studyof
Cangroupsbe trusted?An experimental
trust in coliectiveentities
Bill McEvilv,RobertoA. Webet,CristinaBicchieriand
Yiolet T. Ho
lntroduction
This
in the socialsciences'
amountof recentresearch
Trusl is th€ toprcof aconsiderable
literatures,
and stralegy
organizational
trendis pafiicularlynotewo hy in the economics,
extremelyimportantfo( manykindsof interactionFor instancq
wheretrustis considered
'lubricanl'without whicheventhe sim'
arguethat trust is an essenlial
severaleconomists
plest forms of economicexchangecan not occur (A ow 1974).'Trusl incrcasesthe
by reducingthe expectationof opportunisticbehaviorand conseifficiencyof exchange
transactioncosis(Bromilevand Curnmings1995; John 1934;
quentlyioweringassociated
suggestthat trustls a
McEvily and Zaheer,chapter16,this volume).Sifategvresearchers
strategi;resourcerhat has ihe potentialto providea sourceof sustainedcompetjtive
conceptur€searchers
(Barneyand Hansen1995),whil€ other organizational
advanrag€
guide
direct
th€ orgaand
alize trust as a governanceform ihat provides a framework to
eral'
1989;
McEvily
nizationandcoordinationof economicactivily(Bradachand Eccles
2003;Powell1990).
theolies
lncorporatingtheconc€ptof trustinto economic,strategicand organizational
understanding
clearlyholdsthe potentialof producingfar-reachingimplicationsfor our
settingsBy lbcuscomp€titionandbehaviorineconomicandorganizational
of exchange,
jntentions
of economicaclors,this line of researchpromrsesto
ing on the motivesand
upon which theory is basedAi
and sharperthe coreassumptions
explicitiyinvestigate
th€ sametime, howeverintegralingrhe conceptof trusl into €xislingtheory posesa
Chief amongth€seis the questionof how to ext€nd- or whethel
numberof challenges"
to extend an individuallevelconstructsuchas lrust to moreaggr€gate
it is reasonable
levelsof analysis.
To a largeextenlplacingtrustin individualsandplacingtrust incollectiv€entitjes(eg'
in tl1elirera_
instituiions,etc.)areusedinierchangeably
indusrries,
groups,organizations,
iure and without specificconsideration for whether dilierencesin the object of trusl are
meaningfulor appropiate. For example,transactioncostseconomicsproposcsthat
'humanagentsare givento opportunism'(Williamson1985'p 64),but thatr/'nr musr
againsttle threalof suchunirustworthybehavior.As a result
theirtransactions
safeguard
thereis ambiguityabout the objectof irust lhat is most relevantto minimizinglmnsaction costsof exchangc the individual agenlor the parlner organizationThis raises
Firsl and forelnost.doesirusl existat difler€ntlevelsof analysis(indiseveralquestions.
lf so,is trustacrosslevelsrelatedanddoestrustat onelevelinflulidual v;$us collective)?
jf on€truststheindividualageniwith whomonedeals,
encetrustat another?Forinstance.
Oris it evenposmoreincliDedto trustthat persor'sorganization?
thenis onenec€ssarily
lbr
its iDdividual
sible to trust a collectiveentity, independentof the trusl one has
52
Ca groupsbe trusted? 53
perhapsmostimportantly,doestrust ar differ€ntlevelsof analysisaffect
iols in dillerent ways?
these
fundamentalquestionshavereceivedrelaiivelylittle researchatter,
thewidespread
applicationof trustto economicand oqanizationalrelationcollective
entities.A relat€dslreamof researchin sociolosvfocus€son
1979;Giddens1990)and 'institutional'based'
(Zucker 1986)trust
oftluslreferto abstractstructuresthai shapeexpeciations
throughgeneralof behavior.
Systenand inslitutional,based
trust createcommonlvaccepted
assumptions.
and therebylowerthe inherentrisk of irusting a counterpart
2001;2001).Simjlarto our notion of trust in collectiveeniities,systemand
tlusl arc 'impersonal'lbrms of trust ihat arenot basedon familiarity
incindividual.At the sametime, our view of trust in a collectiveentity prethattheindividualis involvedin a directr€lationshiD
aeconomic
exchanse
in this
thecollecliveentiiy.whereassystemand insiitutional,bascd
trust primarily
€conomic
framework\\rithinwhichtherelationshiD
is embedded.
For instance.
of buy€r supplierinlerfirm exchanges,
trust in a collectiveendrywould be
itrgmanager'.s
trust in the buyer organizationwhile systemand institutionalwouldfocuson, for example,the legalsystemof contraclenforcementj
reguies,third-partybrokers,etc.
thework on systemand institutional-based
hust is conceptuallyrelatedio
ontrustin a collectiveentity,thereis virtuailyno empiricalwork validatingthe
of trustin collecliveentities.A notableexceptionis a studyby Zaheerer al.
thatexplores,lsing surveyresponses
of boundary-spanning
agentsin buyer
interfirmexchanges.
the relalionshipbeiweentrust in a specificindividuaidealt
trustin that individual'sorganization,referredto as interpersonaland interionalt st respeclively.
Zaheeret al. (1998)find that interpersonaland intertrusl are related,but distinct;economicagentsdiscriminatebetweenthe
ol trust,but also view trust at differentlevelsof analysisas stronglyrelated.
theirstudyprovjdesevidenceconsistentwith rhe conceprof trust in a collecity,it doesnot definitivclyrule out the possibilitythat trust in a collecliveentity
ir-organizational
trust)is merclyan artifactoftrustin theindividualmembersof
iveentity (i.e.interpersonaltrust). ID parricular it may be rhe casethat trust
i\e enliryi. , mpl) Jrtunclronof Lrrrr rn irsindi\id.rdI nremberc.
lf so,lrurLin
iveentity is reducibleto trust in individualsand doesnot exist as a separate
. Thissuggests
that validatingthe existence
of trust in a collecliveentityrequires
that is not specificallytied to trust in individualsand ruisesthe questionof
thereis someaspectof trust in a collectiveendrythat existsapat from trust in
members
of a collectiveentily.
p r r D o s oe i r f i c c h d pe - i ' , o c r p l o r et h e r c h t i o n s h i bp e t $ e e nt r u . t n i n d , \ r d ( r a l r
1flrstin collectiveentities.andthc relalionshipof thes€two typesof trustto econornic
We argue that trust can be meaningfullyappliedto economictransactions
ing both individual and collectiveentiiies,and that trust at theselwo levelsis
W e p r o p o s et h dI e c o n o n r ( a c L o i st o r m p e r c e p r i o na, b o u r r h e r - J . r $ o | | h . n e s ro f
iveeniitiesbasedon exchanges
conductedwirh individualmembersof the collec!Thistrustin the collectivethenbecomes
transferabie
to otherindividualswithhthe
se es as a proxy tbr individual tmst wher€ derail€dknowledgeof
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Cangrcupsbe ttusted? 55
syslem
compnsinga numberof individuals.The placingol trusi jn a collecrive
raiherthana specificindividuat,is consisrenr
with detinirionsof trust rhatempha,
)nndence
in or relianceon somequatity or attribuleof a le$on or thing,@;ford
,ictordry, emphasisadded).2
theconceptual
distinctionbetweentrust inan individualandtrusl in acollecrive
tufairlywellestablished,
empirical€videncesubsrantiating
thedistinctionis largely
t.Asnotedpreviously.
in orderro disringuishrhetwo formsof trust it is imooriani
ratethetrusran individrai placesin acollectiveentiryfronl rhetrust rhat anindijn Indirrdualmcmbemof rheco tecrjree iry.For in{an.e.in
place.
i di\ idual
m 10trusi a certainorganizaiion.but may only be referringto rhe lrustwodhi,
specificindividuals in the orga zation or of rhe generalpopulation lrom which
ron drawsits membership.
Similarly,onemay generallybelievethat peopl€
hy. and thereforemost oryanizationscomprisingordinary peopleaie aiso
O! oncmayfeelthatagroupis rruslworthybecause
of famil;ritv wirh a of
. of .heg.oupdndtl-eiflrusrsofrhine$.
\\e arguerharrhc.earenorin.r"rrc,
a collective
entity.sincethereis no separateatribution of trustworthiness
to
ionasan enrrrlin ir.clI lncreJd.
se ,ugfesr,harrru\r in a co ec.i\renriti
'ieanl)
'rom rru,rin indi,rd
di.ringurshea
Jatsby.rLd)irg a bchar.orat
mrn_
of trustthaais clearlyseparable
across,and distinctlyattribulableto. the two
trust.
tangletrust in individuals and Inrst in collectiveentities.we desisneda
e \ p e r i n e n r " r a l l o $ e dL r r o d i r e c r le) \ p l o r el h ep o * r b i t r Lr )h a r r u , rm a y
for Eoups,independentof the rrust for rhc indiviclualsin rhosesrouDs.In th;
i m e n t s . u e c - c a r e d abraesr iyc t o r - o t c o , l evcer u . i n p a v a f i u n t ol . * . t t - t n o " n
rul groupparadigm'(Tajfeler al_1971).Researchon njnimal groupsshowsrhat
is a discontiDuityberweenindividuatand group behavior:peoplctend ro behave
whenconfrontinganotherindividualor a group.or whenthey themselves
act
,upmembers.What is evenmore striking is thar rhis disconrinuityoccuN even
th€groupis createdon the basisof an inconsequenriat
criterion,and groupmem_
Lrprsanonyrous-We lhus expectedto find a differencein behaviorwhen subjecrs
facedwith'unlabeled'individualsas opposedro membersof a designatedgroup.
iabsence
of prcviousjnteracrionswith a specilicmember
of a group.wewere-intei_
in exploringwhether
an initial expedence
with an anonymousmemberof the same
translaiesrnto a srereotypical
judgmenr of the whole group, on somechosen
pafticular,we €xploredthe extenlro which subjectswerclikely to exhibit trust in
rersubj€clbasedon experience
with a previousmemberof tha! subjectt group.
! participantsin our expedmentplayedthe rrust gametwice.Our focui is on
theactionsof thefirstcounterpartatTected
decisions
whenplayingihe gamewirh the
counterparl.Weareespecially
interested
in whethermembership
ofthe twocoun_
; n tl1esame'minimal group'makesthis eft'ectstronger.We find a modesrellect.
bothmagnitudeand significance.
Howeve! ihe presenceof a posiriveresultis com_
L evengiventhe modestsignificance,
sincewe usedrhe weakestpossibleform of
identityinourexperimentsMofegenerally,thefindingisimpofia;t becauseilpro_
aclearand carelullycontrolleddemonstrarion
that lendssupporrlotheexisrence
of
in collectiveentities.
56
Ha dbaolt oJ t)ust rsuth
play
As 'ls..t'nc sugges(s.lhe trust game createsa sillralion rvhcfc onc plaler nrst decide
whclhcr b l.ust another and ihis other rnusr drcn dccidc rvhcthcf b honof or abusethis
Lru$l.Spccilically.Phlef I isgiven someinilial r! calth .rllocauoDoI$iich shemust decide
ho$, muoh to ir st to l)laler:. Play.r 2 c.rn bc lhought of as an rgeni ol l,laler I who
h . t st h c r b i l i l y ! o t u r n t h i s r n r s t e da m o u n li t ] t o a n c l c n g r c x t c f s u mT
. h e r e f o r ei h e i m o n n l
rccerledlry Plar-cr2 is so'ne muliiple of the amount rruncd 10 Pl.Nc.2 by Playef 1. After
rccelving this .rnrounl. Plxvcr 2 lnust decide how much. if .tn!. of thc tolal nrnount
recei\'ed1()rclun L{)Pla}cr l.
Ihis ga c niodcl! $evcral situations in rihich ihe arlrrcri\c.css to one pariy of a
$,elfarc;ncrcalnrg in\'€srment hinges on the rrun\rorthincss ol nroiher. For insrance.
considcr I silualiolr \4herethe olvnef of a snall li.ln ha$ 10 dccide how much rrrxrlng io
prolidcan cmplo,"-cc.
This lraidng is costly for lhc owncr ol th€ ljrn, burcan yield greater
proflls lbr borh thc cmployee and ihe firm. pro\ided thc cnrplo,"-cc
I cnrairs wirh the fiftr1
altef ihe training. ODcc thc owncf decjdeshowmuch to connnil to lraining.rnd rhe rftiring actually takes placc, thc crnplor-eeihen decides hor lorg 1() rcnrain $jtb rhe lirm.
Assuming lhal the employcc can rcxlize greaief pfofit b) lealiDg ro go to nnorher lifnr
once the trainlng is rcccivcd. lhc problem is exactl)'.thc onc nrodclcd br the tfusr game.
Player I llhe owDcr) dccdes how much of sone allocation Lo comnit to Player 2 (rhe
emplolee). who Lhcndccideswhether io ho|or this Lrusl (rcnrain lvith ihe firm, h \r'hich
caseboil cnrploycc and o\\ner receivea beitef payoU lhan i1 !| cre had been no n xinhg)
or rbxse this lrusl (lcavc rirc lirm immediriel,! nfter training. yi.lding lhe highest pa,lof
to ihe employeebut lhe lo\lcsL Lo Lhco$,ner).
The gamecar also be describcdlbr m allr. In ihe conrlnuous versnn o1 lh c ganc Pla)€l
I rs glren sone anounl irr--0. u4rich sle can dilide betwcer onc anrount $e keepsfoL
hefself rnd one shc rrusLslo Pl.Lyer2. Label ihe amount shc trun! 10 Playef 2 as -r, with
0 = f = l J ' ,T, l c a o u n t - r i s t h c n m L r l r i p l i e d b ) ' ' . a c o n q r a n l . f > l . s o t h a t t h e s e c o n d p l a y e r
recelvesfie grcatcr anrount,-\-. Player 2 must then decidc what proporiion, i, of rr to
r e t x f n t o P l a l c r l . l c c p n r g l h e r e s t ,( l - / i ) r , f o r h n n s c l i A s s u m i n g! h a ! l , l a v e f 2 a l s o
receilesso e6xcd sun.(u4rich mighr bezefo). ihe follolving arc thc p.Lyolls lbr the gr me:
l , a y o f f1 ( ]P l a y c rl :
I , a y o f f I o P l a y c ,l ,
rr= (r/
r) + r,* = a + (/o
(
1
rr=.r
l)r\
ll.r
Player 2 nolcs s.cond and the choice of /i does ro1 afcct .r. $,lrich has alr rd) bee
d e t e r i n e d . T h c r c i b . c .t L ! l o n g a s P l : r ) e r2 l s n a x i n i / n r g l i s m o n e t a r yp a y o l l . h e $ i l l
s e l e c i I e q u . r l 1 0 z e r c a nkdc c pt h c e n t i r e a m o u n i fr . K n o , i n g t h i s . P l a y c f1 s h o u l d a t w a y s
keep the erilre anloxnt It and scl r ectuaito zero. lhus 1rrrhc uDiqu. subganle-perfeci
Nash equilibrium to the ganc. -r = /r = 0 Tr = ,| and ,, = ..
Il-(-Jr ,. i,er.,i .. lorr.r b..- r.c r..or ,l';.d,r,rP.,\.
l.Jn e..Jro".l
outcome lhrt Pareto do rialcs (i c. is nofe eflicient thar) ilis cquilibriunl. This is t|xe
for ar) outcome nr which -r is grcatcr than zero and /u is grcalcr than ore. rne<rningthat
Playef I lnveslsa positivc anount and |eceivesrnore than thal aDounl back lionl I,lalef2
Sevefrl laborarory crtcrinrcnts studied dre trusr gane. In rhc lirs! c\ample of such a
slud)'.Befg el :1. ( 1995) uscd thc Lrustg.Lmeto determine wherhcr or no! lrusting behavior lan be found Nhen social cnli)rc.mcnt i! not possible.ln their eifcrincn!s subjecrs
five !
T.
the t
Buc
tior
Play
full
grna
Con
C
alth
for
Res
P,o
Re
Prc
Prc
Rcl
Bu
(m
by
Cangrcupsbe trusted? 5'7
thegamein an environment where the usual self-interestedmotivatioDs assumed
islsto leadto trustingbehaviorwereeliminated.Subjectsplayedlhe gameonly
undefcomplere
(doJble-blDd)
mrr).ln rprteof thrsanonyruOandldcl
"non)
ition, only two of the 32 subjectsin the role of Player I sent $0.On the other hand,
i€ctss€ntthe entireamountof $10.The averageamountsentwas$5.16and the
amountretumedwas$4.66,indicatingthat sendingmoneyled to slightlosses
on
for PlayerLr
together,
the experinentsby Berget a]. and olhcrsusingdillercnlvariationsof
game with varyingpayoffsandparameten showsomeconsislentrcsults,even
cultues(e.g.Van Huyck et al. 1995;Ciith et a]. 1997tSnijde$ and Keren 1998:
el J. rnprcss:
Ashfrf et al.2005).f r|'t. Iherubgame-perfect
equrhb.
rumpredrcisrarclyobsefled.Most subjectsin the role of Player1 senda posiliveamountto
2. On ihe oth€rhand,most subjectswho sentmoneyas PlayerI did not sendthe
r. A secondmain findins is that while many subjectsin the role of Player 2
a positiveamountto Playerl, the retumstendedto be slightlylessthan the ori
general
investment
onaverage.
Thereforc,
whilesubjectsjn
exhibited
trustingbehavlrusr$ai oftenrcpdid.bul J.ualb nol .Jmci,.nrly
ro prcvenrr, fiom beingco.lly.
which usea variationof the trusl game,we expecta
, in our expeiiments,
amountof trustingbehavior.Howeverour atteniionis primarityon whether
behavioris influencedby past experience
with counterpartswho belongto the
previousstudy exploredthe cornection betweengroup boundariesand trust,
s i r h a n e n r r e l )J r H e r e rl o
t c u rt h a no u r , .B L . h a ne r a l . r ' 0 0 ' ) u s e dr a n d o m
and thenused
!o dividesubjeclsinto two groups(Proposers
and Responders)
lusl gamero mea\uielhc eirenllo $ l'ichrubjccr.i1 rhefirrl groupc\hibiredlru.l
'ectsinthe secondgroup.The treatmen!vaiable wasthenalureof therelationship
Proposers
rnd RerpondeEIn a Drrccl(onJrtion.a Proporcr*r)t mone,lo a
who then sent money back to the sameProposer.In a Croup conditioD,
serA sentmoneyto ResponderA while ProposerB sentmorey to ResponderB,
Responder
A then sentmoneyback 1(:)ProposerB wlile ResponderB senlmoney
L bul lwo Proposers
wdsindr-e,
rnd r\ o
lo Propo'erA. In rhl.coid||ion.recrprocr.y
were mulually linked by lheir aclions-Finally, in a Sociely condition,
A sentmoney to ResponderB, who senlmoneyback to a randomlyselected
C. In this conditior! reciprocitywasindirectand links belweenProposers
and
weremuchmoredistantthan in the GrouDcondilion.The resultsin all three
itionsrevealed
significantamoun* of trust andreciprocation,
thoughboth of these
a ' r h e i n t e m c l r o nb e L u e e nP r o p o r r ' r n J R e . p o r J e r ' b e c a m el e L . d l e ( r .
ei al.'sexperiments
demonstrateth.t hust existsevcnwheni1 involvesindirecl
lion bel$eermcmbeho[ ,"1donly derermiredFoupc. bur rhar rhi. ru.l
by the amountsenlby Proposen)js lesslhe moreindirectlbe relationship.
Thenudyb) Buchanel al. rs relerantlor our erpe imenlsincr'r .howsthatsLrbject:
for
it trustingbehaviorevenwhenthe objectof this trust is not direcllyresponsible
ingrt.OneintefpretaUon
of lhel rerul. r' har.e\e. { rlh group.dclcrmined
anentirelyrandomproc€ss,subjectsare willing to trust counterpa(swhensomeone
I nr h r cs o u n r e f p ar rgl f o u pm u s il e c i p r o c dl h
l ei sl - J . l I n l h r s c a s e l h e o b j e c l o I r r u . l
to be the group ralher than a specificjndividual.aWllile the experimenlsdo not
58 Ha dbaok oJ ttust rcsearch
constitutea directt€st of trust in a collecliveentity,the rcsuitsare consistentwith
notion that subjectscantrust a groupratherthar an iDdividual
our ex'€riments differ from lhose of Buchan et al- in that we dileall' explore trust m
pasthistoryof dealingwir
collectiveeniity.In particulatwe focuson whelhera subject's
propensity
to
trust another member
gloup
that
subjecl\
influences
of
a
one member
provides
about the
such
history
information
that
group,
the
beyond
the same
second
individrlal.
of
the
\rorthiness
Experimentald€sign
minimal grouplabelsusethese1abe13
Our experimenttestswhethersubjectsassig1led
individual$ In our expedment,
of
other
the
trustworthiness
inferences
about
draw
liom th€ pop
jectsplay the trust gametwiceagainstlwo subjectsrardomly selected
these
belween
is
the
relationship
variable
participants.
Our
treatment
other
tion of
su
to
as
two
other
are
simply
referred
condilion,
they
the
Control
subi€cts.
In
olher
of the opposite role (Player I or Player 2). which was randornlv detennined at the beg
ning ofthe experiment.lnthe Group condition,thesetwo othersubjectsaremembe$
the same'minimal group' lhat was delermined by responsesto an unrelatedquestion.
are particula y interestedin how subjectsrespondto the outcome of the first game,wl
playing the secondgame.Our hypothesisis that subjectsin the Group condition wil
more influencedby what their first counterpart did than those in the Control.
our exp€rimenlis primarily intendedto testwhetherperceptionsof trustworthiness
i
inditr,lual'$ho arern lhe'amegroupthanacross
rran.lerndmore-eadilr
"cross
vidualswith no suchgrouplabel.
Subjectsin our experimentplayed two rounds of the following discr€t€version of
trust game:
Player I was gilen an allocation ol $4 at the beginning of the game.
PlayerI thenchosean amouni !o sendto Player2 This amountwas$0,$2 or
Player 2 receivedan amount equal lo four times the amount sent by Player I
Player 2 then decidedwhether lo r€turn to Player I either $0 or half of the an
Notc that this is the sameas the trust game discussedin the previous section, with tr
I
thepavoffs
to Plaver
54,-r€ {S0,$2,$4},/:4,r:$0,andtre{0,l} Therefore'
were:
Player2, resp€ctively,
r, =
o,:
4 + (41- l)ir
( 1 k )4 - r .
Nashequilibriumis
As inother versionsof lhe trustgamqtheuniquesubgame-perfeci
Player I to send$0 and for Player2 to reiurn $0 for any amount recejved'leaving
with $4 and Player2 with $0.However,thjs equilib um outcomeis Pareto-dominatedby
outcomein which Player I sends$4 and Player2 returnshalf, leavingboth plaverswith
recruitedfrom a
of 10 20 subjects
in our exp€rimentconsisted
Eachof the sessions
of
PittsburghAt
and
the
Univ€rsitv
Carnegie
Mellon
students
at
list
of
tribution
subjectsweredividedinto two Foups (explainedin more
beginningofthe session,
below). Each subject then played the game twice, in the samerole, with two
Cangrc ps b€ trulted? 59
subjects
from tbe other group.Subjecrsdid nor know the idenrity of rhe other
with whom they wereplaying the gam€.
playof thegamg acrionsweremadeand recordedusinga choicesheet.At the
of the game,Player 1 circled on the choic€ sheethow much he or shewanted
to Player2- The sheetwasthencollected.the chojcerecorded,and the sheetwas
a Player2. This Player2 thencircledhis orherchoiceof how muchro sendback
| 1.5Thesheers
werethencollecred,thechoicesrecorded,andthe sheetwasgiven
Player1 who could obse e the ourcome of the game.players also had r;-cord
on whichtheyrecordedwhat happenedin eachof the two qames.
onl)diffe'ence
betueen
ther$o rrealmenrc
\ er i.l ho$ rheg;oUps
$ ercdelermrned
thelabelsusedto refer to the two roles.
lIn theControlcondition,subj€crswererandomlyassigned
participantnunbersar
lhebeginning
of theexperiment.
Theywereihen rotd tharoild pafi;ciDantnumbers
corre.ponded
ro rie foleot Ptale' |
'haLe\en parric,p;nrnumber,core,_
"nd
pondedto the role of Player 2. Subsequenrly,
the two roles were referred to as
'Player1'and 'Plaver
2'.
In theGroupcondition,subjectswerealsoraDdomlyassigned
participantnumbers,
butthesewel€no1usedtodetermjnethercles.Insteaa,
subjectswereasrcato mate
a guess
aboutthe numberof daysil wouldrain the foilowingyearinSanFrancisco.
Amediansplirof thes€guesses
wasihenusedtodividethesub.jects
into two groups:
HighGuessers
and Low cuessers.High cuessersplayedtherole of playeri, white
Low Guessersplayed the role of Player 2. Subsequently,all referenceto tte rwo
roleswasmadeusingthe terms'High Guessers,
and ,Low cuessers'.
thatthisis a veryweakgroupmanipulation.Inonecondition.therclesaresimDlv
redby a gue.. abour.omerhingunrclareLt
lo rhr grme. lhere *r, no o,t.i
betweenthe lwo trearments.
ln both treatments,
subjectswho werein the rote
I wereseatedon one side of the room while subjectsin rhe role of ptaver 2 were
ontheother Subjectswererisibletoeachorherduringtheexpeimenr,but did not
with whomtheyweremarched.6
At rhe endof the experimeni,subjectscompleled
u e s , i o r n a i rm
e e d , u r i F gl h e i r g e n e m lp r o p e n s i t )r o l r u c t { R o l l e r i q b - r .
Weconducrea
I 'sescion5
r,ir in rheConrrotconiirron
and.rr in rt-ecroup condir,on,.
a lotal of 174CamegieMellon and Universityof pittsburghgraduareand unriei_
,tLdenls{80;n Conrrolands4 in Croupr 5Jb ecl.sererecfuired
tromd tarye
ol porenr,dlly
Inre.esred
Dilicipdnr.vjarn e.nartarnouncencnr
rharpro,rdedtrriie
ion on the detailsof rhe experiment.The sessionswere conduct,"abetween
2000ard May 2001
main hypothesisis rhat the interacrionbetweenexperience
(what happensin ihe
round)and cxperimentalrrealmentaffectsthe amounrsentin the secondround by
yerl. Specifically,
rheprcsence
of trusrin a coliectiveenrilyimpliesthat subjecrs
in th;
)upconditionwill be mol€ influencedby experience
than subjecrsin the C;ntrol. We
gmour analysisby exploringrhe aggregate
data for otherpatternsof behaviorrelated
thegroupmanipulation.T
6l
HandbDakrl husl ft'\ur.h
Table 3.1 prcscnlsrhe total .llnounts scn! b) sLrbjectsi. the role ol Plalcr I b)' condilioll
Thc aggfegatcchoices b) subjccts do noL difel greatlr by condition. There rrre slightlv
no.c Playef ls who seni $4 in the Corirol (an)percent) lhan 1ll the Cro'rp condilion
(48 pcrccnr). but !his differeDccis not significanr. Moreo!c': .rhnosi i$rcc as nauv sub
jecrsnr rhe GrorLpconclirion (12 pcrceni) thtn $ lhe Conlfol(18 percenr)nritiallJ-sent$2
ln lrc1. $,hile aboul lio percent ol subject! in Lhelole ol Plaler I irl both co ditlons scnl
somc anronlrt o I nrore-v-in th c ln st rourd. n l.rrgerpfoporlion ,/ //rrr( 1r,l; ng sottt('!'t tr
sent$.1ir the Control condiijon (25 of 32. 78 perceni) thai ir the Group condirion (22 of
37. 59 pcrceri). This dillercncc in anount scnl anong thosc $'ho sent mo ev rs marg'n'
alLysignillcant in a Fisher Eltct Lcsr(p = 0 08) Hor'ever !his pattefD is rc\'ersed butis
" t h c s e c o n dr o l n d
n o t s i g D i l j c a n i \ { h c n $ c l o o k a t t h c c h o i c e s i D R o u n d 2 S p c c i f i c a l l )i n
in
!hc Controlcon
\,,P,rrn(r'scnt
54
tlta\e
sctllitlg
ol:orrtor
ol
$e seeih:rLa smaller Pr
(21
p'rceni) i Notc
of
18.
8l
condiiiot
the
GfouP
(21
than
ot 19. 79 Frcent)
dition
aho thal in bolh trcatrnents rhe frequencl of pla,versscrcling S0 incrcased bc[vccn
Ror.ds I an.l 2. nnd thni ihis increasew.ls gr.ater in lhc Group cordilion (ffonl 2l 1(]'10
pefocnl) than in lnc Contfol condition (fio 10 Io 28 pcrccnt) Overall. among subiccts
rn ihe rol. of ljlayer l. thefe arc slight diflercnccsin behavior bet$een thc L$'oconditions
when looking at the rggregrie dat.r. In pafticular of thosc scnd;ng somc nlone), the drs
tribuiions of amounts sent dife. b.Lseen thc trc.rrmentand conlfol condilions
Table 1.2 repo|ts lh. beha\'ior of subiectsin thc role of Plavcr 2 b) conditior and round
EtLcbcnlry iD thc Lablegives for each possible anounl sent wh'rl prDpofircn ol
Playcr 2s reiurncd one-half ol lhe amounr received. rcsulting in an imprcvenlcnl iof
Plal,cr I over thc initia l alloctlbn. I he r cmaining subjccls rll fel urncd S0, resultng in a
1'lttuI I
hcttu!tuilsol
untuu|l\slt'tlt b\: Plot)tt l
Anonni sent
$0
S2
S4
$0
$l
S4
Rornd I
8(10!il
1(r8rn)
t5 (6r,ti,)
10(21'r.1,)
r5(llI)
22(1..1|
)
RouDd l
1 1( 2 8 , t 1
6(l5li)
: l 1 5 8 Ul
t9 (.10,f,)
5(Il )1,1
2 l ( 1 9r '
l9 (24f)
ll (r6r'i,)
.+8(60'11)
29(l1':t)
20111r1,1
45r.13'f
l
1/6( I l'rli)
ltl21{52fl,)
[/]9 (15fl)
l/j (60,)r.)
12/2r(5r'ri,l
t 5 / 2 3( 5 4 1 1 , )
5/ll (iErl)
l5/.1E(5211)
10/61(491,i,
6/10(30e1,1
2 l / 4 5( 5 1 r , )
29t65(45"1i
fitbk' I 2 P(ruitusu ol Plltlr ^ rct t ins hall b| oi.r
sl
s.1
Gro!p
Torrl
$2
S4
.lr- (57')i,)
l v 2 5 ( 5 rt 1 )
ll/12151'.ti)
l/ l5 (20'N
)
ll/12 (50,t1,1
1.1/3r(l8 r/i,)
Ca eloupx be bustett? 6I
2 received
$0medn,
rhercwd5
nosubsequen,
choicc
$,{affi'gge*1lit
"1,.1fti.::;:llffilliyer
*r#il##i[lffirtr*
rualbehu o and n
ut n t c,,ltccrtrcentit I
:ffi:":Jff
' ,he
oLrcome
::1".'',1":l"i:1.'
,s
fit:rt,TI','"' $4,o. pia)cr
j"fl
i,.l:,,':*l,u*$iil't
{litt:ti,,;,.'',
iift
i',.iii
ffi
j;;*illt*{::,
jif
luli:ii:.#,..:,]l,i,liirn"#i ;
s,i+,;;;j:
* *:1il:$:.:l*
ff:tr3:til{::
[r
**i,=L,,
*'
lli*in*
ilgl-itr*+
ll**ff
',:'#:iT:rffi::**:*t,'t"n*xi#iittil,,sTf
i*[l*i*
ffi
*
33
Ch.)i.esin Round2 br pta),er
I contingentan autuomesin
Round1
Roundi
N/A
S0/$8
l;4/$8
$0/$16
$8/$r6
-SerrtIn
Conrrol
Group
$0
s (rlyo)
3 (8y")
o loyl
3 (:8y,)
0 (0y,)
0 (0/,)
0 (0yt
7 (15rA
1 (2't)
2 (4't)
8 07"1)
s2
Trust abused
Tru$ horored
fi.,ff
$4
$0
s2
$4
$0
$2
$,1
$0
$2
$4
$0
$2
s4
r (\yl
3 (8ilo)
3 (8"/")
0 (!yl
9 (23%)
0 (0%)
2 (5"/r)
| | (28oA
10
2 Gvl
2 (vl
0 (0%o)
a rc%)
3 (6'r)
4 (:9'/,)
2@n
5 (11".o
0 (070)
0 (070)
| (23'X)
I
62 Handbaokol tn|st research
Table3.1presents,
for all possibl€outcomes
of Round1,thesubsequent
Round2 choices
of subjectsin the role of Player1 in eachcondition.The fiIst two columnsin the table
presenlthepossibleoutcomesin the lirst round,Thenextcolumnclassilies
theseoutcomes
into threepossible
categories
frcm PlayerI's point of view:no iDformation(if $0 wassent
and no action of Player 2 was obs€rved),trust abused(if either $2 or $4 was sent and $0
wasretumed),
andtrusthonored(if either$2 orMwas sentandone-halfof themultipli€d
amountwasrclumed).The fourth columnprcsentsthe possibleamountssenlin Round2
by a Player 1, and the lasi two columnsgive the number of subjectsin eachcondition who
sentthat amount after obseffing the outcomedescribedin the first threecolumns.
The resulis in the table revealgreatersensitivity to prior outcomesin the croup condi"
tion than in tle Control condition. For instance,of those subjectsin the role of Player I
who sent$4 in Round I and receivedback $0 (i.e.trust wasabused),9 of 12 subjects(75
percent)in the Contrcl condition again sent $4. In the Group trcaunenl, however,only 5
of l1 suchsubjects(45 percent)againsent$4. Similarly,of the subjectswho sent$4 in
RoundI and received
$8 back (i.e.trustwashonored),all of the 11subjectsin the croup
conditionagainsent$4,but a smallerftaction(9 of 11;85 percent)did so in the Control
group. Howevet neither of thesediflerencesalone is significant in a Fisher Exact test.
Still, theseresultssuggesta greatersensitivity to first-round rcsults on the part of subjects
in the crcup conditionthan the Control condition.
A direct test of our hypothesisinvolves looking at how subjectsin the role of Player 1
reacl when their initial trust is either abLrsedor honored, To demonstratethe existenceof
trust in a collectiveentity,we needto showthat subjectsin the croup conditionwhose
rrusris abu'ed(honored)
in RoundI arelikel)ro sendlessrmo'e)in Round2, hansubjectsin the Controlconditionwhosetrustis abused(honored).Table3.4presentsthe relevantresult$ Specifically,the Round 2 choicesof subjectsin the role of Player I arc given,
by conditionand outcomein Round 1. UsingTable3.4,we can seewhetherbehaviorin
the two conditions differs in the way we predicted, and in a way consistentwiih subjects
Table3.4 Choicesof Plawt I i Round2 b, Round 1 outcomesand condition
Trur! honoredin Round I
Round2
$0
$2
$4
Total
Group
0 (07")
3087")
t4$2n
t'7
0 (0v")
0 (07")
l4(1007")
Total
0
3
28
3l
Trustabusedin Round 1
Round2
$0
$2
$4
Total
Group
6GIn
0 (07")
9 (60"/")
t5
t2 (52v1
4 (r1%)
7Gon
23
Total
18
t6
3E
Cangnups be trusted! 63
trustin a collectiveenlity.evenwith theminjnal lorm of groupscreatedin our
iop part of Table3.4 indicates,in lhe Group condilion, all 14 subjects(100
sent$4,whilein the Control 14of l7 subwhosetruslwashonoredsubsequently
percent)
did so and the other3 only sent$2 (18 percent).wlile the direclionof
thai subjectsin ihe Group conditionwhoselrust is honoredareslighily
deviationsby
with our hypoihesis,
to send$4 in the nextround is consisteDt
ectsis insuficient to produce a significant differenc€.
canbe foundln ihe
andmor€conpelljng,dlrectsupportfor our hypothesis
in the roleof PlayerI
parlof Table3.4.Here,weexplorethe behaviorof subjects
theiilrustabusedin thefirstround(theysentsomeamouniofmoneyandrecelved
in lhe patternof choices
beiweenthetwo conditions
). Thereis a cleardiiTer€nce
(60percent)whosetrusl wasabusedstill sent$4in the
Control,a majorityof subjects
did so,anda
In tle Groupcondition,howevetonly 30percentofsuchsubjects
thedistributions
ol actions
(52percent)
between
sentS0.Thedifference
ityof subjects
at ihe p<0.1 levelin a chi-squaretesl (X12)=4.78).'y
twoconditionsis signiRcant
of trust
wiih ourhypothesis
in behaviorconsisteni
djflerence
weseea significant
in theGroupconditionwhosetruslis abusedin RoundI were
entity:subjects
in Round2 than lhosein the Control.ru
morelikelyto rcactnegalively
analysisto determinethe elTeclof
usingregression
canalsoexploreour hypothesis
weusedorderedloglr
on behaviorin thesecondround.Specifically,
experience
to explore how the amount sent in Round 2 is affect€d by the expcrimental
variable.Round t history.and an intemctionbeiw€entreatmentand history"
resultsof this estimationarc reportedin Table3.5.''zThe first threeindependent
3.5 O iercd logit rcgtessionof atnauntsenttu Round2
(ll
-2.670''
(0.696)
0.266
(0.576)
(Rd l)
abused
0.644*
(0.395)
-0.533
(0.432)
E7
-81.76
0.027
(1),
(2)
(0.729)
-0.1l5
(0.598)
- 1.518"
(0.827)
0.955
(1.21r)
1.901'
(1.385)
0.154
(0.579)
0.141
(0.630)
69
4E.88
0.185
48.83
0.186
Standaderos aie in parentncses.
'Valueof oheobseruatioD
vlriablc chaDsed
of dependent
Ge note I 2)
l p < 0 . t i + * p < 0 0 5 j . r * ! < 0 . 0 l i a 1o1n e - t a i l e d .
69
-50.55
0.182
(5)"
Ll50'
(0.884)
1.055
(1.221)
-2.206'
1r.422)
0.419
(0.565)
0.594
(0.624)
69
,19.89
0.192
64
lluntlha.L ol trusr tcscurth
ldrjablcs are bir.r|)- \'rriablc! indicaling whethef tflrst $as abuscdi ltound l. whcltcr
thc liccl $as in the Crou! condiliou. alld the irleruclion bclween the nvo. To tcst
fobu\tDcss.$e .rlso lnclL e a gcndcr dunrlny r.rfiable and a condrucl iion qnestionnrirc
f e s p o l ] s cm
: Jc a s u r i r ga n i n d i r d u x l \ g c n c r a lp f o p e n s i t t1 o l f u s t .
fcsults
indicate,if trust \\'rL!nbtrscd.strbjectssenrsig licnn!1,"lcsc than if irwas
As tbc
llowc!cr
the
regative efle!t ol Lrust bcing abusedon unloun! scnl iD lhe subsequent
not.
is.ve|
stfonger
lin strbrccrsnr the Group cordjlio. (al lcasl 1$ice as big). Thc
rcund
coclicientortheinterucrionLernr(p.-:0.09lnmodel,1andf':0.06inmodel5.onclrLilcd)
is starislicallysigniiicxrt providnlg furrher support ld ouf hytoLhcsis.
Cotrclusion
The abolc cxircfrnent .rnd .lnal)sis rivcal elidence of trusi nr a coll.cli!c elrllty Subjects
m lhc Croup condition show.L grcalcr rcrction to prc\'ious expcrcncc. parliculafll rvhen
Lhiscxt.rience is negtrti\,e.\vhiic rhc cllccl is nol small, it js only {cakly slxlislicall,! signillcanl. This is probabl] duc lo sdveralfeaturesof ouf f.sca.ch d.sign. first. ereDthough
$e used 174subjeclsin thc cxpcrnnents,the rnalysis lbcuscsolr o|1) ihose sxbjectsm lhc
role of Phyer 1. reducing our sanple size b) one-haU:Thc srmtlc size is flrfiher feduced
sincewe arc interestedin !hos. subiects$4ro had eithcr a positi!c or neg.rrile erpeleDc,
ii Lh. 1ls1 found. elinrrntnrg !hosc '!ho senl S0 ir rhe first round. Whilc usirg deception
would hale allowed Lrsto coll.ct much noi: daIa, $e feLidral i! wns inrporrant 1(]lely or
a silualion $'hefe subjecis\\'cfc acltrally rralched whh two olhcr pcoplc in rlre fooln and
r n r si v a sr f a n s p r f e n r .
A secondreason lin nor obsefling a lafgef eficct mr,"' halc Lo do $'i1h the subtlet) oi
oxf Gfoup treatmcn!. In our cxpefitnent. tflrsl ir a collcctivc cntily is bllsed solely on.rn
i n d n i d x a l : l i l n i t e d c x p c r i . n c c\ { i r h r n e r n b e r so f a n o D i . r l g r o u p . B y c o n t r a s t .u a n
orgarizariolr I ciuter ! indi\iduals lypicall) hrve fepeatedc\pcricncc \ri1h long-srandxrg
groupc tb at stfongly infi ucncc th.ir ne1llbe|s lives.ln such cn cum slances.it is felsorable
1.) cxpecl unifofmii) i. bch^ll{n b) group rnetnbers.In our cxpcrinrcnls, holteler the
' g r o u p $ r s m n d o m l yd . L c f n i n c c b
s l ra n i r f e l e t l a e d i a ns p l i t o f i n d i v i d u a l sr . s P o n s e 1
vant r nd tfivir I grLcssTh crcfolc. i1is striking ihai \!e obscrvcdd,r' c1l.ct wirh sucha slighI
gfoup identir) mrnipulallon and we uo ld erpccl xn c\cn l.trgcreH-ectin sitlrationsrvhcrc
the group or org.tnirational ideriity is srrongcr.
T h e r c s u l L s . r c l c n n o r e c o m p e l l i n gw h e no n ec o n t i d c r sL h . rol u f g f o u p i d e n t i $ m a n i t
ularior also likcly crcrrcd .rn ou1-gronp bir s.which would clc! rl) '!ork .rg.rmst our hypothesis Individuah tcnd ro !jc$ oot'gfoups as lesscoopcrrli!o. honcn. ard rfustwofthy. and
terd to eripecllcls posilirc bcl avior ionr o Lrt-gro Lrp nlenbct! ( Br.\!cf I t)79) ConseqI entll
subjecl! intcucrin-s with counlefprtu c tegofiTedas m..rbcrs ol .|r oul'groLrp \rould be
biascd toward lic$mg theif cou|ierpats l].\ untruslllorLhl. Therelbrc. $,e expeci that
h u l i . g l , j c c l \ i l l f i e G r o u p c o r d i l i o n j f t c r a c ! r i L h l w o n e n b e f s o f t h e s a m eg r o u f
l v j t h o u !i ! b c i . g a c o n n t e pl r f t t o t h e i ro $ n g r c u f m i g h l f m d u c e m o f e s n i k i n g r e s d l ! .
Thcsc linitalbns nol\rilhstandir!. \\c bcliclc !111 this study nrkes r nLrmberof
i m p o r t a . t c o n t r i b u l i o r qt o f e s e r L f cohn t f u s l i n t h c c c o n o n i c s .s t f a t e g yl n d o f g a n l z a
r i o r a l l i t c f r t u r . s .N i o s l i r n p o n a n t l y .t h e f e l l l l t so l o l n . x F r i m . n l r e i r f o r c e . . r n d! i l i d x t e
ir a morc crrclirllr- corlfolle,:l setring.ihe iirdlng bI Zahccr cLal. (1993)th.rt rrnst in indi
l i d u x l s a n . l 1 )u 1 1i r c o l l e c l i l ee n t i t i e su r c r c l . L t c b
d u t d i s t i i c t . T h i s s u g g e s trso t i u l y t h a t
i L i s m . a n i r g f ' r i t o c o n c e p r u a l i zteh c p l a c i n go 1 l r ' u s ri r a c o l l e c l i v ee r t i r ) , .b u t a l s o t h a L
Fur
(Kr
ligh
ind
glv
I
fut
pr(
ri1
iu
dl
si
\,i
at
S
Cnngtuupsbe turte.l?
65
lrustmayinfluenceeconomicaclivityoverandabove
individualtrusr.Consequentiy,
tnportantto carejullyconsiderwhjch levelof uarysrs
ls nosr relevantwhen the-
abouttheroteof rrustin theorganizarion
andcoordin"r;o".f ."ono.i"-o"ilu]iy.
tn a co ectivcenriryhasa oasrsln
srouprdentification
::T:g1i:i,lh:]
et al. 1996)is essenrial.
"i:i
figfi::i:l"il#*
lilffi:ffii'ffi.lr,jlll;
li!ffi.:ifi:"",
";":if;t
tru$in collective
enriries.
Theevidence
reporred
he* ir."^;."*
*;ii ifr" ia"",fr"i
'n a colectjviryas a heu.ir,i"e., a"ell1li"i,rg,r," ou.i_
to**^T1i:lu*"1't
iness
ofmembers
wirhwho-trr"yrru".n" p,i.. rn..","ir".,
I rs stdking becauseit suggeststhat the;flects of an ;itial
"i",rii,",*lfi,i
*p.'.i*""-*iifr'l
rcpresentalive
of a couecriviry
exrend
beyond
,rr" ."r"it"""ir"',"'_i".."iii'rl
Newrcdrionshio'
*a;.,".""1""" *i''r' p.""ll
:::::::.::1'::l*"":riectivitv
unknolvnmembersof a collectivirydo not start
fio. ;;;;;;;;;;;"':;;_
the lensof sharedgroup idenrirywjrh trr*" *i f,
*fr". i""i".
^through
p-.;or
:
il,ii!?"id;TftiJ;Ji:'""*:ril:*fi'il?t,,T,:JJt"
we areable to broadenthe applicationof the lrusr game
to a wider and more
th".^re^more closelyreiatea ro acruareconomic
orsarizarjons
,..::,,:l l::1:-,:."
a.".''
iJ"'il"i'J,i*:j::
:j:f: fi#;il,!il;,;i,v,,1
"r".."'"i*i'
ffi1T1,"",'
Whilethissrudyadvances
our 'nderstandingof the ..fationsfript"tr"e"rriru"r in
inai
ly'.::j":.:t:
research.In :.lg*
enriries,
it arso
ra-is€s
an"-t* oi ii.,p_,u'tqu",io.',io.
understandingthe condilions tf,^i **f".it",
. Ine process.particular,
throughwhich trust rransfersbetweeninaiviauats
"G-".
ana coitectiviries
tsa fruitful areaof inquiry.Forinstance,in ar organrzarronal
context,do cerlain
alrerthedesree
towhichindi;iduai;;;t
:*:::::::1.1T:ll,ll:,.fundamentaly
:iti,llj.llilil+iiiu';f;1r::,'itffJfi
::i:.r;ilff
;"'*,;,j;::,'},.,:
'tv",,
rcpresents
a usefuland e|lcient heuristicverlusan enoneousand
costlybias_To the
can-be
idenrin.a,
*" **ra
i" e,ln
:'..:umstances
ll,::: _*:::j:,T_"T.ll
"i*
asabasis
*-,0 identity
fort'u;i;;;.* ;;;;""*J;';H,"."1;
#lr,lJJ::;X"'n*
idei,hxr..u5,inI co ecn\eenrj,yr. re,Jred
ro,bur
1"":ll.^I. :..:*:l ",lporr.rhe
oi,;;i;;i;;;,r,;li;:;;;r,:i:,ii#:
3:::::,::T;,j1:l
l"it1i,i.r,,;a,,r,.''u.,.
sj,e,,,
w,h'he\ ic$,h.,r
e.onomic
a.or. de;.;;;;;;;,,;;;;
on
il: ;l-,:i#il]-
with
t s r \ conoucled
co uucreow
n .jndividuar
n
,,
_ . - , . . . . , - . u qlased
a v v i i ! \ ! , ,exchanges
J
members
of
:is.::.::ll.:ll::ljl:f.
( o r r e c ' r \ r l l)h r r l r u \ r i n l h e c o l l e c l i r e c n r i t )
r r h . n s e r \ e s d r heuistic
dh
for
qd.ril, sh(re pfior hi.roly or knouledge
if memU"^
"f
the
trust in indi,f,. *fr".,i,,,y i. f,rn,,j-o,
Acknowl€dg€menrs
Wewouldlike to rhank Robin Dawesand parricipanrs
in rhe Org4nizationatBehavior
andTheorysemin"j\eles ar ( n,nes,eVilon Urrrer,irl
,1. iooiti.".rn,"
science
A.\o,idlion'lleetrng.
""a
",
tor u.erutcomjnenls
on earlef vcf,ionsof tli. cnapre..'
66
I
L
Handhook oJ tru$ tu\tdtLh
F o ri n n l . r . . 9 ! . n l s l i s o . i . L o - s! !. c C r . r o , e l 1 . (r 1 9 8 5 ) r n dM n 0 r u i e (r L r 6 l )
irr 1lt .bi.s .f ! un. lk rlo nol con$dc. dlllrctr..s in drc oignr ol
Whil! \e n.Ln.$l.d!. drllcrcnccs
i l . c i n r! lu s t i D( . . ! g r . t r p s o . o r l N i l z d . n s t r r { i n g l i n { l i r t r r l s o i
L i t r s sL f. c . i l i c r l] . . o l L . c t i vccn t i r i eD
orher.oll..tir. c.(iri.\ r be!o.d rh. icopc ol this chnrler (lo' r lh.rghiful di\cu$r.n fl ar i$uc s.c
, c s . x f . hb r a r n l l . r d ' f k N i a h ! p l . f ! : l ( h r \ ! o l L r n el !:0 1 )
l l o w c v c l r h e $ e r x g d , t t r r i s i o r s c n d n g S 5 r n a $ l l ) r . , c 5 1 l r r n { l S l 0 . l 0 . r . ! | e c l r ! . l r _ B . , g ci +t rul c
L h d1 h .h i e h crf c l u r n ls( l L e ! eL \ Nr t l r u . 6 D l x tr c d . c sl o c r n l r u r ' s . . n . . , i i D -b! c h r L o rt o q . r d s Fr ) e s
w h . s c n lh r l l o r L h e e n r r tr.c$ L l t c x n u L n t .
A p h r r b l e l i t ! n c t r t i . D o l t l n s! r a r p e l e . r i s t l [ l ! u s t i n ! b c h n l i o r i s n o n d l ' \ . . n r t h c \ . n \ c r h l l i t i s
p ! r l . r s d i t r t h x t i s r i i i n c d [ 1 h r . r J r . r n f . n t x ] s i t u ! r i o n .rl ln b l l n g b e h d i . rs p r i . r c a . r l e i l l b e t i l h e r
nr.ns t !. 10tb..l).cL oi 1,!\r. h. it r stc.i6c rurqr ol n grorl .nrbcr
lhon
I n t h . c v c r rr l r r l f l r y c ' h r d s . n t $ t l l ' l a v c . l d r o l f r e d l . m x k . ! . h o i . . .L r r lr . s l r l l. . . L u r i ! d
rocirclc N.hdcu od th. sh!.t !r it rorlf not Lrcrpfireil tr[o hxd tuccLr.d$| lioni Llen lai]urci. cnaL
rn.l 160(r0lxDd|onr n hrse
Si.ccrve'r.rrn!d n.m.1o lr.se u.ireriLrdsil.liLstudcnl popuLrlron\li1)1r|
l i s r . f t o i . D t i i ls u b t c c lisn., \ r t r n l . i t r n t s d i d n o t k n o r e r c h . L h s A m . . ! d r c f c * t h r ( n D F c . r e d l o r ! r
osnizcsor.onc in rhe'r.ni. it lrxs 1.r! rnlLk.l.yLhnrrhe! \$Dld b. n rchcf sLlh LLefe.ui rIcl. hnc{
The gcf(l.r ..ntosilion dni noLairle. isnili.rntl! b.trr.ct thc ConLirl (.r! !e,..nr f.DrxL.l!ml Croup
( r 9 t c r . . n l f c D t l c ) c o n a r l r f NN l . r c . v . r . d r c r . . r c n o ! e n d e r ( l i l i , . n c . s i n h . w i n u c h t h e J n \ L F l r y e r s c t r l
t o t h cs . c o n . l p l . r _i er irR . t r D dI l h . r c l o r cs. e o f r l l u n I e r d D r l r s n . i g c n { l c r
Tb..hlns. n l trghrrb.ut b! an Ncrexscln thc (nouf c.ndLlionol areproroili.d .l tLDscscn{liir!
n o n e f l l r d : . n d S l l n a r c a . n l r o l . o n r l l l l o n t | . f r o t . f t i d l o l l h o l c s e n d n i g. n . y l h r t s . n d S l r n r i n s
1.{.f I r I r I corri.sencJulJl.! o L.ok lor ori hypotheri/ed..lr
\I.
D xh. urc Goodnrrn\ (196.1)
rnnnhrDLrc.rcer.ntuunl iftr iD R.rDd :. hisroir rna c.niltllt Lookln! otl! n( derniorj 1. leDd54
r c i ! r ! I $ n r l l c rr n h t r r t l D t h . i c . o n dr o ! f d ( u i r i r hl s n r l u r x l! i r c n l b . n e x r5 0 j 1 )r l n n o f l i s t r o u n d
!hort!str\i|!{r.h.!tceori.9.\!efirllhrlu.ltrrcctrh.nrllhr_!oLhesi\xtr':()llhGisc!.DrlroLgh
$c.hrDgc oic vlhLeol 0 L. I ir o'dcr i. pcifo.n lbtr re{..1,kni! Lhc{.sl nro.cco.ser!.r've
Our r.$lL5 \r!!e{ in xffrrnt liJ_nnnelrrin Lhrl 1lr.r !!c {rone.r $hen Lntrrn rlrhcd thdi whor 11is
hnro.r(l.itrai.xtltrethrlrofnnltrll5n,tr),.r.tto.ollc.hrc.n1rlresnnt!rlorgly$hctrrnrcmb.r!dtrr!s
llicii trrrt llo$cvci: tlrer rr! ii l.r{ 11..thcr fo*rblc erPhnill.ii lor {Lclrrn xs!nnne.I Firn. rl'n.st
.\tr!onc rho LntrLstu rh! nrt rofnd rnd htrsLhenlrun |onorcd. lrir lgri. u the !!!ord round
i . r. t s i r t h c C r o r !
T h o c l n i t . \ h i l e 1 r ] e , . . r q L . x d i l r . r c . . . i i r L h e p o l 1 e . s i l ! t o t u r t r R o u . d l b e t L r er e
x . d C o n L r . l . . n ( l i n r D s $ c n r i - ! h r n o l o b v r ! e l r l d l l i c { d x t a r l u c l o s u c h r 'g. cc ,l T
l ..fS.cond.qorkon
L $ 5x r s . n r r ( . ! ( r h D c n n x r a T \ e f r L r l 9 i 9 l i n d i c l t c i r h r L o u l c o n r d i r I r l l x l l h c l o $ r r . l i u 0 e l e v e l
.r ! nlorc\!cigh1artrntho\c llhl c{r..d it liolLoworll o.r th$. oi. nrlehtc\n.ct tlul l u.s lrud ibNd
lxndo in!up\rLhr'l.s)nriehlhxv.rir!.!erellltr1r[ihainsnhonor.{]lrndendirrlufritirr.errnl.
11. T h . r e i u l r sr r . s t r b s t a n t n cul .yr h . r g ! d l l { . u s c . r d i l l r r l c l n s q u r e sr n { r x d . l . r d . r . d l o - ! n
rr.r..cnl\rho hrd (iun hofo,t(liri R.uDd I scnlS'lii Rorfd I (sdcTxhl.
\ll ll
blcclsur (hcCroLLlr
l 4 l . T h c r e J o i cb.e h r \ l . r i n t h n c c L li s p e r l c c L lnr l e . t l n . d l n t h c s c c o n dr e g r e $ l . nl n h b l . l 5
Consequerr\'.u..nrDg.don.srchobserrtrtl.ruSllnorl.ilocordrcllhEc{nnxliorsI.rthcfotrrh
.nl lililr.rdck ir'l!blc I5 This.lrarg.ronsrernrtotrrhypolh6is..rdknr!tb.rcnrhrnrorecof5i
s ecorlf0hrigt lr
r a l n ' . l h c r . i h r l b r t h el o u , l hr n o d . lI . . l ! c l l r r h er l r t e r o r i . r - . l d ] c l ' 1 ] a l u c w
..ltrnm j. trc iepon 1l,erejtrlrsol thc F!rc*ion uirs Lh'!lrxt!. dlxl pFrfuccf the LrenJi1(liLgliesli]g_
Likclihoofr Hore\ci. rlr. subiLmtircr.!r 1s.r un.In.g!d nrr anr' 01 lhe 11po$,ble .rDng.s (i.. the
cocliicienLiin t|. lirl nnd rlnRl indeferd.il \xrixbl.s irc ll$rrs sst,lic..r ar | : 01. {hilc the
roe ll.l.rs lnf I r..lhci auceiffeFerd.rl l'rrixblc\!rc t.!.r s(11r!Li.,llts gnin.rDtl
A,D{. K lltltl.7r.lrrlti
rl .)l..j",i:rri,. \.\r lnrk: )!or L,'r
. c.i!risLrL,stindtrrn$or{buesr.\rorLnrgfrf.'
A n u x f .N . . l B o h n e L n r d Nl ' i r n ] ( . \(' 2 0 0 5 rM
Bnchmun. R ir01)r). litrst. to{.i 0l .of(rol li rii oiirnizllr.nll rehlrtrt. a)E.t atn t St t.\,22,
Ii 6i.
Brclnrrrd. R (li0:l). Thc.ooidnrNrioi ni i!l!tioDs ncrossoi-qrrr/.1L.rdl1.tr0d!ri.f rr.nnrn,ttl thktia
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