Handout on Rawls, Nozick, and Matson
Rawls
John Rawls, in his enormously influential A Theory of Justice, proposes that we can determine
the principles of justice and hence the operations of a just society in the following way.
First, suppose that we want to construct a society out of scratch and that we do not currently have
a society that we are in (this roughly corresponds to the ‘state of nature’ discussed earlier, and
Rawls’ account has contractarian elements, in that justice is determined by the procedures that
would be agreed to by maximally self-interested but non-biased rational persons). Suppose
further that we are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, that is, we do not know who we will be in this
new society (or, what we’re like, what our values are, our gender, income, etc.). The veil of
ignorance is a useful tool in that it helps us to more likely arrive at a fair conception of justice—
that is, one not influenced by the contingent facts about who we are which are likely to sully our
judgments.
This imaginary bargaining situation is called ‘The Original Position’, (‘OP’), and whatever
agreements we make as to how our society is to be run, what principles it will follow, and so on,
is called the ‘Original Agreement’ (‘OA’).
Rawls believes that thinking about what procedures we would think best in this kind of situation
is most likely to lead to the formation of a just society. Rawls famously construes ‘justice as
fairness’, in that the principles of justice settled on in this arrangement would not be influenced
by pre-established power, wealth, and other inequalities.
What kinds of principles would we decide upon in this situation? Rawls believes that maximally
rational beings will decide upon the following two, or something very similar:
I.
Special Conception of Justice
II. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty that is
compatible with a similar liberty for others. (Liberty Principle)
III. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions
and offices open to all. (Difference Principle)
IV. General Conception of Justice
All Social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of selfrespect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all these
values is to everyone’s advantage.
Why would these principles be accepted? For several reasons, but the most overarching reason in
support of this is the Maximin principle (maximum minimorum, or, more mnemonically, the
‘maximizing the minimum’ principle). Since you don’t know who you’ll be after you decide on
your principles, and you could very well be one of the least advantaged in society, you would
rationally decide to make the society such that the least advantaged person is not that poorly off.
Rawls system is an ‘end-state’ one, that is, it evaluates whether a society is just by what
distributions it ends up with. Rawls does not consider himself a utilitarian, since he does not
think folk in the original position will voluntarily trade off a greater sum-total of goods for some
to the disadvantage of others, although he does believe that rational folk in the original position
can rationally trade off some liberties (although not basic ones) and allow some inequalities, just
so long as they advantage everyone and disadvantage no one.
Rawls sees his system as more Kantian, and representing Kant’s idea about society as the
‘Kingdom of Ends.’
Nozick
Nozick can be viewed as the arch-enemy of Rawls, and wrote his famous Anarchy, State, and
Utopia in reply to A Theory of Justice. Nozick’s theory is libertarian, in that it favors the
maximization of personal rights and liberty over any operations of the state that seek to curtail
them, even such operations are well-meaning (eg, welfare, etc.).
First, Nozick defines the idea of The Minimal State. The minimal state is ‘the most extensive
state that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights.’(614)
The minimal state is one whose sole purpose is to guarantee the continued free exercise of the
rights of its citizens, and the abridgment of any rights (eg, to murder) is justified only if this
abridgment guarantees in turn a right all rational people would wish to have (eg, to not be
murdered).
Nozick wishes to challenge theories of justice and systems of distributive justice that warrant
bloating the state and it’s abilities to curtail individual rights with certain goals of societal benefit
in mind (read, Rawls). “In this chapter we consider the claim that a more extensive state is
justified, because [it is] necessary (or the best instrument) to achieve distributive justice.”
Nozick does not wish (in the passage we have sampled) to discuss justice along all range of
applications, but only justice in distribution of goods, moneys, property, rights, etc.
Nozick’s view about justice in holdings is called ‘entitlement theory’. In brief, entitlement theory
says that a distribution of goods in a society is just if everyone has that to which he or she is
entitled. Entitlement theory would need to satisfactorily establish when and how it is just to:
1) Acquire previously unowned goods.
2) Transfer previously owned goods.
3) Rectify an injustice in (1) or (2) by retransfer (really (3) comes under (2)).
And, we need a closure clause: (4) No one is entitled to anything they have other than by (1)-(3)
Nozick does not wish in detail to flesh these out, although he does think that Locke was going a
long way toward establishing (1) with his concept of coming into property by ‘mixing one’s
labor’ with what was previously unowned. He also tends to think that any transfers are justified
if they are voluntary and do not harm another in denying them their rights.
Nozick is mostly intent on denying any theory of distributive justice that is ‘patterned’. “Let us
call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with
some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions,[etc]...And let us say a distribution
is patterned if it accords with some patterned principle.”
Simplistic examples of patterned distributions:
1. Distribute on the basis of IQ.
2. Distribute on the basis of moral worth.
3. Distribute on the basis of good looks.
4. Distribute in such a way that everyone receives at least 20,000 a year, by taking away income
from those who make more than 20K and giving it to those who make less than 20K until
each and every person makes at least 20K. If such a distribution cannot allow for everyone to
make at least 20K, distribute so that everyone receives the same minimal amount.
Nozick also calls such patterning, and governments that operate according to some patterning
principles, as following end-state principles (they are called end-state principles since there is a
certain end in mind, namely, a certain distribution. Communist Russia was, ideally at least, endstate, since it patterned distributions so that everyone had a standard of living approximately
equal, a job, and no private property).
Problems with Patterning:
Liberty upsets patterns, and patterning upsets liberty.
a) The Wilt Chamberlain example.
b) Bequeathing/gifting problems.
c) Entrepreneurial problems.
Summary: “Patterned principles of distributive justice necessitate redistributive activities. The
likelihood is small than any actual freely-arrived-at set of holding fits a given pattern...From the
point of view of an entitlement theory, redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it
does, the violation of people’s rights. (An exception is those takings that fall under the principle
of the rectification of injustices).”(622)
One of the main problems of patterned theories is that they are un-historical, that is, they pay no
attention to how things came into existence, who made them. They seem to think that we can just
look at a pattern of distribution and assess whether it is just w/no attention to the past facts.
Also, patterning upsets personal liberty since it makes other people somehow entitled to what is
yours and yours only, namely, the fruit of your labor and what you have justly come to hold.
“Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor.”
“When end-result principles of distributive justice are built into the legal structure of a
society...[they result in] each person [having] a claim to the activities and the products of other
persons, independently of whether the other persons enter into particular relationships that give
rise to these claims, and independently of whether they voluntarily take these claims upon
themselves....This process...makes them a part owner of you”(623)