What Can We Learn From
Development of Irrigation Management Transfer
In Mexico1?
Sept. 1, 2007
In trying to answer the above question, this study was conducted by the author for the
Water Program of the World Bank Institute (WBI). Mexico is among the pilot countries to
implement an Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) program since 1990. There has been a lot
of world attention to it. For the purpose of developing a training module, the team at WBI has
designed this study a little differently, i.e. to tell the story of the formation of Water Users
Association (WUA) and IMT through interviews with farmers, WUA managers, and former staff
of the national water agency (in Spanish Comision Nacional del Agua, CONAGUA). One
example of WUA is illustrated to show its evolution.
The general approach to the WUA has a lot of similarities all over the world. However,
cultural, social and economic settings of a country, local politics, institutional set up, and specific
geographical location of a water user group made all the differences on the evolution of each
WUA. For example in Mexico, in some irrigation districts (ID), there had been certain level of
water users’ participation in the past and the water users there accepted IMT more easily than
those without past user participation. In other places, farmers have had low confidence in
government as irrigation service provider, and they took the IMT program as an opportunity to
take over control to improve irrigation services to their benefits. In yet other places, strong local
farmer leaders or local champions emerged to take up steps toward reforms.
Mexico’s IMT program – How was it born?
Irrigation in Mexico. Irrigated agriculture in Mexico is essential to crop production due
to its climate. Irrigated agriculture is 3.7 times higher in productivity than rain-fed. Although it
represents less than 30 percent of the total area harvested in the country, it contributes to 56% of
the total agricultural production and accounts for 70% of agricultural exports. There are 20
million hectares (Mha) under cultivation, 6.3 Mha of which have irrigation and drainage
infrastructure: 3.4 Mha in 86 large-scale irrigation systems, known as ID, and 2.8 Mha, in
numerous small-scale irrigation systems, known as Irrigation Units (CNA, 2005). The former
were initially managed by the government and were thus the subject of IMT. The latter were
built with government support but have traditionally been managed by water users, and were
thus not subject to IMT.
1
This review study was carried out by Paula Silva, consultant of the World Bank Institute (WBI). It was funded by
the water /rural program of WBI for the purpose of developing WBI training modules on Development of Water
User Associations. It was guided, supervised and edited by Dr. Mei Xie, Sr. Water Resources Specialist of WBISD,
World Bank. The views in the paper reflect only those from the author.
1
The Breaking Point. The main shift of management in the operation and maintenance
(O&M) of the ID was closely related to the country’s economic crisis and political shifts. The
ID infrastructure was constructed by the government starting in 1930 when the country was
experiencing an economic booming and a centralized government gave significant subsidies to
the irrigation sector. O&M costs of irrigation were covered by the government and farmers
(through paying irrigation service fees – ISF). Infrastructure was managed by government
through different agencies in history: National Commission of Irrigation, 1930-1934/ 1945-1946;
Agriculture Credit National Bank, 1934-1944; Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 1947-1951.
It was during the period of 1952-1976, the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources consolidated largescale irrigation schemes. It was commonly considered as golden days for the irrigation sector.
Former staff of the ministry thought that any agencies that followed never reached that glory:
“… the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources was an internationally
renowned institution. It was the era of the great hydraulic works. In
those days, technical abilities were what counted …When it merged
with the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry, which formed the
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources Ministry (1977-1988), less
emphasis was given to technical aspects.…” (Mr. Galdino, a former
CONAGUA2 staff)
“…it had very well defined tasks. Afterwards, the government mixed
water issues with agriculture, fishery, etc. From my point of view, it
was a big mess to try to cover may aspects besides water.” (Cobian,
former staff of CONAGUA and now staff of El Grullo WUA)
During the 1980s, the Mexican peso devaluated against the US dollar. The economic
crisis (1982-1988) depleted government funds for O&M of public infrastructure, leading to
deferred maintenance and declining services in irrigated agriculture. Farmers, dissatisfied with
the top-down approach of the irrigation agency and the poor quality of services, refused to pay
service charges, reducing further the funds available for O&M and creating a vicious cycle -lack of O&M funds --poor services -- low willingness-to-pay—lack of funds, etc. When the
economic crisis was over, the government requested a loan from the World Bank to rescue the
ID infrastructure. The Bank set, as a loan condition, that farmers should have joint responsibility
in management over infrastructure and there should establish a financially self-sufficient water
fee. As a result, and in line with the local economic and political conditions to reduce
government subsidies, the IMT program was born. Mr. Gadino recalled:
“The IMT was driven by financial crisis, this was its origin. Water user participation and
co-responsibility were requirements for getting a loan oriented to rescue the hydraulic
infrastructure of the large-scale irrigation systems…The vision was something like this make farmers work for getting something they appreciate and care about … This really
2
Or known as National Water Commission (CNA)
2
worked … If something costs you, you care about it; if it is free, you don’t take care
about it.”
There wasn’t a manual to implement IMT; it was a challenge for the Mexican
government to design an implementation strategy since there wasn’t previous experience
anywhere in the world. How to convince water users to take over infrastructure, given the
deteriorated ID? How to organize water users who had always been under the care of a
centralized government? The process of water user involvement in IMT evolved over time.
Setting Institutional Foundation for IMT
The government played a central role in the conceptualization of IMT. During
implementation, new actors - new water ministry, farmer water user associations, local hydraulic
committees, federations of associations, etc - entered the institutional scenery. A new
organizational structure emerged. Today, the government, still retaining the overall supervisory
responsibility, plays mainly the role of monitoring, regulation, training and advisory. Below, the
transition of the government role is explained while the new actors are presented in
chronological order.
The first steps were oriented to consolidate institutional and legal frameworks. In 1989,
the government, seeking for more independence in the management of water resources,
established the National Water Commission (CNA, or CONAGUA as later known), which
became an autonomous body under the Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Secretariat.
“…when CONAGUA was created, we all thought that the golden days were coming back.
But in fact, the new agency reduced its involvement in the technical aspects of O&M of
ID. Instead, it concentrated on the formulation and enforcement of regulations” (Galdino,
CONAGUA)
“The creation of CONAGUA had a very good reception among the former staff of the
Ministry of Hydraulic Resources because it was seen as an opportunity to go back to the
original work that the agency had…” (Cobian, El Grullo WUA, and former CONAGUA)
The best description of CONAGUA maybe an agent of change since its main aim was to
induce changes in water resources management on behalf of the government. It reshaped the
water culture in Mexico (Trava, 2002). One of the CONAGUA mandates was the transfer of the
operation, maintenance and administration of the ID to new entities that were governed by water
users. Apparently, the establishment of CONAGUA satisfied the interests of the government’s
irrigation lobby, which were willing to support the IMT (Garces, 2001).
In 1994, the Secretariat for the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries was
created and the CONAGUA was placed under them, but with a high degree of autonomy and
independence.
In 1992 a new National Water Law (NWL) was promulgated –which was a landmark
document and acted as the legal framework for IMT (in fact, the Federal Water Law of 1972
3
already suggested eventual transfer of irrigation infrastructure to its users, but didn’t specify a
timeframe (Ramos, 1999)). The 1992 NWL sets the legal framework for WUA. It not only
defines the obligations of WUA to operate and maintain irrigation districts, but also stipulates
that the WUAs are responsible for fee collection and that the fees should be sufficient to cover
the O&M and administration costs of the entire systems. In 1994, regulations and bylaws were
issued. For example, the NWL bylaws Article 97 states that WUAs should request both hydraulic
infrastructure concession and water concession in order to legally allow them to operate
irrigation infrastructure and be responsible for its maintenance. The water concession titles –
normally granted for 20 years to up to 50 years - is the best assess for WUA. They represent
legal certainty that WUA have the required water resources to deliver their irrigation services. To
ensure this, the NWL stipulates that the water concession as well as the hydraulic infrastructure
concession should be registered at the Public Registry of Water Rights (REPDA, in Spanish) in
each CONAGUA regional office that corresponds to a river basin where the irrigation water
source is drawn. The water concession title is especially important in the context of water crisis
within a basin because it gives the WUA the right not only to use the water and manage
irrigation facilities but also to sell the water within the agricultural sector or with other sectors.
NWL Article 503 states that a water concession should be granted only to a legal entity,
which should have an internal bylaw. Therefore, WUA must be a legal entity. It should be noted
that WUA have the legal figure of a Civil Society governed by the private law in Mexico. They
are non-profit organizations, and benefit from tax exemption.
The relevant NWL article (# 65 4 ) states that the ID will be managed, operated and
maintained by water users or by whom the users assign:
“…The 1992 National Water Law clearly states that the Irrigation Districts should be
operated by the water users or a third party. This left no room for discussion of
alternatives. It was not a choice but a mandate. The government established a certain
timeframe to implement this law ….I personally experienced the first meeting to
implement the IMT in Ameca and Acatlán de Juárez. In those places, water users grow
sugarcane and there is a profitable sugar mill who initially asked for the ID transfer. The
farmers that originally refused to accept the IMT gave a second thought when they learnt
the intention of the sugar mill company. To give to a second party, like a private
company, the legal possibility to provide the irrigation service was a very clever part of
the new law since it acted as a positive pressure on the water users so they would take the
responsibility and accept the infrastructure that is transferred to them. I used to tell the
users that the irrigation infrastructure was like their family asset; even though the
irrigation infrastructure is owned by the government, its use and benefit are for them.
Actually, the law foresees the acquisition of the infrastructure by WUA although water
will always be a national asset. WUA would be decision makers over the infrastructure
like any other owners”. (Galdino, CONAGUA staff)
3
4
Chapter II: Agriculture Use; First Section: General resolutions
Sixth title: Water uses, Chapter II: Agriculture use
4
A Phased Approach to IMT
IMT has been implemented in two-phases (Fig. 1). Phase-I was to transfer secondary
networks to WUA. Phase-II was to transfer primary networks to federations of WUA. A time
schedule for IMT was determined, outlining the IDs that were to be transferred in sequence.
Phase-I focused on the transfer of secondary canal networks to
water users that shared a common infrastructure defined as module
(modulo in Spanish). Equipment and heavy machinery required to
perform the maintenance works of that infrastructure were also part
of the transfer package. CONAGUA set annual transfer goals in
terms of the number of WUAs that were to be established. It hired
consulting firms to carry out a part (around 40%) of the WUA
formation, and did the rest by its own Irrigation Districts Department.
The required time and difficulties differed in each WUA:
“….in some cases, the organization process up to the Acceptance and Commitment Act
singing took one year. We had to make meetings in every ejido or commune… which was
what they called grass-root communities, directly linked to water users.” (Galdino,
CONAGUA staff member)
How Did Farmers React to IMT? In most cases, there was resistance to change and a
general feeling of insecurity from farmers. They thought that they were going to be left alone or
that they were not capable to perform the new tasks. Traditionally, the agriculture sector had
been subsidized by the government. One of the objectives of the irrigation sector reform was to
increase the competitiveness of the agriculture sector in order to take advantage of NAFTA. The
following story as recalled by Mr. Raul Medina, the first president of Rio Lerma WUA,
describing his reaction at the time the IMT was introduced.
“…we were somewhat surprised….They notified us that IMT had taken place all over the
country and that we were one of the last ID to be transferred… We learnt that this
program started with the big and less problematic ID and they left at the end the ones
with some kind of conflicts or problems like ours….We were a small module… Some of
us didn’t even know about the existence of the CNA. I remember seeing a guy who, now
and then, came to ask for a water fee or wheat sacks … In our case, we neither paid the
water fee nor gave them any wheat sacks. So, we were a problem case.”
Former staff of CONAGUA, Cobian, who is now working at El Grullo WUA recalled:
“…the authorities presented two options: either you take it or you take it. Well, it wasn’t
said that way but it meant the same. …. Luckily in our area, the water users were already
participating in irrigation management… People accepted the challenge and started to
work on it.”
5
Figure 1. Irrigation Management Program phases
1st phase: Secondary network
2nd phase: Main network
CONAGUA
Module 2
Reservoir or
diversion dam
Federation (SRL)
of WUA 1, WUA 2
and WUA 3
WUA 2
WUA 1
Distribution
responsibility
within the
module: WUA
WUA 3
Module 3
Module 1
Control point: water delivery from CONAGUA to Federation (SRL) of WUA
Control points: water delivery from SRL to WUA
NOTES: SRL is the legal figure adopted by the federation of WUA and stands for Limited Liability Societies (in
Spanish Sociedad de Respondabilidad Limitada, SRL).
In spite of the anxiety, the incentives from the IMT were good enough to overcome the
obstacles and to convince even the most reluctant water users. The incentives were: direct
control of the income from the water fees and from rental of heavy maintenance machinery and
equipment - besides doing the maintenance works. Moreover, there were other two imminent
reasons to accept the IMT: the government, in accordance with its new policies, was no longer
going to subsidize the irrigated agriculture; and, there was a need of an immediate action to
rescue the deteriorating ID infrastructure on which farmer economic activities depended on.
Reform of the Irrigation Agency –Parallel to WUA Development
As government started to reduce subsidies to agriculture, salary expenditure became a
main issue for CONAGUA. One objective of the IMT program was to reduce this burden by
reducing the number of staff. By 2005, the number of CONAGUA ID staff involved in irrigation
district management decreased from 8,000 in 1990 to 3,000 in 2005. The expenditure on human
resources department represented around 34% of the total budget in 2000. The overall budget
decreased in real terms significantly as can be observed in Figure 2.
This process was not without difficulties. Initially, resistance to IMT from public servants
was great. Many staff at the Irrigation District Department were unionized employees and thus
could not be fired:
6
Figure 2. Annual budget for the water agency in Mexico
Million USD (present value, 2005)
120
100
80
60
40
20
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
SOURCE: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (Mexican Finance Ministry). Expediture budget databases (in Spanish,
Presupuesto de Egresos): http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx /presupuesto/index.html.
NOTES: For years 1980 to 1994, the annual budget correspond to the Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources Ministry; for years
1995 to 2006, the annual budget correspond to the CONAGUA as reported under the Secretariat for the Environment, Natural
Resources and Fisheries
“…one of the main obstacles of IMT was the internal resistance from CONAGUA
employees. They feared loosing their jobs and lacked the confidence in water users’
capabilities to handle the infrastructure…. But eventually, the best operators and
technicians from the IDs were hired by WUA…Water users knew who the good honest
and hard working guys were …” (Galdino, CONAGUA staff member)
“During the transfer, a lot of staff left CONAGUA to work for WUA. Still there was a
lot of staff without a job. But they were part of the union and could not be fired. I made
some sport facilities for them in order to keep them busy. Can you image? Paying them
for playing … Unbelievable? But I couldn’t rearrange their jobs because the union
forbidden to ask employees to perform different tasks from those that they were hired
for” (Galdino, CONAGUA staff member)
Soon after, a voluntary retirement program was launched with government budgetary
support, aiming to reduce more staff. This program is still in force now and consists of offering a
lump sum - the usual sum paid according to the labour law when an employee is fired - but
keeping the pension benefit continuously. It is reported that the cost to government was between
US$ 20,000 to 90,000 per position that is cancelled. This program was a good deal, especially for
those who already had a job offer by a WUA:
“…it was a good deal for everybody - CONAGUA got rid of many staff and these staff
got a higher salary under WUA contracts in addition to receiving incentives for early
7
retirement. WUA gained qualified and experienced staff to work for them” (Cobian, El
Grullo WUA and formerly CONAGUA employee)
WUAs selected the most competent and honest employees from the former CONAGUA
staff, most of whom accepted the offers as salaries were higher with WUA. Since WUA
managed to downsize the number of required staff, they were able to pay more to their technical
staff. It was a win-win situation for everyone.
Rehabilitation to Address ID Deterioration – An Integral Part of Irrigation Reform
In addition to the agency streamlining of CONAGUA, another issue was to address the
deteriorated irrigation systems and deferred maintenance. During initial meetings with water
users, this issue was discussed with farmers as only 58% of the required budget for proper O&M
of the IDs was available (Palacios et al, 2002). Mr. Cobian from a WUA and formerly worked
for CONAGUA recalled:
“It is totally true that the infrastructure was deteriorated before IMT, …and it was so
difficult to control scattered systems from far away ….when replacement for a certain
part was needed, a requisition to the government for purchase was made and approval
received.... By the time it arrived, replacement of another part was needed”.
“A farmer said to me that the IMT program was a story like this: you come along driving
your old semi-functional car. We cross each other and you invite me into your car. I get
in and suddenly, you release the steering wheel and tell me to take it over. I have no
choice, I start driving and you just get out of the car and say ‘see you later’, leaving me
with the old car. The maintenance of the ID infrastructure was left behind for many years.
Farmers didn’t want to receive the infrastructure in those bad conditions”, said Mr.
Galdino from CONAGUA.
Initially, new equipment for maintenance was bought for some WUA as incentive to
participate in IMT. In most cases, due to budget limit, the government only invested repairs to
machinery and equipment and negotiated with the WUA to address deferred maintenance in
stages:
“CONAGUA promised to address deferred maintenance in stages since it didn’t have
enough money to do it all at once. If you ask any WUA, they would say that CONAGUA
did not keep their promises. But the good part of it is that farmers now have experienced
the difficulties of O&M and are making best effort to cope with the system maintenance
on time… Now they are much more aware of the deferred maintenance
problem and also understand better the government situation.” (Galdino)
Amador Sanchez, a farmer from Salvatierra WUA, recalls the
advice from Severo Gutierrez, a farmer from Culiacan where one of the
first modules was transferred:
“…I went to visit (sponsored by the CONAGUA) the Culiacan WUA
that was already in operation for a few years, and there I met Severo
8
Gutierrez. When I told him we were hesitating about accepting IMT in our ID, he told
me: ‘go for it and don’t be afraid. The CONAGUA
promised us machinery for
maintenance in good state. But they just painted the old machines … But we managed
them. Now we even have our new machinery and equipment.’ After I came back from
this visit, I was willing to accept IMT”
In addition, there are currently other governmental programs to support WUA and help
reduce the maintenance gap. These programs also help in addressing the competitiveness of the
agricultural sector under NAFTA and complement the IMT program. Normally, the support
programs involve an investment shared half and half between the federal government and the
WUA. If the municipal and state governments also participate in the investment, WUA’s share
can be less than half.
Structure of WUA
WUA have four administrative levels (Figure 3 and Table 1): the General Assembly
(Box), Oversight Committee, Executive Board and Technical Unit. The first three groups
consist of water users that have non-remunerative positions within WUA. The Technical Unit
consists of a General Manager and his staff that are professionals hired and remunerated under
contract, and directly controlled by the Executive Board (Garces, 2001), with the General
Manager more involved in the operational and technical issues.
To minimize potential corruption, in some WUA, amendments to by-laws have been
made to prohibit members of the WUA executive boards to pursue or support a political
campaign while they are in service. Also, there are restrictions on technical staff hiring as
candidates should not be first or second degree relatives of the board members.
The General Assembly meets at least every two months, and does not include all the water users but
rather representatives or delegates of water users - both land tenure sectors: ejido and the private property.
The number of ejido water users is normally significantly higher than private owners. Since an ejido’s
average land tenure could be as little as 0.5 ha, it could cause logistical difficulties when convening a general
assembly due to too many people. Therefore, representatives or delegates were elected to reduce the actual
number of people at a general assembly. The election of the representatives is done periodically within each
ejido and the number should represent 10% of the total ejido members. It is important to mention that
CONAGUA participates in the General Assembly with the right to speak but no right to vote.
9
Figure 3. Organization structure of a Water Users Association
Elected members -every 3 yr
Hired staff
General Assembly
Delegates
Oversight
Executive Board:
- President
- Secretary
- Treasurer
- Substitute
Oversight
Committee
General Manager
(Agronomist specializing
in irrigation)
Accountant
assistant
Administrative
assistant
Irrigation Section Chiefs
(ditch tenders)
Technical Unit
SOURCE: IMTA not published training material
NOTES: In some cases there is not a General Manger in the WAU and the Executive board performs the administration,
accountability and operational management.
Table 1. Characteristics of Administrative Levels of Water Users Association
Administration
General
Assembly
Oversight
Committee




Functions
Elect and supervise the Executive Board;
Approve seasonal O&M plans;
Approve yearly budget;
Approve proposed water service fee;
Elect representatives to Oversight
Committee
Inspect accounting records;
Oversees assesses and inventory;
Ensure yearly financial auditing;
Attend to all General Assembly meetings
Executive board






Manage affairs and resources
Agree, sign, modify, renew staff contracts
Purchase assets and agricultural inputs
Represent WUA
Execute resolutions of General Assembly
Supervise O&M, administrate per plan,





Members
Delegates
Election
Within each ejido or
group of private owners
- Ejido commissioners
- Private owners
commissioners
- CONAGUA ID staff
- State representative
President, Secretary,
Treasurer and their
alternates
Commissioners elected
by General Assemble.
Representatives selected
by their institutions -3 yr
3 year period, re-election
possible only for a
second period
10
Technical Unit
 Send O&M budget for CNA approval
 Call for bids, handle correspondence
 Present a yearly financial budget to
General Assembly.
 day-to-day O&M and administrative
matters.
General Manager
Administrative and
Accounting assistants,
Ditch tenders
Hired with Board
authorization
Source: Prepared for this document based on IMT Mexico case study (Garces, 2001)
WUA, CONAQUA and Local Governments. CONAQUA staff continued with the
operation at least during one irrigation season after IMT. During the following years, every
WUA evolved in different speeds. Most were able to take charge of O&M and paid for all the
O&M costs. Some WUAs united with other WUAs within their ID and took over the
responsibility of O&M of the main ID networks (phase-II).
WUA were not alone in the decision making process. The relationship between
CONAGUA, state representatives, and water users’ organization is presented in Fig. 4. In every
ID, a Hydraulic Committee (HC) was created, as required in the NWL bylaws, to decide on
issues related to seasonal planning, water trading and access to externally funds. The HC consists
of 1 member from CONAGUA, one from the state government (normally the Rural
Development Ministry of the local state), and presidents of all the WUAs in the ID. WUA
present annual work plans and budget plans to the HC. CONAGUA notifies the volume of water
to be allocated for the coming year. Then, a water fee is set by the water users and approved by
CONAGUA. The distribution of the water fee income is negotiated at HC and subsequently,
O&M are executed by the corresponding organizations in charge, i.e. CONAGUA for headwork;
CONAGUA or a SRL (see section on IMT in Phase-II) for main networks; WUA for secondary
networks, etc. The HC was envisioned under the NWL as a mediating and coordinating body,
whose structure and mode of operation were to be defined under the regulations of each district
(Garces, 2001). In some IDs, however, they have become serious decision-making bodies, from
district-wide water allocation to setting water fees (Urban, et al, 2000).
Establishing Self-sufficiency Water Fees
Service water fee is the backbone of WUAs’ financial
self-sufficiency. There is no water permit charge by CONAGUA
and water service fee is, for CONAGUA, the only chance to
eliminate subsidy as intended by IMT. Before IMT, during the
early 1980s, farmer contributions to O&M costs were less than
20%. There was thus a huge gap between water fee paid by users
and what is needed for self-sufficiency. Asking water users to
overcome this gap, as required in Article NWL was not as
difficult as it appeared for CONAGUA. WUA realized soon that they were going to manage the
income from the water fees and this made it easier to increase the fees. The roles of water fee
collection also changed: WUA was responsible for the collection and the CONAGUA had to
negotiate a proportion of this fee to cover its O&M for main networks and head-works. The
negotiation was often tough, and usually settled between 15% and 25% paid to CONAGUA out
of the total water fee collection.
11
As presented in Table 1, one of the responsibilities of the Executive Board is to send an
O&M budget plan to CONAGUA’s regional office and to the General Assembly for approval.
Based on the approved budget and water availability, a fee per volume is defined. If the water fee
does not fulfill the self-sufficiency condition, CONAGUA could object:
“In theory, water fee estimation should be based on the required O&M costs and
available water. But in practice, they adjust their costs to a water fee estimated based on a
reasonable annual increment from last year and the available water. If we don’t check
whether a WUA has covered 100% of their required O&M costs, the WUA can run short
of budget, irrigation maintenance will suffer. Similar cases can happen when WUA try to
‘save’ what is collected. ”
However, since volumetric measurement devices are not available at the farm level, water
fee at this level is expressed in Pesos per irrigated ha, or per crop ha, or litres per second during
24 hr of irrigated ha based on an average irrigation depth estimated for every ID. For example, if
the fee (based on the O&M costs and water availability) is set at 1¢/m3 , and the average
irrigation volume per turn used in a hectare is 4,500 m3 (considering application and conveyance
losses), the service fee will be US$ 45/ha. The most common is by Pesos/irrigated ha, under
which the number of irrigation turns are agreed or else, the water fee is set in terms of irrigation
per hectare (pesos per irrigation turn in/hectare) and is paid at each irrigation turn.
Annually, the Executive Board has to deal with the difficult task of adjusting the water
fee to fulfill the self-sufficiency condition, i.e. to set an accurate O&M budget. During the first
year when IDs were operated by WUA, the water fee had to increase as much as 4 times
compared to prior to IMT. In subsequent years, WUA did not succeed in keeping up with
inflation and peso devaluations and the fee fell, in dollar terms, from US$17/ha in 1993 to US$8
in 1996 (Kloezen et al, 1997).
The Executive Board only makes small increases to the fee each year, because:





water users complains about their hush economic condition;
a high water fee would jeopardize re-election of some members who often promise no
increments to the water fee at their campaigns for the executive board;
additional funds required for maintenance, i.e. buying new machinery and equipment, are
collected through “special fees” from water users in some years. This is a way of
breaking maintenance costs by having an additional special fee which some times can be
as high as the ordinary annual water fee. But water users appear to be more willing to pay;
they use part of their capital savings to complement the required expenses. To avoid
significantly fee increase during drought years, they estimate the water fee based on
average water availability. In wet years, they make a profit that save for dry years; and/or,
WUA has achieved optimal uses of water and their incomes, and there is no differed
maintenance.
The water fee ended up representing around 4% to 10% of the farm production costs.
According to ANUR, the average irrigation fee is US$45/ha, which varies depending on the ID,
from US$150/ha in small IDs to US$ 40/ha in large IDs. The use of the fee collected is around
12
50% in maintenance, 25% in operation and 25% in administration expenses. Typically, the
maintenance costs refers basically to all expenses related to the heavy machinery work –
operators salaries, fuel, repairs, etc; operation costs are mainly salaries of operators and some
minor repairs to gates, and administrative costs are the office employee salaries and office
expenses. About 2.5 Mha are currently irrigated in the country. Thus the total income from
water fees is estimated at US$112.5 million. In general, the water fee collection rate is high since
water users, in accordance with NWL Article 67, are required to present a sole planting
authorization permit (in Spanish, Permiso Único de Siembra), which is issued only after the
water fee is paid.
Capacity Building for WUA
The government has implemented strategies to support the newly formed WUA not only
in financial terms but also in training. The IMT earmarked US$30m for institutional
development wherein training was a main component (Garces, 2002). During Phase-I of IMT,
WUA staff received on-the-job training in O&M at the National Centre for Technology Transfer
of Irrigation and Drainage, owned by the government. In 1994, the Mexican Water Technology
Institute (IMTA) was established and part of its mandate was to provide training to ID executive
board members and users. From 1998 to 2004, CONAGUA hired IMTA to conduct annual
training to WUA staff and members.
Another agent for capacity building is the National Irrigation Users Federation
(Asociación Nacional de Usuarios de Riego, ANUR), which the government set up in 1994. Its
aim was to act as a WUAs representative in the negotiation with CONAGUA and other
government bodies. It has also played an important role in sharing of success stories and
experiences of WUA. A series of ANUR events, financed mainly by CONAGUA, facilitated
capacity building of WUA. Mr. Raul Medina of Rio Lerma WUA recalled:
“During an ANUR convention, we met an engineer, who told us
about soil conservation, evapo-transpiration and other technical
knowledge for efficient irrigation. I was amazed. It was the first
time I ever heard about them. After we came back, we organized
with other 5 WUAs to open a lab with second hand equipment from
CONAGUA. We started our studies, soil tests.”
After 2004, CONAGUA’s training programs have been open to any training bidders who
could meet the demand of more than 3,000 water users and board members. The service
providers are commonly local universities or research centers. Since the WUA boards are
replaced every three years, the need for continued capacity building and training is always there.
13
Figure 4. Outline for an ID operation, management and administration
Water fee
share
Hydraulic Committee Represented by CONAGUA, WUA
(SRL), State Government
5%-25%
0%-25%
Chief Engineer
SRL
Operation chief
WUA 1
WUA 2
WUA n
Maintenance chief
Irrigation and
Drainage chief
Administrative
department
Internal organization structure for each
one of the WUA (See Figure 3)
70%-75%
Headwork
Main Network
Secondary Network
From Phase-I to Phase- II: IMT in Main Canal Networks
The Phase-I “transfer of the secondary canal network” is almost completed. From 1991
to 1993, 2 Mha were transferred (Figure 4). Now close to 3.4 Mha (or 98%) of the total largescale irrigation area has been managed by 474 WUAs, representing over 550,000 water users.
There are only 20,427 ha where IMT has been unsuccessful, either because of difficulties in
defining module boundaries, or the secondary networks have high O&M costs, or they are
located in marginal land or conflict zones.
The phase-II was to transfer the main network of an ID to
WUAs that shared the network and agreed to establish a federation.
In Mexico, such a federation is legally termed as a Limited Liability
Societies (or Sociedad de Respondabilidad Limitada, SRL). SRL
(with the first one established in 1992) is responsible to distribute
water from the head-works to a delivery point, at which a WUA takes
over. SRL is thus taking over control of the main system from
CONAGUA, as well as a percentage of the water fee to cover SRL
expenses. The remaining water fee percentage keeps CONAGUA in
charge of only the head-works and access roads.
14
While phase-I has made significant progress, phase-II has been almost at a standstill since
the year 2000. There are 13 SRLs so far, covering an area of 1.5 Mha –less than half of total
transferred area. It is noted that the bigger IDs and those located in more profitable agriculture
zones are already under a SRL. There are other WUAs that have chosen an alternative to SRL,
i.e.. rotation of responsibility among WUAs for their main network. The remaining WUAs are
simply not interested in forming SRL, mainly because of a potentially significant increase in the
self-sufficient water fee given specific characteristics of their infrastructure – often large main
network with high maintenance costs, or small command areas with high maintenances costs.
The CONAGUA is taking a “go-slow” approach in this stage and has not speeded announced up
the Phase-II process.
Figure 4. Mexico Irrigation Management Transfer program (1990-2006)
Area Transfered
(1000 ha)
1000
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
800
600
400
200
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Acumulated Area
(1000 ha)
TRANSFERRED AND ACCUMULATED AREA BY YEAR
Years
Transferred
Cumulative
Source: Adapted from CNA, 1999 for years 1990-2000; Adopted from Unified System of Water Basic Information,
(SUIBA,CNA) for years 2000-2002; ANUR (2003; 2006)
WUA and River Basin Management
In a broader context, irrigation management is a part of overall water resources
management. Water management of IDs and irrigation O&M depend on the water allocation to
the agriculture sector by river basin councils. According to the NWL5, basin council should be
established in every river basin as the authority for the coordination between CONAGUA, the
three levels of government -federal, state and municipal- and water users within that basin.
Currently, there are 25 Basin Councils in the country. Farmers, through WUAs and SRLs,
interact with their river basin council through an agriculture user representative who is usually
an ID water user. The CONAGUA coordinates the election of the agriculture user representative.
5
Under ‘Water Administration’, Chapter 4: Basin Council; Article 13
15
Firstly, a state agriculture user representative is elected per each state located within a basin;
normally this representative is elected among the WUAs’ executive board members as their
organization skills are stronger than in the small-scale traditional irrigation systems. Secondly,
the basin agriculture user representative –and a substitute- are elected among the representatives
of all the states.
It can be said that IMT gave the ID water users a voice in the basin water management.
Nevertheless, there is a lack of strategy for communication and feedback from grass-roots to the
basin agriculture representative. Raul Medina, who was the first agriculture water use
representative in the Lerma-Chapala basin, one of the most important and over-exploited basins
in Mexico, says:
“when I represented the water users at the basin level, I could see clearly how well we
were supported by the legal system under the NWL. A lot of doors opened to us given
that I was legally representing a specific sector. The authorities gave me audience and I
could do a lot of things. A water user, not an institution, had an important role in the
basin council, had real participation that could make a difference. The agriculture water
use representative was not often a desired presence when it comes to negotiations of deals.
But our presence was necessary.”
Looking Forward – Sustainability of WUA
The success of the IMT can be measured by the sustainability of WUA. The main goal of
IMT was to solve the problem of deferred maintenance. If WUA fail, the situation would be
back to where it started in the late 1980s. So, how well are WUA doing?
One should first look at the “self-sufficiency water fees”. The water fee collection rate,
per ANUR, is around 85% in most districts. This is good rate compared to most countries. At
national level, the cost recovery averages at 72% (irrigation season, 2000-2001) (SINDHR,
2003). Of the total number of IDs transferred, only 40% reached above this level, with a wide
range of fluctuation –from 20% to 100%. These numbers suggest that less than half IDs are
doing well. However, the situation in reality is actually better as a vast majority of WUA have
additional income from the “special fee collection”, which, as mentioned before, can be as high
as the actual water fees. Some WUAs practice a fixed water fee labeled as “maintenance”, in
addition to the normal water fee. Instead of asking farmers to pay whenever is required for a
“special fee” (when a rehabilitation work is needed), these WUA have the “special fee” for every
season at a fix rate.
The size of WUA also matters. The division of the ID into modules shaped the WUA
characteristics and had the strongest implication in their daily O & M activities:
“…the size of our module was very small, so we didn’t have enough money to hire
support staff… During the first irrigation season, the secretary from another WUA helped
us in collecting the water fees.” (Raul Medina, Rio Lerma WUA)
According to studies by Santos-Hernandez et al (2000), the unit administrative and
maintenance costs ($/ha) tends to decline as the physical size surface of the irrigation module
16
increases; the size reaches around 5,000 ha, after which the unit cost tends to be relatively
constant. Unit operation cost ($/ha) also follows the same pattern until the size reaches 12,000
ha, after which it increases as the size increases. These observations vary depending on the type
of infrastructure, water sources, and design of irrigation infrastructure. Based on experience in
Mexico, the minimum area required for a WUA to be self-sufficient seems to be is around 7,000
ha for those cultivating high value crops, and 10,000-12,000 ha for those cultivating heavily
grains.
Thus, using the size of WUA as one criterion of sustainability, Mexico has nearly half
rated sustainable. The other half have high unit costs that make them financially vulnerable in
keeping self-sufficiency. There have been proposals to aggregate small WUA into bigger ones
to improve financial strength of WUAs. Some studies are being undertaken but aggregation has
not started.
In addition to the above indicators, a case-to-case analysis is
needed for each WUA to assess its sustainability. For instance, El Grullo
WUA - the first WUA established – has since been increasing water fees
by only 5% annually, but has not suffered any differed maintenance. It
even has savings, which were used to build a new WUA office recently.
But there are also WUA who have less funds now for O&M than at the
early years of IMT (Palacios et al, 2002).
Two external factors impacted the growth of WUAs: national economy and agriculture
sector performance, and droughts.
National economy and performance of the agriculture sector. Mexico’s high inflation
throughout the 1990s caused water tariffs to decrease in real terms. Farmer income has decreased,
making it difficult for WUAs to keep pace with inflation. A survey of farmers in 2005 found that
only 20% had seen their incomes rise over the past ten years. Agricultural growth in Mexico has
lagged behind (1.6%) overall economic growth of the country. From 1985, agriculture input
costs have been increasing at a higher rate than agriculture output prices. The sector growth
during 1990-1997 was at 0.5% annually. Meanwhile, population growth averages at 2.25%
annually, leading to an increase in the food import (Palacios et al, 2002). Crop diversification
has failed to materialize, so maize and wheat continue to be the two most grown crops, leading to
income loss when market prices for these grains fell by 40% in the 1990s (Garces, 2002). These
factors constrained modernization of the irrigation sector, and thus limited the income and
growth of WUA. To coup with these difficulties, some WUA and SRL have formed parallel
companies - credit unions, agriculture input supply, etc --in order to support agriculture
production of their members and to gain additional income. These companies are owned by
WUA or SRL but administrated independently.
Droughts. The water fee collection is based on volumetric deliveries and is thus a
function of how much water is provided. During a dry season, when irrigated area is
substantially reduced, the WUA income drops accordingly. In some cases, WUA were unable to
even cover their administrative costs. During the 1995-1996 droughts, the government had to
fund 100% of O&M costs for some WUAs to prevent them from collapsing (Garces, 2002;
17
Palacios et al, 2002). There was a proposed methodology to estimate water fees in two parts:
one in proportion to the area benefited from irrigation, in order to pay the permanent costs of
maintenance and administration; and two by volume of water used, in order to encourage the
efficient use of water (Palacios et al, 2002). This has yet to be implemented.
Lessons
IMT in Mexico is considered successful in terms of the establishment of legal and
institutional foundation prior to IMT. It promoted farmer participation in irrigation management.
In terms of financial sustainability and agriculture productivity, it is too early to say if it is
successful. For countries where irrigation systems are relatively new or with little deferred
maintenance problems, there is greater chance to successfully implement IMT6.
The following lessons can be learnt (Kloezen et al, 1997; others references):
1. Farmer involvement should be reflected in representative governance structure rather
than maximizing their direct participation in O&M activities
2. There should be at least a transition period of 6-month after IMT, during which irrigation
agency and WUAs co-manage the irrigation infrastructure
3. When forming a WUA, its size should be considered to make it financially self-sufficient.
Above 5,000 ha is recommended in Mexico
4. Below WUA, there should be strong grass-root level water user groups, such as the ejidos
and private owners’ organizations in Mexico
5. WUA should be equipped with technical means (including proper machinery and
equipment) to maintain their canals and structures to avoid high capital costs to WUA (at
least initially)
6. Training should be continuously made available to WUA leaders and technical staff on
O&M and financial management
7. Transparency and good communication to farmer water users is critical when water fee
needs to be increased to reach the self-sufficiency
8. WUA should be allowed to address related agriculture support if so demanded by their
members, such as additional services to members in technology transfer, agriculture input
supply, commercialization, financing, etc.
References
Comisión Nacional del Agua, 2005. Síntesis de las Estadísticas del Agua en México, 2005. Sistema
Unificado de Información Básica del Agua (SUIBA), Sistema Nacional de Información sobre
cantidad, calidad, usos y conservación del Agua (SINA). Comisión Nacional del Agua.- México:
CNA, 2005. ISBN 968-817-561-7
Garcés-Restrepo, Carlos. “IMT Country Profiles: Mexico.” International E-mail Conference on Irrigation
Management Transfer. 2001. FAO and INPIM.
José Luis Trava Manzanilla, 2002. Aspectos prácticos en la transferencia de los distritos de riego a las
asociaciones de usuarios. In Localización: El derecho de aguas en Iberoamérica y España : cambio y
modernización en el inicio del Tercer Milenio, Vol. 2, 2002, ISBN 84-470-1847-4 , page. 543-584.
6
It was estimated that a brand new ID could cost US$ 4,000-7,000/ha. If the maintenance is deferred, rehabilitation
can be up to US$1,500-2,500/ha. Normal O&M require an estimated budget of US$25/ha.
18
Kloezen, W. H., C. Garcés-Restrepo and S.H. Johnson III. 1997. Impact assessment of Irrigation
Management Transfer in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, Mexico. IIMI Research Report No.
15. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute.
Palacios Vélez, Enrique, Adolfo Exebio García, Enrique Mejía Saénz, Ana Laura Santos Hernández and
Ma. Eugenia Delgadillo Piñón, 2002. Financial Problems of Associations of Users and the Effect on
Conservation and Operation of Irrigation Districts. In Terra 20: 505-513. April, 2002. Mexico, D. F.
Ramos, S. 1999. El proceso de reformas políticas, legislativas y administrativas en el sector agua en
México en el período 1988-98. (unpublished draft report). México: IWMI.
Santos-Hernandez, Ana Laura, Enrique Palacios-Vélez, Adolfo Exebio-García1 and Luis E. ChalitaTovar, 2000. Methodology to Evaluate the Distribution of Costs and Income related to the Irrigation
Service. In Agrociencia 34: 639-649. Mexico, D. F.
Sistema de Información Hidroagrícola de Distritos de Riego (SINDR). 2002. Information System
Database elaborated by the Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua (IMTA), Software Version
2.36, Data base Version 2.2. Property rights of National Commission of Water (CNA). Cuernavaca,
Morelos. México.
Case: Rio Lerma SRL: from WUA to integral service provider
In this section, the story of the evolution of the ID 011 Lerma SRL (Figure A) is presented as
one of many examples on how a farmer water user organization evolved and reached a
complex structure, complemented with other functions that went beyond irrigation.
Background. The Rio Lerma SRL comprises 11 WUA from ID 011, located in the state of
Guanajuato -central Mexico- in the Lerma-Chapala river basin. Its irrigable area is around
112,000 ha, distributed among 23,500 farmer water users. Surface water is the main source
(70%) of the ID water diverted from the Lerma River and its tributaries - Guanajuato and Turbio.
The rest is from groundwater extracted from private or official wells 7 . Table A presents
infrastructure of ID 011.
The cropping pattern in the ID is as follows: wheat, barley, beans and broccoli from October to
February; sorghum, maize, beans and broccoli from March to September. Alfalfa, strawberry,
asparagus and some fruit trees are cultivated all year round.
IMT- Before 1991, ID 011 was managed entirely by government. In 1992, the implementation of
IMT resulted in the establishment of 11 WUA to take over O&M of secondary networks. At a
recent interview, Amador Sanchez García, who was the first president of the Salvatierra WUA,
recalled:
“IMT was a rumor at the start - we thought it was never to happen in our ID… But, there
were many complaints about delays on maintenance of the infrastructure, and we
thought our participation was necessary.… However, it was a slow process of convincing
7
Official well are owned by the ID and the others are privately owned. The farmer with private well does not have
surface water right unless there in an water availability exceeding.
19
ourselves about our capability to handle O&M of our secondary networks and machinery.
Meeting with other WUA was what really encouraged us to accept IMT in our area. We
started with 50% of the hydraulic structures in bad condition and with few equipment and
machinery. But the canals were not as bad…. We hired only 40% of the ID staff, and in
less than 3 months, we were operating our module. After all, we were very familiar with
irrigation services, which were the main element of our economic activity”.
Figure A- Irrigation Lerma River District 011
Table A. Hydraulic infrastructure in the Irrigation Distric 011, Lerma River
Type
Reservoirs
Diversion dams
Pumping equipment
Irrigation network
Drainage network
Description
Tepuxtepec dam
Solis dam
Yuriria Lake
La Purisima dam
Chamacuaro
Reforma
Lomo del Toro
Santa Julia
Markazuza
Official wells
Private wells
Pumping station
Main
Secondary
Structures
Main
Units
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
MCM
units
units
units
km
km
units
km
Quantity
400
800
148
110
176
1,692
3
475
1,183
7,224
260
20
Road network
Secondary
Structures
Road - no lining
Lined roads
km
units
km
km
761
914
602
763
Similar cases were encountered in the others modules of ID 011.
By 1996, the 11 WUAs had gained experience. They then
established the Rio Lerma SRL. The formation took only 8 months.
By early 1997, the SRL was running the main network. This
process was witnessed by Raymundo Rocha, who has been the
SRL general manager since and also a former CONAGUA
employee. He considers that the main obstacle faced during IMT
of the main network was WUA members’ misperception that the
water fee was going to increase again. In fact, there was no
increase as SRL got a share of the water fee that WUA already paid to CONAGUA, and this fee
was broken down into two parts - the head-work and main network.
Financial conditions. The evolution of water fee (in real values) is presented in Figure A. It
can be observed that prior to IMT during 1985 - 1991, the increments to the water fee were
higher than after the IMT. However, the trend has been constant after adjusting the water fee
increment with that of inflation (from 4% to 9%). It is important to mention that an extra annual
fee of US$ 2/ha is paid by members for rehabilitation and modernization expenditures. The
share of water fee among WUA, SRL and CONAGUA is on average 75%, 18% and 7%
respectively.
Figure A - Evolution of water fee (Real Term) in Rio Lerma ID 011, 1985-2006
30.00
Water fee
Real annual increment
20.00
400%
15.00
300%
10.00
200%
5.00
100%
0.00
0%
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
US$ (2005) /m
600%
500%
3
25.00
700%
Year
The Rio Lerma SRL has an average annual income of US$ 214,500 from water fees and other
services (Figure B). This amount corresponds to the share that is paid by the WUAs from the
total water users’ fee income. There is an agreement among WUAs, SRL and the bank
institutions were the water users deposit their water fee payment; a daily financial balance is
made and the bank distributes the total income according to the shares previously mentioned.
21
The distribution of SRL expenditures has been fluctuating from 6% to 18% on administration,
from 9% to 22% on maintenance and, from 14% to even 80% on operation and some
rehabilitation (how about the remaining 20%?). Figure B shows that SRL has been doing
relatively well except for 1999 and 2000 (drought years) and in 2003 and 2004 when a
investment of around US$ 300,000 took place. It is noted that when rehabilitation investment
increased in some years, financial balance presented a deficit for those years. One of the most
important factor that makes this SRL sustainable is the high water fee collection efficiency.
According to 2007 balance the water fee collection efficiency in the ID is around 90%, one of the
highest in the country.
Benefits from IMT. Since its birth, the Rio Lerma SRL, has brought the following benefits:
 Strong organization structure for PIM, defending farmer interests in their local river basin
council for water allocation as it happened in the Lerma-Chapala basin.
 Accurate assessment of the ID infrastructure and its needs since all modules have a
representative and each expresses their WUA needs.
 Rehabilitation took shorter process according to farmer water user priorities
 Provision of additional services to WUA such as: technology transfer, access to credit at a
monthly rate of 1.8% (lower than commercial banks), agriculture input supply
Figure B Total income and expenses for the Rio Lerma SRL, 1998-2006
800,000
Others
US$, 2005 constant values
700,000
Operation and Rehabilitation
Maintenance
Administration
Total Income
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
Challenges. The Rio Lerma SRL achievements are significant but the challenges are greater.
During the last years, the water crisis in the Lerma-Chapala basin has had a sever impact on
environment and on farmers’ income. All water users in this ID consider the reduction on
surface water availability and the over-exploitation of aquifers as the main issue. This situation
has stronger impact on those farmers without access to ground-water and without capital to
invest in high efficiency irrigation technology. The challenge for SRL is to homogenize water use
and production in order to gain more efficient water use for the whole ID.
22