Phil 122- Anderson
Fall 06
Outline of Nozick’s Entitlement Theory
- Nozick defends an extreme version of market society wherein property rights are
virtually absolute. He has the burden of showing this would be a just form of social
organization. He cannot simply rely on the commonly held claim that free markets with
private property ownership are maximally efficient (Why not?) nor that market societies
minimize the risk of tyranny (Why not?).
- Nozick’s main argument for absolute property rights follows from his thesis of selfownership as the basic moral value. Self-ownership is one way of describing the value of
autonomous self-direction: the freedom to live our own lives in accordance with our own
conception of a good life provided we do not violate the basic rights to life, liberty and
property of others. Note that Nozick is a moral egalitarian at the level of basic human
rights, but definitely not egalitarian about the outcome of this system of values.
- How does Nozick get from the basic value of self-ownership to the conclusion that
property rights are absolute? He goes part-way with Locke: As a self-owner, I own my
talents and abilities in the sense that I alone have a right to determine how I use them.
But I cannot claim ownership of my talents and the exercise of them if others have a
legitimate claim on the fruits of those talents. That would make others a part-owner of
me, thus violating the basic value of self-ownership.
- But there is a hitch: the fruits of one’s labor are rarely the product of one’s labor alone.
We usually must make use of (a) things purchased from others in the market and (b) of
things either unowned (for example?) or (b) owned in common, that is, publicly owned
(for example?). Nozick pays no attention to (b), important as it is in contemporary life,
since in his entitlement theory there is no room for public ownership. Should he allow
for some kinds of public ownership? What troubles would it make for his theory?
- Let us focus on (a). I can legitimately make use of things purchased in the market
through voluntary transfer. Right? Wrong; I can legitimately use what I have obtained
through voluntary transfer only if the person from whom they were obtained was himself
a legitimate owner of them. This chain of legitimacy must be traceable all the way back
to a point of initial acquisition, which must also be legitimate in some way or other.
What makes an initial acquisition of property legitimate?
- There is a tendency of some readers to dismiss Nozick at this point on the grounds that
(a) Historically, perhaps a majority of initial acquisitions and subsequent transfers came
about by force and therefore violated someone’s rights, but (b) it is impossible for us to
learn which current holdings have such a history. Therefore, we should abandon the
entitlement theory. But that conclusion moves too quickly. Nozick himself admits that,
given this sorry history of human rapacity, there should be a one-time egalitarian
redistribution of property, after which the entitlement theory could be put into practice.
(Is this a realistic possibility?) More importantly – from a philosophical standpoint –
Nozick still must explain how an initial acquisition could be legitimate, for if it cannot be
legitimate, neither can the principle of transfer be legitimate and the whole theory
collapses. Remember that Nozick’s theory is an historical theory of justice.
- Nozick argues, again borrowing from Locke, that an initial acquisition is legitimate
provided it leaves others as well-off as they were prior to the acquisition (the “Lockean
proviso”). A simple illustration: suppose Amy and Ben are both making use of the same
unowned land to grow crops, graze their animals, obtain wood, etc. Amy decides (while
Ben is away perhaps) to appropriate the land for herself, leaving Ben with the option of
either working for her for a wage or moving elsewhere. Suppose that moving is not a
rational option for Ben. Thanks to Amy’s managerial skills and the division of labor, the
productivity of the land improves such that both parties are now better off, even though
Amy as owner takes the larger share of the gains for herself. This appears to satisfy the
Lockean proviso as Nozick interprets it.
- But is Ben really better off? Amy’s appropriation seems to deprive Ben of two
imporant freedoms: (a) He did not give his consent to the takeover and was not asked for
it. (b) He has no say over how his labor will be expended; he must accept Amy’s terms
of employment. It is difficult to reconcile these losses of liberty with the libertarians’
strong commitment to self-ownership and autonomy. But it gets worse. Suppose Ben is
an even more talented manager than Amy, such that if he had made the initial
appropriation of the land, hiring Amy for a wage, he and Amy both would be still better
off. Or suppose they could have decided to jointly own the land in common and by
intelligent planning come out even better still. There are many other possible ownership
schemes that could be imagined (Such as?). None of these seem to matter on Nozick’s
account. Amy was the first to appropriate and she didn’t violate the Lockean proviso, so
the property is legitimately hers. This puts a great deal of weight on the purely arbitrary
factor of who decided to appropriate first. It doesn’t seem to matter that there are other
imaginable schemes of appropriation that would be both more efficient and more
respectful of autonomy. The mere fact that people are better off, under this system of
ownership, relative to life in an unowned commons, seems to be an insufficient test of
justice.