Collective Action
in Canal Irrigation
K.V.Raju
Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, India
Email: kvraju@isec.ac.in
and
Ruth Meinzen-Dick
IFPRI, Washington DC, USA
Email: r.meinzen-dick@cgiar.org
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Irrigation sources



Canal irrigation
Categories of major,
medium, and minor
Sources of irrigation





Canals photo
Canals
Tanks
Lift systems
groundwater
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Irrigation Coverage
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Irrigation
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Vicious Cycle
Poor services
Farmer
dissatisfaction
Poor O&M
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Problems

Inadequate allocation of O&M.

Inequitable distribution of water.

Lack of incentives for saving water.

Poor drainage.

Low water rate recovery

Gap in design and actual area

Deteriorated condition of the system.

No measuring devices/ Control
structures
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Overview
Policy context
- Devolution trends
- Participatory irrigation management in India
• What conditions for collective action?
• Study methodology
• Findings
- Factors affecting organization, collective action
• Implications
•
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Collective Action

Need to look beyond
“registered societies”



Formal
Informal organizations
Relevant types of CA for
irrigation


Collective maintenance
Collective representation
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Methodology
STATE
Project
Reach
No of
WUAs
Total
Rajasthan
IGNP
Head
3
12
Middle
3
Tail
3
Purposive
3
Head
3
Middle
3
Tail
3
Purposive
3
Head
3
Middle
3
Tail
3
Purposive
3
Head
3
Middle
3
Tail
3
Purposive
3
Chambal
Karnataka
KRS
UKP
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12
12
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Organisations & CA

Formal Organizations
25 %
Informal Organizations 8 %

Collective Maintenance 60 %


Joint interaction
75 %
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Resources mobilised for CA

Interaction with officials:


Rs 1,483/ minor (cash only)
Collective maintenance



Rs 16,534/ minor
Rs 311/ farm
Rs 75/ ha (cash + labor)
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Conclusions







More likely to find organizations where:
· larger minor commands
· closer to markets
· active temples
· college graduates
· influential persons
(not affected by head/tail, coops)
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conclusions

Organizations are a means, not an end
· not all are active

·

Collective action

look for collective action




more often for lobbying than maintenance
organizations increase CA for maintenance, not lobbying
CA can mobilize significant resources
not full substitute for government, irrigation fees
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Andhra Pradesh Story
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AP-PIM focus


Irrigation Policy
APFMIS Act, 1997.


Financial control


Clear roles & responsibilities for
WUAs and Govt agencies
Fee collection & retention
Operation & maintenance
by users
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Rationale- AP-PIM






Better O & M
Adequate & Timely water supply
Improved supply to tailend areas
Farmers involvement in irrigation
management
Sense of ownership
Social audit, water budgeting, water
management
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Structure of WUA
Major
Medium
PC
PC
Minor
DC
WUA
WUA
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Sector
No
Area of Irrigation
Major Irrigation
1705
68 lakh Acres
Medium Irrigation
424
8 lakh Acres
Minor Irrigation
8163
31 lakh Acres
10,292
107 lakh Acres
Total
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Benefits








10.07 lakh acres – gap command area reduced
Tail end problems –reduced
Production increased to 140 lakh Tonnes
Farmers got 5-10 bags extra Paddy
No crop submersion – flood waters quickly drained
Execution of Works – with Speed & Quality
Estimated Rates ( No Excess)
Farmers participated – Owners

Money given directly to WUAs
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