Questions and Answers: Concert of Europe
1. "Its merits outweighed its defects." Discuss this verdict upon the Treaty of Vienna.
The principal defects of the Treaty of Vienna wee four. First it ignored national feeling for unity in Germany and Italy, and
other peoples under the rule of States which they opposed. Secondly it operated to discourage constitutional government in
Europe. Thirdly, it was a settlement characterised by a cynical disregard for the interest of the small States by the Great
Powers who dominated the Congress. Lastly, the settlement produced at Vienna failed to survive- a measure of its failure to
solve the problems of Europe.
By the treaty Germany remained, like Italy, "a geographical expression". It consisted of thirty-nine separate States; and
although these were organised in the Germanic Confederation; it posed no unifying power being dominated by Austria and
Prussia, whose interests were to prevent a united Germany. Italy was mostly restored to its pre-revolutionary dynasties, most
of whom were allied if not related to the Hapsburgs. Austria ruled Lombardy and Venetia directly and hence could obstruct
any moves towards unity of the Italian people. The idea that there was an Italian nation was ignored by the peacemakers of
Vienna. Of the smaller peoples, the Poles reminded divided under Prussian, Austrian and Russian rule; the Roman Catholic
and partly industrialised. Belgians were placed under the rule of the Protestant and sea-faring Dutch; while the Norwegians
were transferred against their wishes from Danish to Swedish rule. No attempt was made to meet the national aspirations of
the different peoples in the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires or of the Irish under British rule.
The settlement opposed liberalism because it claimed to represent the principle of Legitimacy, which meant the restoration of
the pre-1789 dynasties. Absolutism was completely restored in Spain, and most of the German and Italian States.
Constitutions, where they existed, were usually only consultative in character and representative of only the wealthier citizens.
The smaller States of Europe, whether their monarchs were legitimate or not, were generally treated in a cavalier fashion by
the Great Powers. The Kings of Denmark and Saxony, both indisputably legitimate, lost territory through having been too
late in deserting Napoleon. None of the Great Powers suffered any net loss of territory, and even France was restored to
her frontiers of 1790. Their gains were at the expense of the smaller States.
Finally the Treaty of Vienna failed to secure lasting peace or to maintain its own decisions for century. By 1871 much of the
settlement had been destroyed with German and Italian unity and Belgian independence. By 1919 the settlement had been
totally destroyed. Tsarist Russia and the Hapsburg monarchy had been blown to pieces by the forces which the Vienna
settlement had sought to control. The men who made the settlement, cynical conservative aristocrats such as Metternich,
Castlereagh and Talleyrand, assisted by the unbalanced personality of Alexander I, failed to understand the influence which
ideas such as liberalism, nationalism and socialism would have on the next century, even though those ideas were already
present in 1815. They also failed to foresee the social changes that would be brought by industrialisation and soon render
their aristocratic and monarchical Europe obsolete.
The above arguments all make up a formidable indictment of the Treaty of Vienna; yet the case in defence of the treaty is
stronger, when one considers the circumstances in which the peace was made. The men who made the treaty wee practical
statesmen living in a world which had just seen the greatest war ever fought up to that time. They were not concerned with
building an ideal Europe, but with preventing a recurrence of the type of war which had just ended and with curbing the ideas
which that war had spread. Naturally they were conservative in outlook and opposed to nationalism and liberalism, the
success of which would have destroyed the order which they wished to preserve.
There was in fact little sign in 1815 that nationalism was all- conquering force. Both in Germany and Italy the forces of
particularism were far stronger than those of nationalism, which was confined to the small educated middle class that had
been in contact with French ideas. There was indeed more pronounced national feeling in Poland, Norway and Ireland, but
account could not be taken of this without offending the Great Powers, and this was simply not practical politics. There
was no distinct sense of nationality overcoming the differences between Fleming and Walloon in 1815 to lead the Treatymakers to guarantee an independent Belgium, and in this instance the peace-makers had taken care to guarantee complete
religious toleration and religious equality to the Belgians. It is hardly a valid criticism of the treaty that the Dutch government
failed to carry out these clauses.
2. In what ways can it be said that the Vienna Settlement of 1815 was "realistic and
sensible" ?
After 1/4 century of chaotic and confusion, the great powers met together in 1815 to discuss the peace settlement. Most of the
powers were tired of war after such a bloody revolution caused by Napoleon I. Therefore, the basic principle of the settlement
was based on maintaining peace, preventing war and restricting France from rising up again. Moreover, the balance of power
should not be neglected in avoiding future war and the ensuring of balance of power was the principle of legitimacy. However,
the ideas and effects left behind by the French Revolution should not be ignored. The powers realised that it was not possible
to put the clock back", therefore, a compromise between the old and new order should be made. As we examine the settlement
in further detail, one may a real that the Vienna Settlement in 1815 was realistic and sensible.
As regard the principle of legitimacy, the 'diving right' of king in Europe was deep-rooted. We could not uproot this long
historic fact. Moreover, the new ideas left behind by the French Revolution, for example, nationalism, liberalism,
democracy, etc. had no deep foundation in the hearts of the people since the history of these ideas in Europe had only 25 years.
Furthermore, this principle was used as an instrument to maintain the balance of power. Therefore it was said by Talleyrand
that "as it such a subordinate to the more comprehensive theory of balance of power". Thus, Bourbons was restored in France,
Spain and some of the Italian States etc.
However, the statesman of the Vienna Settlement were sensible enough to see the tide of history. One of the principle of the
Vienna Settlement was that "fait accompli", should be accepted. Therefore, new ideas of nationalism, liberalism, democracy
should not be ignored. So the legitimacy was not blindly carried out. The statesman encouraged the French Bourbon should
rule with a Charter, constitution and parliament. The German States should have their own parliament and constitution.
Belgium own religion and government should be respected. It was said that "The formula of legitimacy loomed much larger in
the conversation of Talleyrand than in the treaties of Vienna Settlement".
Well, on the field of balance of power and restricting France, the settlement was very realistic and sensible. France was
surrounded by other powers to avoid her rising up again. Some weak states nears France was strengthened, ,for example,.
Belgium united with Holland to form the Kingdom of Netherlands. Austria was given Venetia and Lombardy to counter
balance the gains of Prussia from 2/5 of Saxony, Danzig and Posen. Moreover the Roman Empire was not received but was
reduced to 39 States headed by Austria and Prussia. Austria and Prussia was made heads of the German Confederation to
counter balance each other. Russia, being a victor, gained part of Poland and Bessarabia. In checking Russia, Austria and
Prussia was thus strengthened and with the second purpose to counter act the growing power of Britain who like overseas
expansion. Therefore after the settlement was carried out, the four powers emerged but with none of them gained the position
of domination.
Some may argue that the settlement neglected the nationalism and liberalism of some states and caused revolution in later
years. But was it really guilty for doing that? Of course not, it is because they should be made practical and sensible.
Taking the German Confederation as example, unification was not ready at that time. It should involve wars and blood in
achieving the unification as we had seen up to 1871, it was by forced to unify the country of Bismarck. But in 1815, the most
important solution at that time was peace. Moreover, the number of German States was reduced greatly compared with the
past. It took a step forward for the unification.
As regard to Belgium, it was too weak to be independent and its dangerous proximity to France promoted its unification with
Holland. Moreover not all of the Belgians desired independent. Although in 1830, it became independent, because in that
time France was regarded as `manageable', it was not the case in 1815. Belgium's religion and government were to be
respected. It was the fault of the Holland government not to give Belgium's religious freedom government achieve it but not
the settlement. Norway has a long history under the foreign rule has been consulted before the transference to Sweden.
Moreover she has her own army, naval, government etc. and her independence in the beginning of the 20th century means she
was so far satisfied with the settlement.
Italy, under the Austrian rule because after the Hundred Days War, the powers were afraid and be wiser to tackle the
settlement of Italy. It was in Italy that Napoleon III carried out his aggressive policy. It was in Italy that Bonarpartism was
revived. Freedom in Italy could not help her but made her easily to be affected by France.
Finally, Poland should not be independent because a small and weak independent Poland meant a puppet state of Russia. The
great powers saw the threat that Russia might use Poland as a stepping stone and extended her influence in the other place in
Europe. Therefore, the suggestion of an independent Poland by the Czar was turned down. As Russell observed `he always
has such an excellent motives for doing himself a good turn. 'As observed by Seaman `Freedom offered as an act of grace with
guilt-complex was meaningless. '
Besides these, in restraining and punishing France, the settlement has a moderate and wise decision . The admitting of France
into the Quintuple Alliance well meant that when France took any action, she must consult the other powers first. It achieved
in retraining France. Furthermore, the indemnity that France had to pay was not much and the occupation of army was soon
withdraw from France.
France was treated so leniently that she had no excuse for revenge and these maintain peace in the following years.
It was realistic and sensible for the powers had adopted such a moderate and lenient terms to France. The settlement was
unlike the Versailles Settlement which was humiliated and harsh to Germany and it provided an excuse for the rise of
dictators and revenge which caused bloody and disastrous world war in later years.
Actually wars are neither caused nor prevented by treaties, but policies. However, realistic and sensible settlement of Vienna
`offer no clause to any of the powers for an excuse of war' which did actually maintained peace in Europe for the following 40
years until the Crimean War in 1854 took place.
3. "The Congress of Vienna saw in change the greatest threat to the welfare of Europe."
Discuss
In reninscence, the Congress of Vienna did preserve peace in Europe and help to prevent a major European war for almost
40 years. Despite its achievements, the Congress was being criticised of ignoring the forces of change particularly
nationalism and liberalism. Maybe the 1815 statesmen did so really because they saw in change the greatest threat to the
welfare of Europe. Nevertheless, to concede this argument will undoubtedly over-estimate the potentiality of the forces of
change and complicate the aim of the Congress.
The Congress of Vienna was held to end a war, not to discuss every national aspiration in Europe in sympathetic detail. Its
chief intent was to preserve peace in Europe after the Napoleonic Upheaval in a desperate way. It is beyond doubt that they
had no contemplation of change , or else, wars might be broken out to coerce Austria into accepting German unity, to evict the
Russians from Poland or the Turks from the Balkans.
Simultaneously, France was still regarded as enemy to the Allies and was perilous(dangerous) to European security. The
powers were afraid of the revival of a new Napoleonic Era in the Continent; so to eliminate the possibility of any future
French aggression became another instant task of the Congress. Under such circumstances, acceptance of nationalism and
liberalism would undoubtedly assist French ambitions, for they believed that France was the symbol of the force of change.
Above all, France had once regarded herself as the liberator of Europe under Napoleon's reign.
Even if the statesmen did take into the account of change, what would they do? The question of the independence of Belgium
caused a great many troubles to the statesmen in Vienna . The former Austrian Netherlands was transferred, without the
consent of the Belgians, to the Kingdom of Holland, but an independent Belgium seemed to have no change of the Hundred
Days in mind, the 1815 statesmen would have considered it a betrayal both of the general peace and of the Belgians to give
them an `independence' that would have left them defenceless in the path of the largest and most aggressive nation in West
Europe. So it is obvious that the acceptance of change in this sense was either impossible, or undesirable , or both under
such circumstances.
The situation of Italy was the same to that of Belgium. The unification of Italy was obstructed by Metternich while Northern
Italy passed into the hands of Hapsburg. This seems objectionable but past reminded that the abdication of Austrian control
in Italy was likely to result, not in Italian freedom, but in Italian subjection to France. Will the Allies rejoice to see this
happen?
Likewise, the Vienna Settlement showed no concern with German nationalism which was to be fulfilled half a century later.
None of the powers was delighted to have the unification of Germany for fear of the aggrandisement of Prussia.
Enforcement of the unification would undoubtedly result in a new war which was against the will of the liberals. However,
the ambitious desire of the Tsar was more threatening to the stability of the continent than the expectation for liberalism and
nationalism. This became the guideline of the statesmen in making peace settlement.
One may sad that the Vienna diplomats were reactionary at home as well as in the conference. The 1919 statesmen blamed
the Congress of ignoring the interests of the people and of employing suppressive policies against the revolutionaries. Yet,
how about their settlement? Versailles, in retrospect, laid seed to a new catastrophe. As a matter of fact, the Congressmen
did apprehend the change. They had imposed on the Dutch the duty of guaranteeing religious toleration and commercial
equality to their new Belgian subjects. It's only the Dutch, not the diplomats, to be responsible for the drastic situation in
1830. On the other hand, a similar arrangement was made to Sweden and Norway which looked successful. The union
between the two lasted till 1905 and was then ended peacefully. Nevertheless, the powers did not count the change as a
cause leading to war. They seemed that before revolutions could make wars, there must first be the wars that endeavour the
revolutions. Hence, albeit(even if)they aimed to conceive the forces of change, they did not see in it `the greatest threat to
the welfare of Europe'. And the fact that the Vienna Settlement contained no clause that offered any of the great powers a
pretext for war is its complete and sufficient justification.
4. Do you think that the Vienna Settlement is a moderate and progressive one?
The Vienna Settlement was definitely not a progressive one. As to its moderation, we simply cannot dichoticise it present as
a picture of discrimination--- it was moderate towards the big powers even defeatist France, yet it was ruthless in face of the
minor states for as Grant and Temperly remarks, "the small powers were sacrificed for the great ones."
France was indeed treated with great leniency even though she was guilty of turning Europe into a turmoil in the past decade.
Yet, in the first Treaty of Paris, France did not have to pay any indemnity; she was allowed to retain her colonies and most
important of all her boundary remained that of 1792 and not 1789. A comparatively more demanding treaty was imposed on
her in November 1815. This was done only as a just punishment for the comeback of Napoleon who again attempted to
disrupt the peace the Allies were trying to create. However, even this more demanding treaty, was still a moderate one for
France was permitted to her keep her boundary at 17910, though she was now asked to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs.
The Settlement shows itself to be moderate to France especially when we compare it with the Treaty of Versailles for
Germany, the guilty and the defeatist was made to bear 'the War guilt clause' deterred from attending the Conferences and the
indemnity designed to 'cripple her economy.' France, in 1815, however, however, was allowed in the words of Castlereagh 'to
keep intact her integrity'. She was allowed at the peace Settlement. She joined in with the alliance, afterwards, for example,
the Holy Alliance and by and by she was treated as one to the great powers. The settlement no doubt was moderate to France
for "the powers could have been as vindictive as they wanted, but the fact was they were not.
Fairness was also done to the Victors for their loss of territories as well as for their contribution to the stoppage of war in
Europe. All the powers were handsomely compensated. Austria got Lombardy and Venetia for the loss of Belgium. Norway
was given to Sweden since Finland was given to Russia. yet at this point, it is interesting to note that all this moderation
towards the great powers were accomplished at the expense of the small powers. For example, Poland and Italy were forced to
be divided. Posen was given to Prussia, while the rest was given to Russia. Austria got Venetia and Lombardy from Italy. The
minor states were further sacrificed to achieve the encirclement of France. Holland and Belgium were forced to join up
together despite their difference in custom, language and industrial development, for the sake of having a strong front to the
north of France. These minor states were thus exploited. The big powers disregarded their national unity or independence.
The settlement cannot be considered as moderate to them for these were revolts in all of these states, Belgium, Italy, Poland
and Swiss. Moderate is hitherto said to be practised only in consideration of the big powers.
Progressive was definitely not one of the characteristics of the Vienna Settlement. Progressiveness is defined as the eagerness
to more forward with new ideas. At first sight, the Vienna Settlement may give one a taint of progressiveness. It was the first
time in European history where the powers decided to come together to settle their differences; to divide fairly and equally the
spoils and not fight barbarically over them. They came together to devise a system which would help to maintain peace,
security and prosperity in Europe. From the fact, that they were largely successful, seems to indicate that the settlement was a
progressive one. Moreover, through the defeater was still allowed to negotiate in the peace settlement, the powers really
seemed to be very democratic indeed.
However, to say that the Settlement was progressive is to merely judge it by its appearance. For progressiveness was more
apparent than real. Why was France so 'democratically' allowed at the Peace Conference? One of the reasons was that
Talleyrand, came up with the principle of Legitimacy--- that is the restoration of the rightful rulers of France, the Bourbons to
undo the 'evil work' of the French Revolution and Napoleon. This shows us with crystal clarity how conservative the
Settlement was. The Principle of Legitimacy corresponded to Metternich's Principle of Restoration. Both stressed a
reactionary policy, to restore autocracy as the rightful rule in Europe. Moreover, the principle of legitimacy was to undo the
evil works of nationalism, liberalism and democracy which had been fought for in the French Revolution. These were the new
ideas. To be progressive meant to go forward with these new ideas vanish with a magical mind.
Moreover, the system of international cooperation to seek for compromise and hence peace seemed to be progressive
Metternich's principle of Restoration aimed at restoring the supremacy of the Austria Empire as it was in the century--Autocratic and monarchical. These ideas however, were already out-dated while the divinity of Emperor was possible with the
advent of the French Revolution in this idea was no longer accepted, people no longer cherished the myth that the Monarch
was the father of the people. hence, what Metternich was trying to do was not only not progressive, but in fact even
regressive. Metternich was the engine drivers of the Settlement and he was a die-heart conservative, if where was the
possibility of the settlement bring a progressive one?
The concept of the Balance of power may seem to some as a new ideas, a new concept of attaining peace. Hence the
adherence of the powers to this principle indicated they were progressive. However, the means to achieve the balance of
power were again conservative ones. It used back the age-old method of territorial adjustment without taking into
consideration the socio-politico-economic changes of society. It totally neglected the importance and impact of the size of the
muddle class, nationalism and liberalism. Territorially there might have been a balance of power, bit not politically Belgium
was joined with Holland there was the Belgium revolution in 1830 because the middle class struggled for independence and
democracy. Part of Italy was given to Austria there were revolts among the Italian urging for unity. All the revolutions of the
later age were revolts fighting for the principle of nationalism and democracy because the Vienna Settlement entirely
neglected them. History of the later years proved that the Settlement was not a progressive one.
The Vienna Settlement only used "progressive" means to achieve an ultimately conservative ends there were constitution
granted to many countries. Poland was given a constitution and France had a charter. Yet all the was done to pacify the people.
The French fought for the new principle with their blood and tears, if it were entirely anticipate another revolution. Hence, the
Charter can be said to be a means to suppress the revolutionary spirit a 'progressive' mean to attain a conservative end. Even
the constitution given to the German Confederation was only a share for it never aimed at the promotion of German unity, but
only a superficial kind of unity. The neutrality given to Switzerland was also not out of any progressive ideals but merely a
means to achieve the encirclement of France. A constitution was given to Poland only because the other powers feared too
powerful influence from Russia on Poland.
Nevertheless it might be argued that the Settlement was as progressive as it could be in 1815 under those particular
circumstances Seaman believes that whether it was progressive or not should be assessed from the situation at that time and
not with modern ideas. He believes that ideas of liberalism and nationalism were still in its embryonic form. And if they had
been taken into consideration in the settlement, the consequence would have been drastic. 'Acceptance of the principle of
nationalism in the circumstances of 1815 were either impossible or undesirable on both. He quotes the example of Belgium
by saying that an independent Belgian would have no chance of survival because of the idea of democracy. To say that these
ideas were still in the embryonic form is merely to find excuse for the Powers. If they were in their infant stage, these would
not have been so many revolutions of insurgent 'nationalism' after the reactionary Vienna Settlement. Moreover, it would not
have been pre-mature for the Allies to grant a parliament to Belgium. She was the first country to start industrialisation
which meant that by 1815 she already witnessed a rise of a prosperous bourgeois class. This was already a pre-requisite for
her to have a democratic government. If England who started industrialisation later than Belgium have a parliament what
justification is there to say that the idea was pre-mature in Belgium? The same situation applied to the other states. Germany
already started to build up a strong central authority and a truly nationalist army with a system of education designed to infuse
a common spirit into her people during the Napoleonic Era. In Spain, their nationalism was so strong that they were able to
defect Napoleon in the Peninsular War. Napoleon himself remarked 'the Spanish War destroyed me'. All these examples
reveal that as early as 1800s, ideas of nationalism and democracy were already active and creating a very positive force, they
were going towards maturity, by neglecting them in the settlement, the powers were in fact attempting to make the clock stop
at 1815.
It may also be argued that the Vienna Settlement was progressive because it did not take the idea of nationalism into
consideration Seaman suggests that many areas like the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. Switzerland, Spain and Italy were
removed from the menace of conscription into the armies of foreign despot. As he says "there were fewer people being ruled
and dispelled by foreigners by the end of 1815, than these were at the end of 1810." However this insufficient to say that the
settlement was progressive beaux the nationalism Seaman talks above is that of the traditional concept. David Thomson
points out that nationalism is traditionally measures was merely the sense of belonging in a common homeland. But
rationalism in its new contact deft the French Revolution started to mean much more. It was unity, evidence of a ration, it
stressed an loyalty to ones nation and not ones monarchs. Therefore, freeing the states from Napoleon's domination still did
not make it progressive because it was merely satisfying something of the old generation and not the new one.
Certainly the Vienna Settlement was moderate towards the big powers but only it the expense of the smaller powers. And it
was not progressive even when viewed from the 1815 time contest. It was as Knapton said "a semister league of the Monarch
against the liberties and nationalism of the people." It was only the fear of revolution and economic exhaustion of the
Continent that prevented any recurrence of war. The only comfort for advocates of progressives is that the Vienna Settlement
did attempt the abolition of slave trade and promoted international trade by declaring the freedom of navigation in
international waters.
5. To what extent was the old order restored by the decision taken at the Vienna
Settlement in 1815?
In 1815, a year after the defeat of Napoleon, the Vienna Treaty restored the old order in Europe to a certain extent.
Before 1789, all countries in Europe, except England, were under absolute monarchic rule. During the French Revolution, the
Bourbon King, Louis XVI was deposed. France changed to a Republic until 1804 when it became an Empire under Emperor
Napoleon. Similarly Napoleon reorganised Italy into three kingdom, replaced the House of Orange in Holland by his brother,
Louis Bonaparte and dethroned the Bourbon King in Spain in 1808. By the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, all the dynastic sovereigns
who had ruled in their respective countries before they were overturned by Napoleon, were restored. This meant legitimacy,
one of the principles the Congress acted upon. As a result, Spain and Naples reverted to the Bourbon kings, Holland to the
House of Orange, and Sardinia and Piedmont to the House of Savoy; the German princes were restored to the German states,
the Austrian princes to the central Italian States and the Pope to the Papal States.
Nationalism, hitherto confined to the countries on the Atlantic seaboard, received fresh from the French Revolution, and
found its way into the central and eastern Europe. The success of the French army from 1792 onward was partly due to the
patriotism of the soldiers. In establishing the Kingdom of Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine and the grand Duchy of
Warsaw, Napoleon roused the national feelings of the Italians, Germans and the Poles. Along with the spread of the spirit of
the spirit of nationalism, a new Europe arose. In order to form a strong ring around France regarded by the contemporaries as
the main source of disturbance, the 1815 peace-makers however cut up territories and joined nations. They united Austrian
Netherlands (Belgium) and Holland, left Germany divided into thirty-nine states under the presidency of Austria and Italy into
several states and put Poles under Russian control. They disregarded the new spirit, thinking that Europe was still in the
eighteenth century. The Congress of Vienna refused to lead Europe forward.
Obviously, the Vienna peace-makers saw in French as well as the Germans and Italian nationalism, a new political force, the
threat to European peace. On the other hand, the ancient regime survived the Revolutionary War. The Romanov of Russia, the
Hohenzollern of Prussia and the Hapsburg of Austria had not been overthrown, but had weathered the storm. These
monarchical institutions still rested on the support of the church and the landed aristocracy. The old dynastic monarchies were
still the focus of loyalty for all those on the side of conservatism the anchor of political stability within a state. Thus, the
Congress of Vienna preferred no change from the monarchical system of government as a pre-requisite of peace.
But since 1805 there had arisen a new Europe. Napoleonic conquests had destroyed many of old boundaries roused the
consciousness of nationality, and communicated revolutionary ideas and practices of the French type to a large part of Europe.
Moreover, it was by a strict balance maintained within the Allies- the 1813 treaty of Chaumont- that the Napoleonic Empire
was finally brought down.
Despite the restoration of the dynastic monarchies, the new elements in Europe were not uprooted by the Allies. The 1815
territorial arrangement was determined by the concern with the maintenance of the existing balance rather than by the
principles of legitimacy or restoration. They drew new boundaries, and caused some states to come into existence and some
into growing power chiefly to prevent any single power from becoming too powerful as to start aggression. Accordingly,
Austria though recovered Lombardy and Venetia, was not given back into Austrian Netherlands which was then joined to
Holland to form the new state, the United Netherlands. Switzerland which was only a geographical expression in 1789
became an independent state. In central Europe, Prussia in 1815 gained Westphalia, the Rhine Province and part of Saxony,
and so, she was much enlarged. Though Austria, held the presidency of the German Confederation, Prussia was to share with
Austria the leadership in the German affairs for she was entrusted with mission of safeguarding the Rhine frontier against
recurrence of French aggression. During Napoleonic conquests, the Holy Roman Empire was abolished; the Allies in the
Congress did not have it restored. The Napoleonic Confederation of the Rhine was enlarged and there were now 30 German
States. The enlarged states, Bavaria, Baden and Wuttermburg were not reduced; the lands they obtained from Austria under
the Napoleonic treaty of Pressburg (1805) were not given back to Austria. Thus Germany not only was not restored to the old
division of hundreds of petty states, but gained accidentally a step towards unification which was impossible in 1789.
The Allies also redivided Italy. The Papal States, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, Parma, Tuscany and Modena were all restored,
though not the hundreds of the petty states which had existed before the Napoleonic conquests. Despite these, the new
kingdom of Sardinia acquired Genoa, Savoy and Piedmont, and so challenged Austrian supremacy in Italy. Hence, at the
Vienna Congress, the Austria predominance in Central Europe which she had before 1789 was not restored. Restoration was
not to interfere with the European balance.
In re-affirming the balance as reached in 1805 and not going back to the pre-1789 Europe, the Congress of Vienna believed
that any significant departure from the existing balance would endanger peace wherein lay the general welfare of Europe.
Furthermore, the Allies in their restoration of legitimate monarchs did not signify the return of despotism. The constitutional
monarchy of Louis XVIII in France was re-affirmed. The Vienna Congress made the recommendation that all the German
princes were to grant constitution to their people if they so desired. The Allies did not restore the feudal practices in the
German and Italian states which Napoleonic regimes had abolished. They even guaranteed a liberal constitution to the Poles
from Russia. Hence, the Congress of Vienna did not make any reactionary decision. Nor did it try to impose in the European
countries the pre-1789 divine absolutism, which may mean frustration of the wishes of those who had already had a taste of
liberty and democracy. The Congress preferred no changed from the new Europe which had arisen since 1805.
By welfare, the Congress of Vienna took it to mean the general well-being of the European peoples which, it was taken for
granted, would be taken care of naturally by peace and prosperity. It would not be appropriate for any international
conference to deal with welfare of the people in a particular country in a direct way.
Thus, the Congress of Vienna did not redirect European development into the channels back to pre-1789. Neither did it lead
Europe to look forward. Toward the issue between the old regime and the revolution stand and between autocracy and liberal
democracy the Congress took a neutral concern was the maintenance of the balance reached in 1805. for any departure from it
would bring recurrence of disastrous war. Thus there should be no change. Certainly the Congress of Vienna ignored the
existence of the nationalistic. In 1815, whether nor not nationalism was a force sufficiently powerful to compel its recognition
by an international conference, is, however, controversial. Indeed, whether or not the conference system of national states is a
pre-requisite for well-being of the European is another debatable topic; they would, as the conservative were convinced, live
more happily under monarchical states. Nevertheless, rather beyond the expectation of the 1815 peace-makers, the decisions
taken for Prussia and Sardinia, Piedmont to serve as the bulwarks against recurrence of French aggression, respectively on the
Rhine and to southeast of the Alps subsequently led them to take up the leadership in the German and Italian national
movement and to found national states by 1871.
6. "The Vienna Settlement is a compromise between the new and old order." Discuss.
The Vienna Settlement was the peace settlement of the Napoleonic War, which had marked a great era of change in Europe.
The main purpose of the Vienna Settlement was to maintain peace. The new ideology and change brought about by Napoleon
I was regarded as something terrible for the excess of 1789 revolution. Hence it was commonly held that the pre-war
conditions should be restored as far as possible. However, the statesmen of the Vienna Congress were suitable enough that
changes could not be wined away completely and it was impossible to put the clock back again. Therefore, they did accept
some concession to the new order. Before analysing the old and new ingredients of the Vienna Settlement, we must first
understand what is the meaning of new order and old order at the time of the Settlement.
The old order referred to the traditional European political structure that is the institutions of monarchy, the union of state and
church, the landed aristocracy dominating the political structure, while the new order referred to the new revolutionary ideas
inspired by the Napoleonic Wars--- nationalism, liberalism, democracy, and socialism. As mentioned above, the main purpose
of the Vienna Settlement was to maintain peace. After long years of chaos and confusion, all the people in Europe were tired
of war, and longed for peace and stability. The excess of 1789 revolution had discredited the new ideas of liberalism,
nationalism, republicanism, and socialism. These ideas seemed to represent something terrible to the existing order. Hence,
after 1815 there was the revival of the old order.
Moreover, as the old order was deeply rooted in the continent, it was impossible to be uprooted completely. The Vienna
Settlement had restored the institutions of monarchy. The principle of legitimacy was accepted as the principle of the peace
settlement. Louis XVIII, the Bourbon King, was restored to France. The legitimate ruler of Spain and Nepal had also been
restored. The Pope became the ruler of Papal State again. Though the institution of monarchy was the order in 1815; however,
the Settlement did also accept that the principle of divine right of king had been discredited. The Settlement did not state that
the restored emperors should have absolute power. On the contrary, the power was stated to give constitution to the people.
Louis XVIII was to rule with a character, the German states had also given constitution to the people according to Vienna
Settlement. Though Belgium and Holland was to group together to form the Kingdom of the Netherlands, it was also stated it
should give a constitution and religious freedom to Belgium. Thus, in short, though the settlement generally favoured the
traditional institutions of monarchy, it had also given the concession to the new idea of liberalism. Moreover, the principle of
legitimacy was not carried out consistently as Seaman observed, "the formulae of legitimacy loomed much larger in the
conversation of Talleyrand than in the clause of Treaty of Vienna."
But the Holy Roman Empire was not restored. Instead, a German Confederation of 39 states was created. Italy had been put
under the influence of Austria. Many Italian states were restored, Venetia and Lombardy were to put under the direct rule of
Austria, while Tuscany, Parma, Modena were put under the control of Austria. Belgium and Holland were to combine
together to form the kingdom of Netherlands. Norway was transferred from Denmark to Sweden. However, it was the above
mentioned examples that were widely used as evidence of reactionary character of the Vienna Settlement. While, examining
these examples, we must first understand the element of time in the development of history. Though the new idea of
nationalism, liberalism, democracy had been brought about by the Napoleonic revolution, they did not have exactly equivalent
meaning of today. At that time these terms were only newly discovered and the ideas they represented were only in the
embryo stage. Moreover, we must not forget that peace and stability were the hope of majority after years of war. Referring to
the case of German Confederation, it was claimed that the decision was against the idea of nationalism, which advocated the
unity of the country. We must not forget that the number of states had greatly reduced in Germany. Hence the country was
brought a step forward to unification already.
Moreover, even themselves, the German had no concept or rather was against the idea of unification. It was absurd to demand
the Vienna Settlement to give unification to Germany, which needed years of war and hard work. Hence, these condemnation
of neglected nationalism was not valid.
For the case of the Belgium and Italy, we must bear in mind that peace was the watchword of the Settlement. Both Italy and
Belgium were not strong enough to stand up by themselves against the ambitious neighbour--- France. Hence it was the good
of peace that they were put under foreign control. Moreover, as mentioned above the Settlement had stated that Belgium be
given a constitution and religious freedom. The failure to get these rights was the fault of the Dutch government rather than
the Vienna Settlement. And for Italy, just as the German States, was not prepared for unification at that time. It was even valid
to say that Italian unification was immature in 1815.
However, once again the Vienna Settlement was not against the idea of nationalism and liberalism. It was only the condition
that was the determining force. As for Norway, it was transferred to Sweden after consulting their own opinion. Moreover,
Norway had long been under foreign rule before 1815 and this combination was maintained up to 1905, indicating that
Norway was quite satisfied with its own condition.
Last of all, though the allied army fighting Napoleon was the army of royal general, it had actually liberated many countries
from foreign rule--- France. This just coincided with the principle of nationalism and liberalism. Though 1815 was followed
by a period of reaction, the principle of union of state and church such as France and Italian states, great political power was
given back to the land-owing class. Some emperors even intended to restore absolute power and the three Eastern reactionary
powers intended to join together to suppress any revolutionary ideas. But all these were the work of the rulers of various
powers, but not the intention of the Vienna Settlement.
As conclusion, the Vienna Settlement had accepted that the clock could not be put back and limited concession was necessary,
though the statesmen of the Vienna Congress had no confidence in the new order and hoped to restore the pre-war condition
as far as possible. Hence for the peace and stability, the statesmen was sensible enough to create the Settlement which was "a
compromise between the old and new order in 1815."
7. Would it be true to say that the Vienna Settlement was wise and moderate? Give reasons
to support your answer.
After the defeat of Napoleon, the most important task of the European powers was to establish peace and stability. It was also
the principle of the Vienna Settlement. However, at that moment, it was never an easy task to establish peace and maintain it
because of the conflicting national interests among the powers and the problems left behind by the Napoleonic Era.
Nevertheless, the Vienna Settlement was wise to work out a compromise between the conflicting national interests and strive
a balance between the powers. Furthermore, it neither involved any major injustice to any one of the powers, not even to the
defeated, nor had been too timid to let any one of them become excessively powerful but kept strictly between the two
extremes. Thus, it may be the best agreement that could be reached in the contemporary Europe and so it was acceptable to all.
So to a large extent, the Vienna Settlement was wise and moderate.
Though Napoleon, the common foe of the European powers was defeated, it did not mean that from then on the 'Concert of
Europe' could be easily established. On the contrary, the defeat of Napoleon exposed further the conflicting national interests
of the European powers, which was a potential threat to the peace of Europe. If a compromise could not be reached about it,
any form of peace settlement would be delicate. The Vienna Settlement was wise because it did work to achieve this fatal
compromise.
Firstly, we should look clearly at the situation of Europe; the Russian wanted a westward expansion that could be obtained
served in her claim to Poland; however, it was of the British and Austrian concern to keep Russia as far as possible from
intervening the European affairs. Then, to the Prussians, it was her interest to increase her influence across her south-west
border, that can be observed clearly in her agreement to support Russia claim in Poland in exchange for Russian support to
her claim in Saxony; however, it was one of the main interests of Austria to stop Prussia from becoming too influential in the
German states. Furthermore, to France, the defeated power her immediate national wants were of course to restore her
prestige and influence; however, it was the common interest of all European states to ensure that there should not be a 'Master
of Europe' anymore. Under these circumstances, establishing peace was never an easy task. However, the Vienna Settlement
did achieve a series of compromise between the powers wisely. The three powers, Britain, France and Austria finally
abandoned the risk of war and let Russia get what she wanted in Poland. To Prussia, it was her pleasure to gain two fifth of
Saxony. However, in the newly created German Confederation, Austria gained an upper hand as she could preside the Diet of
Confederation. Thus, once again, a compromise was reached. To France, though she could not re-established her power
behind her border, she did not suffer from any major injustice too. By the end, a series of compromises between the
conflicting national interest of the five big powers was reached. The five big: Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia
were all satisfied and their being satisfied in fact meant any major conflict in Europe less possible and thus peace could be
maintained and settlement was a success.
The Vienna Settlement was wise also because she did not only reach a series of compromise between conflicting national
interest, but also actively prevented was by establishing a balance of power in the Europe Continent. To the understanding of
Metternich and Castlereagh, the preservation of peace depended on a common front by the victors. Both wanted a 'just
equilibrium' to exist among European states in terms of territory, population and resources. They were less concerned with
obtaining power for their own states than preventing other states from becoming too strong as it would only encourage future
unilateral aggression. So when Russia had made gains in Poland, Austria received compensation at once by re-establishing her
influence in the northern part of Italy and in the German states. While, France was not being unduly weakened as both a
counter-weight to Austria and Russia. So, as the result, of the Vienna Settlement, Russian ambition in the Eastern Europe was
checked by Britain and Austria, Prussia and Austria were incorporated into the German Confederation, Bourbon princes were
reinstated as well as Hapsburg's. The aim was to find and keep a balance among themselves which would prevent any one of
them dominating too large an area of Europe and thus peace would be preserved.
From the above analysis, one may raise a question about the treatment of France in the Settlement. At that time, France was
indeed too major a power to be ignored. Without her participation, a real balance of power in Europe could never be achieved.
Dealing with this delicate issue, the general spirit of the settlement was moderate and lenient. Or we may say that it was wise
for them to be moderate to France. Though it was impossible for the powers to let France to re-establish her power across the
boundary, the powers at the same time did not want to weaken France unduly too. Furthermore, it was also the power's
concern not to humiliate France. Though the Vienna Settlement was concerned with the European Continent as a whole, it did
not provide any article against the First Treaty of Paris by which France could keep her boundary of 1789 and was not
required to pay an indemnity or reparation. Though the Second Treaty of Paris was more harsh to further reduce French
territory into what she was in 1790, impose an indemnity of 200 million francs, send an army of occupation for five years and
asked for the return of art treasure; the terms were still moderate when compared with the panic resulted by the 'Hundred
Days'. The powers were wise to be moderate to France because it may make it easy for the restoration of the Bourbon rule
which would make France a feeling, the powers wanted to let the Bonapartism die naturally.
On the other hand, leniency to France did not mean that she was left unchecked. Though the powers were moderate to France
in order not to create a lasting sense of grievance, the Vienna Settlement at the same time was wise to set up barriers around
France to prevent the revival of a 'master of Europe'. Adjacent to the south-west border of France. Piedmont, which was given
Nice and Genoa, was established as a buffer against her and Austria too received Lombardy and Venetia in order to gain a
strong position acting as a check to French expansion. Adjacent to the northwest border of France, the German Confederation
was formed to get ride of Napoleonic influence and an attempt was made to revive the Holy Roman Empire who was proved
to be ineffective to check France. To the east of France, Belgium was united with Holland in order to strengthen Holland's
border. With regard to the Swiss Confederation, she was strengthened by the addition of three cantons, making twenty-two in
all. Her neutrality was guaranteed by a declaration of the major powers. Thus, by the arrangement of the Vienna Settlement
France was surrounded by many states, which were determined to curb any French expansion.
Another point that illustrated the wisdom and moderation of the Vienna Settlement was her acceptance of new changes as
long as they did not act against the general principle of the settlement, and of course, the national interests of the powers. As a
result, many changes brought about Napoleon in Europe was recognised particularly in the German states. The German
Confederation learnt a lot from the Confederation of Rhine, and the Holy Roman Empire was not restored and many small
states were re-established. They wanted stability and peace so it was wise for them to accept the inevitable.
However, many historians attacked the Vienna Settlement for negligence of the impact of the ideas of the French Revolution,
and thus the peace established after the Napoleonic War was eventually buried by the growing tide of nationalism, liberalism
and democracy. So their conclusion was that the diplomats in 1815 were unwise to neglect the forces of change. However, we
should admit that although the settlement did fail in the long run, the fault of the Vienna Settlement was not that they put the
clock back in 1815, their error was that they hoped to keep the clock stopped at 1815 for the next half of a century. Acting too
much on the principle of nationalism was not unrealistic and impracticable in 1815 while the statesmen's negligence of
liberalism and democracy was also understandable.
With regard to liberalism and democracy, they were not mature enough to gain momentum in 1815. Although the ancient
regime was on the way of decline, the bourgeoisie, the backbone of liberalism and democracy, was all a very minority group
in the western part of Europe at that moment. In the east of Elba, they were totally negligible. Furthermore, these ideas were
too much linked up with the French Revolution. which had once overshadowed the European Continent with Jacobinism,
disturbance, and at last a general war. So we should not blame the Vienna Settlement too much on this issue for at that
moment, peace and stability were the prime concern of most of the European states.
At the same time, acceptance of the principle of nationalism was impossible and undesirable in the circumstances of 1815. For
instance, an independent Belgium would have been though in 1815 to have no chance of survival at all because of its perilous
proximity to France. In Germany, the unification was not in the realm of practical politics in 1815; as firstly, parochialism was
strong enough to overshadow increase the conflict between Prussia and Austria. In Italy, as what Metternich said, 'it was
nothing more than a geographical expression'. Moreover, if we look at Europe as a whole, we may find that, at that moment,
besides the influence of parochialism, a national movement was not mature for most of Europe as there was still the landed
aristocracy placed as the dominant group which symbolized that the distinction of class cut horizontally across the local and
national division of Europe and these local leaders were more concerned about their class interest rather than national
interests. In the west of Elba, the situation was even more complicated. Their confusion of people and classes confined any
political organization of Central and Eastern Europe to a non-national basis.
As a conclusion, due to the work of Vienna Settlement such as the realistic and cool-headed attitude towards critical issues,
the establishing of the balance of power, restoration of the legitimate rulers and the successful creating the barrier encircled
France, Europe could have a comparative peace for forty years; however, the ignorance of the nationalism and liberalism
paved the way for the 1830 and 1848 revolutions. Generally speaking, the Vienna Settlement was, to a large extent, wise and
moderate.
8. Could it be said that the Vienna Settlement met the needs of the time?
As C. A. Leeds states "Vienna Settlement" was "a Congress notables." Many historians have questioned how notable it was
and how much it had met the needs of the time. And it is the latter past which we have to pay attention to. Before we look into
the question. we better bear in mind the comment of Seamen of the Vienna Settlement, "it was concerned solely with restoring
the rights of royal and princely property owners and never with the rights of 'the people'". This will help us to examine the
question.
First of all, we should have an understanding of the backgrounds and needs or forces of that time. At that time, two forces
existed in Europe, they were respectively force of continuity and force of changes. The forces of changes were the legacy of
the French Revolution which consisted the ideas of nationalism, liberalism, fraternity and equality. The force of continuity
was represented by the Monarchs, the Church and the landowners who felt the challenge of the revolutionary ideals to their
ancient regime and tired their best to resist these challenges. Since Napoleon was defeated, it was the force of continuity
which dominated the time. Besides, this force was backed by government and corruption who were exhausted after twentytwo years of war. They longed for peace and stability, so they welcomed back the monarchical rule, which was regarded as a
guarantee of peaceful life against revolution and turmoil. Although Napoleon was defeated no one can deny the fact that the
ideas of the revolution were spreading to the people. Therefore, through a brief introduction of the backgrounds and forces of
the time, one may saw the basis needs of them. Their needs were mainly peace, legitimacy return of old orders and territories,
security against France invasion, and somewhat liberalism, nationalism and equality.
Secondly, we have to look into administration of the Vienna Settlement. Apparently, it was a settlement for all powers but
actually, it was dominated by Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria and even France. Instead of fulfilling the needs of the time, the
settlement aimed at "Consisted the divisions among the victors of the spoils and to revive the balance of power in Europe."
Therefore, the domination and self-interest of the "Big Five" had actually diverted the settlements.
Significantly, we have to seek the self-interests of these five powers. Castlereagh of Britain wanted to safeguard Britain's trade
and maintain rights. He also wanted to check Russia expansion and tired to create strong barriers around France. Metternich
of Austria wanted to preserve the status quo and was "totally out of sympathy with national and liberal ideas" as C. A. Leeds
has alleged. Alexander I of Russia hoped to have liberalism and maintain Russia national interest in Poland. Frederick
William of Prussia was conservative and decided to back Russia. Talleyrand of France simply wanted to promote and
safeguard French interests. And it was basically these self-interests of the "Big Five" which put down the principle of the
Settlement. They were legitimacy, security against French Revolution, balance of powers, national self-interest and
compensation, restoration of territories and nationality neglected.
Now, it is time for us to examine these principles and see how far they met the needs of the times or the needs of the "Big
Five". For the principle of legitimacy, most of the rightful kings and rulers were restored. For instance, House of Savoy was
restored in Sardinia and Piedmont, House of Orange in Poland, the Bourbon family was restored in France, Spain and Naples
and Pope was restored in Papal States. Anthony Wood has said "Vienna was a more genuine Congress" and Hardy has
stated " Earth's wormy dynasties re-robe." However, for the sake of balance of powers, this principle was not applied to
Belgium and Poland. Besides, some unpopular absolute monarchies were restored. Therefore, discontent would turn out.
For the principle of security against French Revolution, David Thomson has said, "the territorial indeed drastic safeguard
against a resurgence of France." For this reason, buffer states were created to round up France. However, for the preservation
of this principle, sacrifices were made in Belgium, Poland, Italy and Rhineland.
For the principle of balance of Power, a historian has alleged "the Vienna peace Settlement of 1815 at the close of Napoleonic
wars attempted with considerable success to restore in Europe an effective balance of power and hence paved the way to a
long period of peace." To achieve, this principle, compensation is inevitable, as David Thomson says, 'the settlement was a
network of bargains and negotiated compromises." And it is these compromises which helped to show the selfishness of the
peacemakers. Some of them gained more and some got less. For instance, Russia got most in Poland and Britain got France
overseas colonies which would strengthen her naval power. A revolutionary phenomenon would exist those who were rich
became much richer, for those who were weak became weaker.
Together with these principles, principle of restoration of territories was following. However, owing to the above principles,
old territorial situation was impossible to be restored perfectly. Besides, nationalism was neglected, ideas of liberalism and
equality were ignored. Despite their desire for independence, Poland, Belgium and Finland were handed over to foreign
governments. Little was done in encouraging an united Italy. Nevertheless, nationalism was not yet a strong force at that
period. Therefore, not much discontents were aroused by these.
For the achievement of peace, one must bear in mind "it was not technically a peace conference" as David Thomson states.
However, through the processes of balance of power and territorial arrangements, powers, especially the "Big Five", were
satisfied with their spoils of victory and no one of them wanted to have war. So Seaman says "they did in fact prevent a
general European conflagration for a whole century of time" and "wars are neither caused nor prevented by treaties, but by
polices." What prevented a major war until 1853, was a determination made easier by the fact that the Vienna Settlement
involved no major injustice to anyone of them, not even to the defeated.
As a conclusion, the settlement was dominated by the "Big Five" and interests of the small powers and individuals were
disregarded. As I have already quoted Seaman statement, "it restored the rights of royal and princely property owners, not
'right of peoples'". Therefore, one may frankly says that needs of the "Big Five" and the royal property owns were met. For
the other needs, most of them were scarified for the sake of balance of powers. But the it may argued that the leadership were
"not wholly selfish" for they still hoped to have some form of unity in Europe which was longed for by the powers, After all,
Vienna Settlement had brought unexpected merits which was feverly hoped for by the whole. As David Thomson states,
"Vienna had the practical merits of giving Europe nearly half a century of comparative peace and this was what most
Europeans most fervently wanted in 1815.
9. Describe the role played by Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15?
Castlereagh, Metternich and Alexander I wanted not only to confine power to themselves, but to do it in such a way that might
avoid outraging the rest of the Congress and also evade summoning it into plenary session. These narrow intentions, slightly
received by adroit and dramatic objection from Talleyrand, and produced the simplest organisation of the Congress
imaginable. The Four (later Five) retained the control of territorial questions.
For Talleyrand the moment of opportunity had finally arrived. He had come to Vienna in September as the head of a defeated
power, theoretically excluded from inner decision by to the secret articles oft he First Peace of Pairs, and practical, prevented
from participation by the success of the leading powers in retaining the initiatives themselves. Much has been made of his
proposal for that sacred principles of legitimacy which had often, and erroneously been described as the dominating them of
the peace conference. He came fortified with the most exploit directive of any of the participation statesmen in the form of the
elaborate King's instructions conceived by himself. In it he hold legitimacy to be the best advice for establishing the separate
entitles of the state-system, governing conception for Europe as while. According to the instructions, he accepted perpetual
neutrality of Switzerland, he sought to limit Prussian gains in West Germany to check her power within the new German
Confederation, which itself should not be strong, and equally cleared aimed at generally finishing compensation to the
member, of coalitions.
Talleyrand at Vienna showed extra-ordinary skill. Refusing to accept as permanent France's exclusion from the inner meetings
of the peace conference, he devoted most of his energy to working his way in. By offering leadership to the disgruntled
representatives of the medium size and small powers he was able to harass and embarrass the statesmen of the leading powers.
In his eagerness to council limit the compensation of Prussia, he stood for denying Saxony to her and thus, formed in October,
annoyed enterprises. Castlereagh felt to at Talleyrand should have co-operated in checking Prussia before everything else.
Talleyrand often praised for his prediction of the defeat of Castlereagh and Metternich over clans, might have prevented that
defeat if he had stood with them against Czar during October. This point, however, remains speculative, and whatever one
thinks of his conduct in the autumn, his stock had risen noticeably by winter time.
On the 12th December, 1814 Talleyrand sent Metternich a written overturn for alliance and receiving encouragement,
repeated it a week later. Shortly there after the creation of the statistical committee served inadvertently as the point of entry
for Talleyrand into the inner councils of the Congress. Arriving unwanted at the first meeting, he successfully resisted
expulsion by threatening to withdraw the French delegation from Vienna. Having crossed the threshold, he still had to
penetrate the inner sanctum of the Four. The time of that, too, was now at hand.
Castlereagh, although aware of the rapprochement between Talleyrand and Metternich, had until Christmas been chary of
giving them an exploit indication of his interest in an alliance. However, with the Four Powers still deadlocked over the
disposition of Saxony, he finally indicated that he was ready to enter a treaty relationship and to urge the acceptation of
Talleyrand within the inner group of ministers. When the Four Powers met on 29th December, Castlereagh and Metternich
demand the Talleyrand be included in the top ministerial council, thereby expanding the Four to Five. Their request evoked
highly agitated responses from Hardenberg and Hesselrode, who naturally sought to evade any arrangement giving three
values to their two on the Saxony issue. The Prussian Chancellor, usually discrete and usually able through his deafness to
avoid hearing what he disliked, not only heard the proposal but was moved to declare in the meeting 31st December that a
refusal to cede Saxony to Prussia was tantamount to war.
The statesmen thus squeezed past the most bitter phase of the Conference. When it was over, Talleyrand reported statically to
Louis XVIII: "the coalition is dissolved, and for ever. Not only does France, no longer stand alone in Europe but- France is in
concert with two of the greatest powers, and three of the second."
The Russians, having the secured their own chief aim, were now less eager to risk war over gains for the Prussia ally through
use of this advantage Castlereagh and secured the Czar's support for compromise on Saxony, and was then able to devote the
remainder of January to modifying the intransigence of Metternich and Hardenberg.
The Italian Settlement, a complex affair, was stalemated for months and unsolved until May 1815. Murat's daring manoeuvre
worked successfully in 1814, but Metternich, thus committed, found himself entangled with Talleyrand who sought to oust
Murat and restore the legitimate Spanish Bourbon Monarch. The problem remained until Murat soled it during the excitement
of the Savored Days be his further gamble on switching back to Napoleon and attempting to raise Italy against Austria. He
had no alternative, since Metternich had Castlereagh had already secretly agreed to unseat him. Talleyrand succeeded in
restoring the Bourbons in Naples.
With Alexander I, Castlereagh and Wellington in agreement with Metternich not off, preponderance lay clearly with a policy
of moderation. Hardenberg indicated on 28th August 1815 that he would moderate his position and Alexander I eager to avert
a humiliating setback for Prussia, said that he would support moderate territorial concessions from France. The items which
they presented to France on 20th September, were disconcertingly refused by Talleyrand just before he was replaced by his
successor, the Duc de Richelieu, who soon accepted a slightly altered version.
They theory of equilibrium, although clearing domination, the peace settlement did not pervade it to the exclusion of other
conceptions. Legitimacy claimed much support, but even Talleyrand, regarded its as a subordinate ingredient of the more
comprehensive theory of the balance of power.
Talleyrand gave timely assistance in the restoration of the Bourbon, resourcefully worked his way into the inner delegation of
the Congress, and was to some degree responsible for salvation.
10. Evaluate Alexander I's role at the Congress of Vienna, 1814-15.
In the city of Paris the moment belonged wholly to Alexander. Napoleon's emissaries secured the Czar of the offer of Elba,
commitment which could have been averted if Castlereagh and Metternich had reached Paris earlier. Through exchanges
which appear to have been amicable, terms were soon settled with Talleyrand and signed on 30 May in the treaty known as
the First Peace of Paris. Alexander I favoured Talleyrand and advised Louis XVIII to issue a constitution as the basis of the
French government of restoration and as a means to reconciliation the forces of the old order and revolution in France. Within
three months the allies had bound themselves by the Treaty of Chaumont, occupied Napoleon's capital, sent him to his island
kingdom, restored the Bourbons, and written for France a peace treaty free of indemnities, occupation and humiliation. Even
this had its uses in smoothing the way to diminishing the threat of a civil war in France, and enabling her to be represented in
the Congress of Vienna.
Alexander of Russia was supported by the most international group of advisers at the Congress - the Russian Raymovskil;
Nesserirode, his foreign minister of German extractional Stein, distinguished reformer and exile from Prussian Services;
Czartoryski of Poland; and Pozzo de Boyo, Corsican enemy of Bonaparte. Despite the presence of these men, the Czar
intended to handle many important matters himself.
The Russian began to reveal their plan, drafted in August and dominated by the principle of Compensation for Russia, Prussia
and Austria. It stood against a unified Germany; gave most of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia; Posen, Kulm and Saxony to
Prussia and parts of South Germany, north Italy, and the Illyrian provinces and Dalmatia to Austria. These proposed terms lay
at the centre of the biggest and bitterest fight at the Congress, the struggle over the disposal of Poland and Saxony. Although
not adjacent, these two territories were tightly linked, primarily because of the Czar's insistence on the basis Russian formula
that Poland should go to Russia and Saxony to Prussia. Since Russian troops occupied both areas, he had scarcely to whisper
to be heard with frightening clarity. This emphasis within his formulation lay on the Russian gains, and this meant that early
Congress activity was primarily concerned with the Polish half of the formula.
The background of the problem was complicated. As a consequence of the three partition of Poland the Russians had been
poised after 1795 on the edge of old Catholic which had formed the bulk of the Prussian and Austria gains of '93 and 95'.
Then Napoleon, after his victories in 1805-06, had taken this region to create the new duchy of Warsaw, his satellite outpost
in East Europe. The area was especially significant to Poles, because it lay at the geographical heart of Polish culture.
Although obviously attractive to the Russian--- its retention by Russia and the concomitant denial to Prussian and Austrian
of their former Polish lands would mean, however, that these powers would have to seek adequate compensation elsewhere.
Alexander himself was undoubtedly one of the most puzzling leader of his day, brought up by a French septic, he had swung
strongly towards a deep Christian commitment a sensitive idealist; he resented and was often unable to cope with the arch
decisions he had to make; a moralist he was plagued the awareness of a tacit participation in the murder of his father. He
wavered between the cold mechanics of the balance of Power, urging proportions appropriate for maintaining the general
equilibrium, and lights of idealism, distrusted by the others, in which he spoke of his moral duty to minister to the happiness
of the Poles. They were to enjoy a semblance of national existence in a separate Polish kingdom linked with Russia.
For several more months Castlereagh and Metternich continued to concentrate on Polish half of the Russian formula.
However, with no further reason for them to cope for appropriate concessions from the Czar, they were compelled to turn to
the other half of the formula and block the cession of Saxony to Prussia.
On the new year's day of 1815, Castlereagh submitted a draft of an alliance to Metternich. Nesselrode tried to secure a
compromise, but Hardenburg continued to claim all Saxony for bargaining purposes. Metternich blocked by refusing the
Prussian of any part of Saxony. He was considerably helped by the right that the new western frontier of Poland had been
virtually settled on 3rd January 1815 when Metternich had placed before the Four Courts the Austrian counter project to the
formal Russian proposals of 30th December. This 30th December document revealed Austria still to be in strong
disagreement with Russia over Saxony but in complete accord with her on the boundary of Poland. Their agreement really
determined the frontier which was written into the Final Act of the Congress in June. The Russian having secured their own
chief aim, were now kiss eager to raise was over gains for the Prussian ally. Through use of this advantage Castlereagh
secured the Czar's support for compromise on Saxony.
One of his benevolence and Christian concept of morality Alexander proposed a constitution for the separate kingdom of
Poland which was placed under his personal rule, and secured on the Congress of Vienna's guarantee for the Polish
Constitution.
Castlereagh and Metternich discovered to their great relief that Alexander had redirectly involved, the Czar favored their
policy of moderation over the harsh designs of his Prussian ally. Alexander had increasingly turned toward religion since
1812, and been through a deeply religious experience in the spring of 1815 which made a strong impression on Russian policy
throughout the year and which doubtlessly explains much of his gentlemen in this period. With Alexander, Castlereagh and
Wellington in agreement and Metternich not far off, preponderance lay with the policy of moderation. Hardenburg, although
isolated, pressed his country's demand vigorously, but in vain. Under the Second Peace of Paris France received the frontiers
of 1790, failing to keep the considerably more generous lines of the First Peace of Paris. The French were not asked to cede
Alsace-Lorraine, although Prussian took over the responsibility of defending the Western frontier of Germany by enlarging
her holdings in the West.
Alexander I sought a general alliance for redressing the balance of Power against the British influence in Europe. He
proposed for disarmament in April 1815, designed to suggest that any pruning of military powers on the Continent should be
collective instead of isolated 2 action against the Barbary pirates and worked on the resentment of all the larger maritime
powers against an extended use of British navy's claim to right of visit and search in suppressing the slave trade.
A device for shoring up the peace settlement appeared with the Czar's treaty of the Holy Alliance, which he hoped his fellow
Monarchy would sign, and by which they would make of themselves a true and indissoluble fraternity, searing to base their
conduct of foreign affairs on the precepts of Holy religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Charity and Peace, which far from
being applicable only to private concerning must have an immediate influence on the councils of prince.
Alexander I, as the ruler of Russia, was original in the national interests of Russia kept Bosh, Finland and Bessarabia which
the Russian troops had occupied during the Napoleonic War.
Alexander assumed responsibility for the direct march on Paris in 1814 joined in giving timely support to moderation in
handling France, and by signing Poland at the Congress of Vienna, would virtually the entire Congress Settlement and also
gave Russia her greatest westward extension of influence up to that time.
11. Examine the influence of Alexander I in the European politics during 1815-25.
Alexander I had gathered some liberal ideas from his French tutor, but as a Czar of Russia, he could not be a liberal at heart.
In 1814, he was entrusted with the command of all the allied forces and it was he was persuaded Napoleon from Leipzig to
Moris. The Russian military power remained undestroyed in the years following 1815. The victories now won and the military
force at this command engrossed the Tsar, Alexander with ambition. For these reasons the Russian power constituted a threat
to the international peace during 1815-25 despite his peaceful professions.
In 1814-15, he was the one who agrees with Castlereagh that France be treated leniently at the end of the Napoleonic War,
and that she should have a constitutional monarchy to reconcile the forces of the old and the revolution. He urged Louis
XVIII to grant the Royal Charter of 1814 to his subjects. Obviously Alexander I understood well if a European balance was to
be maintained then France had to be kept intact as a counter-weight in the seal. Indeed after Napoleon had fallen out,
Alexander I taught himself to be the master of Europe. If it could be alone, the structure of European balance should be turned
to check the expansion of the British sea power.
At the Congress of Vienna, 1814-15 Alexander I negotiated with the sword in his hand. His proposal that Russia to be given
the whole of Poland with Prussia to receive Saxony in it's entirely would extend the Russian influence further to the west if it
were accepted. Castlereagh joined Metternich in resisting the Russian pain, and the crisis thus generated nearly brought about
a war between Russian and Prussia on the one hand and Austria, Britain on the other. Talleyrand threw the French weight
behind the weaker side. Only after the agree powers, Austria, Britain and France entered into the secret alliance of January
1815 that Russian and Prussian beat a retreat of compromise was reached by which Russia was to absorb a large share of
Poland including the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and some Polish provinces previously held by Prussia, while Prussia gained a
half of Saxony. Even under such an arrangement Prussia still dominate in the Eastern Europe with Austria to serve as an
inflective barriers.
For deep in a religious mood, genuinely concerned with he well being of the Europeans and yet reviling with Metternich for
the leadership in international affairs, Alexander I proposed on November, 1815 his famous plan for the maintenance of peace
in the world. The primary aim of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance was to commit all nation to the codes of behaviors and
conducts and the morality affirmed by Christianity and brother Holy at the Congress of Vienna too, Alexander I sought to
prong instead the British naval power by proposing a general disarmament, collective instead of isolated British action against
the Barbary pirates and limitation on British navy's rights to visit and search slave versions.
True it is a piece of mysticism and nonsense as Castlereagh had put it. Though it was conceived by Alexander I and advisers
as a way to maintain the existing order and so to prevent a revolutionary reconstruction to the social and political order, it
cannot be rightly considered as originating an international fire brigade against absolutism, when they signed the secret treaty
at Munchengrats in 1833.
In 1815, Alexander I still appeared as one of the very few spokesmen for nationalism and played with the idea of liberty. Thus
he claimed the revival of the Polish kingdom; secured a guarantees from the Congress of Vienna for the Polish constitution of
1815 which provided for a constitution monarchy in Poland and he took care to make clear that Poland was under his personal
rule, and not to be ruled as part of Russia. Alexander I's liberal experiment in Poland proved to be failure. The Polish mobility
was not cooperative, each to care for his own interest and the Polish nationalists refused to give up their dream of receiving
Ukraine, then a part of the Russian Empire, and they were discontented for Alexander I refused to satisfy their claim on
Lithuania.
As early as 1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander I proposed for the organisation of an international
expeditionary force to help the Spanish Bourbons put out revolutions in the Spanish colonies in South America. In spite of
Russia's own weakness of sea, Alexander I might hope in time to draw a reviving Spain, France and Holland and possibly
even the United States to creating globally a balance of power like that which England naturally wished to confine to the
continent of Europe. Earlier in 1825, he already transferred some old warships to Spain and even Holland by marrying his
own sister to the Dutch crown Minorca as a naval base, though the attempt was short live.
In early 1820's there were the liberal revolts in Spain, Germany, Naples and Piedmont and the Greeks rose in a rebellion
against Turkey. The right of the absolute rulers was threatened. In each of those cases, the reaction of England and Austria
were different. But the two powers cooperated with chiefly because Castlereagh saw the necessity of bolstering up Austria as
the pivot of the balance, that is, a barrier against Russian despotism in the East and against French revolutionary force in the
West. In all cases Alexander I wanted allied intervention if he could have it. He aimed at imposing a moderate character on
King and the insurgents. Hence Alexander I's approval of the Troppau Protocol and his acquiescence in Austrian's
intervention in Italy and French occupation of Spain.
As regards Spain and the Spanish colonies, he still hoped to keep for Spain enough strength to be reckoned in the scale along
the France against the sea power of England. His plan was made ineffective unity be Castlereagh's president's Monroe
Doctrine of 1823 which was a death-blow to the so-called "Congress System".
The Greek revolt of 1821 against Turkey provided an occasion for Russia to extend her influences to the Mediterranean. Both
Hypsilanti and Capodistrin had served with Alexander I and had received from the Czar confronted with Anglo-Russian
combination, Alexander I had to deny any Russian encouragement to the Greek cause. Still Alexander I contemplate
intervention. In January 1824 he proposed dividing Greece into three principalities with a self-governing state under Turkish
Austeraisnty. This seemed to be merely a device for ensuring Russian predominance. The Congress at St. Petersburg at which
Alexander I resided did not give Russia a mission to intervene on behalf of Greece, for Metternich feared that a change of the
Near East would call to a drastic revision of the 1815 settlement.
In the years following the Congress of Vienna, the "conservative alliance" led by Alexander I rather than Metternich had been
active and had gained the upper-handed. As a result, the European balance was tight to the advantage of eastern despotism.
By 1823 Britain hardly had a foothold on the Continent of Europe. Canning was to seek his revenge first in the America and
Portugal and then in the Near East.
12. "The Vienna Settlement caused a century of conflict and instability because it ignored
the idea of progress and tried to restore the old order." Do you agree with this statement?
It is held by some historian that the Vienna Settlement had ignored the principle of liberalism and nationalism. It tried to
embody the principles of reaction as the permanent basis of the European order. The reactionary character of the Vienna
Settlement is contrasted with the democratic and progressive spirit of the Versailles Settlement of 1919. 1815 saw the
restoration of reactionary dynasties; 1919 saw a world made 'safe for democracy' and devoted to 'the self-determination of
peoples'. A study of the Vienna Settlement may help to disapprove of this view.
The allied victory did free Europe from the domination of the French. French soldiers and administrators were expelled from
the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. From all these areas there was removed the menace of
conscription into the armies of a foreign despot, or the threat of having to fight is an army forcibly devoted to that despot's
ambition.
The Vienna Settlement did not only restore the rights of nobles, clergy and property-owners and ignore the rights of the
people. The principle of legitimacy was not strictly applied everywhere. It was ignored in Western Germany, in Poland,
Saxony, Norway, the Austrian Netherlands and Northern Italy. It was exclusively applied to the French Bourbons, but it was
only for them that Metternich invested this principle.
In terms of nationalism, the acceptance of the principle of nationalism in the sense of united and independent nation-state was,
in the circumstances of 1815, either impossible, or undesirable, or both. In fact, the events of 1919-1939 may have shown that
even by 1918, the application of nationalism in certain parts of Europe is still undesirable.
The Belgians were transferred without their consent from Hapsburg Empire to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. But as
independent Belgium would have been thought in 1815 to have no chance of survival at all, because of its perilous proximity
to France. Not even all the Belgians wasted independence, even in 1830. The reason why Belgium was able to achieve
independence as a neutral country under a European guarantee was that France under Louis Philippe pursued a foreign policy
which the other European countries, especially Britain, found it easy to handle. In 1815 when the memory of French
expansionism was still so very fresh, the men of Vienna would not have given Belgium an independence that would make it
defenceless in the path of the largest and most aggressive nation in Western Europe.
Similarly, the failure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands can not be ascribed to the 1815 arrangements. This was due to the
failure of House of Orange to apply faithfully the spirit of and the terms of the document on which the union of the two
regions was based. The 1815 Settlement imposed on the Dutch the duty of guaranteeing religious toleration and commercial
equality to their new Belgian subjects. But the Dutch did not comply with this arrangement. So the Dutch and not he men of
1815 made the mistake that led to the breakup of the unions.
The unification of Germany was not practical in 1815. Nobody at the Congress wanted it. Prussia and Austria did not like the
idea. Other powers rejected the idea because it would mean the expansion of Prussia and Austria, resulting in the increase of
German power. Certainly, the diplomats at Vienna would not agree to any settlement that would lead to the end of their own
countries. The unification of Germany would mean exactly the disappearance of Prussia and Austria as independent countries.
In any case, the 1815 Settlement did create a German bund with much smaller number of states than before. The Germany of
1815 was much less divided than it has been in 1789, since the Congress of Vienna did not undo the work of Napoleon in
Western Germany. Moreover, the act setting up the Confederation required the rulers of the German states to establish
constitutions. Although the Carlsbad Decrees were designed to nullify this provision, liberal constitution of some kind were
not banished from Germany in the years after Vienna either in theory or in practice; their absence was in any case not
prescribed by the 1815 settlement.
The settlement of Italy may seem the most objectionable part of the arrangements in western Europe. Except in the Kingdom
of Sardinia, and with the doubtful exception of the Papal States. Italy was given over more completely than ever to the rule of
the foreigner. Northern Italy passed into the control of the Hapsburgs. But this arrangement is understandable in the light of
past developments. Bonapartism was born through the Italian campaign. The lesson of the past was that the lack of Austrian
control in Italy would result in the French domination of Italy and not in Italian freedom. In 1815, after such a long period of
war, the overriding aim of any settlement was to achieve general peace. It is possible to argue that the unification of Italy was
premature even in 1870. So it is much too early to think of a united Italy in 1815. Metternich and the other conservative
statesmen did see that changes had been made and they did not try to reverse the changes. On the whole, the Vienna statesmen
did not put the clock back in 1815; they only tried to keep the clock stopped at 1815 for the next half-century. This was
certainly the aim of Metternich, the Russians and the Prussians; their negative policy in the years after 1815 is far more at
fault than the Vienna Settlement itself.
The Polish arrangement also seemed to deny the idea of liberty and nationality. On the surface, Poland was made an
independence country with a constitution. In fact, it was very much under the Russian influence. The apparent independence
statehood and the constitution was an attempt to get the support of the liberals and nationalists of the Polish region. But it was
in fact a creation of the Czar Alexander I in an effort to extend Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Alexander I tried to
create a Polish client-state by means of which he would extend the influence of Russia into Europe further than before.
Russian ambition frightened both Austria and Britain and even France. In fact, the Polish question helped to draw these
powers together and restore France back to the rank of the Great Powers.
Norway was transferred from Denmark to Sweden, against the wishes of the Norwegians. The Norwegians protested. So the
Act of Union between the two countries declared that their unity had been achieved 'not by force of arms but by free
conviction'; and Norway had its own government, parliament, army and navy. The Great Powers accepted this solution; this
proved the practical sense and realistic wisdom of the men of 1815. The fact that the settlement of Norway endured till 1905
and was then ended peaceably, is sufficient indication that he difficulties that persisted through the century were not major
ones.
Nevertheless, the Vienna Settlement must not be regarded as having of itself prevented European war for a century. It is
possible to say that it contained in none of its provisions the seeds of a future war between the great powers, and must thus be
rated a better peace than Versailles. Versailles humiliated the Germans; created democratic but defenceless new nations;
abolished old minority problems only to create new ones; disappointed the Italians but inflate the French; released the
irrational forces of the masses instead of the orderliness of Vienna due to the ignoring of the masses. For the disregard of
Liberalism and nationalism at Vienna did not cause war. They were right in thinking in 1815 that before revolutions can make
wars, there must first be the wars that encourage the revolutions. They saw that the issue of peace and war are decided by the
great powers and by them alone. Hence the simple fact that the Vienna Settlement contained no clause that offered any of the
great powers a pretext for war is its complete and sufficient justification.
Yet ultimately, wars are neither caused nor prevented by treaties, but by policies. What prevented a major war until 1853 was
the determination of the great powers that there should not be such a war: a determination made easier by the fact that the
Vienna Settlement involved no major injustice to any one of them, not even to the defeated. The cause of peace was not
seriously jeopardised until Louis Napoleon became Napoleon III. He was the first ruler of a great power consciously to desire
the overthrow of the Vienna system: and it is his arrival on the scene that very largely accounts for the wars of the 1850s and
1860s. These wars broke the alliance of the great powers, on which the maintenance of the Vienna System depends, and then
destroyed the Vienna Settlement in Italy and Germany. By 1871, neither the territorial boundaries nor the political institutions
of the European powers bore much resemblance to those of 1815. If there was peace in Europe for forty years after 1815, the
credit must go mainly to Metternich, but also to Palmerston and to Nicholas I. That there were wars between 1853 and 1871
was due mainly to Napoleon III. That there was no general war between 1871 and 1917 does not mean that peace prevailed in
any sense in that period. There might have been wars in 1875, 1878, 18855, 1898, 1906, 1911 or 1912. Thus, it was avoided
on each of these occasions had nothing to do with the Congress of Vienna. It was due to the lack of reasons to go to war for
each Great Power. Or rather, the developments of events have not yet reached a point when war seemed to the statesmen to be
the inevitable solution to the internal and international problems they faced at home and abroad. One vital difference is in the
economic developments of various countries in the years 1815 to 1914. In the years of 1870 to 1914, economic growth of
Europe had undergone a tremendous leap and the development of economic imperialism has given international relations a
new tension and a whole new dimension of conflict. The economic basis of power conflicts combined with the nationalist
unrest of multi-national empires and the militant expansionism of ruling classes to throw countries into war with one another.
The conflict of interests among various powers underlie the cause for the outbreak of the First World War rather than the
shortcomings of the Vienna Settlement. Generally speaking, the Vienna Settlement can be considered a wise, practical and
pragmatic arrangement that meets the realistic needs of existing time in 1815.
13. How successful had the Congress System managed to preserve the Vienna Settlement
up to 1848?
After the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire, the victorious powers met at Vienna for a peaceful Settlement. The powers aimed
at maintaining the balance of power, preventing wars and revolutions, restraining France, restoring legitimacy and accepting
the fail accomplished. Moreover, at the Congress, the powers suggested further cooperation to settle all disputes that might
endanger the Settlement and the peace of Europe. Hence, the Congress system was thus derived. As it trained out, however,
powers clashed over problems of common interest. This contributed to the breakdown of the Congress System and the
increasing tensions created by mutual suspicion opened the doors to liberal and nationalist revolts in the later years.
Eventually, the Vienna Settlement was also destroyed. The events up to 1848 was essential proving that the Congress
System failed to preserve the Vienna Settlement.
In 1818, the powers first met at Aix-la-Chapelle to discuss the question of France. At Vienna, Russia suggested the Holy
Alliance and met with failure. Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the other hand, had agreed to form the Quadruple
Alliance in defence of the Vienna Settlement by upholding the Congress System, in order to maintain peace and the balance
of power, France was admitted to join the Quadruple Alliance and then thus it became the Quintuple Alliance. Moreover, to
restore the principle of legitimacy, the powers agree to withdraw the army of occupation at Paris so as to strengthen the
position of Louis XVIII. This marked the first success of the Congress System in preserving the Vienna Settlement.
However, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, powers disagreed over some issue: allies standing army in Belgium to
suppress revolution, the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean and the slave trade. This marked the fast failure of the powers
cooperation upheld by the Congress System in preserving the Vienna Settlement.
In 1820, as revolutionary movements were active in the New world, powers met at Troppau so as to find revolution. As a
result, the Troppau Protocol was signed with British refusal. The powers were now separated between the East and the West.
Though Britain refused to intervene, the Troppau Protocol aimed at suppressing the revolts, maintaining peace, restoring war
and cooperation of Russia, France, Austria and Prussia. The congress was still successful to preserve the Vienna Settlement
even though it marked the difference between the policies of the powers.
The Congress of Laibach (1821) was adjourned Congress of Troppau and by which Austria was allowed to send troops to put
down revolts in Naples and Piedmont and to restore their King, Charles Felix. This slowed that Metternich was very eager to
try his best effort in suppressing revolts to consolidate his own interest. This meant that the main reason for the Vienna
Settlement through the upholding of the `Congress System' was just pushed forward by the forces of conservatism. This was
in fact invented by Metternich,as Thomson had said. Hence, over several problems concerning their own interest and thus the
Metternich System failed to preserve the status quo in 1815.
In 1822, revolution broke out again in Spain. Hence, the Congress was called at Verona. France slowed her eagerness to
intervene but Britain first refused to support. Later, in 1823, America put forward the Monroe Doctrine. As a result, there was
no intervention from South American Colonies. Nevertheless, the balance of power was still maintained as each power feared
of the growing position of others. Moreover, peace was maintained as the revolt was suppressed. However, it was very
cleaned that the real aim of the powers cooperation to preserve the Vienna Settlement was to consolidate their own interest.
Consequently, after the four congresses, jealousy and suspicion among powers lead to separation among them. From that time
onwards, revolts and revolutions broke out frequently. Though most of these revolts met with failure, it showed that Vienna
Settlement was indeed going into failure.
In 1821, the Greek revolted. In view of the revolt, Alexander I wanted to extend her influence in Balkans though the of the
Greeks. In 1827, Britain, Russia and France signed the Treaty of London to help the Greek revolt with the opposition of
Austria and Prussia. Finally, the Greeks were able to get Independence. The division of opinion and action eventually broke
up the Congress System and hence proved a failure of the system in preserving the idea of suppressing revolution made at the
Vienna Settlement.
Between 1821 to 1830, revolts were common the South American states, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Poland, Prussia
and Austria. In 1824, Britain recognized the Independence of the South American states. In 1830's, where revolutions were
sparked of by the "July Revolution" in everywhere Belgium, with the aid of Britain and France, also success in gaining
Independence from Holland. Though some other revolts met with failure, the idea of nationalism and liberalism take it root
from that time onwards. The powers separated by their self-interests no longer cooperated to preserve the Vienna Settlement.
The years between 1830 to 1848 was known as the years of Revolution. As countries saw the successful made by the
Spaniards, the Greeks and the Belgians, they gained aspiration from them. Hence, during this period, Posen, Cracow,
Switzerland, Greek, Serbia, France, Germany, Austria and Italy started revolutions. The revolutions further spread the idea of
nationalism and liberalism against the foreign powers. At the end of 1848, what had laid down in the Vienna Settlement
almost been destroyed powers did not cooperate, legitimacy was overthrown, nationalism and liberalism gained ground,
France was strengthened as Napoleon III came to the thrown in 1848 and this broke the balance of power.
Nevertheless, in so far as the congress system meant that the great powers of Europe could usefully meet together from time
to time to resolve disputes among them and to preserve balance of power in the continent, it met with partial success and help
to keep the peace. But in so far as it came to serve the Quadruple Alliance, it was a disturbing force in Europe. Hence, to
conclude, the Congress System was successful to preserving the Vienna Settlement only in the sense that powers cooperated
to maintain a general peace up to the Crimean War of 1854. As concerned with other aims at the Vienna Settlement
legitimacy, nationalism, liberalism, balance of power, the Congress System was a complete failure in achieving its task.
14. "The Congress System failed to maintain peace during the nineteenth century."
Comment.
By 1815 all the great powers of Europe including Austria, Russia, Britain, Prussia had already calmed down Europe by
suppressing the Napoleonic conquest of Europe and reduced French power to the reasonable low level such that it could not
harm the general peace of Europe. It was this period that gave it seemed that general peace of Europe was the main concern
of all powers and states and that all countries treasured this peace even though some sacrifices had to be made. Therefore, in
the Vienna Settlement, may small countries consent to the judgement of the peacemakers like Belgium which was to be
combined with Holland to form the Netherlands and Spain which was to be under the guardians of the Bourbon and Italy and
Germany also had to be under the Austrian rule. This settlement, although at first sight was unfair to the small states but
there was no doubt that all these countries followed the instruction willingly. Besides, there was also other states like
Switzerland and Poland who benefited from the settlement by having their independence and constitution. Therefore, there
was no complaint among the great countries and small states.
The atmosphere of 1815 was then harmonized by the contentment of the European countries and hope was thrown to them
that further co-operation that can be seen in future. That was why in 1815, besides the compensation of counties and the
redrawing of map of Europe, the peacemaker also did not hesitate to form some basic idea to guard the future trend of Europe.
Like Talleyrand proposed the legitimacy idea--- although this idea was to the countries a kind of pressure and suppression,
trending to eliminate their independence and future but no doubt most counties urged for peace so much that they were willing
to accept the uphold of ancient regime. To the great countries this principle was extremely true to Austria whose country
contained a cosmopolitan nature and without such legitimate principle, other principalities would rise and get their own
freedom and hence endangered the Hapsburg Empire. As Francis Joseph once said "my reign is like a worn-eaten house it
one part fall, one will imagine how much will fall" and hence in ruling Austria, Metternich also treated Europe as part of his
country such that the external stability will help to maintain his internal affairs. Moreover, it was also to, note that before the
settlement, there were also some pre-congress promise to restore the prince of Roman Tuscany and Modena in Italy as well as
Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden in Germany for their help in forming the 4th Coalition against Napoleon. Hence if such
matter was not settled, discontent would arise and no general arise and no general peace will be achieved. Apart from this,
to check French military forces was also a main direction to general peace in Europe. To all powers especially Britain,
France power was a direct threat to her trade in war time as Castlereagh proclaimed Britain would commit herself only to the
return of Napoleon and his family to the French throne hence to all powers to check a single domination of power in Europe
was necessary and essential therefore all Europe needed now was also a balance of the powers through suppressing French
excessive power.
All these principles thus lay the foundation for the immediate, if not future, peace of Europe. And to hope that such peace
will continue, the power did not hesitate to form alliance to maintain peace like the Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance
which were proposed by Russia and Britain respectively. The main aim of the Holy Alliance was to make all powers rule
according to the doctrine of Christianity, but such ideology in politic was a bit absurd and vague. Hence, it was to
Castlereagh "a great piece of mysticism and nonsense" and to Metternich "a high sounding nothing". Yet, it still held some
value in combining the conservative power together for further movement. The Quadruple Alliance was a little matter, it
was more practicable and sensible in creating the concert of Europe to discuss the matter of Europe so as to prevent another
similar type of French Revolution and the person Napoleon. This was this alliance that pave way to the Congress System by
which the powers tried to sit together to solve problem by concert and not war.
At first sight, this congress system was a product of all genuine idea and principle of all powers. As purpose of creation was
a merit, and due to the sacrifice themselves in system.
However, things turned out to be rather different from the ideal in the Congress System. It no longer maintain the ideology
of the settlement but tending to create a tension between the powers and this was due to several reasons the most apparent and
obvious one was that in political aspect, ideology had not hold long in a great period of the whole nineteenth century and that
on ideology might not suit the other countries. Hence in the Congress System when the European have concern with the
internal affair of the countries, such ideology would be abandoned like in the Aix-la-Chapelle. The idea of suppression of
slave trade and the pirate by Britain and Russia was destroyed by the mutual suspicion of the 2 countries as well as the others.
It was true that Britain was intending to secure her influence in the Mediterranean against Russia and Russia was also making
use of the opportunity to extend her power to the area and to minimize British total dominance in the Mediterranean.
However, such selfish policy of intervention in their internal policy was the main hindrance for co-operation. In dealing with
the suppression of revolution in Spain too. Revolution proposed a cross continental march to Spain. Such idea was of
course immediately suppressed by Austrian and Prussian for it meant a Russian troop crossing their countryland. Besides,
jealousy and suspicion of Russian domination in the problem and her intention, her enthusiasm to partial help of Europe was
dismissed.
Therefore, without trust among the powers. Co-operation was impossible and of course the harmonized atmosphere after the
settlement was easily distorted by the revelation of self-interest of all powers. However, despite of solving problem, more
problems were created by the power themselves with tightened up the political tension once again and such was their
conflicting idea of intervention.
In the system, Austria and Russia and Prussia were mainly for intervention as such policy would help to closer her control on
her Empire over all people, races and principalities which might have potential to become and individual unit. Besides, to
them, every incident in the internal unrest of other states was regarded as a direct influence of other counties and Europe,
therefore to suppress them was necessary. However, such idea was rejected by Britain that "she only commit herself to......
the territorial arrangement of 1815 settlement" and to her the main concern was trade and domination in the Mediterranean as
well as to check France and Russia. internal unrest was then to her a minor affair, hence with such different interpretation of
the Congress System. Britain and other powers began to break as in the Treaty of Troppau and Laibach. She only
recognized Austrian right in Spanish area but rejected all co-operated action to suppress other countries. Besides, as Britain
was a constitution country brought by the 17th century Revolution, it would cause a lot of embarrassment in her suppression.
Hence it was in this Congress System that see a clash of power instead of co-operation and while the powers began to oppose
one another, the peace of nineteenth century was also endangered, it was eventually true as revealed in the late nineteenth
century. Although the first 40 years been backed to be a peaceful period, it was under the domination of the Metternich
system and other conservative power like Nicholas I that help to maintain the surface peace of Europe but it was to realize
that this general peace was by suppressing the right of other states and not by compromise and it was revealed in late
nineteenth century the peace was distorted by the great powers instead of the revolution of the small states. That is to say the
Congress System marked the conflict of powers and laid foundation for their open cleavage in late nineteenth century.
However, besides this Congress System, other factors also contributed to the building of peace in Europe, and it was
necessary to follow the time sequence of politics. After 1815, peace was rest-method of maintenance. This peace war in
1789 threatened people and make people turned back for order and peace under ancient regime. Their main purpose was
directed to French aggression and Napoleon. However, in the Congress, since Austria wanted France to enter and suppress
revolution. The Quadruple Alliance was for this was already a distortion of the 1815 settlement that now there was no
common enemy in Europe. France was readmitted to the great power list and helped by others. So without a common
antagonism, the cohesion of powers all break and distorted the peace by suppressing France. Britain who was so concern
with France revival of power left distaste and had already no desire to continue the Congress for peace in Europe.
Besides, in the Congress, it also revealed that the anti-French motive was now changed to anti-Russian for their jealousy in
seeing Russia took a upper hand in proposing the solution for Europe. Besides it was also from maintain peace of Europe to
anti-revolutionary system by intervention policy. Hence, as all powers clashed their aim and saw no sense of co-operation it
the system. Britain withdrew and marked the failure of the Congress System in dealing with European problem.
Foreign hindrance was also a factor testing the validity of the system and check whether it could help keeping peace in Europe
or not. The Monroe Doctrine which was proclaimed but he American to forbade intervention of European powers in
American Spanish affair had held the system of co-operation in suspension and limit its power to help Europe, besides, it
revealed the self-interest of all states and laid foundation for their future conflict like between Britain and Russia as well as
Austria.
Besides, there was also the change of minister in Britain that change the atmosphere. Canning who replaced Castlereagh
was a more absolute minister and favoured isolation policy. He is a less compromising man than Castlereagh, therefore, as
he saw there was no sense of co-operation, he did not sit in the meeting of the system but carry on his policy in Greek
Revolution and Spain revolution which was opposed to the idea of all others powers and distort peace. His visit to Richard
Rush of America also marked a direct clash with all powers. He treated himself as the Saviour of Europe though the middle
way of despotism and revolution while Metternich wanted a total conservatism and autocracy. Such conflicting ideas was
then heightened and marked a future compromise as seen in his redrawn of Verona Congress of 1822. Hence with his
withdrawal, the system also broke.
15. Did the Congress System give Europe general peace?
First of all, it may be argued that although there were congress after 1815, there was little that was systematic about them.
There was little that was systematic about them. There was no agreement between the powers as to what Congresses were for,
and there was no permanent organisation for international co-operation such as the League of Nations or Untied Nations
Organisation. The Congress System may be just an invention of historians.
The basic reason why the great powers continued their cooperation after 1815 was the thought that by continuing their
cooperation they could keep the peace as they had won the war. In 1818, the victorious nations even restored the power status
of France and the Quintuple Alliance replaced the Quadruple one. This was a pragmatic move by Metternich and Castlereagh
to balance the growing power and expansionism of Russia and Prussia.
What made it possible for the Great Powers to cooperate after 1815 was the fact that until 1820 no problems arose on
fundamental issues. The powers were not divided on any fundamental issues. But in 1820, there arose the problems of the
Spanish and Neapolitan revolutions. Austria, Russia and Prussia wanted to intervene on the basis of the Protocol of Troppau.
It announced as a general principle that the great powers should interfere, if necessary by force, to restore any government
which had been overthrown by revolution. In his State Paper of May 5th 1820, Castlereagh rejected intervention and
recognised only the Treaty of Chaumont and Paris as the basis of international cooperation. This division between Britain on
the one hand and Austria, Russia and Prussia on the other made it impossible for the powers to work on 'common interest' as
the basis of cooperation. Apparently, it had split Europe into west and East: England and France, as opponents of the Troppau
Protocol; Austria, Russia and Prussia as its supporters. What prevented this division from producing any open clash was that
neither side was ever fundamentally united. The eastern powers were less united than it seemed. Austria and Russia had
conflict of interests in the Balkans; Austria and Prussia in Germany. Even England and France had conflict over the
Netherlands and overseas trade. So England and Austria may sometimes cooperate against Russia; England and Russia
against France. So there was all through the century a gap between the political philosophies of the liberal West and absolute
East, but there was never any iron curtain. The alliance and cooperation among the powers were fluid and mobile.
But the understanding between Austria and Russia was important to preserve peace. For their understanding would keep their
conflict in the Balkans under control. It was the explosion of Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans that led to the outbreak of
the First World War. From 1815 to 1848, the existence of an understanding between Austria and Russia more than anything
else helped to ensure peace throughout Europe. Any conflict that did take place was localised rather than generalised into fullscale hostility among the powers. But this understanding between Austria and Russia was broken by the Crimean War. After
this, it was possible to revive the Vienna Settlement by diplomacy and war. Because Austria was isolated from an aggrieved
Russia. Napoleon III and Bismarck could create the new Italy and Germany at Austria's expense. Like Metternich, Bismarck
tried to keep Austria and Russia away from fighting each other in the Balkans. Only by preventing Austro-Russian conflict in
the Balkans could a general European war by avoided. Metternich had done so by binding the three powers Austria, Russia
and Prussia bound three powers together in the Three Emperor's League against republicanism and socialism. But this
cooperation could in the long run not last long because the conflict between Austria and Prussia over German supremacy,
Austria and Russia over the Balkans was so fundamental that nothing could keep it from becoming the focus of attention and
section for ever.
To counteract the principle of intervention, the British devised the principle of international action. That means the problems
of Turkey should dealt with by all the powers acting together and never by anyone or two in isolation. Over the Greek revolt,
therefore, the British and the Austrians, acted together in restrain the Russians. The Greek questions was eventually settled by
international action and Russia was successfully restrained. In 1834, Austria and Russia signed the Munchengratz Agreement
which guaranteed the status quo in Turkey. Austro-Russian cooperation was again ensured in the Near East. Troppau and
Munchengratz thus marked the high tide of Austro-Russian understanding and cooperation. In this case, European peace was
ensured.
Apart from Austria and Russia, the conflict between Prussia and Austria was also kept under control. Prussia had also signed
the Munchengratz Agreement so this means that the struggle for German leadership between Austria and Prussia was for the
time being subsided under an appearance of good will and cooperation. With this sold understanding among the eastern
powers, the general peace of Europe would be definitely guaranteed. For the expansionism of France would be easily
contained and Britain would never seek to extend her influence over the continent. British interests lie overseas and she had
no territorial ambition in the continent of Europe. Her primary concern was to maintain the overall balance of interest and
power. So the inclined to support a strong Austria and later on a strong Germany as a strong centre against both Russia
expansionism in the east and French expansionism in the west. Unfortunately, when the strong central powers became
aggressive, it proved hard to restrain them with the concerted action of weak powers at the periphery. In any case, an
understanding and cooperation among Austria, Russia and Prussia helped ensure the general peace of Europe, rather than any
'congress system'.
16. Examine the significance of Austrian and British diplomacy on the Concert of Europe
during the period 1815-1848.
The Question
~You should first trace the diplomatic development of European history from 1815-48, then, try to see how did both countries
involve in those issues and events, at last, you need to evaluate/ assess the effects of their involvement in those affairs, i.e.
maintain Concert of Europe?
Foresee problem
~Candidates may just describe those facts without explaining adequately the significance of the role of both countries.
The Suggested framework
~It seems that, as usually argued, Austrian diplomacy ruined the relationship among powers and hence led to the breakdown
of the Concert of Europe, or at least the Congress System. To Britain, It is also argued that her insistence on liberal principles
also worsened the relationship among powers. Was it true?
~Such arguments could not explain the real picture and hence underestimated the contribution of both Austria and Britain. On
the role of Austria, such view could not explain why did Austria, and other Eastern powers alike, still call for the Congress of
Laibach even though they had already proclaim the Troppau Protocol. Besides, why did Austria constraint Russian move on
Greek Revolt? On the role of Britain, such view is also inadequate. Take for an example, why did Britain accept, though not
yet encourage, Russian intervention on the Hungarian Revolt in 1848. Such move was undoubtedly against the liberal
principle of British government and hence on a pragmatic ground. In a word, it is a generalization that Austria ignored the
Concert of Europe. It also jumps too far to argue that Britain insisted on ideological principle and hence helped little on
maintaining peace in Europe.
~Explain how both Austria and Britain tried to maintain the Concert of Europe in the Congress of Vienna. i.e. on balance of
power and Polish-Saxon question. Austria also tried to maintain the Concert of Europe during the Congress System. i.e.
explain in what sense the Troppau Protocol was a test for British attitude and the Laibach was a response to British attitude.
Besides, suggest why Austria supported the French intervention, and not the Russian, on the Spanish revolt. Clearly, Austria
tried to stop Russian support on Greek Revolt was also a gesture of self-constraint on the side of Eastern Powers. Yet, after
the Congress System, there were several changes, for which Austria lost her role as a gravity of diplomacy in Europe. The
changes were: Nicholas I, who did not welcome Austrian advice on Russian policy, came to reign over Russia British strong
hold on her interest in Belgian issues and Eastern Questions. Austrian attention was diverted on internal revolts. During the
period 1830's and 40's the gravity was at London.
~Explain how Britain made a deal with the Eastern Powers on Belgian issue and hence could maintain both peace and
Concert of Europe. On Eastern Question, though there was severe conflict between France and Britain, Britain and stopped
French move on Egypt without ruining the Concert of Europe since France at last yielded. On the 1848 Revolution, Britain
accepted intervention on revolts and hence maintained the good relationship among the powers.
17.
Assess the extent to which the policy of England was responsible for the breakdown of the
Congress System.
According to the Quadruple Alliance (1815) of Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia signed in the Vienna Settlement, the four powers
agreed to hold periodic meetings to discuss matters of common interest and to consider measures that could be "most salutary for the repose
and prosperity of the nations and for maintaining the peace of Europe". So there came the Congress System. In the period between 1818-22,
four congresses including the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of Troppau, Congress of Laibach and Congress of Verona were held.
However, the Congress System proved to be a failure and it broke down in 1826. The policy of England was responsible for the breakdown
of the System to a certain extent. Nevertheless, other factors such as the mutual suspicions among the powers and the rise of revolts also led
to the breakdown of the Congress System.
England's policy was quite important in leading to the breakdown of the Congress System. England's policy after 1815 was to
cooperate in the Concert of Europe without becoming involved in further entangling commitments, to preserve the Continental balance of
power, to maintain the maritime supremacy of England as well as to promote and retain markets for English goods and manufacturers in
Europe and the New World. England carried out this policy throughout the Congress System. In the Congress System, she favored the
principle of non-intervention to the internal affairs of their states. However, when other big powers took action which would endanger the
balance of power, she had to intervene. This created much conflicts between her and the Holy Alliance.
There were conflicts between them from the very beginning. In the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Alexander I proposed an
"Alliance Solidaire" suggesting that all European states should mutually guarantee not only each other's territories and possessions but also
the existing form of government. However, it was rejected by Castlereagh who stated that each state must be allowed to rely for its security
upon the "justice and wisdom" of its own system. The powers then began to contemplate separate combination among themselves. The
Alliance System and the Congress System were doomed from that moment. Later, there were revolts in Spain, Portugal, Naples and
Piedmont. Alexander I proposed in the Congress of Troppau taking intervention against the Spanish Revolt. However, Castlereagh once
again rejected it by declaring a "State Paper". No longer, Metternich presented to the Congress a Protocol claiming that any state had
succumbed to revolution had to cease to be a member of the Holy Alliance automatically and that other Powers had a duty to coerce the
state "back to the bosom of the Alliance". Britain vigorously opposed it because it could make the Allies "the armed guardians of all
thrones". The Congress was adjourned and the rupture between Britain and the three autocratic powers was widened. The adjourned
Congress of Troppau was resumed later at Laibach. Austria and Russia took military intervention to suppress the revolts in Naples and
Piedmont. Britain withdrew from the Congress for it was a direct violation to her principle of non-intervention. So the rupture between
Britain and the three Eastern Powers was further widened.
Later in the Congress of Verona, Russia and Austria supported the despatch of a French expeditionary force to quell revolt in Spain.
Britain again protested and later withdrew from the Congress System altogether because Canning who succeeded Castlereagh believed that
if Britain was to lead the world along the middle path between despotism and revolution, she must dissociate herself from the Holy Alliance
and place herself in the vanguard of the new movement of nationalism and democracy. Afterwards, there came the question of the Spanish
American colonies. Hoping to promote the growing trade between Britain and the former Spanish colonies in South America, Britain
openly supported the revolt of the Spanish American colonies, cooperating with the Americans in making the Monroe Doctrine, which
stated that any influence by a European power in the American continent would mean unfriendly act against the USA. The serious
disagreement between Britain and the other powers made the breakdown of the Congress System inevitable.
Therefore, Britain's policy should be responsible for the breakdown of the Congress System. Owing to her policy, Britain was very
uncompromising and she always opposed the policies of the other three powers, causing their relationship become worse and worse. Her
final withdrawal from the Congress System prevented the Alliance from acting as a whole, making the eventual dissolution of the Congress
System inevitable. Nevertheless, I think that Britain was not the only one who was responsible for the breakdown of the System. Other
factors also combined to destroy the whole system.
The Conflicts between Britain and the Holy Alliance were the results of the sharp differences between them. Britain was a
parliamentary government while Russia, Austria and Prussia were absolute monarchies. Economically, British economic interest mainly
relied on colonial peace since she was a colonial power. But the three autocratic powers' mainly rested on the territories they controlled and
so they were against revolutions. As a result, Britain preferred the principle of non-intervention in order to maintain peace in colonies while
Austria, Prussia and Russia favored the Principle of Intervention to safeguard their power of monarchy. These two principles
frequently clashed and led to much conflicts which gradually deteriorated the relationship between Britain and the other three Powers. It
was the two completely different systems made it difficult for the powers to cooperate. Had there not been such differences, great conflicts
which undermined the whole Congress System would not have occurred.
Moreover, once there was a common aim among the powers to safeguard themselves from France. Though the differences between
Britain and the Holy Alliance existed for a long time, this common aim bind the Powers together and prevented them from conflicts.
However, in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, the occupation of France was ended. The Restored Monarchy of France was no
longer a menace to the peace of Europe. France was thus readmitted to the rank of a great power and was admitted into the Quadruple
Alliance which became the Quintuple Alliance. As H. Nicolson concluded, "Coalitions begin to disintegrate from the moment that the
common danger is removed". Once the common enemy was removed, the conflict among the Powers became more prominent and finally
led to the breakdown of the Congress System.
On the other hand, there were no real cooperation in the Congress due to mutual suspicions among the powers. Their suspicions were
first shown in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Owing to the fear of the expansion of British naval power, there was objection to the idea
that the British would have the right to search ships for slaves in their efforts to enforce the abolition of slave trade. Apart from this, there
were also mutual disagreements between Austria, Prussia and Russia though they were said to be in the same camp. In the Congress of Aixla-Chapelle, there was joint expedition against pirate. However, due to the fear of Russian expansion, Russia was checked by not allowing
her vessels entering the Mediterranean Sea. When the Greek Revolt started in 1821, Alexander I wanted to help the Greeks in order to
weaken the Turkish Empire. However, Metternich was determined to prevent the Tsar from supporting the Greeks and to maintain Turkish
integrity against Russian aggression. He gained the support of Britain and so the Russian ambition was checked. Later, in 1824, when
Alexander I invited the powers to a conference in St. Petersburg to discuss about the Greek Revolt, Russia and Austria clashed again.
Russia proposed dividing Greece into three principalities and the Sultan granting autonomy to the Greeks. The other powers were alarmed
and there were fear of Russian predominance. Austria would never tolerate strong power as Russia to encroach at the Lower Danube.
Moreover, there were fear of France exploiting the issue for a general revision to the 1815 Settlement. Metternich baulked and the collapse
of the Congress System was then an obvious fact. From these, we can see that Britain was not the only one who should be blamed. There
were not only conflicts between Britain and the other powers
but there were also conflicts among the three powers themselves. Moreover, although Britain withdrew from the Congress System at
Congress of Verona, the Congress System was not yet extinguished. It was actually the conflicts between Russia and Austria on the Greek
Revolt tore the Congress System into pieces.
Furthermore, series circumstances also helped to load to the breakdown of the Congress System. The negligence of liberalism and
national identity in small states by the great powers in the Vienna Settlement gave rise to liberalism and nationalism in these small states.
The spirit of unrest seethed and in the 1820s, many disturbances and revolts occurred. These revolts such as the Spanish Revolt, Revolts in
Naples and Piedmont and the Greek Revolt did have great significances. On one hand, they alarmed the monarchs and consolidated their
idea of intervention which clashed with the British idea of non-intervention. For instance, Alexander I was a liberator but later even he was
alarmed by the revolts and changed to a reactionary. On the other hand, these revolts led to the summon of the last three Congresses and
helped to bring the conflicts among the powers to surface. The Spanish Revolt brought out the conflicts between Britain and the Holy
Alliance while the Greek Revolt brought out the conflicts between Russia and Austria and directly led to the breakdown of the Congress
System. Events after events worsened the relationship between the powers and accelerated the breakdown of the Congress System.
In conclusion, the policy of England, to a certain extent, had led to the breakdown of the Congress System. However, other factors also
worked together to undermine the Congress System.
18. In what ways did the British foreign policies between 1815-1856 affect the European politics?
Between the years 1815-1856, owing to her foreign policies, Britain was frequently involved in the European circumstances, including
the Vienna Settlement of 1815, the Congress System, the Greek War of Independence of 1821-32, the Belgian Revolt of 1830-39 and the
Crimean War of 1854-56. And her involvement in such circumstances had in different ways affected the European politics during this
period as well as in later days.
First of all, Britain had taken part in the Congress of Vienna of 1815. After 25 years' disturbances and wars, the European Powers
wanted to settle the aftermath of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars, as well as to restore order and peace in Europe, so
they met together at Vienna and the Vienna Settlement was produced. Being one of the great powers dominating the Congress, Britain, with
Castlereagh as the representative, played a quiet important role in the Settlement. Such participation of Britain in the Settlement affected
the European politics in two ways. On one hand, during the Congress, there was the negligence of liberalism and national identity of the
small states by the great powers and this gave rise to liberalism and nationalism in these small states. The spirit of unrest seethed and in the
1820s, many disturbances and revolts occurred. Britain was partly responsible for this because as Sir C. Webster criticizes, Castlereagh also
have 'failed, as almost all of his contemporaries failed, to see the strength of the national and democratic force which the French Revolution
had liberated'. However, despite such defect, the Settlement, as it turned out, did secure peace for Europe and there was no major war for
forty years. This was to a certain extent the work of Castlereagh as he always insisted on the balance of power in Europe. He always
opposed excessive territorial ambitions of Prussia and Russia and supported Austria's actions to achieve such an objective.
On the other hand, the Vienna Settlement had produced a Congress System in which Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to
hold periodic meetings to consider measures to maintain peace and to discuss common interest. However, the Congress System proved to
be a failure and it broke down in 1826 and the breakdown of the System was to a great extent due to the British foreign policy. Britain's
policy after 1815 was to cooperate in the Concert of Europe without becoming involved in further entangling commitments, to preserve the
Continental balance of power, to maintain the maritime supremacy of Britain as well as to promote and retain markets for English goods
and manufacturers in Europe and the New World. Britain carried out this policy throughout the Congress System. In the Congress System,
she favored the principle of non-intervention to the internal affairs of other states. However, when other big powers took action which
would endanger the balance of power, she had to intervene. This created much conflicts between her and the Holy Alliance.
There were conflicts between them from the very beginning. In the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Alexander I prepared an
"Alliance Solidaire", suggesting that all European states should mutually guarantee that not only each other's territories and possessions but
also the existing form of government. However, it was rejected by Castlereagh who stated that each state must be allowed to rely for its
security upon the "justice and wisdom" of its own system. The powers then began to have conflict and the Congress System was doomed
from that moment. Later, there were revolts in Spain, Portugal, Naples and Piedmont. Alexander I proposed in the Congress of Troppau
taking intervention against Spanish Revolt. However, Castlereagh once again rejected it by declaring a "State Paper". No longer, there was
the Metternich Protocol and Britain vigorously opposed it because it could make the Allies "the armed guardians of all thrones". The
Congress was adjourned and the rupture between Britain and the three powers was widened. The adjourned Congress of Troppau was
resumed later at Laibach. Austria and Russia took military intervention to suppress the revolt in Naples and Piedmont. Britain then
withdrew from the Congress for it violated her principle of non-intervention. So their rupture was further widened.
Later, in the Congress of Verona, Russia and Austria supported the despatch of a French expeditionary force to quell revolution in
Spain. Britain again protested and withdrew from the Congress System altogether because Canning, who succeeded Castlereagh, believed
that if Britain was to lead the world along the middle path between despotism and revolution, she must dissociate herself from the Holy
Alliance and place herself in the vanguard of the new movement of nationalism and democracy. Afterwards, there came the question of the
Spanish American colonies. Hoping to promote the growing trade between Britain and the former Spanish colonies in South America,
Britain openly supported the revolt of the Spanish American colonies, cooperating with the Americans in making the Monroe Doctrine
effective, stating that any influence by a European power in the American continent would mean unfriendly act against the USA. The
serious disagreement between Britain and the other powers made the breakdown of the Congress System inevitable.
So we can see that owing to her policy, Britain was very uncompromising and always opposed the policies of the other three powers,
causing their relationship become worse and worse. Her final withdrawal from the Congress System prevented the Alliance from acting as a
whole, making the eventual dissolution of the Congress System inevitable. Though other factors such as the mutual suspicions among the
powers, the rise of revolts etc. also combined to undermine the System, the foreign policy of Britain should held great responsibility.
Besides, Britain also participated in the Greek War of Independence of 1821-32. During the war, Canning intervened on behalf of the
Greeks against the Turkish. The Anglo-Russian Protocol was formed on 4 April, 1826. It gave no hint of the use of force by Britain, but
contained by implication a threat of it by Russia. Canning's objection was to save Greece by playing upon the fear of Turkey without a war.
In the eyes of the contemporary conservatives, Canning was "the spirit of evil". He induced the Bourbon government to take initiative by
producing first draft of a tripartite treaty in January 1827. The Treaty of London was signed by the three powers, that is Britain, Russia and
France, on 6 July, 1827. It was a separate Triple Alliance. It included one secret additional article pledging the three powers, if the
proposed armistice was not accepted within a month, to accredit consuls to Greece and to prevent any further collision between the
combatants, but without themselves taking any part in hostilities. The British Admiral Codrington interpreted it to mean that a settlement
was to be imposed on the Turks if necessary. It was followed by the Battle of Navarino on 20 October in which most of the Turkish fleets
were destroyed by the British and French.
Nevertheless, the Turks would not submit to "ignoring its connection with the Greeks", that is recognizing Greece as a separate state.
The risks involved in Canning's policy was clearly revealed. Meanwhile, with the Turkish strength paralyzed, Russia executed alone and
occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. Metternich thus agreed with Wellington that a small independent Greece was preferable to a larger
Greece which would perhaps be dependent on Russia. Finally, the Anglo-French Entente compelled Russia to accept the settlement which
not only contained for the Greeks independence from Turkey but also from Russia. So Britain did contribute to the independence of Greece.
In addition, Britain also played an active role in the Belgian revolt of 1830-39 and this posed important significance on the European
politics in later days. According to the Vienna Settlement, Belgium and Holland were united into one empire. However, after 1815, the
Belgians were increasingly dissatisfied with the policies of the joint government. This finally culminated in a large-scale revolt in 1830. In
August 1830 the Belgians rebelled and in October proclaimed their independence from the Dutch. The Belgians declared the House of
Orange deposed, but wanted a continuation of a constitutional hereditary monarchy. In December, Palmerston, the British foreign minister
backed by Louis Philippe, induced Austria, Prussia and Russia to abandon the principle of legitimacy and to recognize Belgian
independence.
However, the Dutch rejected the terms of separation of the two countries and war took place between Anglo-French forces and the Dutch
until 1833. An armistice was then agreed. Eventually in 1839, King William of Holland agreed to the terms of settlement, which adopted
the frontiers of 1790 except for Luxembourg and Limburg. Belgium was recognized as an "independent and perpetually neutral state" under
the collective guarantee of the powers. The creation of Belgium as a new independent state under the support of Britain had profound
influence on Europe in later days. As we can see, Britain entered WWI mainly due to the German violation of Belgium's neutrality. So
Britain's support for Belgium was of great significance.
Furthermore, there was the Crimean War in 1854-56, and it was to a certain extent provoked by Britain. By the mid-19th century,
Russia had been trying to expand her influence in the Mediterranean area and in Turkey. As Britain was a Mediterranean power, her
interests would be threatened by Russian advance. So as stated by Wilson, to prevent Russian encroachment in the near East was a cardinal
principle of British diplomacy at that time. In order to preserve British investment in Turkey and to prevent Russian expansion into the
Mediterranean and Asia Minor, Britain was determined to preserve and to back up Turkey against Russia. Later disputes happened between
Russia and France over the Holy Places. Britain then allied France to fight against Russia. In 1854, they declared war on Russia though by
the time Russia had already withdrawn her troops from Turkey. This directly led to the outbreak of war, one of the most futile and
unnecessary wars in modern history. Europe was dragged into instability. The war finally ended with drastic change in the power relations
and the differences between the powers were later exploited by Cavour and Bismarck to unite their countries. The creation of the two
nation states, especially Germany, was proved to be disastrous in later days because as we can see, it was Germany's ambition that finally
led to WWI. so Britain's initiating the Crimean War was of great significance on European politics.
In conclusion, British foreign policies between 1815-56 did greatly affected the European politics during this period.