Lecture 3: Rawls and Nozick
1. Ideal vs Non-Ideal Theory
Ideal theory considers the principles of justice for a society with full compliance. Non-ideal theory
deals with the principles of justice for a society with less than full compliance.
They can vary wildly in their implications: perhaps in a society without gender discrimination women
only discussion groups would be unjust. In the real world some women have very good reason to
seek out such safe spaces.
Non-ideal theorists have criticised the Rawlsian project on a number of grounds (e.g. Charles Mills
‘Ideal Theory as Ideology). Complaints include: ideal theory is a distraction; it leads to
conservativism; given how unvirtuous real people are ideal theory may not even be possible.
Rawls concedes that non-ideal theory is more important than his project: he just thinks that thinking
about ideal theory is useful and necessary for that project. Even if ideal theory runs the risk of
merely deepening our understanding of a morally compromised concept of justice, what else can we
do? That is just our Neurathian position.
2. Property Owning Democracy
When Rawls engages in non-ideal theorising we starts to outline his recommendations for how we
should organise the basic structure to ensure it enshrines his principles: we should look to property
owning democracy.
Such a system is one where the means of production are widely owned. What this ensures is that
improvements in production benefit everyone. It is a way of embodying the difference principle
without continual intervention (this point will be important when considering Nozick’s critique of
Rawls).
This system will meet the standards required for stability and legitimacy, and should be selfsustaining (generates its own support). It’s the kind of system we can justify to one another.
3. Goods or Capabilities
Rawls has been primarily concerned with how we should distribute basic goods. But are these really
the morally relevant goods we should be concerned with?
People may, through no fault of their own, have different capacities to convert basic goods into
things that they enjoy. For instance disabled people or nursing mothers. Thus, some would argue
that to focus on basic goods would be fetishistic.
According to capability theorists like Sen and Nussbaum we should be instead concerned with the
distribution of capabilities: what you need in order to instantiate certain valuable functionings.
Does raise question of how we are to determine what the relevant functionings are. Also an issue
that affects over conceptions of justice.
4. Constructivism
Rawls rarely talks about his principles being ‘true’: and when he does he makes it clear that he is a
political constructivist. One way of getting at what this means is to ask an updated version of the
Euthyphro question: are the principles of justice just because the original position argument
discovers pre-existing truths about justice (Realism); or are the principles of justice just because they
are the output of an appropriate deliberative procedure (Constructivism)?
This has inspired others to try to build a whole moral theory using constructivist materials (e.g.
Christine Korsgaard).
Rawls seems to think that constructivism is the best way to ensure that his view of justice coheres
with his strictures on public reason.
5. Public Reason
For Rawls, an arrangement isn’t just unless we can all reasonably agree to it. This is required for our
arrangement to meet the liberal standard of legitimacy. People must be able to accept the political
settlement freely, not be compelled by it.
To be a reasonable citizen is to be prepared to go along with a settlement that allows differing
conceptions of the good life. This, Rawls thinks, has implications for how reasonable citizens are
allowed to argue with one another in political contexts.
Public reason requires citizens to be able to justify their political decisions to one another using
publicly available values and standards – without adverting to your own particular conception of the
good life (or comprehensive doctrine).
Part 2: Nozick’s Historical Entitlement Theory
1. The Experience Machine
Nozick shares Rawls’s contempt for utilitarian approaches to moral and political questions, but takes
the critique further.
Consider the case of the experience machine: would you willingly plug into a machine that would
give you a panoply of enjoyable experiences (more enjoyable experiences than the ones you’d get in
your real life).
Nozick’s contention is that you would and should not plug in. The hedonist utilitarian has a radically
impoverished conception of what matters in life. But perhaps we can ameliorate Nozick’s concern by
merely changing our theory of the good. Nozick’s objections to both utilitarianism and Rawls go
deeper.
2. The Entitlement Theory of Justice
Nozick’s big idea is to model justice on logic. In logic an argument is good if it uses true premises and
legitimate rules of inference to generate the conclusion. In the same way, if you start with a just
system and then make legitimate transfers of property you end up with a just outcome. All we need
to understand justice are:

Principle of Acquisition: explains how individuals can acquire property rights in objects that
were not previously owned.

Principle of Transfer: explains how individuals can acquire property rights in objects that
were previously owned.

Principle of Rectification: explains how instances of historical injustices (e.g. theft) should be
rectified by estimating what would have happened had they not taken place.
Rawls’s fundamental error is to think that society makes goods, and we then face the problem of
how to dole them out. For Nozick, goods come into the world with property rights attached.
3. Historical v End-State; Patterned v Non-Patterned
The entitlement theory is historical. In it, whether a holding is just depends on how you actually got
to having it. In contrast, a theory like Rawls’s is end-state: justice depends on the distribution
matching up to a particular aim.
Some historical theories are also patterned: which goods you have varies with certain of your
qualities. For example, on Hayek’s conception of capitalism people are rewarded for merit/hard
work. Thus justice is historical and patterned. The entitlement theory is not like this: you can do
with your goods what you like (give them away even). So there will be no guarantee that merit or
effort is rewarded. The theory is historical and non-patterned.
4. Nozick Against Patterned Theories
Nozick’s most famous contention is that you can only maintain a pattern by impermissibly
interfering with people’s property rights.
Suppose we start with a just distribution: everyone is entitled to the things that they have. Then
suppose that many of us freely decide to pay a small fee to see Wilt Chamberlain play basketball.
Each of these transfers is voluntary. Yet we end up breaking the pattern.
The only way to maintain the pattern is to interfere with how people use their justly owned goods:
therefore, despite Rawls’s attempt, it’s not possible to reconcile liberty and equality.
But couldn’t we use a tax system to maintain a pattern without massive interference? Nozick says
no – taxation is a kind of forced labour. Think also about whether the idea of property owning
democracy can help Rawls here.
5. Justice In Acquisition
How does anyone get to own anything? Nozick starts from Locke’s theory of just acquisition. We can
acquire private property when:
1. We must not take more than we can make use of (the non-wastage proviso).
2. We must mix our labour with a previously unowned object and
3. Leave enough and as good for others.
Nozick regards 1. as non-fundamental. And ridicules 2 (see the tomato juice example). But he thinks
3. is important.
We must construe it the right way otherwise we fall prey to the zip-back argument. If I am to
permissibly acquire a piece of property I must leave opportunities to use resources that are as good
as the opportunities to use resources that I had.
6. Rectifying Injustice
It is fairly likely that many of the things we own will be tainted by injustice along their historical
chain. What are we to do? Nozick suggests that we should have a one-off re-distribution, perhaps in
line with Rawls’s principles. But this is incoherent: some of the things you will be re-distributing will
be justly owned. You will be performing theft in the name of justice!