Draft for chapter in book on civil-military relations in the Middle East.
Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Danish Political Scientist Association in 2012.
Please do not quote from this paper.
The Political Roles of the Egyptian Military in 2011 and 20121
Carsten Jensen
The socalled 25. janurary revolution in Egypt in 2011 contained elements of both
popular uprising and military coup. In this paper (which is a first draft on a book
chapter) the focus is on the dimension of military coup. The book, to which it is
designated, concerns the development of civil military relations in The Middle East as
well as the development of theory concerning this matter, and the papers main
concern is to point to issues that undermines the authority of the classical theory of
civil-military relations. This is done by pointing to features of the military role in
Egypt in January and February 2011 that contradicts classical theory (in this Case
the concepts of Samuel E. Finer) and to highlight elements in the coup that differs
from that in 1952. While the latter could be described as a classical ‘Third world Cold
War coup’, and should be analyzed as such, the coup in 2011 brings new features to
the fore and thus points to need for theoretical development in civil-military relations.
The role of the military in the uprising in Egypt in 2011 is a challenge to the classic approach to the
study of civil-military relations (cimir), that was launched in the late 1950’s by Samuel Huntington
in The Soldier and the State (1957) and later developed by Samuel E. Finer in his The Man on the
Horseback (1962). These books took their starting point I historical experiences but it is maybe time
1
This chapter is a development of ideas from Birthe Hansen and Carsten Jensen (2012) Demokrati I Mellemøsten
København, Djøfs Forlag, Carsten Jensen (2011) Soldater og demokratisering. Det egyptiske militærs politiske rolle og
retning efter det arabiske forår. København, Forsvarsakademiets forlag og Carsten Jensen, ed. (2008) Developments in
Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East. Copenhagen, Royal Danish Defense College. Theoretical concepts, data and
literature can be found in these works.
1
to ask if they are still the most relevant guides for research in the development of cimir in for
instance the Middle East during the New World order and series of events like the Egyptian
uprising and the following process of democratization in 2011 and 2012.
1. The Role of the military in the Egyptian uprising as an anomaly to classical cimir
The uprising in Egypt was an important part of ‘The Arab Spring’ and thus a pivotal research area
in the attempts to develop contemporary theories of cimir. This is so both because Egypt is one of
the central countries regarding its size, its role in the peace process and its relation to the USA. A
success for the democratic political currents in this country would have encouraging effects on the
movements in other countries while a defeat could have delayed the general process of
democratization in the Middle East. Because of the structure of the Egyptian society, where the
military is a crucial part of the state apparatus, because of its size, place in the national economy, its
legitimacy and its former monopoly as supplier of presidents, the question of the military was also
central to the uprising.
The uprising started the 25 of January 2011 with the occupation by demonstrators of the central
Tahrir Sq. in Cairo. Before that there had been a month long period of political unrest in
neighboring Tunisia. Demonstrations against the regime in that country had proved unstoppable
within the range of means that had been accepted by the military and the uprising had culminated
by President Ben Alis flight to Saudi-Arabia where he took refuge and the establishment of a new
government.
The events in Tunisia had inspired young Egyptians liberals who started organizing smaller actions
against the Egyptian government. The actions soon became coordinated turned directly against
President Mubarak demanding him to leave office and country. They thus challenged the state as
such an the situation soon developed into a real trial of strength concerning the Egyptian regime.
The answer from Mubarak and the government was as could be expected a refusal and it tried both
with political means and with the police force to stop the demonstrations. It quickly became clear
that the political means used was insufficient and the effort to police the crisis which included direct
violence against protests. On this background the military was ordered out in the streets. The
2
military was thus present on the ground but with a policy only to show its presence and not to
interfere with events. To the extent that it played a role it was rather on the side of the
demonstrators (which it in some cases protected) than on the side of the police force and
government. The leadership of the military played at that time a role in relation to the civil
government that best could be described as independent. The military was not an instrument in the
hands of the President but more like a third player in the drama between the demonstrators and the
government.
The decisions of the Egyptian military in the first week of February 2011 were increasingly
concerned with isolation President Mubarak and during the 10 and 11th of that month it became
clear that the military was in a process of displacing him as a President. After the final displacement
his post was taken by the leader of the High Council of the armed forces, Field Marshal Tantavi.
Between February 2011 and the summer of 2012 Tantavi was acting president in a process which
had as its explicit goal to secure a democratic future for Egypt. The plan was with some delays
actually fulfilled when Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as the new president in the summer of 2012.
The blue print for the process was drafted in the spring of 2011 and has with comparatively minor
delays been implemented by autumn 2012. In march 2011 the Military Council organized a
referendum, that accepted changes of the constitution that allowed the process towards elections for
parliament and president to move on. During the winter of 2011/12 a new parliament was elected
democratically through a complicated process during which three regions of the country voted on
different times. In the summer the process was ended with the presidential election.
During the process the military council has stuck to power on the basis of principles that is has
claimed was within the Egyptian constitution. Even if voices has been raised claiming that the
military rule was not legitimate in the sense of the law in practice few have contested the actual
political dimension of the military rule. The general public accepted the military as the main force
in the actual process that led to democratization.
The process continued with negations up till the autumn 2012 where the president in a controlled
process changed the leadership of the armed forces. Tantavi was then not only replaced as the
political leader of the state but also as the leader of the military. The personal changes have so far
not seemed to change the relations between that army and the civil branch of government. The
military has thus handed over the political power to democratically elected new politicians as well
3
as accepted the changes in its own leadership. By and large the people formally in charge of Egypt
before the uprising are now replaced. There thus seems to have been a complete change from a
consolidated authoritarian regime to a fairly organized civil regime within a period of one and a half
year.
In terms of the classical cimir the core of this series of events should be described as a military coup
(Finer 1962). If one separates the single major element of the process one would have at least six
major parts: 1) a popular rising, 2) a political trial of strength, 3) a military coup, 4) a gradual end to
military rule, 5) building of civil democratic institutions and 6) elections within these new
institutions. I the full process of interrelated processes the military coup is an integral part.
Therefore it is relevant to discuss what a military coup actually is. It is further relevant to discuss
which effects they might have and by which means they operate. The Egyptian case in question
gives a great deal of new data and this new knowledge of how a military coup can work together
with means of democratizations can be used to develop a better understanding of military coups
than that offered by classical cimir. In the following section this issue will be dealt with.
Finer and the politics of the military
Samuel E. Finer work is one of the examples of the classical approach to the study of military
relations. In his most important work, the book The man on the horseback with the subtitle The Role
of the Military in Politics from 1962 he developed a broad range of concepts designed to
conceptualize, analyze and explain the relations between civil political leaders (and authorities) and
military. Since his book has been widespread and goes to some details in its treatment of the
relations in states that are not related to the NATO group of states he book seems to be suited to a
discussion of cimir during the Cold War in a country like Egypt.
It is a fundamental idea by Finer that there is a close relation between the political culture of a
country and the means of power that the military can use towards the civil leaders. He distinguishes
between four different types of societies that each makes it likely that certain means will be used by
the military. In modern societies the military will most likely try to use official constitutional
channels in order to gain influence. In developed societies it will use blackmail and intimidation. In
4
societies with ‘low political culture’ it will try to change the civil leaders in order to serve its own
means and in countries with minimal political culture it will rule itself.
The primary means by which this happens is according to Finer through forms of action that are to
some extent overlapping as it is indicated in the below overviews. There is a succession in these
forms of actions that means that those related to societies where the civil leadership has full control
over the state are at top while those most associated with societies where the military has the upper
hand are below.
Table 1. Samuel E. Finers central concepts of military control
Forms of
Mix of means:
Means:
1 and 2
1 Constitutional channels
Control:
Influence
2 Competition with civil authorities
Blackmail
2, 3 and 4
3 intimidation of civil authorities
4 threats of stop for cooperation and
violence against civilians
Displacement
4, 5 and 6
5 Will not defend civil authorities
Supplantent
4, 5 and 6
6 Violence against civil authorities
As can be seen the two last categories are really the same seen as mixes of means, but they differ
from those of Finer since he also distinguishes between cases where the military decides which
civilians are to form government (displacement) and cases in which the military forms government
by itself (supplantment). On the background of these conceptual schemes one can discuss whether
Finers approach is suitable to analyze and explain the Egyptian military coup of 2011.
5
In Finers own terminology the coup can be seen in its context in such a manner that it started within
an authoritarian civil regime: Mubaraks presidential authoritarianism. During the unstable first part
of February 2011 the military took power by a swift movement that on the one side simply claimed
that Mubarak was no longer in charge but that the High Council had taken command. In the same
movement Mubarak and his close family was taken to a hotel in a tourist centre. Hereby the military
showed without much further ado that it had installed itself as the effective central political power
in Egypt. The coup was more or less accepted by the Egyptians. Essentially the coup lasted not
much more than a day although the situation leading to it had been building up in the week or so
before (see Jensen, 2011 for details). It took a year and a half to dismantle the military regime that
followed and to build a new civil regime: a democratizing, transitional society.2
Military means and the coup in 2011
Seen in relation to the various types of actions that Finer claims characterizes the relation between
the military and the civil leaders the coup can be described in the following terms:
Influence through constitutional channels. Formally speaking the military used the ‘constitutional
arguments’ during the coup although it must be said that the constitutional character of the
displacement of the president can be contested strongly. On the other the legality of Mubaraks
regime has also been contested in the first place. He was formally elected in an competition, but
widespread opinion has been the election was rigged. Under these circumstances the question of
‘influence through constitutional channels’ must always be ambiguous and the military use of this
channel must seen as just as formal (or informal) as the process that secured Mubarak his post in the
latest election.
Competition with civil authorities. The military went on the street in the week before the coup, but
did not interfere on the side of the government. It showed its presence as a latent physical threat but
as events progressed it showed itself more to be on the side of the demonstrators than on the side of
2
It could still be discussed whether the military really has left power or if Egypt is still ‘a military regime with a civil
face’ or in Finers words ‘a quasi-civil military regime’. Only the following years can answer that question. If there new
democratic elections are held within the next five years or so one could argue that the electoral democracy of Egypt
has stood its test.
6
the president. It was made clear during this process that the military was an actor separated from the
civil government and that it did not cooperate with the civil politicians but rather was in a situation
of competition concerning control of the situation.
Intimidation. During the process the lack of will on the side of the military to use its force against
the demonstrator became a means of intimidation of the forces the ministry of the interior. If these
forces had trusted the military to help them out of trouble with the demonstrators it was shown that
it was more likely that the military would side with the civilians in the streets than with the armed
policy forces.
Threats of non corporation and threats of violence towards civilian authorities. The military
worked with the Mubarak government in the very beginning of the uprising but gave up this support
rather quickly. Threats of violence from the military against the civil politicians are not recorded,
but of course the very displacement of Mubarak and the military seize of power could not according
to the nature of things have been carried out without at least a latent threat of power.
Concerning the last to means in the arsenal of means of influence that Finer has developed and
which he associates to the minimal political culture that facilitates the minimal political culture
there is no data that it has been used. The military did not bring itself in a situation where it became
relevant to threat to deny civilian politicians its protection, because there were no significant threats
of violence against politicians from the demonstrators. During the process there were no real threats
of the use of violence against the politicians (with the above mentioned reservation). That means
that the means that has been used up till and during the coup primarily came from the arsenal of the
modern and developed culture. Only one of the three means associated with the minimal political
culture was used. On this background it is fair to say that Finers conceptual schemes do not fit well
with the Egyptian military coup in 2011. His description of means of control is in a limited sense
useful as a conceptual framework that can bring ‘order’ in data about events otherwise chaotic, but
the logic of relations between political and the militaries choice of means cannot be found. Actually
the means chosen pointed away from the coup logic that Finer describes and not towards it.
At the same time the means does not fit well to the result of the coup, namely a military regime that
actually worked in a direction that ended with a reform of the political that produced the first
democratic elections ever. On the background of this score it must be fair to conclude that Finers
analytical tools, seen in relation to the context of political culture and form of regime that he
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anticipated, did not work well when used on the present case. The military coup in Egypt 2011 and
Finers The man on the Horseback does not mix well.
2. The role of the military in the Egyptian uprising and the contemporary democratization an as
anomaly
The Middle East was in the period from 1950 to 1970 the scene of many coups where the military
displaced political leaders which often were kings installed by former colonial powers. The coup in
question is of another kind since it was connected to and initiated from a popular uprising while the
earlier coups had a more limited base in widespread popular consent3. The military chose side for
the opposition and against the authoritarian government in a situation where the fundamental
relations of power in the Egyptian society was put on the agenda by the demands of the rather
successfully demonstrators. One could also ad that the military not only opted for the demonstrators
but also for its own interests.
Seen as an intervention in the relations between state and civil society the coup dimension of the
Egyptian present Egyptian history is only superficially covered by the terms of the classical cimer
theory. A dogmatic reading of the theory would see the role of the military as a part of a game
where military leaders displaces civil leaders as part of a power play between elites. A
contemporary perspective the relations to the civil society and the international framework would
show that this dogmatic reading needs a further category namely one that contains the possibility of
coups (and other military interventions and roles) that intends to develop the societies in question in
a democratic direction.
This text takes its point of departure in a perspective that sees data that does not fit into the
theoretical schemes as ‘anomalies’. This means data that undermines the validity of an approach as
an adequate conceptual frame. The interventions of the Egypt military during and after the uprising
as an actor that that coordinated and put frames around a starting democratization goes beyond both
the concepts and the ‘spirit’ of classical cimir . Hereby not only the idea of what a coup is (a
3
To be elaborated: the social base of the coup officers were in some cases clans and tribes that were ‘overlooked’ by
the colonial powers. The cases in question are for instance Iraq and Libya.
8
displacement by an elite of another elite in an otherwise unchanged state) but the whole approach is
challenged.
The role of the Egypt military as coup maker has a formal parallel in the coup of ‘The Young
Officers’ in 1952. Even if the two coups have some formal features in common (the displacement of
the civil leader, the beginning of a new regime form). There are also major differences in the two
political contexts. In the following both the common features and the differences will be analyzed.
The 1952 and 2011 coup d’états: similarities
King Farouk was replaced by ’the young officers’ coup’ in 1952 and in 1953 Egypt was officially
proclaimed a republic. The king had been entered the throne 1936 following political unrest, and he
took over from his father, who was Egypt’s first king since 1922 when Great Britain officially
recognized Egyptian independence. Great Britain, however, remained in the country and did not
completely give up control until the 1950’s, after having had decisive influence since the 1880’s.
Consequently, British troops remained in the Suez Canal area until June 1956.
The group of officers who conducted the coup appointed an elder general, Naguip, the first
president, but the real coup leader was Colonel Abdel Gamal Nasser, who slowly took over also
formal power. In 1954 his was appointed Prime Minister, and in 1956 President of Egypt. A new,
post-colonial elite had thus come into power, and it stayed in power until 2011, as both of the two
later presidents, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, belonged to the same group of officers.
The rebuild of Egypt under Nasser’s presidency took place in the context of decolonization. In this
era, two models for decolonization and state building were effectively available, and the models
were supported by alliances with either of the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Both superpowers supported decolonization, which ended the old Western European rule and
division of the Third World. Decolonization and realignment contributed to the order, which was
established under the Cold War label, and during the Nasserist era, Egypt tilted towards the Soviet
Union and the Soviet model.
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Egypt was lacking a big political party that could – as it was the case in the Soviet Union – supply
the political elite with a social basis and loyal cadres, who could disseminate the political message.
In the lack of such a party, the military became a substitution for a civil social base. The leaders
were recruited from the military and used it for recruiting new members as a ‘model’ for political
behavior. In combination with the anti-imperialist policy that was crucial in the ousting of King
Farouk, the military adopted a solid power position within the new Egyptian regime. The civilmilitary relations thus developed with the military in a position as the political leadership rather
than with a civilian elite in need of a military to protect the country and its own power.
The new regime developed into militarized version of the Soviet model, and the command economy
was adopted from this model but it was impossible to adopt the political model. The role of the
Communist party in the Soviet Union was partly entrusted the military. Later, under Sadat (197381) and Mubarak (1981-2011) the direct role of the military was reduced, and attempts were made
to build up a civil base in order to strengthen the president vis-á-vis the military through a
centralized party the National Democratic Party. Particularly after 1973 and the Egyptian
realignment from the Soviet Union to the U.S., the presidents formally attempted to develop civilmilitary relations similar to those in the U.S. and Western Europe in the sense that civilian leaders
were superior to the military ones, but still the Egyptian version differed by it authoritarian rather
than democratic form.
The two military coups thus resemble each other in two ways: they encompassed the toppling of
civil leadership and they established new regimes (in contrast to replacement of officers while
maintaining the old regime). These similarities could to some extent be explained within the
framework of the classic literature on civil-military relations. The classic literature describes well
how civil-military relations in the Middle East were subjected to a coup phase between 1950 and
1970, and a comparatively stable phase during the second half of the Cold War (Alfoneh and
Norton, 2008; Hansen and Jensen, 2008).
The 1952 and 2011 coup d’états: differences
The major difference between the two coups regards the international context. In 1952, the
international context for Egyptian politics was characterized by the decolonization issue and the
10
Cold War, while the 2011 coup took place during the new world order and its democratic norms.
The decolonization process produced strong norms on national independence, and the officer corps
adopted these norms (and was supported in doing so by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union), but the
Cold War comprised the opportunity to realign, which implied a weakening of the position of the
(liberal)democratic norms. It was possibly to choose the other option, which was what the Egyptian
leadership did. Rather than ally with and choose the ‘liberal democratic offer’, after 1952 the Free
Officers chose the Soviet, and thereby the authoritarian, model.
After the 2011 coup the military faced an international context with pressure for democratization,
and particularly the military, which cooperates with the American military, has strong incentives to
connect the social order (which the coup intended to enforce) with democratization (Jensen, 2011).
Since February 2011, the military has aimed to combine ‘order’, which demands stability, with
‘democratization’, which demands an open process in a post-revolutionary context.
The domestic situation was different, too. The 1952 coup took place during unclear relations of
power resulting from the weak position of the king, while the 2011 coup took place during national
mobilization against the politicians. I 1952, the political situation was resolved without substantial
civil mobilization, but it resulted in a change of elites from civil to military. This is easily explained
by means of the classic theory on civil-military relations.
In 2011, the military interfere in a situation in which the continuation of the civilian regime was
beforehand questioned, and it was questioned without the participation of the military. The
military’s interference was thus produced by a classic revolutionary uprising rather than tensions
among existing elites. In this situation, the Supreme Military Council actually provided military
assistance to the rebels. According to the classic civil-military relations terminology, this resembles
an armed revolution against a civilian regime. The role of the military in the uprising should
therefore be reconsidered.
This indicates an anomaly, because the military supports liberal-democratic aspects of the uprising.
The classic conception of coup is close connected to the authoritarian regimes and militaries but
less suited to capture the political contents and implications of coups during the new world order.
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A third difference regards the state forms. The kingdom of Egypt existed for only a short time
before it was ousted by the Free Officers. It did not mature politically, and it became only a moment
in Egyptian history. Great Britain had intended to facilitate cooperation with its former colony,
particularly regarding the strategically important Suez Canal. However, the new military regime
nationalized the Suez Canal only a few years after the coup and only a month after the last British
soldiers had left Egypt. The 1952 coup thus took place a part of a transition process between the
impact of the previous international system (reflected by the ‘British content’ in the kingdom) and
the Cold War (reflected in the Soviet-style authoritarian presidential regime).
The uprising and the military intervention in 2011 ended the Cold War regime. Even though the
new world order was established in 1990-91 many cold war institutions survived for a long time in
Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. This way, the 2011 coup resembled the 1952 coup, as they
were both related to a previous international order and its remains within the national leaderships,
but the differences are bigger: the coups were related to two were different set-ups. The 1952 coup
was related to a fragile kingdom installed by a former colonial power, and the 2011 coup to a
nationally produced leadership that fell due to its own contradictions. Paradoxically, the role of the
military in the uprising became to restore its original authority.
The 1952 coup produced the development of an authoritarian regime according to the Soviet Cold
War norms. In 2011, the Egyptian military kept its self imposed obligation as stated shortly after it
overtook the central political power: it promised to establish liberal-democratic rule after a
comparatively short phase of transition with referenda and elections. This obligation strongly
contradicts the policy conducted by the Free Officers in the 1950’s, who conducted a still more
authoritarian policy. It also contradicts the understanding of military coup according to the classic
literature on civil-military relations. The uprising and the coup in combination provided an
adaptation to new world order norms, which transcends the classic ideas. Paraphrasing Huntington,
the 2011 uprising was also a revolution against The Soldier and the State.
This difference is the most important one but it is also the one that is most fragile: the end result of
the Egyptian uprising is still to be known. Still, the performance of the military in 2011 and 2012
justifies a questioning of the classic notions.
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Table 2 summarized the differences between the 1952 and 2011 coups:
Table 2: Political differences between the Egypt military coups in 1952 and 2011
International political context
1952
2011
National independence and
New World order
cold war
National political context
Power struggle on state and
Civil mobilization and civil
elite level: Military versus king
state leadership
and civil government
Political form
From kingdom to authoritarian
Stand of within republic
republic
Political direction
Established Cold War content:
New World Order.
new authoritarian forms of
Establishment of preliminary
government in line with choice
preconditions for democratic
of external alliance (The Soviet rules of government and
Union)
popular participation
3. The Egyptian experience with civil-military relations in a generalized form
On the background of the above scheme one can place the Egyptian case in a generalized
representation of the major lines in the Middle Eastern political history. This is relevant because the
Egyptian development is not only a national development but also follows some broad historical
lines of the region. Parallel to the development in Europe (that were divided by the Cold War and
got political system according to this divide) the political systems in the Middle East were also
subordinated to this order.
With the presentation of this general tendency I can be shown that ‘the Egyptian anomaly’ is not
only a special case, but could be representative for features that will be more prominent in the
coming decade or so. If this will be the case it is even more important to develop the approach to
the civil-military relations so that it facilitates research in these processes rather than sticks to
concepts and theories developed during the challenges of the Cold War.
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There can be identified a general pattern in the history of the Middle east that shows that the period
from the start of the 1950’s to around 1070 was marked by a succession of military coups. These
could be framed by the Egyptian coup in 1952 for a start and by the Libyan coup in 1969 that put
Muammar Gaddafi in power. In between these there was coups in for instance Iraq and Syria that
placed regimes in power that chose the Soviet Union as their preferred partner in the Cold War. At
the same time these coups gave the military a central role in the ruling of the states that for a time
militarized the politics of the Middle East.
Meanwhile the regimes was stabilized around 1970 and from then to 2001 the region was
characterized by great political stability where the leaders could present themselves as (almost)
unchallenged rulers. Hand in hand with the stabilization the development turned back to civilian
leaderships in the once military led states. The leaders had learned how to hold on to power or the
coups had allowed the leaderships to adjust to the most powerful social bases in the societies.
Egypt, that along with others developed new more civil styles of leadership during Sadats and
Mubaraks presidential terms in the 1970’s and 1980’s, showed another kind of solution to the civilmilitary challenge than Iraq and Syria even if they all were placed within the same broad story of
the development from Kingdoms via coups to civilian republics allied to the Soviet Union.
After the Cold War pressure was put on the authoritarian Middle Eastern states to democratize, and
there was also some expectations that they would do so like their authoritarian counter parts in
Europa. These expectations were frustrated for many years and not until the attacks on Afghanistan
and Iraq the New World Order began to make itself visible as democratization in the Middle East.
After the invasions the pressure on the states were increased and after a minor pause (conditioned
by the violent struggles in Iraq in 2005 and 2006) this was again increased. The dynamic
culminated for the time being by the events of the Arab Spring.
In Egypt this general history was noted as an increased pressure on the president and thereby the
military in January 2011. The fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia was followed by Mubaraks fall and thus
there was a new beginning in the story of the civil-military relations in the Middle East, where the
militaries old roles as coup makers or supporters of the authoritarian leaders needed to be
supplemented by new roles where the military were neither nor, but should be described and
analyzed in other terms, and where their conducts and choices of ends and means could no longer
be explained by reference to old theories.
14
Compared to earlier the Egyptian military was under a pressure where it was challenged by a mix of
the Muslim brotherhood, liberals and a new class of globalized capitalists. This challenge was
shared by President Mubarak, who broke under it, whereby the military stood in a situation, where
it could choose to intervene with means of violence towards the challengers or put themselves on
their side and try to make the best of the situation. The military chose the second solution, displaced
Mubarak and put itself in front of the project of democratization, that was compatible both with the
demands of the internal opposition and the international pressure of the New World Order.
The story of the Egyptian militarys relation to the civil politicians can thus be described by the
succession of the below formalized roles:
1948 – 1952: New independence military. Put together by old colonial power, formally controlled
by King and Parliament.
1952-56: Military rulers. The military took power from civilian leaders. The institutionalization of
the power relations of the Cold War starts.
1956-2011: Supporter of the authoritarian regime. The leaders of the military takes civil form to
some extent (quasi-civil government in Finers terms). Formal professionalization of the military
begins slowly and are developed during the alliance with the USA after 1973.
2011. Partner in the uprising and formal coup maker. Plays a prominent role in the development of
new power relations in Egypt. Manages situation by coordinating of the relations between state
organizations and new civil politicians and frames the relations between state and civil society by
securing a stable (non-violent) social order.
2011-2012. Democratization manager: manages transition to electoral democracy by coordinating
processes that establishes democratically legitimate institutions in Egypt.
2012 and forward (Possible future role) Democratic regime supporter: plays role similar to the
NATO model of military in democratic societies. Further professionalization.
These role are formalized so that other Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes could be analyzed in
the same scheme. As it is seen the three last mentioned roles cannot be contained theoretically in the
classical theory of cimir.
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4. End comments
This paper has 1) shown that the classical cimir theory of Samuel E. Finer is not well suited to
analyze the role of the military during the Arab Spring in Egypt, 2) shown that there are significant
differences between the coups in Egypt in 1952 and 2011 that points to the need for new theoretical
thinking and 3) that it is possible to formalize the development in Egypt in a way suited to
harmonize theoretical developments in such way that new concepts can be developed that could
cover both the Egyptian development and developments in countries in a similar situation.
16