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Contents
List of Tables
vii
List of Figures
viii
Acknowledgments
x
Introduction
1
Part 1 Competitive Dynamics
1 Competitive Dynamics Research
7
Part 2 Competitive Dynamics in
Technology-Based Industries
2Changes in Industrial Leadership:
Technological Discontinuities and
Firms’ Aggressive Actions
45
3Competitive Intensity and Product
Line Strategies in Technology-Based
Industries
79
4New Technology Imitation: Who Is
Copied More Quickly?
93
5Aligning with Competitors when Adopting
New Product Technologies
115
6Concluding Remarks and New Directions
140
Index
145
vi
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Introduction
Abstract: This introduction presents a short overview of
the various chapters, and illustrates the types of issues this
volume covers. The book is divided into two parts. The first
part offers a general perspective on competitive dynamics,
discusses its main constructs, comments on their meaning and
how they have been measured empirically (Chapter 1). The
chapters in the second part deal with specific issues related to
the dynamics of competitive strategy in technology intensive
industries, and in the mobile phone industry in particular
(Chapters 2–5). The final chapter (Chapter 6) provides an
overall summary and suggests new directions for research.
Keywords: introduction; chapters’ overview; competitive
dynamics
Giachetti, Claudio. Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile
Phone Industry. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
doi: 10.1057/9781137374127.
1
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Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile Phone Industry
The mobile phone industry, from its inception at the beginning of the
1980s, has been characterized by frequent structural changes, from
periods of high industry concentration to hypercompetitive scenarios
where an increasing number of vendors strive to survive with the rapid
introduction of new product models as well as radical and incremental
innovations, features that result and contribute to the high level of the
industry’s innovativeness. In this rapidly changing environment, mobile
phone vendors have been forced often to rethink about their business
model and strategic actions in order to defend or strengthen their competitive position. Therefore, competitive dynamics, represented by competitive actions and reactions of firms to one another, in this industry
have been particularly intense.
The intersection between the competitive dynamics literature and the
literature on technology and innovation management is an important
area of research. The technology and innovation management literature
has focused on understanding the different types of innovations and how
firms use these innovations to improve the performance of their products. However, we are still way off from a comprehensive understanding
of the competitive dynamics triggered by such decisions.
This book offers some insights into the competitive dynamics of
technology intensive industries, using the mobile phone industry as a
reference setting for the analysis.
The book asks the following general question: Which kind of competitive moves and countermoves are taken by firms in technology intensive
industries, and in the mobile phone industry in particular, to defend
their competitive position, and which factors drive these actions?
The book is divided into two parts. The first part offers a general
perspective on competitive dynamics, discussing its main constructs,
commenting on their meaning and how they have been measured
empirically (Chapter 1). The chapters in the second part focus on more
specific issues related to the dynamics of competitive strategy in technology intensive industries in general, and in the mobile phone industry
in particular (Chapters 2–5). The final chapter (Chapter 6) provides an
overall discussion and suggests new directions for research.
Chapter 1, after have defined “competitive dynamics”, presents the
main tools proposed by competitive dynamics scholars for “competitor identification”, the objective of these tools being to understand who
the firm’s competitors are and in particular those that are more likely
to threaten the firm’s competitive position in the industry. Competitor
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Introduction
3
identification is a key task for managers interested in scanning their
competitive terrain, supporting their defenses against likely competitive
threats, and planning competitive attack and response strategies. It is
the starting point for analyzing the dynamics of competitive strategy. It
follows a review of some of the main tools proposed by strategy scholars
to analyze the intensity of competition within an industry. “Competitive
intensity” refers to the extent to which the firms’ competitive position
within the industry is threatened by the competitive actions of industry
rivals. Competitive intensity has been growing for decades in many
industries through price competition, continuous new product technology introduction and product differentiation, posing a challenge to
incumbents and new entrants. The chapter closes with a review of studies on “competitive aggressiveness”, defined as the firm’s propensity to
directly and intensely challenge its competitors to improve its competitive position through a combination of proactive moves and innovative
efforts, and “imitation and differentiation dynamics”, defined as the
extent to which the firm’s response mimics or deviates from the rival’s
action in type and form.
Chapter 2 explores how firms in technology-based industries may
gain or lose their market leadership over the industry life cycle. There
has been a significant amount of research on the persistence of market
share leadership and changes in market share among leading firms.
Much of this research, however, is rooted in industrial organization
economics and has focused on industry characteristics or the characteristics of dominant firms. And although important management and
marketing research has examined the effects of product innovation,
pioneer status, and entry order on market share or changes in market
share, there has been little emphasis on delineating a profile of “successful followers”, namely those challengers that are able to catch up
with market leaders. Based on empirical evidence in the global mobile
phone industry, findings presented in this chapter show that market
leaders are likely to be dethroned by those challengers that compete
more aggressively and are more capable to adapt their capabilities to
exploit the advantages offered by technological discontinuities. The
longitudinal analysis presented in this chapter also offers an overview
of the mobile phone industry, how it has changed over time from its
inception at the beginning of the 1980s, when the first handset was
introduced into the market, to 2012, at the heart of the technological
convergence revolution.
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Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile Phone Industry
The analysis in Chapter 3 links competitive dynamics and product
line extension literatures, and explores whether competitive responses
to industry rivals in terms of product line extension are different when
faced with different levels of competitive intensity over time. The product line extension literature suggests that firms lengthen their product
lines to use their underutilized capacities more efficiently, achieve quick
increases in sales and improve their overall competitive positions in
the market by enhancing the market dominance of their brands. The
competitive dynamics view, a potential complement to the preceding
approach, emphasizes attacks and competitive moves and countermoves, competitive signaling and multipoint competition. Although
competitive dynamics may help understand the rationale underlying
product portfolio adjustment, scholars from this stream of thought offer
very limited arguments on the relationship between competition and
the length of a firm’s product line. This chapter takes a different view
by linking competitive dynamics and product line extension literatures,
and develops a theoretical framework exploring whether competitive
responses to industry rivals in terms of product line extension are different when faced with different levels of competitive intensity over time.
Moreover, insights into the mobile phone industry are illustrated.
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of product-level and firm-level factors
that affect the time it takes for firms to imitate new product technologies
introduced by competitors. In particular the analysis link product diffusion and product imitation dynamics, a level of analysis that has been
surprisingly missing to date. With the aim of shedding more light on
new product technology imitation dynamics over a product diffusion
life cycle, in this chapter it is shown that the time to new technology
imitation may change over time depending on the characteristics of the
firm introducing the technology. The mobile phone industry is an ideal
setting for such analysis, given the heterogeneous types of innovations
introduced by mobile phone manufacturers over the industry evolution.
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the industry targets that may influence the firm when it is in the process of adopting new product technologies. Common to many strategic management theories is the assumption
that firms dynamically adjust their behaviors to a predetermined target,
a process that some authors have called “strategic adjustment”. Research
has provided multiple explanations for the origins and dynamics of strategic adjustment, but studies have essentially examined the influence of
only one or the other of the following two external sources of industry
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Introduction
5
targets: (a) firms select targets based on the collective strategic decisions
of the firms in the industry and (b) firms select targets based on the
strategic decisions of the industry leader. More recently, in the strategy
field, the “strategic reference point (SRP) theory” has introduced the
idea of strategic adjustment toward more than one reference target. By
borrowing from various insights offered by the SRP theory, this chapter
analyzes how both the leader and the collective behavior of industry
rivals influence the firm when adopting new product technologies.
Using data on product portfolio strategies of mobile phone vendors in
the UK market, results show that in the process of technology adoption,
the benchmarks toward which firms adjust their strategic actions vary,
depending on whether the product technology represents a radical or
incremental product innovation.
Chapter 6 summarizes and discusses the general findings and arguments presented in the book. Further, new directions for research on the
competitive dynamics issues related to technology intensive industries
are suggested.
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Part 1
Competitive Dynamics
6
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Competitive Dynamics
Research
Abstract: This chapter, after have defined “competitive
dynamics”, presents the main tools proposed by scholars in the
field of competitive dynamics for “competitor identification”,
whose objective is to understand who the firm’s competitors
are and in particular those that are more likely to threaten
its competitive position in the industry. This is followed by a
review of some of the main tools proposed by strategy scholars
to analyze the intensity of competition within an industry.
The chapter closes with an overview of studies on “competitive
aggressiveness” and “imitation and differentiation dynamics”.
Keywords: competitive aggressiveness; competitive
dynamics; competitive intensity; competitor
identification
Giachetti, Claudio. Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile
Phone Industry. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
doi: 10.1057/9781137374127.
7
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Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile Phone Industry
1.1 What is competitive dynamics?
A sequence of attacks and reactions among firms in an industry ­creates
competitive dynamics. These competitive actions reflect the firm’s
intent to generate superior performance with respect to industry rivals
(MacMillan, McCaffrey and Van Wijk, 1985). Successful actions, namely
those actions which increase the firm’s performance, trigger a reaction by competitors, which may attempt to block or imitate the firm’s
actions, and in turn affect its search for a competitive advantage. The
study of competitive dynamics is thus the analysis of how the firm’s
actions affect competitors’ reactions and performance (Smith, Ferrier
and Ndofor, 2006).
An example of competitive dynamics is the eternal battle between
Coca-Cola (Coke) and Pepsi-Cola (Pepsi) (D’Aveni, 1994; Ghemawat,
1991). The two American multinational beverage corporations began
to fight at the beginning of the last century. The soft drink market was
initially dominated by Coke. During the 1930s and 1940s, Pepsi initiated
an aggressive price competition against Coke by strongly reducing the
prices of all its cola drinks. Coke did not respond with a price ­reduction,
and this helped Pepsi reduce its market share gap with respect to Coke.
In the 1950s, Pepsi invested a lot in advertising. This helped the firm
to continue to gain shares, but dramatically damaged its profitability.
In the 1960s, both players started to lengthen their product line, introducing new soft drinks to give a larger variety of product choices to
the heterogeneous consumer segments. At the beginning of the 1970s,
Pepsi began to attack Coke with a series of advertising campaigns. At
first it introduced the Pepsi Challenge marketing campaign, in which
Pepsi set up a blind tasting test between Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola, and
showed that the majority of participants picked Pepsi as the better tasting of the two soft drinks – apparently the sweeter taste of Pepsi was
preferred by consumers. In 1983, the market share gap between Coke
and Pepsi was further reduced and the two companies owned 23% and
19% market share respectively. Coke responded by reducing prices, in
order to slow down Pepsi’s attempt to catch up with its leadership. Then
Pepsi responded by investing massively in advertising, through advertising deals with celebrities such as Michael Jackson and Michael J. Fox,
a strategy that helped the firm to dethrone Coke temporarily from its
market share leadership. Due to the Pepsi’s dominance in the mid-1980s,
Coke decided to roll out a cola, which it called “New Coke”, with a new
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flavor formula which tasted similar to the sweeter Pepsi product. The
result was a backlash against Coke for changing their timeless flavor.
New Coke did not have a separate brand name but was simply known
as “the new taste of Coca-Cola” until 1992, when it was named CocaCola II. The American public’s reaction to Coke’s change in taste and
labeling was poor, and the new cola was a major marketing failure.
The subsequent reintroduction of Coke’s original formula, rebranded
as “Coca-Cola Classic” and sold alongside the Coca-Cola II until 1992,
resulted in a significant gain in sales, and Coke reclaimed its number one
position in most of international markets. The battle between Coke and
Pepsi has been then characterized by rapid and continuous attacks and
countermoves between the two rivals. Every time a competitive action
was taken, it was followed by the rival’s reaction with an effect on both
firms’ market share and profitability.
While competitive dynamics in low-tech industries such as the soft
drink one are often centered around advertising and pricing strategies,
since product features do not offer much space for differentiation, in
technology intensive industries competitive dynamics are usually
much more “complex”, and involve a wider repertoire of competitive
actions. A perfect example is the battle between Apple and Samsung in
the mobile phone and tablet industries. The battle between Samsung
and Apple began in 2008, when Samsung invested heavily in the
smartphone market segment by introducing a wide range of handsets,
the Galaxy series, with the aim of replicating the incredible success
of the iPhone, the smartphone introduced by Apple in 2007. Galaxy
phones, targeted at the high-end market, had two main characteristics.
First, they were powered with the Android operating system (OS), an
open-source OS developed by Google and licensed for free to vendors,
a true competitor of Apple’s iOS, the operating system mounted by
Apple in its iPhones. Second, Samsung Galaxy phones had a design
very similar to one of Apple’s phones. The rapid launch of numerous
models of Galaxy smartphones, essentially offering smartphone users
more alternatives in terms of price and design when compared with
Apple (which launched just one phone model every year), helped
the Korean competitor leapfrog Apple in the smartphone market. At
the end of 2011, Samsung became the leading smartphone vendor of
the world by capturing 23.8% of the market share, followed by Apple
which grabbed 14.6% of the market share. At the entire market level
(i.e. sales of handsets for both the low and high-end market), Samsung
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Competitive Dynamics in the Mobile Phone Industry
also overtook the market leader Nokia in 2012. In the meanwhile, in
2010, Apple introduced the iPad, a tablet touchscreen computer. This
device, which essentially gave birth to a new industry, was an instant
hit. Samsung at that time did not have any such product in its portfolio to compete with the iPad of Apple. However, by the end of the
same year Samsung announced the introduction of the Galaxy Tab,
a tablet with which one could also make phone calls. In particular,
similar to what it did for the smartphone market, Samsung challenged
the iPad of Apple by introducing different sizes of its own Galaxy
tablets and became the second leading vendor in the tablet category.
By lengthening the line of tablets, Samsung was essentially able to
target different consumer segments, with different design and price
preferences. As a consequence of the aggressive attacks of Samsung
against Apple, both in the ­smartphone and tablet market, in April
2011, Apple filed a complaint against Samsung stating that the Korean
handset vendor had copied some of the features of Apple’s iPad and
iPhone in its Galaxy phones and tablet devices (in 2011, Apple spent
more on lawsuits against “imitators’ attacks” than on research and
development). As a result, the sales of various models of Samsung’s
tablet computers and Galaxy phones were banned in Australia and
Germany as their design was similar to that of Apple’s products. To
retaliate, Samsung filed a case against Apple for breaking the patent
infringement in the case of wireless technology that was owned by the
Korean rival. Samsung claimed that the iPhone had borrowed heavily
from Samsung’s own innovations, included patented technologies for
transmission optimization and reduction of power usage during data
transmission and third generation (3G) technology for reducing datatransmission errors. On August 2012, the San Francisco jury found
that Samsung had persistently infringed many of the Apple utility and
design patents listed in the complaint. It also found that Apple had not
infringed the Samsung patents identified in the counterclaim. The jury
verdict included more than $1 billion damages for Samsung’s infringement prior to the suit. The legal battle between both the companies
spread to almost ten countries and became even more intense when
Samsung challenged Apple through its guerrilla marketing strategies
at the end of 2011. For example, in October 2011, when Apple launched
the iPhone 4S, and many fans of Apple were waiting in a long queue
outside the Apple store in Sydney, Samsung offered its new high-end
phone Galaxy S II at a price of less than $300 (less than half of the
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launch price) to its first ten customers everyday, and this marketing
was done from a temporary store that they had set up near the Apple
store. Further in November 2011, Samsung released an advertisement
which depicted the extent of rivalry between the two multinationals. The advertisement showed a long queue of people in front of an
Apple store in the United States waiting to buy the Apple’s iPhone and
while standing in the line, people were complaining about the various
manufacturing faults in the iPhone. Finally they notice a person with
Galaxy S II and the advertisement ended with the public’s comment
that Galaxy S II’s performance was far superior to that of the iPhone.
At the end of 2011, Samsung’s Galaxy S II sales surpassed that of Apple’s
iPhone and won the “phone of the year award”. In sum, within a short
period of three to four years, the two companies implemented various
competitive strategies, such as new product introduction, radical and
incremental innovations, imitations of the rival’s offer, product line
extensions, price reduction, aggressive advertising campaigns as well
as law suits. As in the case of Coke vs. Pepsi, all these rapid attacks
and countermoves had an impressive effect on the two competitors’
revenues and profits.
The importance of the competitive dynamics was first emphasized
in Schumpeter’s (1934) theory of “creative destruction”. During the
1930s, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1934) developed
the concept of the creative destruction to explain the dynamic market process by which market leaders and challengers engage in “an
incessant race to get or to keep ahead of one another” (Kirzner, 1973:
20). Schumpeter’s framework was based on the idea that the market
share gains obtained by industry leaders will motivate challengers to
undertake new competitive actions in an attempt to obtain the industrial leadership. The outcome of this market process is the inevitable
and eventual market share erosion and dethronement experienced by
market share leaders over time through the process of competition
(Schumpeter, 1934, 1950). Schumpeter emphasized that as a result of
this creative destruction process no industrial leadership position is
safe or sustainable, and thus “changes in industrial leadership” among
competitors are inevitable. “For many firms, sustaining industry leadership, dethroning the current leader in their industry, or closing the
market share gap between themselves and the current leader are key
organizational objectives. In fact, market share leaders are more profitable because they exploit economies of scale and market power, as
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well reputational advantages” (Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999: 372).
In other words, Schumpeter argued that one of the main determinants
of performance within the industry is the interplay and consequences
of competitive actions and reactions. Over time, the creative actions
of challengers threaten the stability of the leader’s position, causing an
eventual dethronement.
Various authors suggest that the higher the number of competitors in
an industry, the higher the probability of the attack intensity against the
firm products (Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor, 2006). Therefore, the more
the industry is populated by rivals, the more the firm is likely to feel
that both its competitive position and its profitability are threatened
(Porter, 1980). As competitive intensity increases, a firm may take no
action or may respond to competitors’ attack. The firm can respond
directly to competitors’ attack either by reinforcing the competitive
position of threatened core businesses (e.g. through stronger marketing campaigns, by extending the distribution channels, or by adding
new features to existing core products/services) or by abandoning the
field. Alternatively, it can respond indirectly by expanding its business portfolio, that is, products or geographic markets. Eventually, the
response depends on the perceived level of the immediate threat (Smith
et al., 2006) and is influenced by how much the firm perceives the new
lines of business to be profitable (Hutzschenreuter and Grone, 2009).
However the firm will respond to the competitors’ attack only if it is
aware of the attack. This means that competitive moves have to be sufficiently large, and generate signals that are visible to the firm (Chen,
Smith and Grimm, 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1991). The motivation
that actors have to attack or respond to competitors’ action depends
on the potential payoff from the contested product (Ferrier, 2001).
Finally, the decision to attack or defend depends on the firm’s resource
endowments (Smith et al., 1991). In sum, there are three organizational
characteristics that influence strategic actions: factors that influence the
awareness of the context and signal threats or opportunities for incumbents1; factors that induce or impede the motivation of firms to respond
to competitors’ action; and the resource-based factors that influence the
firm’s a­ bility to take action (Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 2006). Thus, individual awareness-motivation-capability components are manifested in
a range of variables, including action visibility and firm size (Chen and
Miller, 1994) for awareness; multimarket contact (Gimeno, 1999) for
motivation; and execution constraints (Smith et al., 1991) for capability.
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Index
Abernathy, W., 46–9
aggressiveness, 32–5, 50,
60–2, 69–72
Alcatel, 16, 56, 103
analog phones, 53, 57–60
Anderson, P., 48, 49
Android OS
characteristics, 9, 65,
67, 71
market shares, 66
Apple
competitors, 21
market shares, 48
product line, 61, 71, 80
smartphones, 9, 10, 20, 64
AT&T, 52, 59, 61, 67
automotive industry, 31, 32
awareness-motivationcapability framework,
12–14
benchmarking, 35, 116–20, 130
Bergen, M. E., 14, 20
Bird, 72
Blackberry (RIM), 16, 20,
52, 66
capability equivalence, 19–22
changes in industrial
leadership
in the mobile phone
industry, 48, 52, 57, 62, 66
theory background, 11, 45,
46, 48–51
Chen, M. J., 12, 19, 20, 23, 33,
37, 50, 122
Chinese mobile phone
vendors, 16, 21, 23, 66, 68,
72–4
Coca-Cola (Coke), 8
competence-destroying
technological change, 48
competency traps, 50, 58, 67
competitive aggressiveness,
32–5, 50, 51
competitive complexity, 34,
50, 62
competitive dynamics
definition, 8
literature, 11–14, 50
practical examples, 8–11
competitive intensity
forms, 24–9
measures, 29–32
competitor identification,
14–24
concentrated industry, 24,
26–8
concentration
indexes, 29–31
industry, 27, 28
concentration ratio, 29, 30
creative destruction, 11, 46, 75
D’Aveni, R. A., 8, 19, 28, 33, 50
differentiated oligopoly, 26–8
differentiation, 21, 25, 28
digital phones, 53, 56–61
145
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146
Index
Entropy index, 30
environmental uncertainty, 95, 98–102,
124–6
Ericsson, 48, 53, 60, 64, 103
Euclidean distance, 36
Ferrier, W. J., 8, 13, 33, 46, 83
Fiegenbaum, A., 19, 36, 116, 121, 129
fragmented industry, 24
Galaxy smartphones, 9–11, 17, 22, 70
Galaxy tab, 10, 21
Gimeno, J., 12, 35, 99, 122
Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSM), 57, 60
Google, 9, 18, 65
Greve, H., 107, 116, 121
GSMArena.com, 51, 61, 63, 71
Hambrick, D. C., 29, 116, 119
Herfindahl index, 30
HTC, 16, 21, 65
Huawei, 21, 57, 66, 74
imitation
indexes, 35–8
information-based, 95, 98, 125
literature, 98
rivalry-based, 95, 98, 101
speed, 37, 130
time, 102, 104
incremental innovation, 50, 60,
123–8
industrial leadership, 11, 46, 48, 52
industry life cycle, 47, 52–7
industry structures, 24–9
intensity of competitive activity, 33–5
iPad, 10
iPhone, 9–11, 17, 20, 56, 64, 73, 80
Iridium project (Motorola), 59
isomorphism, 19, 118, 119
Japanese mobile phone vendors, 56, 61
Korean mobile phone vendors, 48
LG, 16, 67, 103, 144
Lieberman, M. B., 38, 95, 98, 116, 119,
125
Linux OS, 52, 65, 66
market domain overlap, 32
market leader, 11, 33, 35, 46, 101–3,
106, 122
market needs correspondence, 19, 21
Microsoft Windows Mobile, 18, 52,
66, 88
mobile phone
analog, 53, 57–60
digital, 53, 56–61
first generation (1G), 53
penetration rate, 56, 62, 100, 103
second generation (2G), 57
subscribers, 55
third generation (3G), 10, 68
mobile phone industry
life cycle, 47, 52–7
vendors market share, 48
mobility barriers, 15, 17–18
monopolistic competition, 25
monopoly, 26
Motorola
market shares, 48, 59
product line, 16, 61
smartphones, 71
Nec, 56, 103
Nokia
market shares, 48
product line, 16, 17, 61
smartphones, 71
oligopoly, 26–8
Panasonic, 56, 64, 103
partial adjustment model, 36, 129
Pepsi Cola (Pepsi), 8, 9
perfect competition, 24, 27, 28
Peteraf, M. A., 14, 20
Philips, 56, 61, 103
Porter, M., 12, 14, 15, 29, 82, 119
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Index
price competition, 3, 8, 22, 25, 27, 54,
73, 87
product diffusion, 101, 106
product line
filling, 62, 142
length, 16, 80, 83
stretching, 62, 142
Psion, 64
pure oligopoly, 26–8
Qualcomm, 65
radical innovation, 117, 124–6
reference target, reference point, 19,
35–7, 119, 121
regular mobile phone, 16, 21
Research in Motion (RIM), 16, 20,
52, 66
Sagem, 103
Samsung
market shares, 48
product line, 16, 17, 61
smartphones, 9, 10, 71
Schumpeter, J., 11, 33, 46, 75
Siemens, 56, 64, 103
smartphone devices, 9, 10, 16, 21,
62–7, 71
Smith, K. G., 8, 12, 35, 46, 50, 62,
83, 124
SMS, 54, 61, 103
Snow, C. C., 116, 119
147
Sony-Ericsson, 48, 64, 103, 144
StarTAC, 58, 59
strategic adjustment, 116, 118, 121, 129
strategic deviation, 37, 38
strategic group analysis, 14–19
strategic intensity, 34, 50, 62
strategic reference point (SRP) theory,
116, 120, 121
Symbian OS
characteristics, 64, 67
market shares, 64, 66
TCL, 66, 72
technology adoption literature, 96, 97
technological change literature, 48–50
technological convergence, 56, 127
technological discontinuity, 57, 62
T-Mobile, 52, 56, 65, 71
Tushman, M. L., 46, 48–50
UK mobile phone industry, 96, 103, 127
uncertainty, 95, 98–102, 124–6
Utterback, J., 46, 49, 95, 100
Vertu, 16, 17
Windows Mobile, 52, 63
winner’s traps, 58, 67
Young, G., 33
Yu, T., 13, 33
ZTE, 21, 26, 57, 66, 72, 74
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