PIVOTAL
Pivotal Research Group
Madison & Wall
U.S. Equity Research
Internet / Advertising
Oct. 24, 2014
A Revisionist’s Recent History of TV and Internet Advertising
Brian Wieser, CFA
A Revisionist’s Recent History of TV and Internet Advertising
212-514-4682
brian@pvtl.com
One of the most important historical “facts” underpinning why national TV ad spending
has been weDk this year is the idea that the industry is experiencing some kind of broadbased “shift” by marketers, collectively. While we are fully aware that the large brands
who dominate TV have been incrementally shifting spending into digital media for nearly
20 years, we have disagreed that anything particularly radical is occurring at this time, at
least on a broad basis. In a release published this week, data from the IAB showed
deceleration in online advertising during the second quarter of 2014 relative to the first,
and of the first half of this year relative to the same period in 2013. Just as we saw in
national TV advertising. On our estimates, national TV probably held stable spending
share during that period, which doesn’t strongly support the notion of a meaningful “shift”.
As we write in this week’s Madison & Wall, we think that many other elements of recent
advertising history will also eventually be revised.
Nielsen-Adobe Initiative Supports More Demo-Based Digital Buying
Demo-driven – rather than click-driven – buying on the web has begun to take root in
recent years. An announcement from Nielsen and Adobe this week will probably go a long
way towards solidifying this trend. We provide background on the underlying products in
question and articulate that initiatives such as this one probably go a long-way towards
affirming the future dominance of demo-driven buying on display-like inventory on the web
in years ahead.
Pivotal's US Advertising Forecast
We also include our recent forecast for advertising in the United States.
200 Park Ave., West Mezzanine
Pivotal Research Group
Important Disclosures Are Located In The Appendix
New York, NY 10166
A Revisionist’s Recent History of TV and Internet Advertising
Students of history understand that knowing where a society has come from goes a long way towards telling us
where it is and where it is going. This is just as true when assessing the advertising economy. A better
interpretation of historical “facts” is important in understanding where advertising is at the present time, and how
spending will evolve in years ahead.
One of the most important “facts” underpinning why national TV ad spending has been week this year is the idea
that the industry is experiencing some kind of broad-based “shift” by marketers, collectively. While we are fully
aware that the large brands who dominate TV have been incrementally shifting spending into digital media for
nearly 20 years, we have disagreed that anything particularly radical is occurring at this time, at least on a broad
basis.
In a release published this week which we think helps to affirm our views, data from the internet advertising trade
group in the United States, the IAB, showed deceleration in online advertising during the second quarter of 2014
relative to the first, and of the first half of this year relative to the same period in 2013. While absolute growth in
online advertising remains strong – if highly concentrated between the industry’s two hegemons, Facebook and
Google, who captured the bulk of growth in the quarter once again – the deceleration was not so different than
what we observed in the national TV advertising sector during the same period. In other words, our conviction that
national TV advertising is growing in-line with the state of the advertising economy and that it is not experiencing
an accelerated shift of spending from offline to online has grown with this data.
We recognize that the national TV market for advertising is tepid presently, and the 2014-15 Upfront market was
outright weak. Meanwhile, internet advertising is still growing quickly, with a raft of initiatives focused on shifting
TV budgets to the web and highlighting mis-matches of consumer time and advertiser money. Traditional TV
ratings have been terrible and yet prices continue to rise – even in the most recent Upfront. Marketers and
agencies then duly comment regularly that they are shifting spending from TV to digital media in general and
online video in particular. For all of these considerations we can understand why an observer to these points
would conclude that TV is on the cusp of a significant decline (if it hasn’t already happened).
While we risk belaboring certain points we have been making in recent months, our ongoing conversations with
investors and industry executives alike in recent weeks suggest we can’t make them often enough. In short, we
believe there is no radical spending shift going on at the present time, only the continuation of an incremental one.
Specifically addressing the other points conveyed above which have also contributed to the belief that a radical
shift is occurring, we think the following considerations about the advertising economy must be taken into
account:
•
Internet advertising is growing in part because of large brands shifting spending into digital
media, but most of the growth comes from e-commerce-centric marketers and developers who are
endemic to the medium. On the latest data we have seen, around 200 advertisers account for around
90% of network TV advertising and around 80% of all national TV advertising. We can estimate that if the
typical top 200 national TV advertiser spends around $200mm on national TV they may be spending
$60mm on digital advertising. Add this cohort up and we can identify $12bn in digital advertising out of a
market that will probably capture $50bn in total this year. This gap is filled by small businesses who are
concentrated in paid search (and increasingly on Facebook) as well as by the aforementioned
performance-based web endemics. Thus it’s very difficult to actually observe or quantify shifts in spending
that are occurring in any given period, let alone the degree to which it is coming from TV vs. print, other
media or broader marketing budgets.
We also think it is important to be mindful that brands shift their spending on a regular basis and that the
best data we have seen conveys that the typical advertiser cuts their spending over time. We have
previously shown how the largest advertisers on TV of any given period will not likely be the largest
advertisers with every passing decade, whether because of shifts of spending into other marketing
channels or because of these cuts. Instead, growth in advertising is dependent upon the creation of new
advertising categories. The real threat, in this regard, is not about shifts in spending by existing
advertisers, but whether or not the economy is still producing large, nationally oriented brands and
categories which differentiate themselves on the basis of awareness of attributes. Those kinds of
-2-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
marketers are the bread-and-butter of TV. It is always possible that industrial shifts could begin to
negatively impact this critical trend, although we would not fully know it until after it has already occurred.
•
The Upfront was indeed week. But so what? Upfronts can be strong in weak years and weak in strong
years. Certainly it was a surprise to most, but only because specific volume changes in any given Upfront
are difficult to predict, even right up to the days when negotiations begin. Again, the bigger surprise is
why last year was so strong, not why this year is too weak: both the 2012-13 and 2013-14 seasons
featured tepid scatter marketplaces in terms of volumes and in the prices that advertisers experienced
(network reports of “double digit” scatter pricing was never fully correct, as they tended to ignore that the
bulk of scatter volumes were accounted for by higher CPM-base cost advertisers rather than the lower
CPM-base cost upfront advertisers). When volumes showed up in 2013-14, the industry rationalized the
activity as due to marketers wanting to lock down critical advertising vehicles. When volumes did not in
2014-15 most of the trade has characterized the choice as about marketers wanting to maintain flexibility.
Both rationales can be true at a given point in time, but critically we have learned that history is commonly
a fable we all agree on, and this is no less true for the Upfronts.
•
The time and money argument is a fallacy on two levels. First, who says that consumer time
should equal advertising dollars? And second, the data commonly used to make the argument is
generally inaccurate in our view. So far as we are aware (if you are reading this report in its .pdf form)
you will have been reading this report for some period of time without exposure to an advertisement.
Neither will a substantial volume of your media activity, ever. More importantly, the logic of time and
money equating to each other falls apart when considering that the small business advertisers who
dominate paid search are never likely to spend money on television; the marketers who depend on
reaching consumers in their cars are likely to focus on audio media at the expense of other choices;
marketers whose strategies are dependent on word of mouth may focus exclusively on PR or other
service-based activities rather than media at all. The second element of the fallacy lies in the data itself.
We have found that many of the estimates used in such assertions overstates spending on national TV
and also overstates time spent on digital media. Further, time spent on print is virtually impossible to know
with much credibility as the only studies we are aware of tend to be based on self-reported data.
•
TV ratings are indeed weak of late, but no one advertiser buys all inventory, which is to say there
will be few advertisers who cannot meet their media goals using television, at least so long as
there is inventory which is going unsold or is generally being monetized via lower revenue
generating direct response advertising. But even if ratings are down, the question that should be
asked is: what is the least bad way for a marketer to accomplish their goal? If TV remains the “least bad”
way to do this, then it is where an optimized media plan would suggest spending should be allocated.
Pricing is an issue when ratings fall, of course, but then advertisers continually optimize budgets and hold
the line on weighted average costs per thousand impressions by adding more and more cable to their
mixes. The mix shift alone allows marketers to realize stable (or even declining) pricing for national
television if they do not require that all of their spending be adjacent to what is generally (still) perceived
as the highest-tier quality content on the broadcast networks.
Relatedly, we think that most large advertisers who do shift a meaningful volume of TV spending to digital
video focused on achieving TV-like media goals with TV-like inventory will find (if they haven’t already)
that viewing is substantially more concentrated on the web among a relatively small number of viewers,
most of whom still watch traditional TV in greater quantities. Lighter viewers still be better reached using
this digital video inventory, and so there is a clear rationale for much of the spending that is allocated in
this manner. At the same time, aside from a handful of media owners (such as Amazon, Hulu, Vevo and
Yahoo) investing resources in still-too-scarce top-tier TV-like inventory which runs first on the web, the
primary beneficiaries of related spending are the very networks who sell traditional TV advertising, too.
•
-3-
Marketers and agencies say lots of things for lots of different reasons which are not always
evident to everyone. They also choose not to say some things for other reasons. From our
observations and first-hand experience, there is significant value to be generated within the marketing
community by conveying oneself or ones’ organization as forward-thinking. Being seen to be leading a
charge that seems to everyone as inevitable potentially positions oneself favorably. By contrast,
defenders of the status quo either come across as self-interested (if they have dominant positions) or
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
luddites (if they do not). There are, to be sure, some high profile marketers who make big changes to their
budgets or in agency executives who reposition their agency brands because they genuinely need those
changes. Speaking publicly about making significant shifts in focus can help concentrate the focus of
team-members around an objective.
In general, senior executives working for large marketers and those whose roles sit within central
marketing organizations rather than the products themselves (in other words, not the brand managers
who actually make the decisions about where to spend money) need to be seen as leaders because they
need to marshal resources and credibility both internally and externally in order to persuade constituents
to pursue even incremental change in what are commonly large, siloed organizations. Other times,
marketers want to be seen as leading the charge in the thrust of a long-term direction because they want
to be an employer of choice for up-and-coming marketers who probably don’t want to go work in a place
where everything is as it was and where change is slow. And in other instances marketers do and say
things because they themselves are looking for their next role. Visibility as an industry leader can be a
helpful element towards such an end.
Another important point: as we touched on above, brands shift their spending preferences all the time,
and this is clearly evidenced by looking at top advertisers in different media in different eras. And it
doesn’t necessarily get in the way of growth, because the driver of growth is ultimately the arrival of new
advertisers. Unfortunately it can be difficult to identify the new advertisers who will eventually be big
spenders on a given medium in advance. Thus a focus on what legacy advertisers are doing ignores that
new ones may yet emerge.
As for agencies, senior leaders who actually run the businesses (rather than buyers or planners who may
not be as vocal or who may not have as much access to clients or the press) tend to focus their public
conversations on certain topics based on what they think will resonate with clients. In other words, much
of what is said by these professionals can often be viewed as aspirational, and is not directed at investors
trying to figure out what just happened this past quarter. There may also be a perfectly reasonable
agenda on the part of those executives to encourage marketers to buy certain services. For example, if
there is limited quality video inventory on the web that would satisfy a marketers’ brand needs, an agency
known for being forward-thinking with respect to online video may be presented with incremental
opportunities to help develop content for the web for a given marketer marketer (and likely realize more
revenue than might otherwise be the case).
As referenced above, defenders of the status quo may not have their voices heard within their own
organizations, and so data or opinions which are contrary to the existing conventional wisdom may not
bubble its way up to the very top in some agencies. Ironically – and this is where another risk for
traditional TV lies – we think that many of the opinions espoused by the most senior of marketers and
agency professionals are based upon perceptions of reality as conveyed in trade magazines or other
publications. Once stated authoritatively, these perceptions may not only go unchallenged, but get
repeated.
To the extent that traditional TV has done a poor job of defending itself at an industry level doesn’t help the
situation for those networks, and there could yet be consequences: perceptions of change can lead marketers to
invest against that change, circularly making perception a reality. We don’t think this has happened yet (as
evidenced by our data conveying that national TV is still growing in line with all advertising), but it could yet occur
in the future. Another cliché about history is that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
When it comes to advertising, this might only be true if we come to broadly appreciate what the history actually
was.
-4-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
Nielsen-Adobe Initiative Supports More Demo-Based Digital Buying
Demo-driven – rather than click-driven – buying on the web has begun to take root in recent years. An
announcement from Nielsen and Adobe this week will probably go a long way towards solidifying this trend. The
two companies announced an initiative this week that we think should eventually facilitate more efficient digital
media planning and selling, and on the basis of Nielsen’s Online Campaign Ratings (“OCR”). The offering aligns
Adobe’s site analytics and Primetime video player / analytics / DRM / ad insertion offering with OCR-based
syndicated measurement data, Digital Content Ratings (“DCR”) into one product.
Before providing additional color on our thoughts on the impact of this announcement, we think it’s helpful to
convey some background first. Adobe’s Marketing Cloud offering includes a range of products, including the
legacy businesses associated with many of the company’s acquisitions including Efficient Frontier (a search,
biddable display and social media buying platform), Neolane (campaign management and marketing automation)
and Day Software (web content management). But the core of the marketing platform is an analytics offering
historically associated with Omniture now called Adobe Analytics. Adobe Analytics has a dominant position in
website analytics, including detailed data associated with site activity among top tier publishers, including brands
and media owners.
Separately, Adobe has also established a product called Primetime, a collection of software centered around a
video / media player which offers publishers cross-device analytics, digital rights management, ad insertion and
ad decisioning attached to video-related content across platforms. While the software is modular and
interoperable with competitors’ equivalent products, it used by most broadcasters for authentication (at minimum)
in association with TV Everywhere and towards that end has a relationship with most of the TV industry:
authentication is the concept which facilitates MVPD subscribers’ access to pay TV content in an online or mobile
environment. Many large programmers also use Primetime to facilitate monetization of ad inventory, too. Among
other features, the software allows programmers to serve ads directly or via third party means and facilitates
trafficking, inventory management, and impression tracking, for example. Although various components of
Adobe’s product are used, few will use all of them. Each of its features faces a range of competitors which the
company may also collaborate with concurrently, including Comcast (via its Freewheel acquisition), Google (via
its mDialog acquisition), and various offerings from Apple and Microsoft among others.
Meanwhile, Nielsen’s OCR has what we believe to be a leading position among large brands relative to the most
similar competing product, vCE from comScore. These offerings require publishers to place related “tags” onto
campaign-related creative assets on an ad hoc basis in order to ensure that data associated with the ad delivery
is captured by the measurement service. They are increasingly used to facilitate the purchase of campaigns
across multiple web publishers on a consistent age-gender-demographic basis. Nielsen’s data-set is driven by
anonymous data associated with Facebook, while comScore’s is based on a panel of its own making. Both can
assign demographic characteristics to media inventory allowing marketers and their agencies to assess reach and
frequency-based metrics against target audiences much as they do with conventional television in general.
Despite Nielsen’s relative strength in media measurement, it has had a weak position on the planning side of
digital media to date. The media owners selected to run a campaign using an OCR campaign would most likely
be planned by buyers and sellers alike using comScore’s MediaMetrix. This product has held a dominant position
in essentially ranking the popularity of sites among target audiences. Its data is collected from both a panel as
well as from the publishers it works with, which helps produce what comScore calls “Unified Digital
Measurement”. This data helps inform which media owners are issued RFPs (“requests for proposal”) associated
with an advertiser’s desired spending levels and audience requirements for a given media campaign. However,
even advertisers asking media owners to guarantee media spending against OCR-based metrics have been
relying on MediaMetrix. This amplifies the chances of mismatches between buyer and seller needs, the two
measure sites very differently. Sellers of media have only been able to view OCR-related data after a campaign
has run rather than something more comprehensive. Consequently, buyers may find they have audience
shortfalls vs. their plans (which sellers must “make good”, obliging agencies to manage against “discrepancies”)
and sellers may supply too much inventory to an advertiser initially as well.
Separately, Nielsen has been piloting DCR to measure content consumption online since early last year. These
measures of viewing at the level of the digital content asset – and not the campaign – have depended until now
on the same underlying data and methodology associated with OCR.
-5-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
With this as context, we can now review the press release issued by Nielsen and Adobe. What the two companies
announced a plan to integrate Digital Content Ratings with Adobe Analytics and Adobe Primetime, and that they
will jointly market a combined product with analytics and content metrics.
Although the time-line for a specific roll-out is still in the works (and we don’t think that anything is likely to be
widely used any time soon) and practical issues such as ease of use and pricing for both buyers and sellers have
yet to hit the road, we think many buyers will likely embrace such a product given our aforementioned views on
the market adoption of OCR among large brands. A digital ratings service / planning product that better matches
OCR should be very well received, not least because it should help to make workflows more efficient for buyers
(although it remains to be seen to what degree, as comScore will inevitably put forward a competitive offering of
its own). Media buyers will not be obliged to become customers of Adobe’s Marketing Cloud, ensuring that
adoption of a more complex offering should not get in the way of the use of digital content ratings. Of course, we
can anticipate that some brands – especially those presently undertaking RFPs for Marketing Cloud services from
the likes of Adobe, Oracle and Salesforce.com among others – would view the inclusion of this product into a
broader suite favorably.
To the extent that buyers do begin to use this product, sellers will likely follow. Sellers of media inventory we have
been in touch with agree that a combined Adobe-Nielsen offering should help limit discrepancies and improve
yield management by virtue of the improved sales management capabilities the tool should provide. It should also
help reduce some labor associated with the ad hoc application of OCR that might otherwise be required, as OCR
will be effectively “built-in” to Adobe’s products. We think that media owners are particularly important sources of
incremental revenue generation for both Nielsen and Adobe from this initiative. Media owners have not been the
primary customer of OCR to date – marketers have, given the orientation of the product around campaign
measurement rather than content measurement – and so this initiative should lead to modest incremental
revenue for Nielsen. For Adobe, the opportunity arises from capturing greater market share among this same
constituency, which increasingly needs to manage content assets and associated advertising units in a costeffective, revenue-enhancing manner across multiple platforms.
Demo-driven buying of digital audiences is a clearly superior way for brands to spend their money on the web vs.
buying against clicks, and for many (perhaps most) brands, it seems better than buying media based on what an
attribution model might suggest. It won’t be the only way that digital media is bought by large brands in the future,
if an effort such as this one works and encourages more brands to use OCR (and demo-based buying) more
generally. But it may help affirm that much of the buying on the web will ultimately be executed on this basis in the
future.
-6-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
Pivotal Advertising Forecast June 2014: Summary Totals
Contact: Brian Wieser
(e) Brian@Pvtl.com (t) 212 514 4682 (m) 917 734 1980
2010A
TOTAL NATIONAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Mass Advertising
• Bi-Annual Growth / Decline
TOTAL LOCAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Mass Advertising
TOTAL NATIONAL AND LOCAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Normalized Advertising
NORMALIZED DIRECT AND MASS
• Annual Growth / Decline
(f)
Political
• Bi-Annual Growth / Decline
Olympics(g)
• Quadri-Annual Growth / Decline
TOTAL ADVERTISING REVENUES
• Annual Growth / Decline
$61,556.9
7.9%
48.5%
-5.7%
$65,349.3
1.4%
51.5%
$126,906.2
4.4%
75.6%
$167,885.4
3.1%
$2,086.7
20.8%
605.0
-6.9%
$170,577.1
4.5%
2011A
2012A
1Q13A
2Q13A
$65,103.8
$66,621.0
$16,777.6
$18,194.4
5.8%
50.2%
13.7%
$64,618.4
-1.1%
49.8%
$129,722.1
2.2%
74.9%
$173,178.4
3.2%
$363.5
4.8%
0.0
------
$173,541.9
1.7%
2.3%
51.0%
7.3%
$64,128.5
-0.8%
49.0%
$130,749.5
0.8%
74.6%
$175,272.9
1.2%
$2,677.4
28.3%
639.0
6.5%
$178,589.3
2.9%
2.5%
53.4%
4.1%
$14,614.9
-1.1%
46.6%
$31,392.4
0.8%
74.1%
$42,369.8
1.2%
$46.7
7.9%
52.7%
6.9%
$16,348.3
-0.5%
47.3%
$34,542.7
3.8%
75.5%
$45,738.8
3.8%
$69.6
3Q13A
$16,806.3
9.6%
51.2%
10.6%
$16,028.5
0.9%
48.8%
$32,834.8
5.2%
74.4%
$44,142.5
4.6%
$78.2
7.4%
53.3%
5.8%
$16,989.3
-0.3%
46.7%
$36,390.7
3.7%
74.7%
$48,714.0
3.4%
$118.9
6.8%
52.7%
6.8%
$63,981.0
-0.2%
47.3%
$135,160.7
3.4%
74.7%
$180,965.0
3.2%
$313.4
2Q14E
3Q14E
4Q14E
$18,909.3
$17,509.3
$20,230.6
3.7%
54.4%
6.8%
$14,556.4
-0.4%
45.6%
$31,953.17
1.8%
73.8%
$43,301.9
2.2%
$243.4
5.2%
$16,321.9
-0.2%
46.3%
$35,231.23
2.0%
75.2%
$46,836.5
2.4%
$309.6
4.2%
52.2%
8.6%
$16,043.4
0.1%
47.8%
$33,552.68
2.2%
74.1%
$45,290.2
2.6%
$899.2
6.5%
$17,015.6
0.2%
45.7%
$37,246.22
2.4%
74.4%
$50,060.5
2.8%
$1,760.7
2014E
$74,046.0
4.0%
53.7%
6.8%
$63,937.3
-0.1%
46.3%
$137,983.30
2.1%
74.4%
$185,489.1
2.5%
$3,212.9
4.2%
54.7%
6.1%
$63,987.4
0.1%
45.3%
$141,137.36
2.3%
74.1%
$190,497.4
2.7%
$376.1
20.0%
20.0%
20.0%
0.0
0.0
500.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
500.0
0.0
------
------
------
------
0.0%
-17.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-17.4%
0.0%
$42,416.6
$45,808.4
$44,220.7
$48,832.8
0.5%
1.5%
$44,045.4
3.8%
$47,146.1
2.9%
$46,189.4
4.5%
(a) Excludes Internet-Based Advertising Revenues
(b) Includes Internet Classifieds, Email and Digital Display Less Internet Yellow Pages and Local Digital
(c) Excludes Incremental Olympic Revenues
(d) Excludes Local Political Advertising Revenues
(e) Lead Generation and Internet Yellow Pages
(f) Total Political Advertising Revenue on Local Broadcast and Local Cable TV
(g) Incremental Advertising Revenue from Olympics on Network TV
Source: Pivotal Research
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
$51,821.2
6.1%
20.0%
2015E
$77,150.0
0.0
Source: Pivotal Research Group, Cinema Ad Council, IAB, Magna Global, OAAA, RAB
-7-
4.3%
54.3%
0.0
$181,278.4
20.0%
3.9%
53.7%
65.4%
1.4%
-13.8%
1Q14A
$17,396.8
0.0
3.3%
-23.5%
2013A
$71,179.8
7.3%
0.8%
-36.1%
4Q13A
$19,401.5
$189,202.0
4.4%
20.0%
$190,873.5
0.9%
2016E
$80,434.1
4.3%
55.7%
6.1%
$64,067.7
0.1%
44.3%
$144,501.71
2.4%
73.8%
$195,831.3
2.8%
$3,855.5
20.0%
750.0
17.4%
$200,436.7
5.0%
2017E
$83,911.0
4.3%
56.7%
6.1%
$64,176.7
0.2%
43.3%
$148,087.73
2.5%
73.5%
$201,510.4
2.9%
$451.3
20.0%
0.0
0.0%
$201,961.7
0.8%
2018E
$87,594.6
5-YR CAGR
4.2%
4.4%
57.7%
6.0%
$64,313.1
0.1%
0.2%
42.3%
$151,907.69
2.4%
2.6%
73.2%
$207,555.7
2.8%
3.0%
$4,626.5
20.0%
550.0
0.0%
$212,732.3
5.3%
3.3%
Pivotal Advertising Forecast June 2014: National Media
Contact: Brian Wieser
(e) Brian@Pvtl.com (t) 212 514 4682 (m) 917 734 1980
2010A
2011A
2012A
1Q13A
2Q13A
$22,137.8
$23,307.6
$6,055.5
$6,297.1
3Q13A
4Q13A
2013A
1Q14A
2Q14E
3Q14E
4Q14E
$6,381.4
$6,597.2
$6,390.0
$6,646.4
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
5-YR CAGR
NATIONAL MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING REVENUES
National Television
National Cable(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National TV
National Broadcast - English(a)(c)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National TV
National Broadcast - Spanish(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National TV
National Syndication
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National TV
Total National Television
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
Total Magazines(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
National Digital
National Digital Display + Mobile Display
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Digital
National Digital Display(b)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Digital
Mobile Ex-Search
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Digital
Online Video
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Digital
Total National Digital
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
Total Network and Satellite Radio
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
Total National Newspapers(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
Total Cinema
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of National Advertising
TOTAL NATIONAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Mass Advertising
$20,424.4
12.5%
56.0%
13,094.9
1.3%
35.9%
1,093.4
8.3%
3.0%
1,867.6
5.2%
5.1%
$36,480.1
7.7%
59.3%
13,865.2
0.1%
22.5%
7,024.4
22.9%
83.1%
6,764.0
22.6%
80.0%
260.4
30.2%
3.1%
1,432.3
43.2%
16.9%
$8,456.6
25.9%
13.7%
1,166.5
4.2%
1.9%
930.2
1.3%
1.5%
658.3
12.7%
1.1%
$61,556.9
7.9%
48.5%
8.4%
56.9%
13,691.6
4.6%
35.2%
1,171.7
7.2%
3.0%
1,938.6
3.8%
5.0%
$38,939.7
6.7%
59.8%
13,781.2
-0.6%
21.2%
7,859.3
11.9%
81.2%
7,335.0
8.4%
75.8%
524.3
101.3%
5.4%
1,820.0
27.1%
18.8%
$9,679.3
14.5%
14.9%
1,209.7
3.7%
1.9%
849.5
-8.7%
1.3%
644.3
-2.1%
1.0%
$65,103.8
5.8%
50.2%
5.3%
57.9%
13,692.4
0.0%
34.0%
1,259.1
7.5%
3.1%
1,992.0
2.8%
4.9%
$40,251.2
3.4%
60.4%
12,676.8
-8.0%
19.0%
8,754.9
11.4%
79.6%
7,453.9
1.6%
67.7%
1,301.0
148.1%
11.8%
2,250.0
23.6%
20.4%
$11,004.9
13.7%
16.5%
1,245.0
2.9%
1.9%
3.8%
58.6%
3,536.3
-11.4%
34.2%
276.6
4.9%
2.7%
465.6
-1.1%
4.5%
$10,334.0
-2.1%
61.6%
2,683.4
-6.5%
16.0%
2,537.0
365.2
7.6%
3.4%
487.3
-1.2%
4.6%
$10,654.6
6.5%
58.6%
3,500.7
-5.1%
19.2%
2,682.4
2,858.5
14.1%
29.3%
302.7
14.1%
3.1%
531.5
-0.5%
5.4%
$9,755.8
9.5%
58.0%
2,806.4
-2.7%
16.7%
2,948.8
$6,290.8
4.9%
55.4%
4,117.5
5.5%
36.2%
437.1
11.9%
3.8%
517.5
4.8%
4.6%
$11,362.9
5.4%
58.6%
3,043.2
-5.9%
15.7%
3,461.9
25.6%
81.0%
2,059.9
6.1%
56.6%
889.0
118.1%
24.4%
30.9%
81.1%
1,999.7
-3.2%
46.8%
1,462.1
152.9%
34.3%
624.0
676.0
693.0
807.0
27.4%
19.7%
$3,161.0
36.5%
18.8%
288.2
-4.1%
1.7%
166.1
-11.6%
1.0%
687.6
145.0
2.3%
51.0%
6.4%
32.9%
8.3%
62.1%
38.6%
79.9%
1,836.5
3.5%
54.7%
845.9
425.4%
25.2%
-11.1%
1.1%
$66,621.0
3,505.0
$6,063.0
38.9%
80.3%
1,844.4
10.3%
58.3%
692.6
349.2%
21.9%
755.6
6.7%
1.0%
7.1%
59.1%
10.0%
0.9%
$16,777.6
2.5%
53.4%
23.1%
20.1%
$3,358.4
35.2%
18.5%
306.8
-3.4%
1.7%
178.8
-5.9%
1.0%
195.1
12.0%
1.1%
$18,194.4
7.9%
52.7%
29.5%
19.0%
$3,641.8
26.3%
21.7%
296.9
-9.9%
1.8%
128.0
-8.8%
0.8%
177.4
-4.0%
1.1%
$16,806.3
9.6%
51.2%
19.4%
18.9%
$4,268.9
28.5%
22.0%
319.4
7.5%
1.6%
222.1
-6.4%
1.1%
185.0
-6.0%
1.0%
$19,401.5
7.4%
53.3%
$24,706.5
6.0%
58.7%
14,017.3
2.4%
33.3%
1,381.6
9.7%
3.3%
2,001.9
0.5%
4.8%
$42,107.3
4.6%
59.2%
12,033.6
-5.1%
16.9%
11,630.1
32.8%
80.6%
7,740.5
3.8%
53.6%
3,889.6
199.0%
27.0%
2,800.0
24.4%
19.4%
$14,430.1
31.1%
20.3%
1,211.3
-2.7%
1.7%
695.0
-8.0%
1.0%
702.5
2.2%
1.0%
$71,179.8
6.8%
52.7%
5.4%
60.2%
3,468.5
-1.9%
32.7%
294.4
6.4%
2.8%
456.4
-2.0%
4.3%
$10,600.8
2.6%
60.9%
2,521.4
-6.0%
14.5%
2,868.3
4.8%
60.4%
3,429.1
-2.2%
31.4%
418.1
14.5%
3.8%
477.6
-2.0%
4.4%
$10,922.0
2.5%
57.8%
3,354.6
-4.2%
17.7%
3,046.5
5.4%
63.7%
2,786.7
-2.5%
27.8%
321.1
6.1%
3.2%
526.1
-1.0%
5.2%
$10,023.8
2.7%
57.2%
2,661.1
-5.2%
15.2%
3,299.7
13.1%
77.3%
1,906.3
3.4%
51.3%
962.0
38.9%
25.9%
13.6%
76.9%
1,889.8
2.9%
47.7%
1,156.7
36.7%
29.2%
11.9%
78.0%
2,097.4
1.8%
49.6%
1,202.3
35.2%
28.4%
844.3
916.6
932.2
35.3%
22.7%
$3,712.5
17.4%
21.3%
265.2
-8.0%
1.5%
150.4
-9.4%
0.9%
146.4
1.0%
0.8%
$17,396.8
3.7%
54.4%
35.6%
23.1%
$3,963.1
18.0%
21.0%
299.9
-2.2%
1.6%
162.2
-9.3%
0.9%
207.5
6.4%
1.1%
$18,909.3
3.9%
53.7%
34.5%
22.0%
$4,231.9
16.2%
24.2%
291.8
-1.7%
1.7%
111.4
-12.9%
0.6%
189.2
6.6%
1.1%
$17,509.3
4.2%
52.2%
Source: Pivotal Research
-8-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
5.7%
57.0%
4,053.2
-1.6%
34.7%
460.1
5.3%
3.9%
508.0
-1.8%
4.4%
$11,667.6
2.7%
57.7%
2,870.4
-5.7%
14.2%
3,870.0
11.8%
78.1%
1,971.3
-1.4%
39.8%
1,898.7
29.9%
38.3%
1,084.7
34.4%
21.9%
$4,954.7
16.1%
24.5%
329.1
3.0%
1.6%
202.6
-8.8%
1.0%
206.2
11.4%
1.0%
$20,230.6
4.3%
54.3%
$26,015.0
5.3%
60.2%
13,737.5
-2.0%
31.8%
1,493.6
8.1%
3.5%
1,968.1
-1.7%
4.6%
$43,214.2
2.6%
58.4%
11,407.5
-5.2%
15.4%
13,084.5
12.5%
77.6%
7,864.8
1.6%
46.6%
5,219.7
34.2%
31.0%
3,777.8
34.9%
22.4%
$16,862.3
16.9%
22.8%
1,186.0
-2.1%
1.6%
626.7
-9.8%
0.8%
749.3
6.7%
1.0%
$74,046.0
4.0%
53.7%
$27,709.7
6.5%
61.6%
13,737.6
0.0%
30.5%
1,577.2
5.6%
3.5%
1,958.7
-0.5%
4.4%
$44,983.3
4.1%
58.3%
10,921.3
-4.3%
14.2%
13,969.2
6.8%
74.6%
7,797.9
-0.9%
41.6%
6,171.2
18.2%
33.0%
4,757.2
25.9%
25.4%
$18,726.4
11.1%
24.3%
1,158.6
-2.3%
1.5%
$29,466.0
6.3%
62.9%
13,720.9
-0.1%
29.3%
1,712.8
8.6%
3.7%
1,946.2
-0.6%
4.2%
$46,845.8
4.1%
58.2%
10,380.8
-4.9%
12.9%
14,945.6
7.0%
72.1%
7,906.7
1.4%
38.1%
7,038.8
14.1%
34.0%
5,784.5
21.6%
27.9%
$20,730.0
10.7%
25.8%
1,127.5
-2.7%
1.4%
$31,248.6
6.0%
64.3%
13,626.6
-0.7%
28.0%
1,801.2
5.2%
3.7%
1,921.8
-1.3%
4.0%
$48,598.1
3.7%
57.9%
9,990.4
-3.8%
11.9%
16,041.4
7.3%
70.1%
8,042.0
1.7%
35.1%
7,999.3
13.6%
35.0%
6,843.5
18.3%
29.9%
$22,884.8
10.4%
27.3%
1,092.3
-3.1%
1.3%
$33,081.6
13,509.7
1,944.7
1,893.3
$50,429.3
9,553.0
17,162.5
7.0%
68.1%
8,100.7
0.7%
32.1%
9,061.8
13.3%
36.0%
8,040.9
$25,203.4
1,052.7
800.0
854.2
912.1
974.0
4.3%
56.7%
18.4%
23.5%
11.8%
-2.8%
-3.6%
1.2%
-11.8%
0.4%
$83,911.0
0.9%
10.1%
28.8%
382.2
4.3%
55.7%
8.1%
17.5%
31.9%
-12.6%
0.5%
$80,434.1
-4.5%
-4.4%
10.9%
433.3
4.2%
54.7%
3.7%
3.8%
57.6%
-11.5%
0.6%
$77,150.0
-1.1%
-1.5%
3.8%
495.7
6.8%
1.1%
7.1%
8.0%
3.9%
-10.6%
0.7%
6.8%
1.1%
-0.7%
-0.9%
26.8%
560.4
6.8%
1.0%
6.0%
5.9%
65.6%
-11.3%
6.8%
6.8%
1.1%
$87,594.6
4.4%
57.7%
4.2%
Pivotal Advertising Forecast June 2014: Local Media and Mass Media Total
Contact: Brian Wieser
(e) Brian@Pvtl.com (t) 212 514 4682 (m) 917 734 1980
2010A
2011A
2012A
1Q13A
2Q13A
$15,431.9
$15,854.0
$4,126.1
$3,788.1
3Q13A
4Q13A
2013A
1Q14A
2Q14E
3Q14E
4Q14E
$4,252.5
$3,894.9
$4,475.6
$4,305.5
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
5-YR CAGR
LOCAL MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING REVENUES
Local Television
Local Broadcast TV(a)(d)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local TV
Local Cable TV(a)(d)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local TV
Total Local Television
• Bi-Annual Growth / Decline
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local Advertising
Total Local Newspapers(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local Advertising
Total Local Radio(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local Advertising
Total Outdoor
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local Advertising
Total Local Digital(b)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Local Advertising
TOTAL LOCAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Mass Advertising
TOTAL NATIONAL AND LOCAL
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Normalized Advertising
$14,977.9
7.7%
79.5%
3,854.2
14.1%
20.5%
$18,832.1
-5.7%
9.2%
28.8%
22,795.2
-8.2%
34.9%
14,181.0
4.9%
21.7%
5,484.5
3.2%
8.4%
4,056.4
13.7%
6.2%
$65,349.3
1.4%
51.5%
$126,906.2
4.4%
75.6%
3.0%
78.7%
4,182.7
8.5%
21.3%
$19,614.5
13.7%
4.2%
30.4%
20,691.8
-9.2%
32.0%
14,060.0
-0.9%
21.8%
5,744.1
4.7%
8.9%
4,508.0
11.1%
7.0%
$64,618.4
-1.1%
49.8%
$129,722.1
2.2%
74.9%
2.7%
78.5%
4,352.5
4.1%
21.5%
$20,206.5
7.3%
3.0%
31.5%
18,944.2
-8.4%
29.5%
14,205.0
1.0%
22.2%
6,015.4
4.7%
9.4%
4,757.3
5.5%
7.4%
$64,128.5
-0.8%
49.0%
$130,749.5
0.8%
74.6%
3.6%
80.6%
990.5
1.9%
19.4%
$5,116.7
4.1%
3.3%
35.0%
3,970.4
-8.9%
27.2%
3,002.0
-1.5%
20.5%
1,354.7
4.6%
9.3%
1,171.0
4.1%
8.0%
$14,614.9
-1.1%
46.6%
$31,392.4
0.8%
74.1%
3.4%
76.9%
1,135.3
-2.4%
23.1%
$4,923.4
6.9%
2.0%
30.1%
4,422.5
-7.5%
27.1%
3,742.0
-0.5%
22.9%
2,010.6
5.0%
12.3%
1,249.9
9.5%
7.6%
$16,348.3
-0.5%
47.3%
$34,542.7
3.8%
75.5%
$4,357.8
6.7%
79.7%
1,112.6
0.8%
20.3%
$5,470.4
10.6%
5.4%
34.1%
4,111.3
-8.9%
25.6%
3,684.0
1.0%
23.0%
1,430.8
4.6%
8.9%
1,332.0
13.9%
8.3%
$16,028.5
0.9%
48.8%
$32,834.8
5.2%
74.4%
$4,218.5
2.3%
77.5%
1,227.3
10.2%
22.5%
$5,445.8
5.8%
4.0%
32.1%
4,884.2
-7.7%
28.7%
3,626.0
-3.3%
21.3%
1,502.0
4.5%
8.8%
1,531.3
15.8%
9.0%
$16,989.3
-0.3%
46.7%
$36,390.7
3.7%
74.7%
$16,490.6
4.0%
78.7%
4,465.7
2.6%
21.3%
$20,956.3
6.8%
3.7%
32.8%
17,388.3
-8.2%
27.2%
14,054.0
-1.1%
22.0%
6,298.2
4.7%
9.8%
5,284.1
11.1%
8.3%
$63,981.0
-0.2%
47.3%
$135,160.7
3.4%
74.7%
3.1%
80.4%
1,037.3
4.7%
19.6%
$5,289.8
6.8%
3.4%
36.3%
3,627.0
-8.6%
24.9%
2,942.0
-2.0%
20.2%
1,422.1
5.0%
9.8%
1,275.5
8.9%
8.8%
$14,556.4
-0.4%
45.6%
$31,953.17
1.8%
73.8%
2.8%
76.7%
1,183.8
4.3%
23.3%
$5,078.6
5.2%
3.2%
31.1%
4,048.1
-8.5%
24.8%
3,735.9
-0.2%
22.9%
2,089.0
3.9%
12.8%
1,370.3
9.6%
8.4%
$16,321.9
-0.2%
46.3%
$35,231.23
2.0%
75.2%
2.7%
79.4%
1,160.4
4.3%
20.6%
$5,635.9
8.6%
3.0%
35.1%
3,754.1
-8.7%
23.4%
3,687.4
0.1%
23.0%
1,512.4
5.7%
9.4%
1,453.5
9.1%
9.1%
$16,043.4
0.1%
47.8%
$33,552.68
2.2%
74.1%
Source: Pivotal Research
-9-
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
2.1%
77.2%
1,271.5
3.6%
22.8%
$5,577.0
6.5%
2.4%
32.8%
4,508.7
-7.7%
26.5%
3,679.1
1.5%
21.6%
1,590.1
5.9%
9.3%
1,660.7
8.5%
9.8%
$17,015.6
0.2%
45.7%
$37,246.22
2.4%
74.4%
$16,928.5
2.7%
78.4%
4,652.9
4.2%
21.6%
$21,581.4
6.8%
3.0%
33.8%
15,937.9
-8.3%
24.9%
14,044.4
-0.1%
22.0%
6,613.6
5.0%
10.3%
5,760.0
9.0%
9.0%
$63,937.3
-0.1%
46.3%
$137,983.30
2.1%
74.4%
$17,388.1
2.7%
78.2%
4,850.1
4.2%
21.8%
$22,238.1
6.1%
3.0%
34.8%
14,510.7
-9.0%
22.7%
14,055.4
0.1%
22.0%
6,938.7
4.9%
10.8%
6,244.5
8.4%
9.8%
$63,987.4
0.1%
45.3%
$141,137.36
2.3%
74.1%
$17,853.6
2.7%
77.9%
5,053.1
4.2%
22.1%
$22,906.7
6.1%
3.0%
35.8%
13,087.3
-9.8%
20.4%
14,073.0
0.1%
22.0%
7,267.7
4.7%
11.3%
6,732.8
7.8%
10.5%
$64,067.7
0.1%
44.3%
$144,501.71
2.4%
73.8%
$18,325.2
2.6%
77.7%
5,262.3
4.1%
22.3%
$23,587.5
6.1%
3.0%
36.8%
11,665.6
-10.9%
18.2%
14,097.0
0.2%
22.0%
7,601.0
4.6%
11.8%
7,225.6
7.3%
11.3%
$64,176.7
0.2%
43.3%
$148,087.73
2.5%
73.5%
$18,803.1
2.7%
2.6%
77.4%
5,477.6
4.2%
4.1%
22.6%
$24,280.7
3.0%
6.0%
2.9%
37.8%
10,243.4
-10.0%
-12.2%
15.9%
14,127.0
0.1%
0.2%
22.0%
7,938.7
4.7%
4.4%
12.3%
7,723.3
7.9%
6.9%
12.0%
$64,313.1
0.1%
0.2%
42.3%
$151,907.69
2.6%
73.2%
2.4%
Pivotal Advertising Forecast June 2014: Direct Media
Contact: Brian Wieser
(e) Brian@Pvtl.com (t) 212 514 4682 (m) 917 734 1980
2010A
2011A
2012A
1Q13A
2Q13A
15,825.7
18,963.8
5,024.0
5,170.7
3Q13A
4Q13A
2013A
1Q14A
2Q14E
3Q14E
4Q14E
5,495.4
5,667.1
5,722.1
6,363.2
2014E
2015E
2016E
2017E
2018E
5-YR CAGR
DIRECT MEDIA ADVERTISING REVENUES
Direct Online
Total Paid Search (Incl. Mobile)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Direct Online
Other Direct Online(e)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Direct Online
Total Direct Online
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Total Direct Advertising
Total Direct Mail
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Total Direct Advertising
Total Directories(a)
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Total Direct Advertising
TOTAL DIRECT
• Annual Growth / Decline
• % of Normalized Advertising
12,004.9
12.2%
88.7%
1,523.1
-15.0%
11.3%
$13,528.0
8.3%
33.0%
20,599.1
3.8%
50.3%
6,852.2
-23.5%
16.7%
$40,979.2
-0.8%
24.4%
31.8%
90.2%
1,723.0
13.1%
9.8%
$17,548.7
29.7%
40.4%
20,403.8
-0.9%
47.0%
5,503.7
-19.7%
12.7%
$43,456.2
6.0%
25.1%
19.8%
91.1%
1,846.0
7.1%
8.9%
$20,809.8
18.6%
46.7%
19,479.3
-4.5%
43.8%
4,234.3
-23.1%
9.5%
$44,523.4
2.5%
25.4%
13.5%
91.8%
450.0
2.5%
8.2%
$5,474.0
12.5%
49.9%
4,742.9
0.3%
43.2%
11.8%
91.5%
481.0
1.7%
8.5%
$5,651.7
10.9%
50.5%
4,698.6
2.0%
42.0%
5,210.2
10.0%
92.5%
425.0
-4.9%
7.5%
$5,635.2
8.7%
49.8%
4,873.4
2.2%
43.1%
5,811.9
12.3%
92.2%
494.0
1.4%
7.8%
$6,305.9
11.3%
51.2%
5,345.7
-0.5%
43.4%
760.5
845.7
799.1
671.6
-32.2%
6.9%
-22.3%
7.6%
-24.0%
7.1%
-31.0%
5.4%
$10,977.4
2.4%
25.9%
$11,196.1
3.8%
24.5%
$11,307.7
2.7%
25.6%
$12,323.2
2.6%
25.3%
21,216.8
11.9%
92.0%
1,850.0
0.2%
8.0%
$23,066.8
10.8%
50.4%
19,660.6
0.9%
42.9%
3,076.9
-27.3%
6.7%
$45,804.3
2.9%
25.3%
9.4%
92.0%
476.0
5.8%
8.0%
$5,971.3
9.1%
52.6%
4,789.9
1.0%
42.2%
9.6%
91.7%
510.3
6.1%
8.3%
$6,177.4
9.3%
53.2%
4,754.3
1.2%
41.0%
9.8%
92.7%
450.1
5.9%
7.3%
$6,172.2
9.5%
52.6%
4,941.3
1.4%
42.1%
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
522.3
5.7%
7.6%
$6,885.4
9.2%
53.7%
5,430.5
1.6%
42.4%
587.6
673.5
624.0
498.4
-22.7%
5.2%
-20.4%
5.8%
-21.9%
5.3%
-25.8%
3.9%
$11,348.8
3.4%
26.2%
$11,605.3
3.7%
24.8%
$11,737.5
3.8%
25.9%
Source: Pivotal Research
- 10 -
9.5%
92.4%
Pivotal Research Group
$12,814.3
4.0%
25.6%
23,247.8
9.6%
92.2%
1,958.6
5.9%
7.8%
$25,206.4
9.3%
53.1%
19,915.9
1.3%
41.9%
2,383.6
-22.5%
5.0%
$47,505.8
3.7%
25.6%
25,704.2
10.6%
92.5%
2,090.2
6.7%
7.5%
$27,794.4
10.3%
56.3%
19,706.1
-1.1%
39.9%
1,859.6
-22.0%
3.8%
$49,360.0
3.9%
25.9%
28,230.0
9.8%
92.7%
2,213.3
5.9%
7.3%
$30,443.3
9.5%
59.3%
19,465.8
-1.2%
37.9%
1,420.5
-23.6%
2.8%
$51,329.6
4.0%
26.2%
30,826.4
9.2%
93.0%
2,327.5
5.2%
7.0%
$33,153.8
8.9%
62.1%
19,191.1
-1.4%
35.9%
1,077.7
-24.1%
2.0%
$53,422.7
4.1%
26.5%
33,493.8
9.6%
8.7%
93.2%
2,432.3
5.6%
4.5%
6.8%
$35,926.1
9.3%
8.4%
64.6%
18,877.5
-0.8%
-1.6%
33.9%
844.4
-22.8%
-21.7%
1.5%
$55,648.0
4.2%
26.8%
4.0%
Appendix: Important Disclosures
Analyst Certification
I, Brian W. Wieser, hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my
personal views about the subject company and their securities. I further certify that I have not received
and will not receive direct or indirect compensation related to specific recommendations or views
contained in this research report.
Legal Disclaimers
Pivotal Research Group LLC is an independent equity research company and is neither a broker dealer
nor offers investment banking services. Pivotal Research Group LLC is not a market maker for any
securities, does not hold any securities positions, and does not seek compensation for investment
banking services. The analyst preparing this report does not own any securities of the subject company
and does not receive any compensation directly or indirectly from investment banking services.
Stock Ratings
Pivotal Research Group LLC assigns one of three ratings based on an expectation of absolute total return
(price change plus dividends) over a twelve month time frame. The ratings are based on the following
criteria:
BUY: The security is expected to have an absolute return in excess of 15%.
HOLD: The security is expected to have an absolute return of between plus and minus 15%.
SELL: The security is expected to have an absolute return less than minus 15%.
Ratings Distribution
Pivotal Research LLC currently provides research coverage of 29 companies, of which 67% are rated
BUY, 30% are rated HOLD and 3% are rated SELL. Our company does not offer investment banking
services. This data is accurate as-of October 23, 2014.
Price Chart and Target Price History
- 11 -
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
- 12 -
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group
Other Disclaimers
Information contained in this report has been prepared from sources that are believed to be reliable and
accurate but are not guaranteed by us and do not represent a complete summary or statement of all
available data. Additional information is available upon request. Furthermore, information and opinions
expressed are subject to change without notice and we are under no obligation to inform you of such
change.
This report is has been prepared solely for our institutional clients. Ratings and target prices do not take
into account the particular investment objectives, financial and/or tax situation, or needs of individual
investors. Investment decisions should take into account all available information, not just that which is
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Past performance is not indicative of future performance and estimates of future performance contained
in this report are based on assumptions that may not be realized.
Material in this report, except that which is supplied by third parties, is Copyright ©2014, by Pivotal
Research LLC. All rights reserved. No portion may be reproduced, sold, or redistributed in any form
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Additional Information Available Upon Request
- 13 -
Brian Wieser 212-514-4682
Pivotal Research Group