American
Philosophical
17, Number
Volume
Quarterly
1, January
1980
IX. ETHICAL EGOISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISPOSITIONS
LAURENCE
their endeavors to show that ethical egoism is an
IN unacceptable moral
theory, moral philosophers
have tended to argue that either (a) the theory is
is
inconsistent,
egoist
(b) an ethical
internally
to a form of solipsism, or (c) the theory
committed
cannot, properly
speaking, be considered a moral
theory.l It would seem, though, that such arguments
have
not
been
persuasive.
particularly
However,
THOMAS
the
theory
To
garb.2
morally
his own
of
ought
long-range
from
this,
and
exploits
to infer
who
turn.
For
course,
to maximize
he must
interests.3
however,
takes
take
is the view
the
that
satisfaction
It would
be
can
egoist
to
afford
example,
most
are
people
to
prepared
admit the irrationality of their fear of traveling by
air, since this in fact is among the safest of ways in
to travel.
which
An
cannot
therefore,
egoist,
maintain
that it is rational for him to take no risks at all. Hence,
to exploit or to take
the egoist must be prepared
runs
of
if
he
others
advantage
only a small risk of
interests. These
adversely affecting his long-range
remarks point to the kind of disposition a person must
have in order to be an egoist :For any person N, N is
an egoist if and only if for any person S and at any
time T, N is prepared to exploit or to take advantage
of S at !Tif A^has good reasons to believe that he does
I
egoism,
For
them.
theories
Ethical
an
even
But now there are some risks involved in almost
anything we do; yet it hardly follows from this that
or irrational for us to do almost
it is unreasonable
if the risks are small
anything. On the contrary,
enough, then it is actually irrational for us not to take
to present
or, at any rate,
state
moral
the obvious,
tell us what we morally
ought to do; and
therefore, how we should be disposed to act. Thus, it
would seem that a moral theory must be unacceptable
if the sorts of dispositions which it requires us to have
as
are such that, given our psychological
make-up
are
we
to
unable
have
them.
Ethical
healthy persons,
egoism, I believe, is unacceptable on just this account.
To show that this is so is the objective of this essay.
not
way.
my
these
in this essay in not to examine
objective
to
if
determine
in
order
which,
any,
arguments
to attempt yet another
I wish
succeeds. Rather,
argument
against
an old one
in new
and
anxieties,
overlook the fact that a given course of action will
for him psychologi?
have undesirable
consequences
a
unless
he
is
cally. Thus,
professional killer to begin
is not apt to be
with, an egoist, like most non-egoists,
one who kills anyone who happens to stand in his
a person
of her or
not
thereby
his
affect
adversely
interests.
long-range
I shall refer to this proposition as (E).
A few explanatory
remarks regarding
a mistake
that an egoist must
be one
at every
of others
advantage
into account
the fact
in
that
To
order.
begin
with,
I assume
can be properly regarded
only if he believes himself
doing so he risks being discovered which, in general,
would not be in his interests ;and that sometimes the
risks are likely to be so great that they are simply not
worth taking. After all, an egoist is a psychological
being nonetheless, and so like anyone else is capable
of worrying, having feelings of anxiety, and so on. It
is not desirable to be plagued with either worries or
in so acting.
interests
have
can
this belief
treat
a person
Of
that
(E) are in
person's
actions
as exploitive of another
to be advancing his own
course,
in order to wrong
cruelly
a
without
it is not
necessary
to
a person. For one
ever
having
this
to treat persons
belief, and it is certainly wrong
out
I
should
also
that
cruelly.
although the verb
point
"to exploit," as used in (E) obviously has negative
1
are Kurt Baier, The Moral Point
of the first two approaches
Respectively,
exemplars
of View (Ithaca, 1958) ; and Thomas Nagel, The
of a number of people. See William
K. Frankena,
Possibility of Altruism (London,
1970). It would seem that (c) is implicit in the writings
"Recent Conceptions
of Morality,"
inMorality and theLanguage of Conduct, ed. by Hector-Neri
Casta?eda
and George Nakhnikian
(Detroit,
1963), Sect. 2, for some of the people to whom
(c) can be attributed.
2Cf.
Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, vol. 59 (1958-59),
pp. 83-104.
3 See Richard
The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 69 (1972), pp. 681-697.
Brandt, "Rationality,
Egoism, and Morality,"
73
AMERICAN
74
moral
way
a case
to make
attempting
in some surreptitious
I am not
connotations,
PHILOSOPHICAL
the
against
egoist
QUARTERLY
true friend could never, as a matter of
to harm or to exploit
course, be disposed
anyone with whom he is a friend [definition
of a friend]
An egoist could never be a true friend to
Pi
A
on
grounds. That will not do, surely. Rather, it is
an egoist must be prepared to act in ways
that
just
which from the moral point of view (so-called) would
be considered
exploitive. The use of the verb "to
ensures
in
that we do not lose sight of this
(E)
exploit"
assume
I
that the verb "to exploit" and
point. Finally,
moral
the
"to
expression
take
of"
advantage
are
count
our
among
friends
than
we
are
to others.
open
fewer
there
whom
about
ourselves,
we
whom
among
take
our interests; for
in protecting
precautions
on our part that those
is a deep conviction
we
count
harm us. Thus,
some
and
It
to be more
is among our friends that we are prepared
time
or
among
our
friends
itwill undoubtedly
the
other
we
are
have
no
desire
to
be the case that at
in the
position
anyone [from (1) and (E)]
Only someone with an unhealthy personality
could never be a true friend to anyone
[definition of a healthy personality]
Ethical egoism requires that we have a kind
of disposition which is incompatible with our
having a healthy personality
[from (i)-(3)]
P3
synony?
mous, and so can be used interchangeably
barring
stylistic constraints.
Now
it should be clear that (E) allows for the
that even an egoist might find it in her
possibility
interests to have friends. For it is a fact about our
psychological make-up as persons that friends have a
most important place in our lives. From this, though,
it should not be surmised that there can be no
in which an egoist could take advan?
circumstances
tage of someone whose friendship he valued without
running the risk of losing that person as a friend.4
Indeed, the very opposite must be true. For in virtue
of the bond of trust which is essential to friendship,
we are more vulnerable
to those individuals whom
we
P2
to take
P4
from the standpoint of our psycho?
Therefore,
logical make-up, ethocial egoism is unaccept?
C5
able
as a moral
theory.
Obviously
enough, the trouble with this argument is
that it would appear to settle too much by definition
alone
here to be using
the term
(and I mean
"definition" rather loosely). Naturally,
if we include
the appropriate definition
(or account) of friendship
and healthy personality
amongst our premises, we
can get virtually anything we want in the conclusion.
We can avoid the charge of circularity, though, or at
least insure that the circle is not a vicious one, if we
can explain why Pi and P3 are true. I take up this
task in what follows.
A most important subset of the beliefs which we
come to have are the evaluative
beliefs which we
have
about
ourselves.
But
it goes
without
saying
that
our we do not believe
that we are a good or bad
of our friends without jeopardizing
advantage
or what
to
is
this
with
them.
And
have
artist,
mechanic,
you
according
(E),
friendship
philosopher,
just
to
an
that.
what
who
claims
be
like
such
about
ourselves
have to
beliefs
Rather,
any person
egoist
precisely
must be prepared to do; for as we have seen, it is a be grounded.5 And our conception
of ourselves
is
that
influenced by the conception which
mistake to suppose that an egoist could maintain
fundamentally
as such,
are
our
to take. But
irrational
others have of us as is indicated by their attitudes and
risks,
given
psychological
structure
as persons,
are we
capable
of
being so disposed? Are we capable of having the kind
of disposition called for by (E) ? I think not, as I shall
try to show in the sections which follow.
II
Consider the following argument against the view
the kind of
that persons are capable of having
:
for
called
by (E)
disposition
4
On
actions
us. No
towards
therefore,
person,
can
come
to
have a positive sense of worth in a social vacuum; for
we each are dependent
upon the existence of some
person or the other for an affirmation of our self
worth. It is impossible to understand the significance
of either parental
love or praise without
supposing
that this is so.
A most important difference
between
love and
praise?and
grounds
so
parental
love
and
for the former, unlike
praise?is
that
the
those for the latter,
: "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,"
this subject, I have benefited
The Review of
greatly from two essays by John Cooper
v. 30 (1977), pp. 619-678;
and "Friendship
and the Good
in Aristotle,"
The Philosophical Review, vol. 86 (1977), pp. 290-315.
Metaphysics,
But see, especially, Lilly Schubert Walkter
and Paul H. Wright,
"Self-Disclosure
in Friendship,"
Perceptual andMotor Skills, vol. 42 (1976),
PP- 735-742.
5
Cf. Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
The Antecedents of Self-Esteem (San
1977) and Stanley Coopersmith,
Francisco,
1967).
ETHICAL
AND
EGOISM
PSYCHOLOGICAL
have nothing at all to do with a person's perfor?
is no surer sign of love than the
mances.6 There
in the face of variations of
constancy of affection
performance. Thus, parental love serves to allay, if
a child's fear of being
not to preclude altogether,
not
his
for
parents
measuring up to their
rejected by
expectations. For a child cannot feel both loved and
rejected by his parents at the same time. And since
then it
parental love is not based upon performance,
is possible for a child to feel loved by his parents even
fails to measure
when his behaviour
up to their
expectations. Hence, parental love engenders in the
child a sense of belonging, a feeling of being wanted,
which does not turn upon the way
in which he
behaves. Clearly, then, parental love serves to affirm
the self-worth of the child. On
the other hand,
parental praise, which is a form of approval, serves to
that is,
engender in the child a sense of competency,7
that he is capable of effectively
the conviction
For it is through
interacting with his environment.
the approval of his parents
(and other authority
figures such as his teachers) that the child comes to
learn that he can correctly perform those tasks which
he sets for himself or which are set for him, and to feel
that what he is doing isworthwhile.
So
as
one
can
our
see,
of
conception
ourselves
is
influenced by someone, usually our
significantly
from
the very outset of our lives. To be sure,
parents,
as we
mature
we
more
become
of
capable
assessing
our abilities and the worth of our pursuits on our
own. Even so, the conception which others have of us
continues to have a very significant bearing upon the
way inwhich we view ourselves; since it is impossible
to maintain
the conception
which we have of
ourselves,
whatever
it may
be,
if it is not
reinforced
time to time. Things are no different for the
egoist. For the remainder of this essay, I shall only be
concerned with
that aspect of our conception
of
from
ourselves
Now
Indeed,
a
makes
to our
reference
there can be no question
to have
desire
least
which
a
positive
it is a generally
prima
facie
but
of
conception
accepted
reason
to
deprecator has deep psychological
is without
fore, if an egoist
abilities.8
that persons
themselves.
fact that we have at
suppose
that
a
self
problems. There?
any fundamental
DISPOSITIONS
75
problems, then it is clear that among
psychological
the many deep desires which he will have, the desire
to have a positive conception of himself will be one of
them. It is this fact, along with the previously noted
fact that our conception of ourselves is significantly
influenced by the conception which others have of us,
seem to make being an agoist quite
which would
reason why this is so is as follows.
The
problematic.
The
of
acceptance
another's
one's
of
evaluation
abilities and pursuits necessarily
involves trust on
one's part, since there is no way of insuring that such
an assessment is an honest and sincere one; and it is
is
impossible to believe that a person's assessment
accurate,
one
neither
though
has
independent
to
claims
person's
can
experiences
what
true.
be
constitute
counts
Of
such
unless
sincere,
for believing
course,
But
grounds.
that
own
one's
except
are few and far between?
in those cases?which
where
not
honest
grounds
as
success
is so
straightforward
is virtually no room for disagreement
among competent judgers,9 even beliefs which are
gounded by experience need to be reinforced from
time to time by other individuals. And there is no
getting around the fact that others can do this only if
that
we
there
trust
them.
It might be objected, however, that an egoist can
to trust anyone simply by soliciting
avoid having
of
his
abilities and pursuits, and believing
judgments
to be true only those judgments which occur with an
assigned frequency. But not so. For surely one would
have to start with the premise that those whom one
was going to query had not entered into a conspiracy
there would be no point in
against one; otherwise,
in the first place. More
their judgments
soliciting
is
the
fact that there is very
significantly,
though,
little in life than we can do which does not call for
the fallibility
trusting someone or the other. Given
and
limitations
of our
human
nature
and,
therefore,
the fact that we could not possibly anticipate every
difficulty which we might encounter as we engage in
this or that activity, it follows that it is rational or, at
any rate, far less irrational to engage in some activities
only if we can trust someone or the other to come to
our aid should any difficulties arise.10
down
Walking
the street, for instance, would be a veritable nightmare
6 For
I am indebted to John Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (Baltimore,
the points in this paragraph,
1953) ?Gregory Vlastos,
in Socialfustice,
ed. by Richard
Brandt
in
"Justice and Equality,"
(Englewood Cliffs,
1962); and Robert W. White,
"Ego and Reality
11, ch. 7 especially.
Psychoanalytic
Theory,"
Psychological Issues, vol. 3 (1963), Monograph
7
is borrowed
The expression
"sense of competency"
from Robert W. White,
op. cit., pp. 13 iff.
8
For an account of an aspect of our conception
of ourselves which does not in any way make reference
see my
to our abilities,
and Our Self-Concept,"
"Morality
Thefournal
of Value Inquiry, vol. 12 (1978), pp. 58-68.
9Cf.
for Ethics," The Philosophical Review, vol. 60 (1951), pp. 177-197.
John Rawls, "Outline of a Procedure
10Cf.
: Some Conditions
"The Self-Reliant
that Promote
It," in Personality, ed. by Rom Harr?
John Bowlby,
Personality
(Totowa,
is accumulating
that human beings of all ages are happiest and able to deploy their talents to best advantage
1976). He writes :"Evidence
AMERICAN
76
if we had to consider
almost every person whom we
as our mortal
encounter
might
PHILOSOPHICAL
if we
So
enemy.
are
to
have a relatively normal and healthy mental
life at
to trust others has to be
all, then our capacity
reasonably well developed. Thus, it iswidely implau?
sible to suppose that anyone who leads such a life
would not trust the judgment of anyone concerning
his or her abilities and pursuits. And of course, we are
supposing that the egoist leadsjust such a life. In view of
these remarks, I take it that the objection under
consideration
fails.
I have been arguing
for two claims:
(i) Our
must
of
ourselves
be
reinforced
by others
conception
from time to time; and therefore, there must be at
least
one
person
of our
assessments
whose
abilities
and
activities we trust, (ii) Among the many deep desires
to have a positive
the desire
which we have,
of ourselves,
conception
hence
the
to have
desire
our
self-worth affirmed, is one of them. If I am right in
this, then the difficulty for the egoist lies in the fact
that (a) he must trust someone or the other in order
a positive conception of himself, and (b)
to maintain
he must be prepared to take advantage of the very
person who affirms his self-worth anytime he can
thereby advance his own interests. Recall statement
that it would be a
(E). And it will be remembered
to suppose that an egoist could never have
mistake
good reasons to believe that he could get away with
of a friend (who affirms his self
taking advantage
a person be prepared
to take
But
could
worth).
of,
advantage
to
the very
exploit,
person
who
affirms
his self-worth anytime he (the egoist) could advance
his own interests in doing so? As I shall argue in what
follows, I think not.
QUARTERLY
to act favorably
towards those who act favorably
towards us. The soundness of the principle is clearly
illustrated by the love between parent and child.11
For it is in virtue of the fact that the parents display
warmth and affection towards the child that he comes
to respond in kind, and that he comes to trust his
But
parents.
in
one's
value
we will be favorably
who
affirm
follows
our
namely
positive
disposed
self-worth,
from what
reciprocity,
a
having
other
towards
things
of worth,
then
those persons
the
same.
This
we may call the principle
of
that we are (or become) disposed
to
disposition
do
so
not
do
act
to
be
a
constitute
move
cannot
and
back
forth
between
these two dispositions at the drop of a hat. Likewise,
a person who
is favorably
towards an
disposed
individual cannot be disposed to take advantage of
that individual the minute he realizes that he can do
so and get away with it.
At this point, I want to say something about the
concept of a healthy personality, without becoming
enmeshed in all of the complexities of the issue. The
one fact about what a healthy personality
comes to
our
to
which
is particularly
is
discussion
germane
that a stable character is an essential ingredient of a
He
healthy
character
personality.13
a wide
over
capable
of rebounding
as
the
healthy
sense
to
interests
one
enough,
very
If we
the
say,
dispositional fit, as I shall say. To be sure, a person's
can change, but not just like that. To
dispositions
illustrate, consider the virtue of honesty and the vice
of mendacity.12 The corresponding dispositions here
do not constitute a dispositional fit. An honest person
to tell the truth in spite of the
has a firm disposition
fact that it is not in his interest to do so. The very
person. Obviously
opposite is true of the mendacious
loss of a
it is worth
Ill
to
needless
towards a person and the disposition
favorably
take advantage of that person whenever
it would
loved
personality
close
affinity
she
of
range
exhibits
same
the
is
and
circumstances,
after such jolting experiences
one
that
noting
or
or
fame.
sudden
a
complete
comes
to would
to what
a
As
account
seem
an aside,
a
of what
to bear
account
satisfactory
a
of
look like.14 For as recent
personal
identity would
work on the topic suggests, any adequate theory of
personal identity must take into account two things :
One is that our future selves may differ drastically
from
our
past
or
present
selves.
The
other
is that
a
when
that, standing behind them, there are one or more trusted persons who will come to their aid should difficulties
they are confident
arise" (p. 3). And on the same page he writes "The requirement
of an attachment
figure, a secure personal base, is by no means confined
to children,
the early years, it is during
those years that it is most evident and has been most
though, because of its urgency during
studied."
11This
by John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge,
1971). See the first four sections of ch. 8.
developed
point ismasterfully
12Here I have been much
"Excellences
and Merit," The Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (1974), pp. 182
influenced by James D. Wallace,
199
13Cf. Gordon
and Personality
1961 ), chs. 3, 12 ;and Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation
Allport, Pattern and Growth inPersonality (New York,
(New York,
1970), pp. 3096?.
14Cf. Derek
in Philosophy and Personal Relations, ed. by Alan Montefiore
Parfit, "Later Selves and Moral
Principles,"
(London,
1973) ;
and the Problem of Circulatory,"
in Personal Identity, ed. by John Perry (Berkeley,
John Perry, "Personal
Identity, Memory,
1975) ; and
Bernard Willams,
Problems of the Self (London,
1973), essay 4, "The Self and the Future."
ETHICAL
AND
EGOISM
person would fail to have a concept of himself as a
a series of
being over time if he were merely
in common
selves which had nothing
disconnected
one
with
would
another.
a
Having
seem to be intimately
a concept
At any
stable
then,
character,
connected
with having
of oneself.
a stable
if having
rate,
is necessary
character
under
course,
anyone
his own
might
interests
it must
others
succumb
at another's
under
the
he is disposed to do so whenever
he can
Rather,
not
his
He
to
advance
interests.
does
succumb
thereby
the temptation to do so; quite the contrary, for him
doing that, and only that, iswhat living is all about.
Let
us return
now
to the argument
presented
at
the
beginning of Section II against the view that persons
are capable of having the kind of disposition called
for by (E). What
is at issue, it will be recalled, is
or
whether
particular
not
the
the
of
premises
in
argument,
Pi and P3, are sound. If the arguments
are sound,
this essay
then we
to why
Pi and P3 are true.
an
have
in
as
explanation
would
in view of what
I have called a
to act favorably
fit. The disposition
dispositional
to exploit a
towards a person and the disposition
are
person
polar
dispositions.
And
a person
can
no
more shift between these two dispositions at the drop
of a hat than can a person exhibit those traits which
are fully characteristic of both the virtue of honesty
and the vice of mendacity upon demand.15 Of course,
none of this is a matter of logical impossibility as
such. There may very well be a world inwhich beings
can
change
their
character,
and
so their
dispositions,
rather like you and I can change the temperature of
the water which comes out of the faucet. But that
world is certainly not this one. It is a deep fact about
15
On
16On
one
of
So obviously
could never
have
to be
one
no
aims,
to
amount
the affirmation
and
pursuits
enough,
be a true friend
for whom
including
own
his
another.
who
treatment,
positive
from
of
of the
anyone
could trigger in him the desire to respond in kind. Let
us consider, then, what a person would be like if the
principle of reciprocity were not operative in his life.
This principle makes reference to a number of
one
the most
of
them
among
important
being the capacity to take up the point of view of
others and to interpret their behavior which, in turn,
presupposes the capacities of sympathy and compas?
sion.
to
For
treat
we
us
are
often
moved
even
favorably
reach fruition. Consider
Moreover,
recognizing
and when
him being
is true
Pi
to
towards
capacities,
IV
a person
that
called for by (E).
it should be observed that P3 is true if and only if the
principle of reciprocity is not operative in the life of
the person in question. Friends are disposed to act
worth
circumstances.
extraordinary
show
P3 Only someone with an unhealthy personality
to anyone
could never be a true friend
a
of
[definition
healthy personality],
anyone
egoist,
to
argument
the kind of disposition
now
Turning
favorably
to exploit
tempted
in my
premise
cannot have
an individual
to advance
But
expense.
is not
be remembered,
only
circumstances
extraordinary
to the
temptation
77
our psychological make-up as persons that stability of
character goes hand in hand with soundness of mind
and therefore a healthy personality. Another
such
fact is that we desire to have a positive conception of
ourselves. And this fact in conjunction with what I
have called the principle of reciprocity, has been a
key
for having a healthy personality,
then a person who
shifts from being favorably disposed towards a person
to being disposed to exploit that person every time he
realizes that he can do so and get away with it, cannot
be one with a healthy personality.
For these two
a
do not, as I have said, constitute
dispositions
a
a
fit.
with
person
Accordingly,
healthy
dispositional
cannot move from one to the other just
personality
like that.
Of
DISPOSITIONS
PSYCHOLOGICAL
the
latter
we
the
efforts
their
parents with
efforts
of others
do
not
their children.
are
when
he
by
when
has
in general
of
capable
quite
a person
us
has harmed
accidentally
our
attitude
towards
not,
positive
adversely
to be
the
affected
case.
Thus,
only when we believe
to
suppose
that
the
principle of reciprocity is not operative in a person's
life is not just to suppose that he is not moved to act
favorably towards others if they act favorably towards
him. It is to suppose, further, that he is capable of
going through life impervious to the aims, desires,
and efforts of others to help him ;and that he is neither
embarrassed not shamed nor plagued with feelings of
guilt by the fact that his own success has been
contingent upon the good will of others for which he
does not feel the least amount of gratitude.
Now there is a medical term for people who are so
impervious to the good will of others. They are called
The egoist, I believe, would be a
psychopaths.16
the idea of something being fully characteristic
of a virtue or vice, see James D. Wallace,
"Excellences
and Merit,"
op. cit.
the topic of psychopathology,
The Meaning
see, e.g., Herbert
Fingarette,
of Criminal Insanity (Berkeley,
Duff,
1972); Antony
and Moral Understanding,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14 (1977), pp. 189-200; Jeffrie G.
"Moral
"Psychopathy
Murphy,
AMERICAN
78
For
psychopath.
then
sound,
the
we
of
kindness
if the principle
are
moved
sometimes
others
even
on
we have no reason to believe
advance
cannot
say,
own
our
afford
interests.
to be moved
those
of reciprocity
is
to
reciprocate
when
occasions
that we would
The
PHILOSOPHICAL
thereby
to
needless
egoist,
too often.
in this way
it seems that only a psychopath would not
However,
be. And if I am right in this, then it follows that P3 is
true. For I take it that a psychopath
is a person with
an unhealthy personality.
V
I have
been
psychologically
egoist. It may
arguing against the possibility of a
individual
being a pure
healthy
that the very
be thought, however,
QUARTERLY
a healthy
point of the essay fails, since having
personality can be one of the egoist's aims. But this is
to misunderstand
my
against
the
theory.
interests.17
It may be
moral theory
outset of this
that the case
quite different
to be learned
make-up
as
that ethical egoism is an unacceptable
for the sorts of reasons mentioned
at the
to
I
have
tried
show
essay. However,
can
a
the
be
made
from
against
egoist
perspective. As always, there ismuch
to our psychological
from attending
persons.18
Received
University ofMaryland
argument
For if I am right, then we do not consider the interests
of others in order to be psychologically
healthy
beings ;on the contrary, it is becausewe are psycholog?
ically healthy beings that we are capable of consid?
ering the interests of others even when we have no
reason to believe that doing so will serve our own
January
5, ig?g
: Kantian
S. Pritchard,
A
;and Michael
Ethics, vol. 82 ( 1972), pp. 284-298
Understanding,
Essay on Psychopathy,"
"Responsibility,
The Monist, vol. 58 (1974), pp. 630-695.
and Psychopathology,"
17To
the force of this point consider that, without
simply ignoring the facts, it is impossible to suppose that the delight which
appreciate
successes and the sorrow which parents feel when
their children suffer could be explained
by the extent
parents take in their children's
or harmed. Thus,
to which
the interests of the parents are either advanced
imagine a pure egoist as a parent.
18
at West Virginia
I have benefited
of Philosophy
A version of this paper was read to my colleagues
and the Department
University.
S. Pritchard
for their comments upon
and Robert Gordon
from the criticisms received. I should also like to thank Michael
tremendously
at Harvard
of this paper was facilitated
earlier drafts of this paper. Completion
by my having an A. W. Mellon
Faculty Fellowship
Death
University
for the 1978-79
academic
year.