The legacy of Greek Anti-Americanism

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Perceptions of Global Justice:
Greek anti-Americanism and the War in Kosovo
Zinovia Lialiouti
Introduction
The opposition of Greek public opinion toward NATO intervention in Kosovo1 and
toward the bombing of Serbia for 78 days (24/3-11/6/1999) has often been presented
as a sort of Greek peculiarity attributed to bias, nationalism and emotionalism. The
interpretations that were given for the Greek attitude emphasized on the traditional
anti-Americanism of the Greek people, the role of orthodoxy in Greek political
culture, as well as on the historical and emotional ties with the Serbian people. In my
opinion, the religious and the pro-Serbian elements have been overestimated. The
main explanatory factor for the Greek attitude is the legacy of Greek antiAmericanism combined with a leftist tradition in the country’s political culture since
1974.
Based on the material provided primarily by the Greek press, I will try to argue that
beneath the passionate anti-American rhetoric there is a coherent set of beliefs that
transcend the political and ideological spectrum. Methodologically, I have chosen to
focus on the press because it has the capacity to reflect, not reality itself according to
the old pluralistic perception, but people’s perception about reality. From this point of
view, the press is not a mirror for facts, but a mirror for perceptions. I have selected to
study five newspapers based on the following criteria: their being representative of the
political and ideological divisions in Greece, their levels of circulation and their
tradition or status in the public sphere. The selected newspapers are: Ta Nea,
Eleftherotypia, Eleftheros Tipos, Kathimerini and Rizospastis. Ta Nea and
Eleftherotypia represent the Centre-Left and were supportive of the socialist party that
was in government at the time (PASOK). Elefteros Typos and Kathimerini represent
the Right and support the opposition party of Nea Dimokratia (ND). Eleftheros Typos
expresses the popular tradition of the Right, while Kathimerini is a more elitist
1
St. Pesmazoglou, Kosovo: I ditti hybris. Epitirissi kai timoria, [Kosovo: The double hubris.
Surveillance and punishment, Patakis: Athens 2000. Chr. Giallourides, V. Kefala, D. Tsatsos, Kosovo:
I ikona tou polemou. Opsis syghronou militaristikou anthropismou [Kosovo: The image of the war.
Aspects of modern militaristic humanism], Sideres: Athens 2001.
newspaper. Finally, Rizospastis is the official newspaper of the Greek Communist
Party. My material consists of every piece of information that was published
concerning my subject during the entire period of the bombings and I use it to
reconstruct Greek narration about NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and the role of
the US.
Based on the above, I will try to point out the basic concepts that construe the antiAmerican and anti-NATO discourse about the war in Kosovo. Most of these concepts
appear in the form of antithetical couples and the negatively evaluated part refers to
NATO and the US: justice and morality vs. illegal and criminal action, rationalism
vs. madness, humanism vs. inhumanity. Another crucial theme that appears in the
narration of Greek media is the fear about what is called New World Order, the fear
for American hegemony in the post bipolar world. In their analysis, a world where
America is the uncontested power is a world where justice and safety are at risk. In
order to draw a complete picture, I combine the legacy of history and the conceptual
schemes employed by the Greeks as far as their perception of justice in world affairs,
as well as the role of the United States are concerned.
The legacy of Greek Anti-Americanism
P. Katzenstein and R. Keohane have applied the term legacy anti-Americanism for the
Greek case2. At this point, I would like to sketch a brief outline of the history of
Greek anti-Americanism because I think it is crucial for the understanding of the
present. The roots of Greek Anti-Americanism can be traced back to the period of the
Civil War. Due to the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) and the establishment of
American custody over Greece, the United States of America were identified with the
regime established by the winners of the Civil War, a regime often attacked for its
democratic shortages3. Besides, in other European countries that were part of the
2
Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, Anti-Americanisms, Policy Review, no139 O/N 2006, p. 2537.
3
A. Fatouros, Pos kataskevazete ena episimo plesio thiesthissis: I Inomenes Polities stin Ellada 19471948 [The construction of an official frame for penetration. The United States in Greece, 1947-1948] in
N. Alivizatos (ed.), I Ellada sti dekaetia 1940-1950. Ena ethnos se krisi, [Greece in the decade 19401950. A nation in crisis], Themelio: Athens 1994, p.419.
K. Tsoukalas, I ideologiki epidrasi tou Emfyliou polemou [The ideological consequences of the Civil
war], in N. Alivizatos (ed.)…, p.562. G.Gianoulopoulos, O Metapolemikos kosmos. Elliniki kai
Marshall Plan, such as Germany4 or France5, the end of World War II signifies the
development of anti-Americanism as well6.
As far as Greece is concerned, anti-Americanism becomes an important issue in the
public debate, for the first time during the 1950’s with the emergence of the Cyprus
issue. Cyprus quest for independence from the British Empire with the support of
Greece and the turbulences provoked by the key actors in this negotiation such as
Great Britain, the United States and Turkey were for a several years a source of antiwestern and anti-American feelings. The frustration experienced by the the Greek due
to the non-fulfillment of their national claims was mainly attributed to the US and its
failure to stand for the ideals of justice and freedom.
The role of the US as the leader of the “free world” in the battle with communism was
questioned even by the Greek Right which traditionally identified anticommunism
with pro-Americanism7. This is the fist time that anti-Americanism, more as a
tendency than an established phenomenon, penetrates the whole ideological spectrum.
Nationalism is an important explanatory factor for this, but it is not the only one.
The claims for democratization, national sovereignty, as well as the formulation of the
so-called Centre-Left and the rise of the youth movement, also have as a point of
reference the denunciation of the US8. During the same period, we have also the
development of a thorough and consistent critique on the American social and cultural
model, the so-called “Americanism”, which goes beyond the communist Left9. In the
1960’s, new tension in Cyprus and in Greek-Turkish relations and the crisis of
evropaiki istoria (1945-1963) [The world after the war. Greek and European history (1945-1963)],
Papazisis: Athens 1992.
4
D. Diner, America in the eyes of the Germans: An essay on Anti-Americanism, Markus Wiener
Publishers, Princeton 1996.
5
Kuisel R., Seducing the French: the dilemma of Americanization, University of California Press,
Berkeley 1996.
6
A. Stephan, The Americanization of Europe. Culture, diplomacy, and Anti-Americanization after
1945, Berghahn Books, New York-Oxford 2006.
7
D. Papadimitriou, O ethnikismos ton “ethnikofronon” ke to Kypriako 1950-1959 [The nationalism of
the ‘nationally minded’ and the Cyprus issue 1950-1959, Sygxrona Themata [Modern Issues] , no 6869-70, July 1998-March 1999, p.230.
8
B. Kremmidas, I Ellada tou 1945-1967:To istoriko plessio, [Greece between 1945-1967: The
historical context] in Idrima Saki Karagiorga(ed.), I elliniki kinonia kata tin proti metapolemiki periodo
[ Greek society during the first postwar period (1945-1967), Athens 1994, p.16.
9
Zinovia Lialiouti, Anti-Americanism in Greece 1947-1967: Criticizing the American way of life, LSE
Hellenic Observatory Conference paper, London 2007: www.lse.ac.uk.
democratic institutions in Greece (1965-1967)10 are also connected by Greek public
opinion with the role of the US in the region.
The experience of the dictatorship (1967-1974) had a decisive influence on the
character of Greek anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism became a new form of
“orthodoxy” in the context of Greek political culture. The entire post-war period was
re-evaluated as a period of reduced national sovereignty due to American policy of
interventions. The assessment of the trauma caused by the experience of the
dictatorship and the national tragedy of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus involved more
the denunciation of an external omnipotent enemy, the USA, than self-criticism in
Greek society. In any case, the consensus over the culpability of the US is manifested
symbolically in the breakaway of the NATO military section (1974-1980), a decision
made by the conservative government of Constantinos Karamanlis.
Throughout the 1970’s and early 1980’s, anti-Americanism is organically linked to
claims of political change and democratization in Greece. It also becomes an
important element in the rhetoric of the up-and-coming PanHellenic Socialist
Movement (PASOK) and is deeply affected by its populism11. One aspect of the most
powerful slogan in the public debate of this period, which is the word “Change”, is
the desire to put an end to American control over Greece. This is clearly manifested in
the election period of 1981, which brought PASOK to power12.
During the PASOK administration (1981-1989), we could say that a sort of
governmental anti-Americanism was established that was more rhetoric than anything
else13. However, we shouldn’t underestimate its legacy in terms of public discourse
and political culture. The differentiation from the choices of the US government is
perceived as equivalent of national independence. A series of events such as the
10
El. Nikolakopoulos, I kahektiki dimokratia: kommata ke ekloges, 1946-1967 [The weak democracy:
parties and elections, 1946-1967], Patakis: Athens 2001.
11
Lyrintzis Ch., Between Socialism and Populism: the Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ,
doctoral thesis, LSE 1983.
12
The news coverage and the articles in the non-Right Greek press during this period are revealing. Z.
Lialiouti, Anti-Americanism in Greece 1947-1989, unpublished doctoral thesis, Panteion University
Athens.
13
G. Boulgaris, I Ellada tis Metapolitefsis, 1974-1990. Statheri dimokratia simademeni apo ti
metapolemiki istoria [Greece during the Politcal Reform 1974-1990. Stable democracy marked by
postwar history], Themelio: Athens 2002, pp. 28-31.
declaration of independence of the so-called Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983), the
fall of the south-Korean jumbo (1983), the hijacking of the airplane of TWA that
departed from Athens and the American travel guide against Greece (June 1985) that
followed, were moments of anti-American peak. In cases such as the above, the US
government, and especially the Reagan administration, was presented by the Greek
press as a serious threat to Greece in a number of ways14.
Another important dimension of the anti-American legacy of this period involves the
contentious practices employed15. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, a series of protest
marches against the role of the US are organized. The annual celebration of the
student uprising against the military regime in 1973 (“Polytechneio”) offers the
opportunity for an institutionalized form of such anti-American marches16. The legacy
of these practices can clearly be seen in the massive and militant demonstrations that
took place during NATO intervention in Kosovo (April-June 1999) and president
Clinton’s visit to Athens that coincided with the celebration of “Polytechneio”
(November 1999).
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the end of the Cold War inevitably affects antiAmericanism that seems to fade away. This tendency is manifested not only in the
public discourse, but also in a series of quantitave researches concerning the attitudes
of Greek public opinion. Anti-Americanism defined as the negative attitude towards
the US decreases from 48,3% in 1985 to 34,3% in the 1sthalf of 1989, 32,4% in the
second half and slightly increases to 35,3% in 199017. However, the decline in antiAmericanism that these polls report will prove to be superficial. Rather than a genuine
decline, it is more appropriate to speak about a latent form of the phenomenon.
14
Zinovia Lialiouti, Anti-Americanism in Greece 1947-1989, unpublished doctoral thesis, Panteion
Univesity of Social and Political Sciences, Athens.
15
Doug McAdam based on the social movement theory suggests that anti-Americanism should also be
examined as an expression of contentiousness, Doug McAdam, Legacies of Anti-Americanism: A
sociological perspective, in P. Katzenstein and R. Keohane(ed.).., pp 251-269.
16
Vivid examples of this tendency are the protest marches of November 1981, which is the first
celebration of “Polytechneio” with a socialist government in power, and of November 1983, which
coincides with the declaration of independence of the Republic of Northern Cyprus that is thought to
have American support. The people that participated in these marches are estimated to 1.000.000.
17
The data mentioned above come from surveys conducted by the National Centre for Social Research
(EKKE). The question asked by the researchers concerned the degree of sympathy in the US on a 10degree scale where value “1” means “no sympathy at all” and value “10” means “a great deal of
sympathy”. I chose to encode the range of answers 1-4, where the degree of sympathy is non-existent
or low, as ”negative attitude towards the US”. The fluctuation of anti-Americanism that I have cited
above identifies with the fluctuation of this percentage.
Besides, Katzenstein and Keohane have argued that anti-Americanism functions in
continuum, with various levels of tension that succeed one another, but they all
represent genuine forms of the phenomenon18.
The original optimism that the end of the rivalry between the two superpowers will
lead to a world of peace is rapidly transformed into insecurity about the new balance
of power and the new role that the US will assume as the sole superpower. In the post
Cold War Era, Greek public opinion seems puzzled about who the new “enemy” is
going to be. In this transitional period, skepticism about the role of the US in the new
international environment seems to prevail. It is interesting mentioning that in 1989
Greek public opinion appears to have “greater trust” in the USSR than the US to
“handle world problems with greater responsibility” (44% for the USSR vs. 39% for
the US)19.
Only a few years after the end of the Cold War, anti-Americanism in Greece seems to
be invigorated. It is worth mentioning that statistic data indicate that this invigoration
precedes NATO intervention in Serbia which is usually considered as a milestone for
the “reawakening” of Greek anti-Americanism. According to them, negative attitude
towards the US reaches 62.2% in 1996, three years before NATO bombings in Serbia,
and 63.6% in 200420. Besides, public opinion in Greece evaluated negatively the role
of the US in a series of events that brought tension to Greek-Turkish relations such as
the crisis over the skerry Imia (January 1996)21 and the capture of the Kurdish leader
Abdullah Otsalan (1998)22. Based on the above, we could assume that, as far as
18
P. Katzenstein and R. Keohane, Varieties of Anti-Americanism: A framework for analysis, in P.
Katzenstein and R. Keohane(ed.), Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, Cornell University Press 2006.
19
The data cited above come from a poll conducted by an American research institute that was
included in Euro barometer 1989. The European average for trust in USA was 60% vs. 54% for USSR.
Greece and Spain were found to be the only two countries of the E.C where trust in Soviet Union was
greater than trust in the United States.
20
National Centre for Social Research: 1996, 2004.
21
In January 1996 a potential war crisis between Greece and Turkey broke about concerning the
territorial rights over the skerry Imia in the Aegean Sea. The crisis was resolved with American
intervention. But the handlings of the Greek government were severely criticized by the opposition and
a big part of public opinion that were in favour of a more dynamic confrontation of Turkey and seemed
to think that the US was not supportive of Greece. After the crisis was resolved, Greek Prime Minister
Kostas Simitis thanked the US government for her services during his speech in the Parliament and
provoked the intense hoots of the opposition.
22
In 1998, the leader of the PKK Abdullah Otsalan who was haunted by the Turkish government as a
terrorist asked protection from the Greek government. After a series of misfortunate handling by the
Greek side and with the assistance provided to them by the American secret services, the Turks
managed to arrest him. The Greek public accused the government for not being able to protect Otsalan
Greece is concerned, in the post-bipolar setting, the perception of the US as a threat is
established and reflects the fear toward the prospect of American hegemony.
Finally, another point that is worth emphasizing on concerns the ideological and
political references of Greek anti-Americanism. It is true that in its original version,
anti-Americanism had a far more intense appeal in the Left and the Centre-Left, even
though it also affected the Right, especially since 1974. But, in its post Cold War
version, the significance of ideological and party divisions diminished. Since the mid
1990’s, the diffusion of anti-Americanism in the entire political spectrum is
established23. In this new ideological environment, the anti-American discourse of the
Right and the extreme Right is worth exploring. In conclusion, we can say that on the
eve of the Kosovo crisis, Greek society as a whole is very critical of the role of the
US.
Perceptions of justice: Anti-Americanism as a filter
The historical legacy of Greek Anti-Americanism should be interpreted as a
conceptual and psychological legacy as well. This legacy consists of distinct and
persistent schemes that shape people’s perceptions about their place in the world, the
balance of power, the nature and function of justice in that world. We can point out
three basic concepts that bear a particular emotional, historical and cultural charge
and play a crucial role in the way Greeks perceive their contemporary historical
reality: a) enemy, b) victim, c) resistance. Each one of them is crucial in order to
understand Greek narration about NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.
The concept of victim is directly linked to Greek perception about justice and moral
values, in a global context. There is a strong tradition in Greek society that encourages
the narration of the historical past of the Modern Greek state as the history of a small
and virtuous nation that had to deal with the aggression and wrongs done to him by
the West. Through this lens, Greek history is a continuous experience of
who was considered to be a revolutionary symbol, as well as enemy of the Turks, and resented the role
assumed in this case by the US.
23
Statistic data as well as discourse analysis confirm this change.
victimization. And this sense of victimization feeds a constant demand for justice that
is never satisfied.
Greek attitude toward Serbia and the US during the Kosovo crisis should be examined
with recourse to the key notions mentioned above. The roles of the enemy and the
victim are easily attributed. The US and NATO, which has always been perceived by
the Greeks- even those with strong pro-American and pro-NATO convictions-as a
mere instrument of the US24, are the assailant. American arguments that the bombing
of Serbia was decided in order to protect the Albanian minority of Kosovo from
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing were almost unanimously rejected as a hypocritical
pretext by the media, the public opinion, and many politicians25.
What is interesting in this attitude is the fact that Greek media, which are the main
focus of this study, did not deny the dark sides of the Milosevic’s regime and often
expressed their sympathy for the suffering of Albanians in Kosovo. What they could
not accept was the Americans claiming for themselves the role of the judge who has
also the authority to implement his rule. First of all, they pointed out a paradox in the
mixture of these two roles. But above all, and beneath every argument made against
NATO’s intervention, which is perceived as American intervention, lies the complete
mistrust in America’s ability to incarnate justice, its inability to rule based on some
unanimously accepted moral values, on what’s right and what’s wrong, on who is the
victimizer and who is the victim26. According to Greek perception of things,
Americans disguise power as justice27. And the exemple often cited is the
Thucydides’s Melian dialogue28.
There is also mistrust in the ability or the will of the western world, in general, to
serve justice based on the recollection of the historical past that we mentioned earlier.
Anti-western feelings are a dimension of anti-Americanism but they do not identify.
On the other hand, the national desires and claims that were not satisfied in the post
24
Th. Couloumbis, Greek political reaction to American and NATO influences, Yale University Press
1966, pp. 132, 179, 205.
25
Anna-Elisabeth Tsakona, Anti-Americanism in Greece: the case of Kosovo, LSE Hellenic
Observatory Conference Paper, London 2005:www.lse.ac.uk.
26
Kathimerini, 9/4/1999, p.4.
27
Eleftherotypia, 3/4/1999. Kathimerini, 26/3/1999, p.20.
28
Kathimerini, 28/3/1999, p.15.
World War II period, as well as anti-imperialist rhetoric in Greek political culture
since 1974, encourage the establishment of America as the absolute symbol of
contempt for justice and moral values. This belief is the precondition for the
construction of the argumentation of the Greek press against the legitimacy of
NATO’s operation.
Based on that, the argumentation emphasizes on two points: fist, on the fact that the
bombings did not have the approval of the UN Security Council and second, that the
disrespect for national sovereignty, as far as Serbia is concerned, is an obvious
violation of International Law29. Even though, the mistreatment of the Albanian
minority is admitted, the means employed by the West are not considered nor
appropriate, as the living conditions of Albanians deteriorated after NATO bombings,
nor proportional, as the attack against a sovereign state was considered as an
excessive measure for a form of injustice (the violation of Albanians human rights by
Milosevic) that goes on unpunished in other parts of the planet, and finally not
legitimized30.
Another point of criticism against US attitude toward Serbia is the double standard
argument31. American claims that their intention was the protection of Albanians and
Milosevic’s punishment for the criminal actions of his regime cannot be accepted as
sincere based on the fact that they have not acted in a similar way in other similar
cases. The doctrine that the protection of human rights should be the new priority for
the international community is considered to be a mere pretext32. The double standard
argument denies any credibility to American claims and raises questions about their
“true” intensions. If Americans are obviously not sincere in their commitment to
justice and human rights, then they must have a “hidden agenda” that they seek to
promote through hypocrisy and deception33. But we will come to the details of this
“agenda” later.
29
Eleftherotypia, 2/6/1999. Kathimerini, 25/3/1999, p.4.
Eleftherotypia, 14/4/1999.
31
F.ex the President of the Hellenic Republic, Kostas Stephanopoulos spoke on 3/5/1999 about
“selective protection of minorities”, Ta Nea, 4/5/1999.
32
The following heading is indicative: “The hypocrisy and the cynicism of the New World Order. US’s
double standards for Albanians and Kurdish guerrillas…” Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.16-17.
Rizospastis, 24/3/1999, p.3. Kathimerini, “Human Rights”, 30/3/1999, p.20.
33
Kathimerini, 26/3/1999, p.20. Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.2.
30
Traditional stereotypes and prejudice about Americans can also be traced in the
Greek’s unwillingness to acknowledge the role of the judge to the US. According to
those, America is a country without a history and its people are known for their rather
simplistic way of thinking34. So, she lacks the ability to make judgments in places of
the world where the burden of history is huge and the situations that need to be
resolved are complex, such as the Balkans35. America is also perceived to be a cruel
punisher, because she herself has never suffered like other nations have, she has never
experienced any threat in her soil:
“American citizens take for granted that America can do whatever she wants
whenever she wants and not being answerable to anyone. Besides, American citizens
don’t know that war means fire, blood, death. Fire, blood and death touch the others.
The US simply command. And they press buttons. And when they go to bed, they
sleep peacefully. We have said it before: those people know nothing about being
bombed. America has never been bombed. If even one missile had fallen, let’s say, on
Manhattan, if an alert had signaled a couple of times and the people were running to
the shelters for rescue, then things would be completely different. Then, the public
opinion would have some idea about the crime that has been going on in the Balkans.
And, eventually, they would react”36.
The conclusion that comes about naturally from the arguments mentioned above is
that according to Greek perception, justice presupposes common experiences. Unless
people share a sense of a common historical and social fate, any attempts to establish
globally accepted norms of justice, will be deprived from credibility. The stereotype
of American differentiation, in a number of fields, makes them unsuitable judges.
They don’t belong to our world, so they can’t judge us.
At this point, we can say that anti-Americanism functions as a filter that shapes
decisively Greek perceptions about what is “fair” and what is “unfair” in world
affairs. There may be elements of injustice in the Milosevic regime, but the amount of
injustice contained in American policies and actions surpasses them37. So, Milosevic
appears as the lesser of two evils38. From this point of view, Milosevic appears more
as a victim than a victimizer, because the US is the world’s greater victimizer. And
34
Rizospastis, 3/4/1999, p.4. Kathimerini, 2/4/1999, p.4.
Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.14. Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.68.
36
Ta Nea, 5/4/1999. Also, Eleftherotypia, 12/5/1999.
37
Kathimerini, 27/3/1999, p.20.
38
Eleftherotypia, 14/5/1999. Kathimerini, 24/4/1999.
35
the ultimate victim appears to be the Serbian people and also the Albanians who
became refugees as a consequence of NATO bombings. The concept of victim that
the Greeks have accepted as a dimension of their national identity becomes the
unifying element with the Serbian people:
“Violence and injustice remind me of the amount of my own weakness. I have
become an eyewitness of a destructive plan and I watch the human life being
humiliated”39.
The content of the concept victim is flexible but we could say that it describes a
situation where small nations suffer the injustices of the powerful ones and that they
are prevented from fulfilling their destiny, from attaining a greater historical or
geopolitical role as they could have done if justice had prevailed. A link of sympathy
and solidarity brings together the victim-nations of the world, even though their
identity may change over time. In the current period, Greeks often list as suffering
nations the Kurds, the Cypriots and the Serbs and claim that special emotional and
moral ties relate them with the above. It is also often reminded that Greeks, Russians
and Serbs suffered the greatest sacrifices in the struggle against Nazism during World
War II40.
Many interpretations of the Greek attitude during the bombing of Serbia have
overemphasized on a so-called traditional pro-Serbianism based on cultural (mainly
religious), historical and emotional ties. This is a simplification that ignores periods of
tension between the two people, especially during the Greek Civil War41. The
religious ties are often mentioned in the analysis of the Greek press, but careful
reading shows that this is more a secondary and superficial element that is used a
posteriori and not as a precondition for the identification with the Serbs and the
opposition to the US:
“We are on the side of the Serbians, not because they have the same religion, but
because they are the target of barbaric attack, the most barbaric and cynical attack
since the 2nd World War…”42.
39
Ta Nea, 6/4/1999.
Statements made by the leader of the Greek Communist Party, Aleka Papariga, Rizospastis,
25/3/1999, p.5.
41
Kathimerini, 8/4/1999, p.4.
42
Kathimerini, 3/4/1999, p.3.
40
Metaphors and expressions derived from the orthodox tradition are often used to
describe the drama of the Serbian people, especially since the bombings go on during
the Orthodox Easter43. But they are more rhetoric schemes than indications of an
essentialist approach based on culture and religion. It is true, though, that the picture
is obscured by the anti-American and anti-western rhetoric launched by the late
Archbishop of Athens, Christodoulos, that gained excessive coverage from the
media44.
A more concrete basis for identification with the Serbs is the fear that the role of the
victim could easily be attributed to the Greeks as well45. The geographical closeness
to the war is a great source of anxiety46. The sense of insecurity is also intensified by
statements and scenarios from the American side47, but most of all from the lack of
rationality, according to the Greek point of view, in American choices 48. If the attack
on Serbia is unjustified, illegal and irrational49, as the Greek press emphasizes, then
who knows what the next target is going to be? If there are no distinct criteria by
which the aggressor selects his victim, then we are all potentially victims, especially
the Greeks who have been in that place many times in the past. This sense of
insecurity is a consequence of the end of the Cold War that marks the end of certain
established divisions between friends and enemies. The sense of certitude provided by
the acceptance of communism as the ultimate enemy in the context of the North
Atlantic Alliance no longer exists. The absence of the ultimate enemy transforms the
old allies into potential enemies:
“…this unilateral move certifies, once more, the desire of the US to impose their will
to every “partner”. And those who suffer the consequences, we stand week, and we
simply realize that, now that the big enemy is gone, our allies are rapidly transformed
into adversaries50”.
43
Eleftherotypia, 1/4/1999. Eleftheros Typos, 10-11/4/1999, p.14. Rizospastis, 6/4/1999.
Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.10-11. Eleftheros Typos, 29/3/1999, p.16-17. It is true that Archbishop
Christodoulos adopted an essentialist approach in his critique against the US and the European Union
emphasizing on the moral and cultural superiority of Orthodoxy.
45
Eleftherotypia, 9/4/1999. Kathimerini, 30/4/1999, p.20.
46
Kathimerini, 8/4/1999, p.4. Kathimerini, 16/4/1999.
47
Greek reaction was particularly intense to Bill Clinton’s statement that NATO had to intervene in
Kosovo, among other reasons, in order to prevent a greek-turkish conflict: Ta Nea, 26/3/1999.
Kathimerini, 26/3/1999, p.2.
48
Kathimerini, 1/4/1999.
49
Eleftherotypia, 7/5/1999.
50
Kathimerini, 25/3/1999, p.4.
44
The American enemy: is it the “new” totalitarian enemy?
We have already suggested that in the post-Cold War setting, anti-Americanism in
Greece has undergone significant qualitative changes. These changes can be summed
up to the fact that the perception of the US as a powerful and dangerous enemy
becomes generalized and transcends the ideological and party boundaries. At this
point, we will try to conceptualize the public debate concerning the “nature” and
characteristics of the “American enemy”.
During the Cold War, the ideological and political confrontation in Greece was
inscribed in the broader confrontation between communism and anti-communism or,
according to another phrasing, the confrontation between totalitarianism and antitotalitarianism. The term “totalitarianism”, which referred to regimes such as Nazist
Germany and Stalinist Russia, had a philosophical and intellectual substantiation51,
but was also successfully propagated by the mass media, and especially the press52.
As the rivalry between the First and the Second World became intense, the term
“totalitarianism” was applied mainly to the Soviet Union53. In the context of the Cold
War, the “totalitarian enemy” par excellence was the soviet enemy.
However, in the mid 1990’s, the soviet threat no longer exists. Does this mean that
after the collapse of communism the world is free from “totalitarian” enemies?
Surprisingly, no. As I will try to show, the concept of totalitarianism did not disappear
from the public debate even though its traditional object of reference did. The concept
remained popular as the object of reference gradually changed and the concept began
to identify with the United States of America. As I will try to show with recourse to a
number of texts, the representation of America as a totalitarian enemy is not casual,
but it is systematic and thorough.
51
F. Borkenau, The Totalitarian Enemy, Faber&Faber, London 1940. H. Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism, New York 1951. R. Aron, Democratie et totalitarisme, Gallimard, Paris 1965.
52
D. Papadimitriou, Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon. I syntiritiki skepsi
stin Ellada [From the loyalist people to the nation of the nationally minded. Conservative thought in
Greece], Savvalas: Athens 2007.
53
L.K. Adler, Th. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the
American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s”, American Historical Review, vol.75, 1970, no4, p.
1046-1064.
The Greek press implies or explicitly argues that the US is the new totalitarian enemy
based on the conceptualization of certain aspects of the American state, its policies
and its alleged goals. First of all, the excessive power of America in a non-bipolar
world is a source of agony. And then, the columnists attest the lack of rationalism in
the way this enormous power is used. So, the first characteristic of the American
enemy is the combination of a fearsome power with irrationalism54. The second is the
development of a so-called “new imperialism” that threatens potentially the entire
globe55. The aggressive nature of the US provokes a generalized insecurity because
every nation could become a target if it turns out to be an obstacle to American plans.
Americans aim at weakening in advance any potential rival, such as Russia, unified
Germany or the European Union. A common metaphor applied for the current
features of the American state is that of a declining empire and especially Rome. The
only hope comes from the fact that the excessive American arrogance will eventually
become the cause of her destruction based on a concept borrowed from Greek
tragedy, “hubris”56.
American aggression, as it is presented in the narration of the press, is somehow
different from the old-fashioned, Marxist approach of imperialism because it has
acquired a metaphysical and essentialist dimension. The post Cold War American
state is perceived as a power of evil57. If Milosevic and Balkanian chauvinism
represents a form of evil that survives from the past of mankind and therefore we
know how to deal with it, American aggression represents a form of evil from the
future and that provokes greater fear58.
The ultimate goal of the US is world domination, the establishment of a New World
Order that is identified with lack of freedom, independence and justice59:
“There are no values any more, there is no global law and order and there is no UN.
All there is, is the fascism of military power…”60.
54
Kathimerini, 18/4/1999, p.2.
Ta Nea, 5/4/1999.
56
Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.2. Eleftheros Tipos, 3/5/1999, p.3. Rizospastis, 27/3/1999, p.4.
Kathimerini, 24/4/1999, p.4. Eleftherotypia, 16/5/1999.
57
Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.21.
58
Eleftheros Tipos, 30/4/1999, p.8.
59
Kathimerini, 14/4/1999, p.4.
60
Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.2.
55
New Order means after all a new form of barbarianism and signifies the return to a
new Middle Age61. In the New World Order, Americans will be the only judge and
the only punisher and justice will be replaced by American interests62. According to a
stereotypical phrasing the US will become world’s “gendarme”63. Besides, the term
New World Order is directly linked to the nazist agenda64. In the majority of cases,
America is compared to Nazi Germany65 and not to Soviet Russia, but their references
that relate the US to both regimes: “(Americans)…are possessed, like the communists
used to be, by the impression that they represent the total truth”66 . The attack on
Yugoslavia is a means to an end and it is thought to be “the laboratory of New Order,
just like Spain of the Civil War was the geopolitical experiment for the rise of
fascism”67. Finally, American resolutions seem to threaten fundamental conquests of
the Western world, the prevailing of reason and politics instead of brutal violence and
war.
In the analysis of the Greek press, American imperialism encourages two traditional
enemies of Greece, the Albanian and the Turkish nationalism68. Greeks are afraid that
a wider plan of destabilization of the Balkans has been activated69 and that Greek
territories near the borders might be the target of an attack70. Besides, in Greece,
Samuel Huntington’s theory about the “clash of civilizations” had become quite an
issue and was, generally considered to be potentially dangerous in case it was adopted
by the American state. In that context, many argued that Serbia was a “cultural target”
as far as the US was concerned. According to that the US desired the weakening of
Serbia, as a means of prevention and a means of punishment, because due to her
regime and her religion, she was perceived as Russia’s “natural” ally. And if Serbia is
a cultural target for the US, then Greece has every reason to be afraid71.
61
Ta Nea, 26/3/1999. Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.2. Kathimerini, 18/4/1999, p.14.
Eleftherotypia, 2/5/1999. Rizospastis, 25/3/1999, p.2.
63
Kathimerini, 26/3/1999. Ta Nea, 8/5/1999.
64
As it is suggested the term corresponds to the fascist “Ordine Nuovo” and to the nazist “Neue
Ordung”, Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.21.
65
Eleftheros Typos, “Back to 1936”, 29/3/1999, p.3.
66
Kathimerini, 25/4/1999, p.29.
67
Eleftheros Typos, “They are bombing our future”, 4/4/1999, p.2. In the same wave length
Rizospastis, 26/3/1999, p.25. Kathimerini, 25/4/1999, p.16.
68
Eleftheros Tipos, 24/3/1999, p.7. Rizospastis, 26/3/1999, p.5.
69
Eleftheros Typos, 1/4/1999, p.12-13. Rizospastis, 30/3/1999, p.6. Rizospastis, 4/4/1999.
70
Eleftheros Typos, 28/3/1999, p.2. Rizospastis, 27/3/1999.
71
Kathimerini, 26/3/1999, p.4. Kathimerini, 14/4/1999, p.4.
62
The bombing of Serbia coincided with NATO’s 50th anniversary and the
announcement of the new doctrine that would dictate the Alliance’s actions in the
world created after the collapse of communism. Under the circumstances, the Greek
press was very critical of the so-called “new NATO” and suggested that it would turn
into a ferocious weapon in the arms of the US in their struggle for world
domination72. The “new NATO” is thought to be a precondition for the establishment
of New World Order73. What is particularly interesting in this approach is that only a
decade after the fall of the Berlin War, NATO appears to be completely deprived
from legitimacy as far as the public opinion of a NATO member country is
concerned. Even the Greek Right, who had a lasting pro-NATO tradition, wishes to
make her distantiation clear, as it is exhibited by the columns that appear in her
friendly press74. They condemn:
“…the shift of NATO from a defensive alliance in a global private police of the big
and dark interests. The support of Greek public opinion to the suffering Yugoslavia is
an act of democratic solidarity and political protest…”75.
In this context, they suggest that the colour of NATO’s emblem should be black like
the uniforms of American policemen paramilitary groups in totalitarian regimes76.
Another symptom of American totalitarianism is the implementation of “total war” in
the case of Serbia77. Journalists and public opinion in Greece express their indignation
about the ferocity of NATO bombings78. The bombing of the television building in
Belgrade became a symbol of NATO ferocity. Even more, the fact that journalists
became a target of attack facilitated the comparison of the so-called “Americanism” to
Nazism79. The columnists focus their critique on the fact that civilians as well as non
military facilities and infrastructure became NATO’s target. They often compare this
tactic to the Nazi’s war practices and they conclude that what NATO is doing to
72
Ta Nea, 3/4/1999. Ta Nea, 11/6/1999. Eleftherotypia, 22/4/1999. Rizospastis, 1/4/1999.
Eleftherotypia, 18/4/1999.
73
Eleftherotypia, 27/4/1999 “Every sensible man reflects on and wonders: What’s the difference
between the Nazi’s doctrines and the “new doctrines’ of the modern emperor…?”. None whatsoever”.
74
Kathimerini, 28/3/1999, p.14.
75
Eleftheros Typos, 31/3/1999, p.7.
76
Eleftheros Typos, 10-11/4/1999, p.9.
77
“…the nazist perception of total war has prevailed…”: Eleftheros Typos, 1/4/1999, p.7. Eleftheros
Typos, 27/3/1999, p.2.
78
Eleftherotypia, 5/4/1999.
79
Ta Nea, 24/4/1999. Eleftherotypia, 24/4/1999.
Serbia, under the guidance of the US, is a lot worse80. Besides, the aid of technology
makes this version of total war unprecedented. The infamous “errors” in NATO
bombings with significant losses in civilians’ lives both from the Serbian as well as
the Albanian side were considered another proof of NATO’s neglect for human
lives81. And this lack of humanism was ultimately attributed to US leadership82 and
was considered to be another manifestation of totalitarianism:
“The domination of the American way of life, and most of all, of the American way
of thinking has established…power as superior value than humanism. Power is
interested only in the result and doesn’t care about the means”83.
There are journalists who argue that Nazism was superior in quality than American
totalitarianism based on the existence of a political goal in its manifestations. Hitler
had a supposedly political goal, acquiring the infamous “vital space”. On the contrary,
Clinton’s America is the most militaristic state in the world, but kills people with no
obvious political objective. Hitler supported the “final solution” for the domination of
the Arian race, while Clinton has activated the “final solution” and destroys
completely a country for no significant reason84. They also argue that American and
NATO war tactic is based on the Nazi discrimination between superior and inferior
races. The pilots of NATO’s air force are members of the superior race as they are
kept in a safe distance from the battle ground because their lives have enormous
political value. On the other hand, the lives of Serbians and Albanians do not have the
same political and communicative value for the western world85.
But, aside all the above, for the totalitarianism hypothesis to be sustained, there has to
be a link between the external behaviour of a totalitarian state and what happens
inside its borders. And that missing link appears in several analyses that try to exhibit
manifestations of totalitarianism both at home and abroad. The lack of pluralism86, the
80
Ta Nea, 5/6/1999. Eleftheros Typos, 2/4/1999, p.14. Eleftheros Typos, 15/5/1999. Rizospastis,
27/3/1999. Eleftherotypia, 1/4/1999.
81
Ta Nea, 3/5/1999. Ta Nea, 11/5/1999. Eleftherotypia, 3/5/1999.
82
Eleftherotypia, 6/5/1999.
83
Ta Nea, 5/4/1999.
84
Eleftheros Typos, 2/4/1999, p.14.
85
Eleftheros Typos, 8/5/1999, p.7.
86
Eleftheros Typos, 1/4/1999, p.8.
domination of media propaganda87, the passivity of American citizens, the lack of
democratic legitimization in the American political system due to the high
percentages of citizens who abstain from the election are listed as symptoms of a
declining democracy88. Besides, it is often mentioned that the true power in the US
lies in the military-industrial establishment and that politicians have a secondary role.
Columnists argue that the American political system has acquired authoritative
characteristics and that the poor quality of democracy is countervailed by the
economic miracle and the values of consumerism89:
“For the last 50 years, the American people have been walking slowly but steadily
through the gate of despotism. For the last 50 years, the United States have been
slipping through authoritarianism…”90.
Another point of focus is the particularly high number of people held in prison,
combined with the fact that prisons in America have been privatized to some extent91.
This is considered to be indicative of the way American elites produce and protect
their wealth from outsiders.
As far as the control of American society in general is concerned, the argumentation
indicates the model of “digital democracy”. “Digital democracy” is the social and
political model Americans seek to promote, a system where citizens will turn into
subjects and will believe to be true anything that takes the form of an image after it
has been shaped by propaganda mechanisms with the aid of technology92. Because, as
it is argued, fascism cannot prevail if the media are not under fascist control93. The
following passage focuses on the ‘totalitarian’ dimension of the American mass
media:
“We used to be afraid of the prevailing of “Big Brother” in the socialist regime, but
the total control of the media has been achieved in the United States…an
87
Kathimerini, 23/4/1999, p.17.
Kathimerini, 7/4/1999, p.4.
89
Eleftheros Typos, 28/3/1999, p.36.
90
Eleftheros Typos, 28/3/1999, p.36.
91
Ta Nea, 23/4/1999.
92
Eeleftheros Typos, “The tragedy of civilization”, 2/4/1999, p.4.
93
Eleftheros Typos, 14/4/1999, p.2.
88
unprecedented operation of policing American public opinion has been taking
place…tremendous brain washing mechanisms have been activated”94.
It is worth commenting that the totalitarianism argument is often sustained by
references to an emblematic writer of the anti-totalitarian tradition, George Orwell
and his “1984”. Orwell’s ideas (“Newspeak”)95 are also cited as a comment for the use
of language by NATO leaders and spokesmen96. The concepts of the words are
distorted and a politically correct language is used to mask violence and horror97.
Finally, Greek journalists wonder whether we are living in “1999 or in 1984?”98.
Alongside with that, the columnists suggest that the presence of violence and crime in
America’s daily life is a result of a morbid social system 99. America is the country
where irrationalism dominates in daily life100. President Clinton’s decision to bomb
Yugoslavia and the lack of reaction by the American citizens are correlated to the
high criminality in the US and the corruption of American youth101. The articles
denounce the alienation of the American people and they argue that the only values
Americans share are the “culture of guns” and the worship of money. In America,
from the neighbourhood gang to the state itself, crime turns against the week. Behind
the attack of these people against Serbia lies the “black thought of anticivilization”102.
The news coverage of a sad incident that took place in Denver, Colorado, where two
teenagers slaughtered students in their school for no obvious reason is quite
revealing103. As it is explicitly said the dead children in Colorado and the dead
civilians in Yugoslavia are victims of the ideology of violence that dominates in the
US104. The teenage murderers are a symptom of the American system that set for
94
Eleftheros Typos, 29/3/1999, p.7.
G. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four, Secker&Warburg, London 1949.
96
Eleftheros Typos, 10-11/4/1999, p.16. Eleftherotypia, 25/4/1999. Eleftherotypia, 30/4/1999.
97
Kathimerini, 25/4/1999, p.14. Kathimerini, “An ultimatum to humanity”, 27/4/1999.
98
Kathimerini, “1999 or 1984?”, 23/4/1999, p.4.
99
Kathimerini, “Violence and horror”, 23/4/1999, p.10.
100
Kathimerini, “1999 or 1984?”, 23/4/1999, p.4.
101
Eleftherotypia, 22/4/1999.
102
Eeleftheros Typos, “The tragedy of civilization”, 2/4/1999, p.4.
103
Ta Nea, 3/5/1999.
104
Eleftheros Typos, 22/4/1999, p.4, p. 21.
95
them as an example “raw violence and the arrogance of the mighty”105. Finally, the
ultimate national ideology of the US is terrorism106.
Greek media also criticize the role of American media107 and American film industry
in the psychological and cultural preparation of the war against Yugoslavia.
Hollywood is perceived to be another weapon for American imperialism108. They also
point out that the dissemination of emblematic American consuming goods, such as
Coca-Cola, and the appeal of American cultural products are equally part of American
imperialism and we need to protect ourselves from them109.
“Today… we cannot speak simply about America’s ambition to rule, but we should
call it totalitarianism. And it is this totalitarianism that pushes wide masses to an overt
anti-Americanism”110.
Besides, it is often minded that the project of New World Order has an economic
dimension, as well as a cultural and a political one.
Resistance or subjection?
Having in mind all the above, we can now examine the final of our initial keyconcepts, resistance. Resistance is a word with a special historical burden as well. It
brings immediately to mind the people’s resistance to the Germans during the Nazi
occupation of Greece. But it can also be related to the word Revolution that is
commonly used to describe the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) and the
confrontation with the Ottoman Empire111. Even more, the association of memories it
creates goes back to the history of ancient Greece and the period of the Persian
invasion112. In any case, resistance brings to mind glorious moments of history as it
refers to a situation where relatively small groups of people managed to fight against
far more powerful military forces. Even though, resistance may not always seem as a
rational choice, its moral superiority leaves no other choice. On the contrary, it is
105
Eleftherotypia, 22/4/1999.
Kathimerini, “Violence and horror”, 23/4/1999, p.10.
107
Eeleftheros Typos, 27/3/1999, p.17.
108
Eleftheros Typos, 27/3/1999, p.7. Eleftheros Typos, 18/4/1999, p.13.
109
Eleftheros Typos, 16/4/1999, p.4. Eleftheros Typos, 10/6/1999.
110
Kathimerini, 2/4/1999, p.4
111
Rizospastis, 24/3/1999, p.32.
112
Rizospastis, 30/3/1999, p.40.
106
exactly its lack of rationality that establishes its moral superiority. Based on the
above, the concept of resistance seems to be part of the national myths as it implies
that there is some sort of mission for the Greece and, supposedly, attributes a special
quality to them.
In the narration of NATO’s operation in Kosovo by the Greek press, the concept of
Resistance appears naturally:
“In 1821 our people rose up with the slogan Freedom or Death! Today the dilemma
that life itself puts forward is “Resistance or Subjection? Servitude or struggle for a
life with real freedom?”113
And the similarities with the national narration of the historical past are obvious. A
superpower, the greater military power history has ever known, attacks a small and
neighbour nation114 and, for a number of reasons that we have already mentioned, she
threatens Greece as well, or at least she threatens the values Greece stands for. And
the dilemma appears: resistance or subjection? And furthermore, what exactly
constitutes resistance and what would signify subjection:
“Life is full of compromises…But how can we tell what’s that thin and crucial line
that once you have crossed it, compromise turns into subjection and, finally, turns
against our national interests…?”115.
The answers to these questions are more complex than they originally appear to be
and they became part of the public debate. What Greece’s attitude should be during
the crisis was a very important issue in the public agenda. The Greek government
chose not to differentiate from NATO, even though the public opinion almost
unanimously condemned the bombings. The parties of the opposition, as well as the
newspapers friendly to them, criticized intensely the government for lack of
independence as far as the US and NATO were concerned116. The confrontation
became more intense in the context of the election period for the European Parliament
113
Announcement of the Communist Party for the celebration of the Greek Revolution on 25/3/1821
published by Rizospastis, 25/3/1999, p.2.
114
Kathimerini, 27/3/1999, p.8.
115
Kathimerini, 7/4/1999, p.20.
116
Eleftheros Tipos, 24/3/1999, p.3, p.7. Eleftheros Tipos, “Limited Sovereignty”, 31/3/1999, p.2.
Rizospastis, 24/3/1999, p.3. Rizospastis, 25/3/1999, p.5.
of June 1999117. Many argued that a peculiar alliance was built up bringing together
politicians and intellectuals from the Right, the nationalists, the communist and the
non-communist Left118. A basic unifying element in their approach was antiAmerican and anti-Western rhetoric, a mixture of anti-imperialism and nationalism.
The government emphasized that here priority was Greece’s best interest and resorted
to the slogan “Greece comes first”. She also argued that Greece should at any cost
avoid all risks that might delay her entrance in the Euro zone. Based on experiences
such as this, scholars argue that there is a growing gap between what political elites in
Greece say, and especially the governmental elites, as gar as Greek-American
relations are concerned, and what they actually do, in their effort to keep up with the
feelings Greek public opinion119. Polls data from this period indicate also that a big
part of public opinion felt comfortable with the government’s handlings despite its
pro-Serbian and anti-American attitude120. Even columnists from the Centre-Left
agreed that the need for self-protection should be considered before the desire for
resistance121. In the public debate, these dilemmas were summed up by two
antithetical concepts, realism vs. emotionalism:
“Let’s see things clearly. Our hearts may by close to the Serbs…But our economic
and strategic interests are closer to the big powers of this world. As cynical as it may
sounds, that’s reality…”122.
Realism, even though, it seems necessary and wise, is also often labeled as
shameful123:
“We believe that the greatest insult for our people is when they tell them to bend over
and when they have to suffer all sorts of insults against their dignity and their national
sovereignty”124.
117
Kathimerini, 25/4/1999, p.18.
Eleftheros Typos,
119
St.Stavridis, Anti-Americanism in Greece: reactions to the 11-S, Afghanistan and Iraq, GreeSE
Paper No 6, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, September 2007, p.10.
120
A survey by Alco shows that 98,6% of Greek public opinion is opposed to the bombings and 76,3%
disapprove of the government co-signing NATO’s decision, Eleftheros Tipos, 18/4/1999, p.7. But, on
the other hand, a poll by VPRC indicated that 51.4% approved of the government’s handlings even
though 96% was opposed to the bombings, Ta Nea, 17/4/1999.
121
Eleftherotypia, 7/4/1999.
122
Kathimerini, 28/3/1999, p.14. Kathimerini, 3/4/1999, p.20. Kathimerini, 17/4/1999. Kathimerini,
18/4/1999. Also, Eleftherotypia, 5/5/1999.
123
Eleftheros Tipos, 29/3/1999, p.7. Rizospastis, 24/3/1999, p.32. Rizospastis, 31/3/1999, p.36.
118
These thoughts also encouraged a form of self-criticism and a debate on the way of
life of modern Greeks and their values. The preference for realism instead of
resistance is believed to be encouraged by consumerism and passivity that
characterize modern life style. So, the next question is how honest is our solidarity for
the Serbs and our indignation against the US since we wouldn’t want anything to
jeopardize our well being?125. After all, our idealism may not be as great as we would
want it to be.
Another set of questions raised during this period concerns the debate on Modern
Greek identity and whether Greeks perceived themselves as belonging to the East or
to the West. This sort of questioning was not recent. It has always been part of the
intellectual legacy of Modern Greece. But it reappeared with intensity during NATO
intervention in Kosovo. What was at stake was the sense of belonging, not
institutionally, as NATO and EU membership was not seriously questioned, but
culturally and emotionally126.
But all these questions and doubts were obscured by the prevailing of antiAmericanism and anti-imperialism. Serbia and Milosevic became the symbols of
resistance against the so-called “Pax Americana”127. The following passages exhibit
the function of this symbolism beyond ideological and party discriminations and they
are derived from newspapers of the Right as well as the official newspaper of the
Greek Communist Party:
“I don’t know whether Slobodan Milosevic is “peculiar”, “authoritative” or
“communist”. What I can certainly say is that, at this hour, he represents the Serbian
people and, along with them, all the people of this planet who have a minimum of
national dignity left…They undoubtedly will de crashed. But, their struggle has a
historical symbolism and great importance…”128.
124
Abstract from an interview of the leader of the Greek Communist Party, Aleka Papariga, to
Eleftheros Typos, 6/6/1999, p.10.
125
Eleftheros Typos, “Life Style and Subjection”, 25/4/1999, p.14. Kathimerini, 27/3/1999, p.9.
126
Eleftherotypia, 5/6/1999.
127
Kathimerini, 26/3/1999, Eleftheros Tipos, 26/3/1999, p.14-15. Eleftheros Typos, 29/3/1999, p.3.
Rizospastis, 24/3/1999, p.3.
128
Eleftheros Tipos, 24/3/1999, p.8.
“Serbs, our brothers, hold on. You must hold on. You are defending today the concept
of motherland; you represent the world’s motherlands. You are the guards of the
Balkans, the defender of Europe…You are the guards of European civilization against
barbarity…History needs you. The future needs you”129.
“That ‘dictator’ has been chosen to express the will for resistance against raw and
cruel force…Milosevic is about to become a hero for all those who suffer oppression.
And that’s a sad, not positive, development…”130.
On the other hand, Greeks, during this period constructed a particularly negative
image of the European Union due to her inability or unwillingness to develop any
form of resistance against US planning and actions. European leaders were severely
criticized for not being able to defend the values on which the unification of Europe
was based and for allowing the bombing of a country in the heart of Europe for the
first time after the end of the Second World War131.
The quest for resistance, marked by intense emotionalism, found its way out in a
series of anti-war mobilizations132. A sort of ritual was established concerning the
public expression of indignation. Crowded concerts by popular artists and the
emblematic participation of Mikis Theodorakis, militant marches destined to the
American embassy133 offered a substitute of Resistance. The contentious legacy of the
Political Reform (Metapolitefsi) was briefly revived to some extent and set the
exemple for similar anti-American protests in the future, such as the massive
demonstrations during American invasion to Iraq (February-April 2003).
Finally, a widespread anti-Americanism is perceived to be equivalent to Resistance.
Many columnists of the Right defend this so-called “new anti-Americanism” after
they have made clear that they, personally, were not anti-Americans during the Cold
War. According to them, the current version of anti-Americanism is a natural and
justified reaction against the current choices of the US:
“The new anti-Americanism is a healthy phenomenon…it is the result of the peoples’
rage and indignation against the policy of the New World Order. It is an expression in
129
Rizospastis, 28/3/1999.
Kathimerini, 1/4/1999, p.20
131
Eleftherotypia, 11/4/1999. The following statement of the President of the Greek Parliament,
Apostolos Kaklamanis is indicative: “…I am ashamed right now that Europe is being drugged down a
road chosen by Mrs Albright and Mr Clinton for their own reasons, of course…”: Eleftherotypia,
13/5/1999.
132
Eleftherotypia, 30/3/1999. Eleftherotypia, 5/4/1999. Ta Nea, 27/4/1999.
133
Eleftheros Tipos, 27/3/1999, p.8. Rizospastis, 27/3/1999. Rizospastis, 2/4/1999.
130
favour of man and against the domination of money. It is the last defense of morality
and civilization…”134.
Or, according to another phrasing:
“When America declares war to the entire world, it’s only natural that the entire world
will declare war to America”135.
Concluding Remarks
The focus on the reaction of Greek public opinion to American policy towards
Yugoslavia and the Milosevic regime as a case study for Greek anti-Americanism
offers a fascinating material. The opposition to NATO and US handlings can be
traced back to a complex set of historical myths, conceptual schemes, systems of
values, as well as secondary factors like political strategies and party competition. The
post cold war version of Greek anti-Americanism has distinct qualitative
characteristics compared to its cold war form, the most important of those being its
diffusion to the ideological and political spectrum. This generalized anti-Americanism
functions like a precondition for the shaping of Greek attitude during the Kosovo
crisis. Anti-Americanism can be perceived as a prism that affects Greek people’s
views on global justice and the ability of the US to guarantee the protection of
ecumenical values and norms. America cannot incarnate justice, as far as Greek
public opinion is concerned, under the burden of history and the burden of ideology.
In the conceptual field, the legacy of the Kosovo narration is the establishment of the
totalitarian argument as far as the US are concerned and the shaping of a dark image
of American society in general that is directly linked to US aggression in foreign
relations. In the post bipolar world, the United States have been attributed the identity
of the enemy par excellence.
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