
International Family Planning Perspectives 30(1): 27-33.
Judith Tendler and Sara Freedheim, “Trust in a Rent-Seeking World: Health and Government
Transformed in Northeast Brazil,” World Development 22:12 (1994).[Blackboard]
M. Moore and V. Jadhav. 2006. “The Politics and Bureaucratics of Rural Public Works: Maharashtra’s
Employment Guaranteed Scheme,” Journal of Development Studies (Nov) 42(8): 1271-1300
Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen P. Ryan. 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to
School." American Economic Review 102, 4: 1241-1278. http://economics.mit.edu/files/2066
Wk 9: Applying Political Economy Analysis: the Donor World
Before class, visit the relevant websites of the World Bank, ODI, and DFID. Links will be provided.
D. Brinkerhoff and Crosby, “Stakeholder Analysis”
Verena Fritz and Brian Levy, “Problem-driven Political Economy in Action: Overview and Synthesis of the
Case Studies”, in Verena Fritz, Rachel Ort and Brian Levy, Political Economy Analysis for
Development Effectiveness (Washington DC: World Bank, 2014).
Jonathan Di John and James Putzel. 2009. “Political Settlements Issues Paper,” Governance and Social
Development Resource Centre, UK.
T. Kelsall, “Developmental Patrimonialism,” Policy Brief. http://www.institutionsafrica.org/filestream/20110610-appp-policy-brief-02-development-patrimonialism-by-tim-kelsalljune-2011. See other policy briefs at this DFID-supported program’s website.
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Wk 10: Agriculture and Development Strategies
Revisit Lipton and Bates’ arguments.
David W. Throup, C. Jackson, K. Bain and R. Ort. 2014. “Developing Commercial Agriculture in Ghana,” in
Verena Fritz, Rachel Ort and Brian Levy, Political Economy Analysis for Development Effectiveness
(Washington DC: World Bank).
Xiaobo Zhang and D. Hu. 2014. “Overcoming Successive Bottlenecks: The Evolution of a Potato Cluster in
China,” World Development.
D. Brautigam. 2008. “Contingent Capacity: Export Taxation and State-Building in Mauritius,” in D.
Brautigam, O. Fjeldstad and M. Moore, eds. Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries:
Capacity and Consent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stefan Ouma and Lindsay Whitfield. 2012. “The Making and Remaking of Agro-Industries in Africa,”
Journal of Development Studies, 48, 3: 301-307.
Wk 11: Manufacturing and Development Strategies
Robert Wade. 1990. “Industrial Policy in East Asia: Does it Lead or Follow the Market?” in Gereffi and
Wyman, eds. Manufacturing Miracles. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 231-266.
Yung Whee Rhee. 1990. “The Catalyst Model of Development: Lessons from Bangladesh’s Success with
Garment Exports,” World Development 18 (2), 333-346.
Dani Rodrik. 2004. “Industrial Policy for the 21st Century,” paper prepared for UNIDO
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Research%20papers/UNIDOSep.pdf
Lindsay Whitfield and Lars Buur. 2014. "The Politics of Industrial Policy: Ruling Elites and their Alliances,"
Third World Quarterly.
Wk 12: Natural Resources and Development Strategies
D. Michael Shafer. 1994. “Zambia: the Mining Sector,” in Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the
Developmental Prospects of States. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press: 49-93.
D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. 2003. An African Success Story: Botswana. In D. Rodrik, ed.. In
Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong. 2006. “Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution
to Managing Mineral Wealth,” Perspectives on Politics. 4(1): 35-53.
Paul Collier. 2011. The Natural Resource Charter, and “A Conversation with Paul Collier,” AllAfrica,
November 13, 2011.
Mike Morris, Raphael Kaplinsky, David Kaplan. 2012. “’One Thing Leads to Another” – Commodities,
Linkages and Industrial Development,” Resources Policy, 37, 4 (December): 408-416.
Wk 13: The Case of China
Yingyi Qian. 2003. “How Reform Worked in China,” University of Michigan, William Davidson Working
Paper. http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39858/wp473.pdf?sequence=3
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Dali Yang. 2004. “The Smuggling Crisis and the Leveling of the Economic Playing Field.” from Yang, Dali.
Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004
Junjie Mei. 2013. “How Europe Should View China’s Industrial Policy,”
http://europesworld.org/2013/10/01/how-europe-should-view-chinas-industrialpolicy/#.UtwNOxAo7rc
Sebastian Heilmann and Lea Shih. 2013. “The Rise of Industrial Policy in China: 1978-2012,” Harvard
Yenching Center Working Paper Series http://www.harvard-yenching.org/sites/harvardyenching.org/files/featurefiles/Sebastian%20Heilmann%20and%20Lea%20Shih_The%20Rise%20of
%20Industrial%20Policy%20in%20China%201978-2012.pdf
Chen, Ye & Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of
provincial leaders in China," Economics Letters, vol. 88(3), pages 421-425, September.
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