Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Hands:
The Expansion of International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations
Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Department of Sociology
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-2047
and
Christine Min Wotipka
School of Education
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-3096
March 2002
Please Do Not Cite or Quote Without Permission from the Authors.
Bleeding Hearts, Bleeding Hands:
The Expansion of International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations
Studies on human rights have recognized and documented the contributions of
nongovernmental organizations in the evolution of global human rights in the post-WWII
era (Lauren 1998; Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Wiseberg 1992). Among them are
international nongovernmental groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, which have played key roles in the formative years of global human rights by
promoting international human rights instruments and reporting on gross human rights
violations. Their contributions have become even more critical in the contemporary
international human rights regime, as their unsparing reports of local human rights
practice all over the world have been essential in proceedings of UN human rights
instruments such as the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee.
Many human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HRINGOs) have
gained official consultative status in the United Nations (UN), and have been actively
promoting their visions of human rights standards into the new century.
Correspondingly, the existing literature has paid much attention to the activities of
such organizations in the international political arena, such as UN instruments, regional
mechanisms and international conferences (Lauren 1998; Weiss and Gordenker 1996;
Wiseberg 1992). What is often neglected in the literature, however, is the fact that these
organizations have local constituencies who find ways to connect with these
organizations. Without their support, HRINGOs cannot carry out their key activities such
as reporting on local human rights practice and promoting global human rights models.
We also note that some human rights nongovernmental organizations are domestic
in their scope (Ball 2000). Although studies of human rights nongovernmental
organizations that operate at the national level contribute to the working of local human
rights politics, they do not address an important aspect of human rights politics, the
interaction between global and local human rights movements. Our research examines
international human rights nongovernmental organizations, and hence enables us to
explore the connection between global and local human rights processes and the interplay
between international governmental networks and global civil society.
This study is guided by the following questions: Why do some nation-states have
greater involvement in HRINGOs and what motivates groups and individuals in those
countries to get involved? Do they engage in international human rights activities
because their governments are committed to global human rights ideas and encourage the
citizens to follow suit, or is it the strength of civil society within these countries that leads
individuals to get involved in HRINGOs despite a lack of governmental human rights
activities? Do individuals in advanced democracies join HRINGOs to promote their
ideals and improve situations in other countries as well as theirs, or is it individuals under
oppressive governments that join HRINGOs to gain leverage vis-à-vis the domestic
government and to call for help from external actors? This paper addresses these
questions about HRINGOs by investigating the patterns of nation-states’ memberships in
HRINGOs.
After highlighting our theoretical perspectives stemming from these questions, we
present statistical analyses on our data on HRINGOs. We present descriptive statistics on
the growth of the number of HRINGOs since 1860 and on nation-states’ membership in
the organizations, and then examine patterns of states’ participation in HRINGOs using a
multivariate regression analysis for two time points – 1988 and 1998.
2
Theoretical Contributions
The theoretical perspectives we use to guide our analysis of nation-states’ memberships
in HRINGOs considers global as well as national-level factors. In particular, we examine
(1) the literature on globalization by sorting out different roles of international
governmental and nongovernmental organizations in global political processes and
human rights politics in particular; and (2) the social movement literature by exploring
the interaction between domestic and global political opportunity structures.
First, recent scholarship on globalization has suggested that international
governmental and nongovernmental arenas may be two separate spheres operating by
different principles and logic (Boli and Thomas 1997; Tsutsui 1998; Jang and Luo 2000).
This distinction is particularly striking in a field such as human rights. In the evolution of
the global human rights regime in the last several decades, governmental agents and
nongovernmental organizations have been taking turns leading the efforts to establish
human rights as a major global political agenda. After WWII, political leaders of
victorious countries took initial efforts to establish human rights as a foundation of the
new world order. Their visions are reflected in the UN Charter (1945) and the UN
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Soon thereafter, however, a power struggle
between the two superpowers and problems in the colonies as well as in the homeland of
the powerful nations were exacerbated with the expansion of human rights ideas, thus
halting progress on human rights in the international political arena. When the initial
efforts by powerful governments slowed, nongovernmental activists and Third World
countries stepped in to push the human rights agenda in global politics. Their efforts
resulted in the adoptions of several key UN human rights treaties since the 1960s and
their ratifications by an increasing number of states (Tsutsui & Wotipka 2001). Third
3
World countries were motivated by their anti-colonialist fervor and by their aspiration to
establish racial equality in the post-colonial world order. The fact that the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) was the first
UN human rights treaty to be adopted attests to the conviction of these countries. Their
enthusiasm gradually waned as their domestic human rights practices became targets of
international criticism in the 1970s. Thus, governments from both the developed and
developing world turned from proponents of the global human rights regime to its
doubters and even critics.
Around the time that Third World countries diminished their human rights
activities in the 1970s, nongovernmental human rights activists became increasingly
instrumental in moving the global human rights movement forward. Numerous
HRINGOs were established in this period and worked fearlessly to criticize rightsviolating governments. In contrast to HRINGOs, national governments tend to be averse
to criticizing other governments’ domestic practices for fear that this would undermine
state sovereignty in general and justify criticism from other governments regarding their
own domestic problems. Other political factors are taken into consideration such as trade
relations with rights-violating countries and possible retaliation in other arenas that may
result from criticism regarding human rights issues. HRINGOs, on the other hand, do not
share these concerns. Motivated by their principles and powered by their flexible and
committed constituencies, these organizations document and publicize human rights
violations in all corners of the world. The work of Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, among other HRINGOs, is widely recognized by now. For their efforts,
Amnesty International received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977. They continue to
constitute a powerful lobby in contemporary global politics.
4
These processes of the expansion of global human rights have not gone through
systematical examination, although parts of the history are well documented (Buergenthal
1995; Donnelly 1998; Lauren 1998; Claude and Weston 1992). By tracing the different
paths governmental and nongovernmental sectors have taken in the evolution of global
human rights, we seek to contribute not only to the scholarship on human rights but also
that of globalization. Although attention given to international organizations has been a
consistent feature in the literature on international relations and globalization, few studies
have made a clear distinction between governmental and nongovernmental spheres. Even
the few that have do not go far beyond suggesting different roles for the two sets of actors
(Boli and Thomas 1997; Tsutsui 1998; Jang and Luo 2000). The history of global human
rights is an appropriate subject matter for extending this argument given the different
roles of the two sectors described above. Our analysis will reveal the sometimes
conflictual and sometimes cooperative relationships between the two sectors.
Second, we seek to make contributions to the emerging literature on global
political opportunity structures for social movements by examining the linkage between
domestic and global opportunity structures. As international and transnational influences
on domestic social movements have grown in the last few decades, social movement
scholars have begun to analyze the global political arena in their studies of national and
transnational social movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Keck and Sikkink 1998b;
McAdam and Rucht 1993; McCarthy 1997; Tarrow 1998). Some of them argue that the
emerging international political opportunity structures enable local actors to move their
social movements to the global stage and pressure their primary targets, such as their
governments and multi-national corporations. Thus, even with limited domestic political
opportunities, this “boomerang” process allows them to launch or enhance their social
5
movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998a). On the other hand, according to mainstream
political opportunity arguments, it is local political opportunities that facilitate or trigger
social movements. This line of reasoning predicts that domestic political opportunities
are prerequisites for participation in global social movements.
HRINGOs are part of global human rights movement, and countries’ participation
in them represents local social movements linking to the global movement. If the
“boomerang” process were the main mechanism for countries’ participation in HRINGOs,
i.e., if a lack of domestic political opportunities compels individuals to seek international
political opportunities, countries with lower levels of civil liberties/ democracy would
have greater representation in HRINGOs. If, on the other hand, domestic political
opportunities spill over to the global arena, countries with higher levels of civil
liberties/democracy would have greater memberships in HRINGOs. By testing these
hypotheses, we delineate the linkage between local and global political opportunity
structures. We also make inferences about the linkage between global and local civil
societies and about the directionality (unidirectional or bi-directional) of the influences.
Hypotheses to Explain Countries’ Memberships in Human Rights International
Nongovernmental Organizations
From the above discussion, we are able to advance the following hypotheses to
understand country memberships in HRINGOs. First, we consider the effect of
international governmental and nongovernmental activities. The world society
theoretical perspective influences this line of reasoning. The world society approach
would argue that greater connections to international society would increase national
memberships in HRINGOs. Through association with global society, a country’s
6
population would learn more about the activity of HRINGOs and about global norms
about human rights. Thus, the more connections a country has with international society,
the more likely it is to have HRINGO memberships. However, the above discussion
suggests that their influence is not equal. As HRINGO involvement is an activity outside
the realm of the government, membership in international nongovernmental
organizations is expected to have a stronger effect than membership in international
governmental organizations.
Second, we examine how governments’ commitment to human rights affects their
citizens’ participation in HRINGOs. The world society approach would predict that
governments’ commitment to global human rights, in the form of ratification of
international human rights treaties and participation in intergovernmental human rights
organizations, would raise awareness of the population and increase the likelihood of its
participation in HRINGOs. It is possible, however, that some local civil society is ahead
of the government and joins HRINGOs despite a lack of governmental commitment to
global human rights. We test both of these possibilities in our analysis to determine
whether it was the government or civil society that led the movement to connect with
global human rights activities.
Third, the literature on global human rights suggests that the level of domestic
political freedom within a country influences its level of participation in HRINGOs. Two
possible hypotheses can be made. A more intuitive hypothesis is that countries with
higher levels of political freedom are likely to have more HRINGO memberships, as the
citizens would have a better understanding of the value and importance of promoting
human rights. Much literature on global human rights alludes to the leading role of
democratic countries in HRINGO participation (Gaer 1995; Wiseberg 1992).
7
On the other hand, another line of human rights research documents an
international process in which oppressed citizens use international channels to publicize
human rights violations and pressure their governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). This “boomerang effect” has become an effective way for
oppressed populations to rectify wrongs done to them. As this process has become fairly
common, it might be the case that these groups are in greater need to develop a
connection with global actors and join HRINGOs, whereas citizens who enjoy political
freedom can start domestic organizations to voice their complaints. Thus, it might be
reasonable to extend this argument to a hypothesis that countries with less political
freedom are likely to have more memberships in HRINGOs. This perspective privileges
international political opportunities over domestic ones, while the other hypothesis
supports a spill-over effect of local political opportunities. In our analysis, we consider
both possibilities.
We also consider realist and world system theoretical perspectives. As we discuss
in our analysis of ratification of international human rights treaties (Tsutsui and Wotipka
2001), realist arguments predict that developed countries are more likely to engage in
international human rights activities. Structural realism draws on either cost-benefit
calculation or resources available to the state in reaching this prediction. . In the context
of this paper, it would predict that citizens in developed countries are more likely to be
able to afford to engage in global human rights activities. World system theory, on the
other hand, would contend that core countries’ eagerness to impose their pro-human
rights ideologies lead to their human rights activities including their citizens’. The
difference in motivation of the arguments notwithstanding, both lines of theory would
predict that developed countries are likely to have more memberships in HRINGOs.
8
Before we launch into the analysis of these hypotheses, we present some
descriptive findings that reveal the global expansion of HRINGOs since 1860.
Expansion of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations in the
Post-World War II World
Using the data we collected on HRINGOs, we first outline the universe of HRINGOs
along a few key dimensions, and then analyze the patterns of countries’ participation in
HRINGOs. Our focus is on the two most important dimensions in understanding global
expansion of HRINGOs: founding date and membership countries1. These variables
provide us with insights as to how the world of HRINGOs has evolved over time and
what types of countries were forerunners of the evolution. To begin, we provide a brief
description of the coding schema used to code HRINGOs.
The data used in our analysis are derived from the Yearbook of International
Organizations, published by the Union of International Associations.2 We define human
rights international nongovernmental organizations as those international
nongovernmental organizations that are concerned primarily with the promotion and
protection of human rights in the long term. Human rights here refer to civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights of living human beings. Nongovernmental status
requires that the organizations are composed largely of independent citizens and are free
of any government’s influences. To be considered international, an organization must
have members from two or more countries. The coding was done using mainly the
1
The data set includes additional information on HRINGOs not considered here such as their aims and
activities, location of their headquarters, their source of financial resources, their consultative status in UN
bodies, and their network ties with other international organizations. In future analyses, we intend to take
advantage of such data and provide more nuanced pictures of HRINGOs.
9
categorizations employed in the Yearbook for three time points – 1978, 1988, and 1998.
As the categorization changes over time toward more categories and specifications,
identifying organizations that qualify as HRINGOs becomes easier over time. For 1998,
most of the relevant organizations are coded from the category “human rights
organizations”. In earlier periods, this category did not exist. Thus, for 1988, we had to
expand the scope and code organizations in several different categories including “rights”,
“justice”, “equality”, “discrimination”, and “humanity”. For 1978, we first coded
organizations under English subject headings “human” and “rights”. Then, we coded
organizations under classified subject headings “social welfare”, “women”, “trade union”,
and “religion, ethics, morals”. In the following analyses, we used only organizations that
work explicitly to promote and protect internationally recognized human rights in the
long term. The data files include 107 HRINGOs for 1978, 200 in 1988, and 553 in 1998,
indicating a dramatic increase in HRINGO activities over the last thirty years.
Figures 1 and 2 show graphically the dramatic growth of HRINGOs over time
using information on HRINGOs from the 1998 data file. Figure 1 summarizes the
founding years of HRINGOs, which range from 1860 to 1998. According to this data set,
among 411 HRINGOs for which the founding year is known and that were still in
existence in 1998, twenty-nine of them emerged prior to 1945. In the following thirty
years (up to 1975), seventy-seven organizations emerged. In the next twenty-four years
(1975-1998), 305 organizations were founded. The growth is particularly dramatic from
the mid-1980s to early 1990s, as the number of foundings consistently registered over
fourteen. Figure 2 captures the cumulative count of HRINGOs and shows even more
dramatically the growth of HRINGOs in this period.
2
According to the UIA, representatives from each country were asked the following question to ascertain
organizational and/or individual memberships: “Please indicate the countries in which your organization
10
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
The number of member countries ranges from two to 170, and averages about
thirty-two countries per organization with a standard deviation of thirty-three for the data
in 1998. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on HRINGOs at three time points
including a list of the top ten and bottom ten countries in terms of the number of
memberships in HRINGOs.
[Table 1 about here]
These data on country membership confirm the global expansion of HRINGOs, as
the mean number of member countries increased from about twelve in 1978 to almost
forty-six in 1998. The list of top and bottom ten countries exhibits an interesting pattern.
Developed Western countries consistently occupy the top ten spots, while peripheral
developing countries are at the bottom. One might speculate that it is a general pattern
that developing countries have more HRINGO memberships. We elaborate more on this
notion in the next section.
Design and Measures
In this section, we present the results of multivariate regression analyses in panel format
to explain countries’ participation in HRINGOs in 1988 and in 1998. The descriptive
analysis above suggests that developed Western countries tend to have more HRINGO
memberships. The analyses in this section further explore the question of the types of
countries that are more likely to have memberships in HRINGOs. If it is indeed a general
pattern that developed countries have more HRINGO memberships than developing
countries, what motivates the former to do so? Is it their wealth, emphasis on democratic
has [members]. Also, please indicate any international organizational members.”
11
values, embeddedness in global society or commitment to human rights in general?
Alternatively, is it possible that countries with many human rights problems attract a lot
of attention and hence more HRINGOs? We address these questions in the following
causal analysis.
Our dependent variable is the number of country memberships in HRINGOs in
1988 and 1998 as described in the previous section. Our analyses make use of a partial
panel design in that the explanatory variables are lagged about ten years but we do not
include the lagged dependent variable in the analyses.
The following independent variables result from the hypotheses presented earlier.
We use GDP per capita to measure the extent of national development.3 It is measured in
1980 and 1990 and comes from the World Bank.
To test the hypotheses regarding the influence of the level of political freedom of
a country on memberships in HRINGOs, we use two different measures in separate
analyses. We use a democracy index from the Polity IV data set measured in 1980 and
1989 (Marshall and Jaggers 1998). The index ranges from 0-10 with high scores
indicating high levels of institutional democracy. The other is a civil liberty index from
Freedom House measured in 1980 and 1989 (Freedom House). This index measures
degree of civil liberties on a scale ranging from 1-7. We flipped the original index so that
high scores coincide with high degrees of civil liberties (e.g., Costa Rica and Sweden)
whereas low scores are given to countries with fewer civil liberties (e.g., Mozambique
and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea).
3
We also tried secondary enrollment ratio (enrollment in secondary school relative to the 15-19 year-old
age cohort). As the variable was highly skewed and could not be corrected with logging, we decided to
only report the results using GDP/capita in this analysis but plan to pursue other measures of national
development in subsequent analyses.
12
Connections to international society are measured in two ways: international
governmental organization (IGO) memberships and international nongovernmental
organization (INGO) memberships. These variables come from the Yearbook of
International Organizations (Union of International Associations, various years) and are
measured in 1980 and 1990.
To evaluate the effects of domestic political mobilization, we use the level of antigovernmental demonstration measured in 1980 and 1985. It is derived from the World
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III (Taylor and Jodice 1986). Level of
forceful oppression is measured using military size per capita4 and two state terror
measures in separate analyses. The first is measured in 1980 and comes from the World
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III (Taylor and Jodice 1986). The last two
were coded from Amnesty International’s and the United States State Department’s
annual reports and turned into indices measuring degree of human rights abuse from 1-5
with low scores indicating low levels of human rights abuses and vice versa (Poe and
Tate 1994; Ball 2000). If the “boomerang effect” argument is correct, domestic political
mobilization might have a negative effect, because disadvantaged populations do not
need to use international linkages if domestic mobilization is possible.5 If the argument
holds that oppression is likely to lead to more ties with HRINGOs, then military power
and high degrees of human rights abuses should have positive effects on HRINGO
memberships.
We are aware of the complexity of this measure and the fact that it may measure things other than “level
of forceful oppression.”
4
5
There may be cases where domestic mobilization spills over to global level social movements. We need
to look at regional variations and international effects to examine this point further.
13
To explore our argument concerning government commitment to human rights,
we use two measures in separate analyses. The first measures nation state ratifications of
international human rights treaties (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2001). By 1980, there are five
treaties available for ratification. By 1990, there are seven. These measures sum up the
years since 1980 and 1990, respectively, that pass from the time a nation-state ratifies all
available human rights treaties starting from the time they are available for ratification.
Countries that more readily ratify treaties have high scores (i.e., the treaties are enacted
for longer periods of time) while those with low scores take longer to act. The other
measure sums up nation-state memberships in human rights intergovernmental
organizations (HRIGOs) for 1980 and 1990. All the variables that have skewed
distributions are logged.
Results and Discussion
Using the number of memberships in HRINGOs in 1988 and 1998 as the dependent
variables, we estimated the effects of the independent variables discussed above in the
following multivariate regression analysis. The results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
We begin by reporting the results for 1988.
[Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Model 1 includes the measure of realism – GDP per capita – and the democracy variable.
We ran the analyses using both measure of democracy and are reporting the results for
just the civil liberties index as it provided a better fit for our models. The same is true for
1998. The effect of development is positive and weakly significant (p< .05), which
suggests that developed countries are more likely to have individual and/or organizational
ties to HRINGOs.
14
We then added INGO and IGO memberships in Models 2 and 3, respectively.
Both have a positive and strongly significant effect (p< .001) and improve the model fit
greatly. The effect of INGOs is stronger as evidenced in its standardized coefficient and
the adjusted R square of Model 2 (.818 compared with .706). This supports our
hypothesis in two ways: Linkages to world society are important for explaining
memberships in HRINGOs, but particularly if they are in the form of linkages to
international nongovernmental organizations. The addition of either INGO or IGO
memberships erases the effect of development while rendering the democracy measure
positive and strongly significant. Among the characteristics of developed countries,
greater involvement in global civil society and democratic political systems influences
participation in HRINGOs rather than financial resources.6
Model 4 considers the influence of political mobilization, which is found to not be
significant. Economic development again becomes moderately significant (p< .01) and
positive while democracy retains its strongly positive influence. The model fit drops
down to a level similar to that before INGO and IGO were included (.586).
Models 5-7 add the measures of forceful oppression in separate analyses.
The
results show mixed results. Neither military per capita nor degree of human rights abuses
captured by the State Department index were significant. However, the index created by
Amnesty International has a positive and significant result (p< .05), suggesting that
countries with greater human rights abuses tend to have more HRINGO memberships.
Thus, the argument that oppression leads to participation in HRINGOs has mild support.
6
In other analyses, we retained the INGO variable in runs using the remaining variables. Because of the
high correlation of this variable with the dependent variable, particularly in 1998, we decided to try the
analyses without the variable. Those are the results presented here. The appendix contains the results of
the analyses with INGOs in most of the models.
15
In this model, economic development and democracy are again both strongly significant
and positive.
As for the measures of governmental commitment to international human rights,
ratification of international human rights treaties has a positive and moderately significant
(p< .01) result (Model 8). In other words, countries that act more quickly to ratify human
rights treaties have more HRINGO memberships. In Model 9, the influence of HRIGOs
was insignificant. In both Models 8 and 9, economic development has a weakly
significant and positive effect while that of democracy remains consistently strong.
The results for 1998 are somewhat dissimilar than those for 1988. In nearly all
nine models, the influence of civil liberties is strongly significant and positive (p<. 001).
It is only in Model 2, with the addition of INGO memberships, that its influence loses
some of its strength while remaining significant (p<. 05). Furthermore, it is only in this
model that economic development has an effect, which is strong and negative. In all
other models, the effect of economic development is insignificant. The effect of IGO
memberships is again strongly positive. Level of anti-governmental demonstration is
weakly significant (p< .10) in 1998 whereas it had no influence in the earlier time period.
Forceful oppression as captured by all three measures is insignificant. The influence of
treaty ratification is again significant, though less strongly so (p< .05). Likewise,
memberships in HRIGOs has a moderately significant and positive influence. It appears
that over time, greater governmental commitment to human rights rather than state
oppression lead to greater HRINGO memberships.
These results indicate that wealthy developed countries are indeed likely to have
more memberships in HRINGOs, but it is their greater involvement in global civil society,
not necessarily their wealth or higher levels of political freedom that lead them to greater
16
HRINGO participation.
The results presented here, although preliminary, do provide some insight into the
world of international human rights organizations. In subsequent analyses, we plan to
expand the present study in a number of ways. First, we will test our hypotheses for one
additional time point. That is, in addition to 1998 and 1988, we will run the analysis for
1978. Cross-sectional analyses will also be carried out. This is in addition to possible
qualitative analyses of various HRINGOs that will be conducted with the aim of
elucidating the goals and activities of HRINGOs and how they have changed over time.
Conclusion
This paper examined the rise in country memberships in human rights international
nongovernmental organizations since 1860. On a global level, the overall number of
HRINGOs and memberships therein increased dramatically, especially within the past
thirty years. At the national level, we find that many of the same countries were
members of the most number of HRINGOs in 1978 as they were twenty years later.
While all of these countries were wealthy Western ones, those at the bottom end in terms
of country memberships were consistently some of the least wealthy and/or peripheral
countries in the world. These findings parallel our earlier analysis of ratification of
international human rights treaties by national governments (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2001).
The results from these studies suggest that developed countries are more likely to engage
in international human rights activities.
Despite these findings, our examination of the factors that affect countries’
participation in HRINGOs yielded some alternative explanations. The most consistent
result was that of the positive and strongly significant effect of democracy on
17
memberships in HRINGOs. It has been argued that in democratic societies, citizens have
a greater awareness of the value and importance of promoting human rights as well as the
freedom to pursue and maintain those rights.
Furthermore, association with global society, either in the form of international
governmental, but especially nongovernmental organizations, increased engagement in
international human rights activities. This suggests that models regarding human rights
are available to all countries regardless of their national characteristics, including level of
economic development. For those concerned about human rights, this may provide some
encouragement that all countries have the means to improve the lot of their citizens.
The positive influences of both level of democracy and memberships in INGOs
capture the idea that individuals have access to these world models concerning human
rights. The findings presented here also suggest that these models influence nation-states
as well. This was revealed in the finding that swifter action on international human rights
treaties and participation in HRIGOs relate to greater memberships in HRINGOs.
18
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Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
19
0
.0
96 0
19 2.0
9 0
19 8.0
8 0
19 4.0
8 0
19 0.0
8 0
19 6.0
7 0
19 2.0
7 0
19 8.0
6 0
19 4.0
6 0
19 0.0
6 0
19 5.0
5 0
19 0.0
5 0
19 6.0
4 0
19 1.0
4 0
19 0.0
3 0
19 6.0
2 0
19 0.0
2 0
19 6.0
9 0
18 .0
60
0
.0
96 0
19 2.0
9 0
19 8.0
8 0
19 4.0
8 0
19 0.0
8 0
19 6.0
7 0
19 2.0
7 0
19 8.0
6 0
19 4.0
6 0
19 0.0
6 0
19 5.0
5 0
19 0.0
5 0
19 6.0
4 0
19 1.0
4 0
19 0.0
3 0
19 6.0
2 0
19 0.0
2 0
19 6.0
9 0
18 0.0
6
18
0
18
0
Count
Figure 1: Founding Years of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations
30
20
10
FOUNDING YEAR
Figure 2: Cumulative Count of International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations
500
400
300
200
100
FOUNDING YEAR
20
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Country Memberships in International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 1978, 1988 & 1998 (Source: UIA)
Descriptives
1978
1988
1998
Minimum
Maximum
0
45
0
80
1
158
Mean
S.D.
12.1
11.0
22.0
18.7
45.9
34.2
N
166
169
167
Top 10 Countries
1978
Country
Number
UK
West Germany
France
Sweden
Netherlands
Italy
USA
Denmark
Belgium
Switzerland
Austria
Canada
45
43
42
41
40
40
40
36
36
35
35
35
1988
Country
Number
1998
Country
Number
France
UK
West Germany
Netherlands
USA
Belgium
Switzerland
Italy
Canada
Sweden
80
77
74
73
73
71
70
67
64
61
France
UK
USA
Germany
Belgium
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
Canada
Spain
158
153
146
142
138
132
131
127
119
117
Bottom 10 Countries
1978
Country
Number
1988
Country
Number
1998
Country
Number
Cape-Verde
0
Nauru
0
Nauru
1
21
Brunei
Eq-Guinea
Maldives
Qatar
Andorra
Vatican
Nauru
Solomon Is
Tonga
Vanuatu
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Albania
0
Qatar
3
Cambodia
1
Laos
4
St. Kitts
2
Brunei
5
Afghanistan
2
Maldives
5
Bhutan
2
Liechtenstein
6
North Korea
2
Sao-tome
7
Mongolia
2
Oman
7
Brunei
3
North Korea
8
Maldives
3
Monaco
8
Qatar
3
Andorra
3
Sao-tome
3
Laos
3
Table 2: Regression Analysis of Countries’ Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1988
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Economic Development
GDP per capita
.22*
(.05)
-.05
(.04)
.02
(.04)
.23**
(.05)
.19+
(.06)
.23***
(.05)
.23***
(.05)
.21*
(.05)
.21*
(.05)
.63
(.03)
.35***
(.02)
.47***
(.03)
.62***
(.03)
.64***
(.03)
.67***
(.03)
.66***
(.03)
.64***
(.03)
.62***
(.03)
Democracy
Civil liberties
Linkages
INGO
IGO
Political Mobilization
Anti-Government
Demonstration
Forceful Oppression
Military per Capita
.68***
(.04)
.48***
(.00)
.12
(.03)
.04
(.06)
22
Amnesty International index
.17*
(.05)
State Department index
.08
(.05)
Govt. Commitment
Treaty Ratification
.19**
(.04)
HRIGOs
.08
(.04)
R Square (adjusted)
.576
.818
.706
.586
.572
.597
.577
.609
.577
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________
Note: +p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. N = 80.
23
Table 3: Regression Analysis of Countries’ Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1998
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Economic Development
GDP per capita
.14
(.04)
-.32***
(.03)
.03
(.04)
.12
(.04)
.22
(.05)
.19
(.05)
.16
(.05)
.18
(.04)
.09
(.04)
.57***
(.04)
.17*
(.02)
.52***
(.03)
.57***
(.03)
.53***
(.04)
.56***
(.04)
.57***
(.04)
.51***
(.04)
42***
(.04)
Democracy
Civil liberties
Linkages
INGO
IGO
.99***
(.06)
.30***
(.00)
Political Mobilization
Anti-Government
Demonstration
Forceful Oppression
Military per Capita
.14+
(.01)
-.10
(.05)
Amnesty International index
.10
(.04)
State Department index
.04
(.05)
Govt. Commitment
Treaty Ratification
.16*
(.04)
HRIGOs
.29**
(.02)
R Square (adjusted)
.450
.789
.516
.465
.451
.452
.445
.468
.492
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: +p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. N = 93.
24
Appendix, Table 1: Regression Analysis of Countries’ Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1988 (With INGOs)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Economic Development
GDP per capita
.22*
(.05)
-.05
(.04)
.02
(.04)
-.05
(.04)
-.07
(.04)
-.05
(.04)
-.06
(.04)
-.05
(.04)
-.05
(.04)
.63
(.03)
.35***
(.02)
.47***
(.03)
.35***
(.02)
.34***
(.02)
.35***
(.03)
.34***
(.03)
.36***
(.02)
.34***
(.02)
.68***
(.04)
.68***
(.04)
.68***
(.04)
.69***
(.04)
.67***
(.04)
.68***
(.04)
Democracy
Civil liberties
Linkages
INGO
IGO
Political Mobilization
Anti-Government
Demonstration
Forceful Oppression
Military per Capita
.68***
(.04)
.48***
(.00)
.01
(.02)
.04
(.04)
Amnesty International index
.01
(.04)
State Department index
-.03
(.04)
Govt. Commitment
Treaty Ratification
.03
(.03)
HRIGOs
.04
(.03)
R Square (adjusted)
.576
.818
.706
.816
.817
.816
.817
.817
.817
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. N = 80.
25
Appendix, Table 2: Regression Analysis of Countries’ Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1998 (With INGOs)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Economic Development
GDP per capita
.14
(.04)
-.32***
(.03)
.03
(.04)
-.32***
(.03)
-.25*
(.03)
-.31***
(.03)
-.35***
(.03)
-.32***
(.03)
-.32***
(.03)
.57***
(.04)
.17*
(.02)
.52***
(.03)
.18*
(.02)
.14
(.02)
.17*
(.02)
.17*
(.02)
.17*
(.02)
.18*
(.02)
.98***
(.06)
.99***
(.06)
.99***
(.06)
.99***
(.06)
.99***
(.06)
1.01***
(.06)
Democracy
Civil liberties
Linkages
INGO
IGO
Political Mobilization
Anti-Government
Demonstration
Forceful Oppression
Military per Capita
.99***
(.06)
.30***
(.00)
.04
(.00)
-.08
(.03)
Amnesty International index
.01
(.03)
State Department index
-.04
(.03)
Govt. Commitment
Treaty Ratification
.001
(.03)
HRIGOs
-.04
(.02)
R Square (adjusted)
.450
.789
.516
.788
.792
.787
.788
.787
.788
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors in parentheses. N = 93.
26