Freiburger Vorträge zur Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie

Freiburger Vorträge zur Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie
Herr Prof. Dr. Jaap Hage
(University of Maastricht)
wird am 10. Dezember 2015 um 18 Uhr c.t.
im KG II, 4. OG, Raum 2408
zum Thema
Powers and Competences
Zur Person:
Jaap Hage studierte Rechtswissenschaften und Philosophie an der
Universität Leiden. Nachdem er für eine kurze Zeit auf dem Gebiet der
Informatik forschte, lehrt und arbeitet er seit 1978 als Professor für
Allgemeine Rechtslehre zunächst an der Universität Leiden und heute an
der Universität Maastricht. Zu seinen bisherigen Veröffentlichungen
gehören die Werke „Feiten en betekenis“ (Dissertation zur Praktischen
Vernunft), „Reasoning with Rules“, und „Studies in Legal Logic“.
In the jurisprudential literature, the notions of legal power and legal
competence are usually not well distinguished. The present article tries to
develop such a clear distinction.
The existence of a legal power is described as a side-effect of legal rules
that make it possible to bring about particular results. For example,
Charlène has the legal power to reduce her tax obligations by moving
from Belgium to Monaco. (The example is on purpose not of a juridical
act.) Legal powers can be the side-effect of the existence of counts-as,
fact-to-fact, and dynamic rules.
A legal capacity is described as a status, attributed by a legal rule, which
is a necessary prerequisite for bringing about legal consequences by
means of a juridical act. For example, Parliament has the competence to
create statutes. Without this competence an attempt to make a statute
would be invalid.
The concept of a legal competence is in first instance an internal legal
concept, meaning that it is a concept used in legal rules. In this respect it
differs from the concept of a legal power, which is not used in legal rules,
even though legal powers exist because of legal rules. The concept of a
legal power is an external legal concept.
If a legal power is to be exercised by means of a juridical act, but only
then, the competence to do so is a necessary condition for the existence
of this power.