Justice as Entitlement In this lecture… Libertarianism Nozick vs. Rawls Property rights The labor theory of property The Lockean proviso The entitlement theory of justice History and pattern Liberty upsets patterns Taxation and redistribution Criticisms Libertarianism Libertarianism starts from the thought that, as far as possible, government should be kept out of individual lives. Government should not tell people what they can and cannot do, as long as they respect the rights of others. Libertarianism In particular, libertarianism opposes coercive forms of redistribution of wealth and income. Libertarians argue that it is illegitimate for the state (government) to seize the wealth of some and present it to others. Libertarianism Robert Nozick’s libertarianism starts from the fundamental premise that individuals have equal natural rights against force, theft and fraud. These individual rights, Nozick argues, permit only a ‘minimal state’, i.e. one whose power should be limited to the protection of people’s existing rights. Libertarianism Notably, all individuals are entitled to the right to private ownership of property, which includes the rights to possess, use, exchange, and gain income from trades of property in a market, without government interference, regulation or taxation. Libertarianism Libertarians champion the idea of ‘selfownership’. They claim that individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products resulting from exercising their talents, abilities and labor. Libertarianism Justice, Nozick argues, is about respecting people’s rights, in particular, their rights to self-ownership and their rights to property. People must be allowed the freedom to decide what they want to do with what they own. Nozick vs. Rawls Rawls’ influential book A Theory of Justice (1971) is a systematic defense of egalitarianism and the welfare state, whereas Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is a compelling defense of free-market libertarianism. Nozick vs. Rawls Rawls’ theory of justice requires equal basic liberties, political equality, equal opportunities, and redistribution of income and wealth from the rich to the poor, all of which, he argues, are necessary to maximize the position of the least advantaged members of society. Nozick vs. Rawls Nozick criticizes the idea of redistribution inherent in Rawls’ proposals. Nozick claims that inequality of wealth and income is not unjust if it is the result of legitimate acquisition and voluntary transactions of private property. Nozick vs. Rawls Nozick notes that Rawls does not include property rights among the liberties protected by his first principle (the principle of equal liberty). Nozick objects that Rawls treats wealth as if it belongs to society, to share out, rather than to its producers, in proportion to their productive contributions. Nozick vs. Rawls Government, in Rawls’ view, must engage in redistributive taxation in order to ensure a fair distribution of wealth and resources among its citizens. Nozick, on the other hand, argues against redistribution through taxation and social welfare. Nozick vs. Rawls Nozick criticizes Rawls’ conception of justice because in order to put Rawls’ ideas into practice, government has to meddle continually with citizens’ existing property rights and voluntary exchange in the free market. Nozick vs. Rawls For Nozick, the only sort of government that can be morally justified is what he calls a minimal or ‘night-watchman’ state, that is, a government which protects individuals, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else. Property rights Nozick maintains that wealth and resources should never be collected together and then reallocated by a central distributor (i.e. state or government). In a free market economy, there is no central distributor – no one should be given the right or power to control all the wealth and resources and decide how they are to be distributed. Property rights For Nozick, to respect people’s liberty means that there should be no restrictions on individual property holdings (i.e. property ownership). Limiting how much property people can possess, and what they can do with it, is unjust because doing so reduces individual liberty. Property rights Nozick thinks that private property rights are fundamental in the sense that they are derived from ‘self-ownership’. A person has a right to what they produce, because they own their own labor, which they invest in creating wealth. Property rights Each individual owns himself or herself and the property he or she has acquired in the right way (i.e. he or she has not done anything illegal to acquire it). Property owners have no moral obligation to share their property with anyone else. Property rights If someone attempts to take property from its legitimate owner, the owner has the right to resist this attempt with all the force that is necessary to defend his property. Property rights According to Nozick, force may permissibly be used to take something back from someone who has acquired it via illegitimate means (through fraud or theft, for instance), but it is always unjust to force someone to give up something that he or she rightfully owns. Property rights Nozick argues that the most important function of the minimal state is to protect people’s existing rights (liberty, selfownership and property rights). But it is morally impermissible for the state or government to force individuals to give up their private property (through levying taxes on them, for example). The labor theory of property Consider a piece of paper. It is made from wood. The trees from which that wood came might have been deliberately planted as a crop, but those saplings came from seeds, and those seeds were descended from trees which once belonged to no one. The labor theory of property Thus at some point an object, be it tree or seed, which belonged to no one became someone’s private property. How could that be? The labor theory of property The question is even more pressing in the case of land. Anyone may use unowned land. As soon as it becomes private property, however, no one may use it without the permission of the owner. How can someone come to have the right to exclude others from using what used to be a common resource? The labor theory of property John Locke, the seventeenth century English philosopher, proposed that initially the world was owned in common by all human beings. How, then, could anyone come to own anything as individual private property? The labor theory of property According to Locke, a person has a property in himself and in his labor. Each person has liberty to decide what he wants to do (subject to the rights of others), and a right to reap the rewards of his own labor. The labor theory of property Locke’s theory of property holds that a person (being a self-owner) owns his labor. By ‘mixing his labor’ with a previously unowned part of the natural world, he comes to own this natural resource. The labor theory of property In other words, an individual owns his labor and in laboring on an object he ‘mixes his labor’ with that object. So long as that object is not already justly claimed by another person, he comes to own that object on which he has labored. The labor theory of property For Locke, a person can ‘appropriate’ an unowned natural resource – originally common property – and claim that the resource is now his own private property by mixing his labor with it. The labor theory of property For Locke, certain conditions must be satisfied for just appropriation of an unowned natural resource as one’s private property; namely, a person must: 1. mix his labor with it 2. not allow anything to go to waste 3. leave enough for others The labor theory of property Nozick notices that there is a problem with Locke’s argument: the premise that mixing your labor with land entitles you to the land cannot be morally justified. The labor theory of property Nozick provides a counterexample: “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” The labor theory of property It can be argued, however, that mixing labor is not the same as mixing tomato juice. In laboring on land one massively increases its value. This can be a reason why laboring entitles the laboror to appropriate cultivated land. The labor theory of property But this argument too has an obvious difficulty. The laboror may have the right to keep the ‘added value’ (i.e. the fruit of his labor) but not the land itself. The land is not part of the added value; it was there before the laboror came to work on it. The labor theory of property If land is scarce then all of it would have been taken by those first to stake their claim by labor. Those born to a later generation, unable to find land of their own, may complain that they have been unjustly treated in comparison with those who have inherited land. The labor theory of property Before a natural resource comes to be appropriated by an individual, everyone is at liberty to use it. Once it becomes an individual’s property, this liberty of non-owners is canceled. Others cannot use it without the owner’s permission. The labor theory of property Why should anything I do to an object overturn your previous liberty to use it? It is very hard to find an answer; thus it is very hard to find a satisfactory principle of justice in acquisition (i.e. just appropriation of natural resources as private property). The Lockean proviso Nozick uses as a starting point Locke’s approach to justice in property acquisition – namely, that ownership of an object originates in one’s mixing of labor with that object. He then draws attention to some difficulties in Locke’s labor theory of property. The Lockean proviso Why does mixing one’s labor with something make one the owner of it? Why should one’s entitlement (ownership) extend to the whole object rather than just the added value one’s labor has produced? The Lockean proviso Nozick notices that Locke imposed, as a condition on appropriation of a natural resource, that ‘enough and as good’ should be left for others. The ‘Lockean proviso’: Natural resources, such as land, come to be rightfully owned by the first person to appropriate it, as long as he has left ‘enough and as good’ for others. The Lockean proviso Nozick reinterprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that no individual should be made worse off by the appropriation of a natural resource. The ‘Nozickean proviso’: Acquisition is just so long as no one’s condition is worsened by someone’s appropriation of a natural resource. The Lockean proviso In other words, individuals may justly appropriate a natural resource that is not owned by anyone if doing so does not have any bad consequences for others. The Nozickean proviso expresses the idea that one’s natural rights to property extend only as far as exercising them does not harm others. The Lockean proviso Once an item is owned, others cannot use it without the permission of the owner. However, because having exclusive rights over a natural resource might motivate its owner to improve it, which might in turn benefit others in various ways. Thus, the advantages of private property ownership may outweigh its disadvantages. The Lockean proviso Counterexample: Person X can satisfy Nozick’s proviso by ‘appropriating’ a beach and charging $1 admission to those who previously were able to use the beach for free, so long as Person X compensates them with a benefit they deem equally valuable, such as a clean up or lifeguarding service on the beach… The Lockean proviso …However, the beach-goers would have been even better off if the beach had been appropriated or acquired by a more efficient organizer, Person Y, who would have only charged 50 cents for the same service. But this alternative is never considered under Nozick's proviso. The entitlement theory of justice For Nozick, an ‘entitlement’ (property ownership) is a just holding (possession), and a just holding can come about in either of the two following ways: [1] direct acquisition by the holder, or [2] transfer from some other person or persons through voluntary exchange or gift. The entitlement theory of justice Nozick defends what he calls a theory of entitlement (or property rights) according to which all holdings which have been acquired in a justifiable manner, or gained through voluntary exchange with those who acquired their holdings in a justifiable manner, are just. The entitlement theory of justice Nozick’s entitlement theory is concerned with ‘justice in holdings’. It is formulated to assess the holdings of any given person at any given time to determine whether they are justly possessed by that person. The entitlement theory of justice For Nozick, there are three major topic areas of justice: 1. original acquisition of holdings 2. transfer of holdings 3. the rectification of injustice in holdings The entitlement theory of justice Accordingly, Nozick’s entitlement theory consists of 3 propositions: a. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. The entitlement theory of justice b. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. c. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of [a] and [b]. The entitlement theory of justice The first proposition [a] is an account of justice in initial acquisition, which explains how anyone can be the first owner of property. The first claimant is entitled to a holding provided that no one would be made worse off by the acquisition of it (i.e. the Nozickean proviso). The entitlement theory of justice The second proposition [b] is a principle of justice in transfer, which explains how property may pass from one legitimate owner to another. The owner has the right to give property away as a gift or in exchange for something else as he or she sees fit. By contrast, theft, fraud or breach of contract violates the principle of transfer. The entitlement theory of justice The final proposition [c] would be a principle of justice in rectification, governing the proper means of setting right past injustices in acquisition and transfer. It would require, for example, that stolen goods be returned to the legitimate owner. The entitlement theory of justice Not all holdings are just entitlements: a holding can be acquired unjustly, by theft or fraud, for example. A person is entitled to a holding only if it has been justly acquired or justly transferred. If a holding has arisen from a past injustice, it is just to ‘rectify’ it. The entitlement theory of justice To sum up: Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice asserts that anyone who owns property in a manner consistent with the three principles (justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in rectification) is justly entitled to it. The entitlement theory of justice A distribution of wealth in a society as a whole is a just distribution if everyone in that society is entitled to what he or she has, i.e. has gotten his or her holdings in accordance with the principles of acquisition, transfer, and rectification. It is just no matter how equal or unequal it happens to be. History and pattern According to Nozick, there are 3 kinds of principles of justice: 1. historical principles of justice 2. end-state principles of justice 3. patterned principles of justice Nozick’s principles are ‘historical’ yet ‘unpatterned.’ He rejects all other principles of justice. History and pattern Nozick advocates a ‘historical’ conception of justice: “The entitlement theory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about.” History and pattern Nozick distinguishes what he calls ‘historical’ and ‘end-state’ (non-historical) theories of justice. An end-state theory of justice supposes that we can determine whether a distribution is just without considering how people acquire their wealth or resources. History and pattern A historical theory, on the other hand, supposes that to determine whether a distribution is just, we need to take into consideration how people came to possess their wealth and resources. History and pattern For Nozick, justice is historical in the sense that a just distribution of resources is simply the result of people’s exercising their freedom of choice with respect to investment, consumption and giving. History and pattern Patterned theories of justice say that just distribution should be the result of conforming to some pattern (or principle) such as ‘an equal share for everyone’ or ‘to each according to his need.’ John Rawls’ difference principle, for example, can be regarded as a ‘patterned’ principle of justice. History and pattern Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice is historical yet unpatterned: the justice of a distribution is determined by certain historical circumstances (contrary to endstate theories), but it has nothing to do with fitting any pattern. History and pattern For Nozick, a particular distributive pattern is not required for justice. The free market is just, not as a means to some pattern, but insofar as the transactions permitted in the market satisfy the conditions of just (voluntary) exchange. History and pattern According to Nozick’s entitlement theory, a distribution is just (i.e. everyone is rightfully entitled to his or her holdings) if and only if everyone’s private property is owned through a sequence of transactions in accordance with the principles of just acquisition and just transfer. History and pattern Whether a distribution is just depends on how it came about. If it came about in accordance with the rules of acquisition, transfer and rectification, then it is not unjust, however unequal it may be. History and pattern In short, Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice is historical yet unpatterned. All other theories of justice are either nonhistorical or patterned and therefore must be rejected. Liberty upsets pattern Nozick points out that if a patterned distribution were established at any given moment, it would of necessity be destroyed if individuals could freely (and hence unpredictably) transfer some of their holdings to others by means of purchases, gifts, loans, etc. Liberty upsets pattern To maintain a patterned distribution, government would have to ban certain transactions in the free market, or constantly intervene in the market to redistribute property. Either way, a pattern can only be enforced at the expense of individual rights and liberties. Liberty upsets pattern Imagine a society in which the distribution of wealth fits a particular pattern. Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that it is an equal distribution (everyone gets an equal share of income). Let us call it D1. Liberty upsets pattern Among the members of this society is Wilt Chamberlain, a famous basketball player. Knowing his popularity with spectators, Chamberlain signs up for a team in a contract stipulating that for each game played at the home ground he is to receive twenty-five cents from the price of every ticket sold. Liberty upsets pattern Suppose further that over the course of the season, one million fans decide to pay the twenty-five cents to watch him play. The result will be a new distribution, D2, in which Chamberlain now has earned $250,000, much more than anyone else – a distribution which thereby breaks the original pattern established in D1. Liberty upsets pattern Is the new distribution D2 just? Nozick’s answer is ‘Yes’. Why? Because everyone who gave up twenty-five cents in the transition from D1 to D2 did so voluntarily, and thus has no grounds for complaint; and those who did not want to pay to see Chamberlain play still have their twentyfive cents, so they have no grounds for complaint either. Liberty upsets pattern If D1 is just, and people voluntarily moved from D1 to D2, then, Nozick argues, surely D2 is also just. But once we have conceded this, then we have admitted that there can be just distributions which do not conform to the original pattern. So all patterned conceptions of justice must be rejected. Liberty upsets pattern The Wilt Chamberlain example shows that a distribution (such as D2) can be just even if it does not follow a particular pattern. Free choice of action is essential to justice, and such freedom will always upset any patterned principle of distributive justice. Liberty upsets pattern Nozick argues that any attempt to impose a pattern of holdings will violate individual liberty. In order to preserve a pattern, it would be necessary to either prohibit people from making pattern-breaking transactions, or forcibly redistribute property on a regular basis (to restore the original pattern). Taxation and redistribution In Nozick’s view, taxation is equivalent to forced labor. Taxing earnings is, in effect, forcing taxpayers to work unpaid. To take the fruit of one person’s labor for the benefit of another is effectively to make one person work for another against his will. Taxation and redistribution Taking a proportion of people’s earnings is like making them spend a proportion of their time working for the benefit of others. Taxation by the state for the provision of social welfare – a forced transfer – is therefore unjust. Taxation and redistribution Each individual possesses inviolable rights that all others, including the state, must respect. To take property away from people in order to redistribute it violates their private property rights. Taxation and redistribution The functions of Nozick’s ideal ‘minimal state’ are limited to the protection against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. Redistributive taxation violates people’s property rights, and therefore must be rejected. Criticisms Nozick’s position rests on the claim that property rights are in some way absolute. His theory of entitlement appears to rest on the dubious assumption that rights of self-ownership can be extended to include rights over natural resources. Criticisms One might agree with Nozick that a person has the right to decide what should happen to his or her own self, but at the same time refuses to extend this reasoning to claims over natural resources. Criticisms Nozick himself ultimately acknowledges that his entitlement theory is inadequate, since it can never be demonstrated that existing holdings actually result from an unbroken series of voluntary transfers. Criticisms History shows that a great deal of initial acquisition of property was unjust, based on theft, exploitation, slavery and colonization. All property that derives from unjust acquisition is unjustly held. Criticisms It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to rectify the injustice of the past. We often have no way of establishing what rightfully belongs to whom. So Nozick’s theory has no application unless we could map out the history of every property ownership and transfer from the very beginning down to the present. Criticisms Another objection to Nozick’s view is that taxation is not the same as forcing taxpayers to work unpaid for the needy. Forced unpaid labor would violate the right to freedom of occupation, but taxation of earnings is compatible with that right. Criticisms A further reason why Nozick’s theory is controversial is that it could justify very unequal distributions of property. It can be argued, for example, that economic inequality is likely to produce unequal political influence, which undermines democracy. Criticisms Nozick claims that whatever distribution resulting from voluntary transactions is just, no matter how unequal it is. However, voluntary transactions over time produce inequalities that are unjust. For example, economic inequalities produce inequalities of opportunity for children from different family backgrounds. Criticisms Supporters of the welfare state would argue that property must be redistributed from the wealthy to the less fortunate to ensure equal liberty for all. By increasing the income of the poor, redistribution allows them to have a wider range of choices that they would not otherwise have.