Effects of industrial conflict between and within organizations: Contagion in collective
bargaining and the deterioration of work relations*
Agnes Akkerman
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Radboud University &
Department of Sociology, Utrecht University. E-mail: a.akkerman@fm.ru.nl
René Torenvlied
Department of Sociology, Utrecht University & Department of Sociology, University of
Groningen. E-mail: r.torenvlied@uu.nl
Abstract
The present paper outlines the essentials of a new research program in industrial conflict. We
study two different effects of industrial conflict. The first effect is on the contagion of
industrial conflict between organizations and sectors. Whereas most micro-economic,
explanatory studies of strikes assume that strikes are isolated events, the present paper argues
that the dispersion of strategic information among negotiators and employees can explain why
strikes sometimes occur in waves, and sometimes do not occur where expected. The second
effect is on the work relations between management and employees, and between employees
at the work floor. Whereas some case studies of strikes mention effects of conflict between
strike participants and non-strikers, the present paper argues that systematic research is
necessary to unravel the conditions under which industrial conflict affects employee wellbeing and productivity long after the settlement of a strike.
1. Introduction
The current study of industrial conflict is dominated by attempts of scholars to explain the
prevalence of industrial conflict in sectors and countries. For example, a prominent question
in the industrial relations literature is: ―why do some countries exhibit more strikes than other
countries?‖ The actual effects of strikes—although widely recognized in the literature—have
received much less systematic scholarly attention. If a strike occurs, this may have profound
effects beyond the actual industrial conflict, and beyond the stakes of the direct participants in
bargaining. In the present paper we introduce a research program that studies the effects of
strikes in two areas: (1) collective bargaining outside the immediate scope of the focal
organizations, and (2) work relations among employees within the organizations that are
affected by strikes.
*
Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Dutch and Flemish Political Science
Associations, Leuven, May 27-28. The authors acknowledge financial support from the ―Conflict and
Security‖ program of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
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Most current explanations of industrial conflict consider strikes as independent and
isolated events: the bargaining between negotiation partners is not affected by conflict
elsewhere, and the conflict has neither an influence on other bargaining events. The microeconomic models developed in bargaining theory attribute the occurrence of a strike to its
information-providing function: a strike provides negotiators with information about their
relative strength. Thus, these models ignore the possibility that negotiators may reduce their
uncertainty in the first place by looking around and informing themselves about what other
negotiators do (or have done) in similar circumstances.
The crude assumption of independence and isolation of strikes is not very plausible for
two reasons. First, from the assumption follows that strike-waves and sudden rises of
industrial conflict can only be understood as a coincidence, or as the consequence of macro
(socio)-economic and political factors—which would affect negotiations in the fashion of an
unexplainable, ‗invisible hand‘. Second, the assumption that bargaining parties are
uninformed about what happens in the rest of the world is not very plausible. Modern
collective bargaining practice makes use of well-trained and professional negotiators—often
responsible for several collective bargaining negotiations—that are part of an extensive
network of peers and other professional contacts. It would be rather naive to assume that
negotiators ignore information from bargaining events, claims made by parties, employer‘s
resistance, and worker‘s willingness to strike, and to assume that such information is not
distributed among others and used in other bargaining events.
This is the aim of the research project ―Contagious Conflict‖: to study how strategic
bargaining information spreads between bargaining events, and how it is used for the
mobilization of workers and in negotiations between employers and employees. The project
further aims to study how bargaining institutions affect this spread of information and its use.
Thus, the contagious conflict project contributes to a further and deeper explanation of
industrial conflict.
In addition, we argue that strikes do not only have an effect outside the realm of the
organization involved in the strike, but also have a long-term after-effect on relations at the
work floor between employees within the organization. Several case studies point at the
negative effects of a strike for the quality of production and the overall productivity of a firm,
even long after the strike is settled. Psychological studies show that strikes have long-term
effects on employees‘ health and job-satisfaction. These empirical findings suggest that the
social relations between both management and employees—as well as between those
employees who joined the strike and those who did not—can become severely damaged by
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
3
the process of the strike. Systematic empirical research into the effects of strikes for social
relations among employees (and management) within organizations lacks to date. To fill this
gap, the project ―The Aftermath of Strikes‖, studies under what conditions social relations at
the work floor are affected by strikes.
2. Contagious Conflict: effects of strikes on other bargaining events
A remarkable feature of industrial conflict, such as strikes, is that it sometimes ‗spreads all
over the country like a forest fire‘, while in other times it is limited to a single sector or firm.
Standard bargaining models in economics and industrial relations studies offer little
explanation for this phenomenon (Hicks 1932, Reder and Neumann 1980, Mauro 1982).
These models attribute strikes to information problems of bargaining partners to assess each
other‘s bargaining power. Under full information, all bargaining partners perfectly calculate
their capacities to endure conflict, and peacefully reach an outcome. Under imperfect or
asymmetric information, miscalculations lead to mistakes in strategic behavior. These theories
regard strikes as dysfunctional incidents.
In a world of static bargaining power, industrial conflict would never recur. But, in reality we
observe that industrial conflict continues to occur, even in well-established bargaining
relations. Current comparative research in industrial relations focuses on (exogenous)
parameters of political and socio-economic systems to explain differences in strike activity
between countries (Franzosi 1995), for example through the presence of central bargaining
institutions, a social dialogue (such as the Dutch ‗Polder Model) or arbitration. However, this
explanation assumes that strikes occur independently, and provides no answer for the
contagion of industrial conflict. Little is yet known about how bargaining in one firm or sector
is affected by industrial conflict in other firms or sectors. Both bargaining theory and
comparative research in industrial relations ignore the mechanisms that relate strikes—or
other forms of industrial conflict—to each other.
Studies of more violent forms of collective conflict, such as civil war, reveal patterns of
violence comparable to strikes: some are isolated events whereas others spread over the
country or region in sequential patterns. Scholars of violent conflict clearly demonstrate the
presence of contagion effects (Holden 1986, Hegre et al. 2001, Gleditisch 2007). There is one
theoretical-empirical
approach
in
industrial
relations,
mobilization
theory,
which
acknowledges that (industrial) conflict is contagious and which made some major
contributions (Oliver and Meyers 1998). The core idea in mobilization theory is that unions
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
4
and their members (workers) learn about a changed balance in bargaining power through
‗example strikes‘ (Conell and Cohn 1995). Faced with imperfect information, unions
permanently observe industrial conflict in order to obtain information about their bargaining
power vis à vis employers. Example strikes yield valuable information about worker
grievances and employer responses (Ibid. 367). When unions learn about the favorability of
strike conditions, strikes become contagious.
However, mobilization theory has two crucial drawbacks. The first drawback is that it
exclusively focuses on a unitary union/worker actor to explain a proliferation of strikes.
Mobilization theory boldly assumes that trade union negotiators and workers share a common
interest and common information. Thus, it does not acknowledge the specific role of
professional (trade union) negotiators to stimulate or discourage a strike. In addition,
mobilization theory completely disregards the crucial role of the employer as a bargaining
partner! Professional negotiators for employers may also learn from industrial conflict. They
could very well anticipate a favorable bargaining position of employees by giving in to their
demands before a costly strike. But then strikes could also prevent the further contagion of
conflict. Consequently, the puzzle remains: why do some strikes stimulate other strikes, while
others remain isolated events and prevent social partners from engaging in future strikes? The
second drawback of mobilization theory is that it suffers from a selection bias in empirical
studies: these are limited to the spread of conflicts, and do not incorporate a study of isolated
events. Consequently, an empirical test of mobilization theory is problematic, since variation
in the dependent variable is absent (McAdam and Paulsen 1993, Soule, 2004) and the theory
cannot provide us with conditions under which strategic information leads to appeasement so
that conflict does not spread.
Research question: Under which conditions does industrial conflict lead to contagion effects
and under which conditions does it lead to appeasing effects?
This gap in our understanding of how industrial conflict in one firm/sector affects bargaining
in another firm/sector still severely hinders industrial relation practice. If we are able to
identify the conditions under which industrial conflict spreads or not, we contribute to labor
peace and reduce important economic and social costs.
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
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2.1 Theoretical background
In order to provide an explanation for the contagion of industrial conflict, the project aims to
integrate the three approaches mentioned above: (1) bargaining theory, which focuses on the
interactions between professional negotiators for employers and employees; (2) mobilization
theory, which focuses on the decisions of workers to participate in industrial conflict; (3) the
comparative approach, which focuses on economic and social-political institutions. Below,
we describe this integration on the basis of five elements of a theory of contagion: (a) actors
involved; (b) use of strategic information; (c) channels for diffusion; (d) behavioral options,
and (e) impact of institutional arrangements.
Actors involved. Bargaining theory and mobilization theory focus on different sets of actors.
Bargaining theory focuses on the interactions between professional negotiators for employees
and employers to explain the outcomes of labor negotiations. However, bargaining theory
disregards the worker as a crucial actor. This is highly unrealistic, as the phenomenon of
‗wildcat strikes‘ shows. These are strikes not organized by a union, but strikes that develop
spontaneously and often expand rapidly, for example those recently in the United Kingdom in
response to lay-offs (The Economist 2009). Most wild cat strikes often are hastily recognized
by trade unions. Hence, interactions between trade union negotiators and members explain the
spread of industrial conflict.
Mobilization theory studies the effects of information from co-workers and the mass-media
on the decision of workers to participate in industrial conflict. The theory explains the
emergence of social movements (Hedstrom 1994) from the behavior of a unitary actor. Thus,
mobilization theory disregards the intervening influence of trade union negotiators and
negotiators for the employer on workers‘ decision to participate in conflict. Yet, trade union
negotiators and workers often have different and sometimes conflicting interests (Ross and
Irwin 1951; Kochan 1980). Ashenfelter and Johnsons‘ bargaining theory (1969) even explains
strikes as a union‘s instrument to reduce workers‘ high expectations about collective
bargaining outcomes, masking its inability to negotiate better conditions. Unsuccessful strikes
produce more realistic expectations about bargaining outcomes.
A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict combines actor assumptions
from both theories. Therefore, we distinguish between three types of actors and their
interactions: the negotiator for employees, the negotiator for employers, and the worker.
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
6
Use of strategic information. Bargaining theory and mobilization theory focus on a different
use of strategic information by actors in their decision to engage in industrial conflict.
Bargaining theory does not inform us how strategic bargaining information is obtained and
processed by negotiators. Reder and Neuman (1980) and McConell (1993) limit their analysis
to learning from information obtained within the same bargaining event—ignoring potential
learning from strategic information from other negotiations. Thus, we are still poorly
informed about the question of why some bargaining parties suffer from information
problems and engage in industrial conflict, while other parties manage to reach agreement
without the burden of incomplete information.
Mobilization theory assumes that workers learn from strategic information obtained from
industrial conflict in other events (Biggs 2002, Soule 2004, Meyer 2000, Andrews and Biggs
2006). The diffusion of industrial conflict depends on two mechanisms. First, workers must
have access to strategic information, either through informal, personal relations, or through
non-relational sources, such as the mass-media. Second, workers must decide whether the
strategic information obtained is useful (Klandermans 1984). Mobilization theory assumes
that the key mechanism to assess usefulness is identification: the worker uses information
from a source who is comparable to himself. Thus, the rule-of-thumb is: ‗how do other
workers like me behave?‘ (McAdam and Rucht 1993 p. 63). The predicted behavior is
imitation.
‗Example strikes‘ show that workers learn from strategic information about the outcomes
of industrial conflict: learning about successes in one firm/industry may drive workers in
another industry to engage in a strike. Conell and Cohn (1995) found that also lost strikes
inspired other workers to engage in a subsequent strike. However, it is quite unrealistic to
assume that professional negotiators base their bargaining strategy on the outcomes of other
conflicts solely. Negotiators need strategic information about: the resistance of
unions/employers to engage in conflict; the judicial, social or political acceptability of means
of protest; potential for the mobilization of workers; specific costs and benefits associated
with the conflict.
A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict must incorporate the use of
various types of strategic information by both professional negotiators and workers to alter or
persist in their strategy. The use of strategic information depends upon the access to (multiple)
trustworthy sources of information (Centola and Macy 2007).
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
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Channels for information diffusion. Trustworthiness of information depends on closed and
strong network relations between actors (Raub and Weesie 1990). Thus, we expect that
professional negotiators who are tied together in cohesive (sub)networks, exchange strategic
information. Mobilization theory makes a distinction between relational channels of
information and non-relational channels, such as the mass-media or meetings and gatherings
(Bohstedt and Williams 1988, McAdam and Rucht 1993, Biggs, 2005). Studies of violent
conflict report that the mass-media are the main channel through which information flows
between groups (Haas and Stack 1993; Holden 1986; Meyers 2000; Andrews and Bigg 2006).
A theoretical explanation for the spread of industrial conflict incorporates both relational
and non-relational channels for information diffusion. The more actors must rely on nonrelational channels, the more they use identification as a filter to assess the trustworthiness of
information. Whether or not the diffusion of strategic information results in a spread of
industrial conflict, further depends upon the behavioral options of actors, and the institutions
for conflict resolution.
Behavioral options of actors. Remarkably, mobilization theory assumes that workers have
only two behavioral options. They can either mimic the conflict of others, or ignore that
conflict. But, there are much more effects of learning from strategic information than pure
imitation. Bargaining theory describes the behavioral options of negotiators for using strategic
information. They can alter their strategy, that is: adjust their claims, reframe their grievances,
be more patient, or otherwise alter their input in the bargaining process.
Because negotiators and workers interact, different combinations of behavior are possible.
We discuss the three most important. In the first place, negotiators and workers could simply
imitate the behavior of others. For example, when employees learn a wage claim rewarded
elsewhere, they could become eager to make the same demand. In the second place, the
negotiator for employees or for the employer could decide to a unilateral adjustment of
strategy. For example when an employer becomes informed about the strength of a union and
its resources for mobilization, he could anticipate a strike and reward the claim without
conflict. In the third place, both negotiators for employees and for the employer could decide
to a mutual adjustment of strategy. Better information about the causes of a conflict and the
interests/strength of the other party could inspire both parties to find a common solution.
Clearly, simple imitation is a catalyst of conflict, while unilateral and mutual adjustment
could lead to appeasement and the prevention of industrial conflict. A theoretical explanation
for the spread of industrial conflict must incorporate such conditions.
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
8
Impact of institutional arrangements and bargaining structure. In advanced capitalist
societies industrial relations are highly institutionalized, involving diverse instruments and
arrangements for the resolution of industrial conflict. Comparative industrial research reports
conditions that explain differences in strike levels between countries, such as: centralized
wage bargaining and arbitration institutions (Clegg 1976); presence of socialist parties in
government (Korpi and Shalev 1979); a social dialogue, like the Dutch Labor Foundation
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997) and the Belgian National Labour Council; state involvement in
tri-partite consultation, like the Dutch Socio-economic Council; interventions, like collective
agreement extension procedures.
Institutions for the resolution of industrial conflict are an integral part of a theoretical
explanation for the spread of industrial conflict. In the first place, they affect the access of
negotiators to trustworthy strategic information. A social dialogue and tri-partite consultation
procedure are platforms in which employer negotiators and unions meet and discuss on a
regular basis. In the second place, the institutions partly affect the result of bargaining
between the negotiators for employers and employees.
2.2. Approach & methods
The overall objective of the project is to determine under what conditions industrial conflict
leads to contagion or to appeasing processes. The theoretical background identifies three main
mechanisms that drive contagion: (a) use of strategic information in collective bargaining
between negotiators for employees and employers; (b) role of mass-media, and
communication between workers, unions, and the employer in worker mobilization; (c)
impact of institutional arrangements. This distinction drives a research design which
comprises of three interrelated subprojects: one subproject (PhD) focuses on collective
bargaining, one subproject (PhD) focuses on worker mobilization, and one subproject
(postdoc) focuses on the impact of institutional arrangements.
The approach and research design aim to create variation in the independent variables in
order to test hypotheses. Firstly, we select two countries for a comparative analysis of the
impact of institutional arrangements: Belgium and The Netherlands. Both countries are
comparable on a large number of socio-economic indicators, but differ in their institutional
arrangements for industrial relations and the level of industrial conflict. Secondly, within each
country we follow a multi-stage sampling design. We start by selecting potential ‗trigger
events‘, that is: events that express a minimal level of industrial conflict, such as a protest
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
9
meeting, work stoppage, or strike. Subsequently, a number of collective bargaining
negotiations are randomly selected from the population of negotiations that started during, or
shortly after the trigger event. For all selected negotiations, the characteristics of the
bargaining process are analyzed (project 1). For each negotiation, we randomly select a
sample of workers, large enough to generalize to the population of workers in the
firm/industry (project 2).
In addition to surveys and network analysis, experiments in the Nijmegen Decision Lab are
planned. These experiments complement the research design for two purposes. First, the main
question of the project is whether negotiators and workers adjust their strategies on the basis
of information from ‗trigger‘ conflicts. Computer-aided experiments allow to systematically
vary (sources of and types of) strategic information under controlled conditions. Second, the
experiments serve as a means for developing and testing the training program for negotiators,
as described in the dissemination and communication plan.
2.3 Subprojects
Subproject 1 (PhD). Learning from strikes: The use of strategic information in collective
bargaining. A core hypothesis of the project is that professional negotiators for employers and
employees use strategic information from other industrial conflicts when they have access to
trustworthy sources of information about that conflict. The dependent variables in this
subproject are: (a) negotiators‘ decisions to adjust their strategy; (b) the resulting level of
conflict in collective bargaining. This subproject studies whether sequences of conflict in
collective bargaining can be understood as the result of inadequacies in the transmission of
strategic information in networks. The main research questions of this subproject are:
o How do professional negotiators obtain strategic information about other bargaining events
(including conflicts) from their social network, institutionalized networks, and mass-media
coverage?
o How do negotiators interact with workers and exchange strategic information?
o To what extent, and under what conditions does the information obtained result in an
adjustment of bargaining strategies?
o Under what conditions do the adjusted strategies lead to conflict events, or to an
appeasement?
The design of this subproject is a multi-level diffusion study of strategic information in the
networks of professional negotiators, using in-depth expert interviews and questionnaires.
Networks will be measured and analyzed using social network methodology (Wasserman and
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
10
Faust 1994). Members of the dissemination board (see section 5) warrant access to the
negotiators. Computer-aided experiments study the (adjustments of) strategies of negotiators
in collective bargaining negotiation under conditions of: (a) trustworthiness of information;
(b) availability of information channels; (c) communication with workers (including union
members).
Subproject 2 (PhD). Industrial conflict as a catalyst: the role of unions in worker
mobilization. To date, mobilization theory has ignored the impact of the union negotiator in
the decision of workers to participate (or not) in industrial conflict. This subproject studies
whether workers‘ willingness to participate in industrial action (or to accept bargaining
outcomes) can be understood as the result of strategic information passed on by: union
negotiators, union representatives like shop stewards,1 or the employer. The dependent
variables in this subproject are: (a) the decision of workers to engage in industrial conflict, (b)
workers‘ aggregate willingness to engage in industrial conflict, or accept a bargaining
outcome, indicated by voting results or actual participation in conflict. The main research
questions of this subproject are:
o How do workers obtain strategic information about other bargaining events (including
conflicts) from their social network, their employer, union representatives and mass-media
coverage?
o How do workers interact with workers and exchange strategic information?
o To what extent, and under what conditions, does this information result in an adjustment of
workers‘ willingness to participate in industrial conflict or accept a bargaining outcome?
The design of this subproject involves a survey under workers (including both union members
and non-union members). In addition, computer-aided experiments study participation
decisions of workers under conditions of: (a) trustworthiness of information; (b) availability
of information channels; (c) communication with union representatives and employer.
Subproject 3 (Post doc). The diffusion of industrial conflict in different institutional settings
In the first stage of the project the postdoc coordinates the development of theory, hypotheses,
and data collection of all three subprojects. Thus, integration of all subprojects within the
overall project is assured. In the final stage of the project (s)he integrates results from all
subprojects in one comprehensive study.
The core hypothesis of subproject 3 is that bargaining institutions interfere with the
diffusion of strategic bargaining information. The dependent variable is the proportion of
1
Shop stewards are workers who are representatives of the union (in Dutch ‘kaderleden).
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
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conflict events in the population of bargaining events. Theoretically, this subproject elaborates
current institutional theories with hypotheses and results from subprojects 1 and 2.
Empirically, it extends current international data collection on industrial conflicts for at least
two additional countries—all in close collaboration with country-experts from the European
Industrial Relations Observatory Online (EIRO) and the International Labor Organization.
The current availability of data on industrial conflict is limited because it (a) is limited to the
aggregated, sector level; (b) lacks information on crucial features of industrial conflict, such
as starting/end dates; success/failure indicators; unions and employers involved, and
substantive issues); (c) is limited to strikes (and lock-outs), ignoring other forms of industrial
conflicts; (d) lacks a uniform definition of industrial conflict. Hence, the data collected in
subproject 3 aims to obtain international comparable micro-macro data for testing hypotheses
derived from the overarching project, as well as replicating relevant sociological and
economic studies with more valid, reliable and richer data. The data-set will be public
domain.
3. The aftermath of strikes: effects of strikes for relations within the organization.
Most strikes are resolved within a few days. Their material costs, in terms of production
losses, are well-documented in micro- and macroeconomic research. Nevertheless, the
aftermath of strikes is often long-lasting and involves personal and relational costs that may
have profound long-term effects on production. During strikes, fault-lines arise: between
management and employees, but also between groups of employees. During strikes,
emotional confrontations occur between employees on strike and those who ―break‖ the strike
and remain at work. (Francis, 1985; Getman, 1998).
The core hypothesis of the project is that fault-lines developed during strikes can have longlasting effects for work relations when persisting after a strike has been settled. Associated
problems of cooperation and lack of motivation combined with socially detrimental
behaviour, such as harassment and bullying, further affect productivity.
Economic research on the consequences of strikes focuses on the volume and quality of
production (Addison & Teixeira, 2009; Krueger & Mas 2003; Mas, 2006). Although these
studies mention obstruction and cooperation problems as probable causes of sub-optimal
production after strikes, they fail to specify causal mechanisms that link strikes to economic
performance. Psychological research reports prolonged effects of strikes on workers‘
psychological health and job satisfaction (Barling & Milligan, 1987; Kelloway et.al. 1993;
Fowler, et.al., 2009). Although they verify that strikes have strong effects on occupational
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
12
health, these studies cannot explain why employees experience stress long after the dispute—
the stressor—was settled (up to six months). Fowler et.al. (2009) suggest that social factors
are responsible for continuation of stress.
Indeed, sociological and anthropological research indicates that social factors are
responsible for a prolonged experience of stress and frustration. Case-studies of severe strikes
reveal strong and destructive cleavages between management and employees, as well as
between groups of employees (MacDowell, 1993). These studies show that overt hostilities
persist after dispute settlement between the former strikers and strike-breakers and report
instances of physical and verbal harassment (Frances, 1985; Brunsden & Hill, 2009;
Waddington et.al 1994). Strike-breakers are put aside as ―blacklegs‖ or ―scabs‖ in union
terminology, effectively splitting teams, organizations, and sometimes whole communities
(Francis, 1985; Waddington et.al., 1994; Getman, 1999). The lack of solidarity demonstrated
by strike-breakers induces sentiments of ―betrayal‖ in those who strike, thereby creating sharp
fault-lines between employees. Although offering rich descriptions, these case-studies suffer
from selection bias: only effects of long and severe strikes are analyzed. The studies do not
inform us why some strikes lead to insurmountable schisms, while others do not affect workrelations. Thus, systematic research about the effects of strikes on work-relations is virtually
absent.
Research questions:
(a) Under which conditions does conflict between managers and employees, and between
groups of employees, persist after the settlement of a strike, and under which conditions does
this conflict dissolve?
(b) How does this conflict affect the relations between management and employees, and the
relations among employees?
Identifying the mechanisms that explain how industrial conflict affects social relations
between employees contributes to our understanding of how (industrial) conflict persistently
affects production and employee well-being long after settlement of the strike.
3.1 Theoretical background
This project develops and tests a theory that explains how industrial conflict creates fault-lines
between groups of employees and management, and specifies the conditions under which
these fault-lines persist. Social cohesion theory suggests the presence of an external threat to
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
13
explain sharp fault-line between groups (Stein, 1976). Over time, conflicting groups become
more cohesive internally, and develop negative stereotypes of the other group, triggering
polarization and disruptive conflicts (Nelson, 1989). Although a strike makes management the
natural ―out-group‖, it does not explain out-group sentiments between groups of workers.
The harsh relations between groups of employees can be explained by a solidarity norm. This
norm explains strikers‘ contempt for strike-breakers and their strong out-group sentiments
towards them. Case-study research (Brunsden & Hill, 2009; Waddington et.al, 1994) shows
that strike-breakers break a solidarity norm and pose an immediate threat to strikers: strikers‘
success depends on the degree to which the production process is disrupted–and thus on the
number of employees on strike. Moreover, because strikers incur considerable costs (e.g. loss
of income) and risk future repercussions by the employer, those who continue working are
considered free-riders. Social disapproval and punishment of free-riders serve to reinforce
solidarity norms (Gächter & Fehr, 1999; Casari & Luini, 2009). The punishment of free riders
increases with the deviation of the free rider from the average investment of the other
members (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In reaction, strike-breakers may develop strong out-group
sentiments towards strikers (Falk et. al., 2005).
Conflict between management and strikers
An ideal-type settlement of a strike resolves all conflict issues between the union and
employer. If not all issues are resolved, some external threat will continue to exist after
settlement. Thus, the perceived effectiveness of the settlement (by both management and
strikers) will positively affect the quality of work relations between management and strikers
after the strike (Hypothesis I).
Conflict between groups of employees
Settlement of a strike not automatically restores work relations between strikers and nonstrikers. We expect that the strength of the solidarity norm negatively affects work relations
between strikers and non-strikers (Hypothesis II). Moreover, we expect that the perceived
need to reinforce the solidarity norm will negatively affect work relations (Hypothesis III).
The perceived need to norm reinforcement depends on (a) the expected future need for
solidarity and (b) on free riders deviation of the investments strikers made (e.g. loss of income
and repercussions by the employer).
3.2. Approach & methods
Effects of Industrial Conflict – Akkerman and Torenvlied
14
The project applies a longitudinal multi-level design, using data about work relations in four
organizations that experienced a strike. A survey will be held at three moments: (1) during, or
immediately after the strike; (2) two months after, and (3) six months after the settlement of
the strike. This design enables us to analyse changes in attitudes and behaviour within
employees over time and within/between groups of employees over time (participants, nonparticipants, and management). Such a design is appropriate since a pre-event survey is
unfeasible: we cannot predict the occurrence of a strike before mobilization starts and faultlines already develop (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). Two aspects of work relations are
measured within and between groups: cohesion and conflict. We use cohesion scales
developed by e.g. Sargent & Sue-Chan (2001) and interpersonal conflict scales developed by
e.g. Jehn (1994, 1995).
4. Conclusion
In the present paper we challenged current explanations of industrial conflict, which consider
strikes as being independent and isolated events: the bargaining between negotiation partners
is not affected by conflict elsewhere, and the conflict has neither an influence on other
bargaining events. By contrast, we argued that strikes are not isolated in space from on other
bargaining events, and are not isolated in time from their consequences for relations at the
work floor. Correspondingly, this paper described two important avenues for industrial
relations research, and outlined the details of a comprehensive research program in these
directions. The aim of the research program is to move from explanations of the prevalence of
industrial conflict in sectors and countries to the actual effects of strikes. Effects of strikes are
most profound in two areas of study: (1) collective bargaining outside the immediate scope of
the focal organizations, and (2) work relations among employees within the organizations that
are affected by strikes. For each of these two areas, the paper described a series of interrelated
research projects.
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