Chapter 7
Instruments of Power
The notion of instruments of national power is an abstraction. Terminology in this domain is not widely
agreed upon, but neither is it the subject of debate. In many contexts the named instruments are merely
quick jumping off points on the way to discussing the concrete capabilities of the departments and
agencies that house the instruments. In this book, I attempt to develop the idea of instruments a bit more
fully before the necessary and inevitable shift to orchestrating the instrumental capacities housed in the
departments and agencies. The perspective developed is not widely held but it should not be controversial.
Power, in the context of foreign affairs, can be defined as “the ability to influence the behavior of
others to achieve a desired outcome.” And diplomacy projects power, including the potential for war. The
seminal work of Edward Carr in 1939 provides a good starting point in discussing the instruments of
power.1
Political power in the international sphere may be divided, for purpose of discussion, into three
categories: (a) military power, (b) economic power, (c) power over opinion. … But power is an
indivisible whole; one instrument cannot exist for long in the absence of the others.2
Carr’s formulation was later supplanted. During the Cold War, the acronym DIME was used as a
common shorthand for the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national
power.3 By the 1960s the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments were housed in
the State Department, the US Information Agency, the Defense Department, and the US Agency for
International Development, respectively. There is no such simple correlation of instrument to agency in
the twenty-first century.
More recently, MIDLIFE—military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial,
and economic—has gained some currency reflecting the greater complexity in the ways and means of
pursuing national security in the twenty-first century.4 Other meaningful lists are too long to be presented
here.5
Why is it that Carr did not include diplomacy as an instrument of power? Certainly he was aware of
it. One possible extrapolation of Carr’s definition of power is that diplomacy is the art of applying the
instruments of power rather than a separate instrument itself. The diplomatic instrument is often called
the political instrument, and Carr’s definition actually defines political power as being subdivided into the
three instruments. This formulation leaves the image of the diplomat negotiating with friends, enemies,
and neutrals backed always by the potential application of American military power, economic power, and
power over opinion. And the diplomat may be the traditional Foreign Service Officer from State
negotiating with peers representing other states, or it may be a young Marine Corps captain negotiating
with a village chief.
It is also worth noting that Carr identified power over opinion rather than the power of information.
As Carr emphasizes, the three elements of power are indivisible and none can exist long in the absence of
another. The substitution of the informational instrument of power for the power over opinion was a
significant innovation, but it is not at all clear that it was an improvement. How the United States uses its
military and economic power communicates volumes and affects domestic and foreign opinion. Positive
1 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty-Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York:
HarperCollins, 1964), 1-21.
2 Carr, International Relations, 108.
3 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. “All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national
objectives.
They
are
expressed
as
diplomatic,
economic,
informational
and
military.”
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html accessed 26 October 2008.
4 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006).
5 National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of US Power
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996).
Instruments of Power | 2
domestic opinion represents strategic staying power while negative opinion can bring down a president’s
policies. Foreign opinion can create opposition or support for US policies. There is but one message. It is
the sum of action and word. Considering the information instrument as a message separate from action
creates contradiction, dysfunction, and distrust. Moreover, governments no longer control information.
Some also make the distinction between hard power and soft power.6 Hard power is the power to coerce.
That is, what can be compelled by military force or economic sanction or what can be purchased with
economic incentives. Soft power is a short hand for the power to attract. Soft power is far closer to Carr’s
power over opinion than is the information instrument of DIME. Soft power also includes US influence
abroad exerted through private commerce and society rather than through direct government effort. Some
inaccurately equate hard power as that provided by the uniformed military and soft power as that provided
by civilian departments and agencies.
And there is talk of smart power.7 The label is a bit misleading. There is no reference to a type of power
that is smart. Instead, a more accurate characterization would be the smart application of the instruments
of power—the orchestration of all instruments of power. It is a not too veiled slap at the Bush
administration’s preference for the military instrument.
Instruments
Each of the instruments is briefly described below. A partial mapping of instrument to agency is begun,
but a detailed discussion of the relevant departments and agencies is deferred to subsequent chapters.
Some of the more contentious issues related to the instruments are highlighted here.
The Military Instrument
The military instrument includes, but is not limited to, the capabilities present in the armed forces of the
United States—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. It also includes the capability of the Coast
Guard when configured for military operations rather than for its other missions, including for example,
law enforcement and public safety. But these are organizations, not instruments. Instead, when discussing
instruments, it is more appropriate to look across these organizations at their collective ability to conduct
military operations.
One useful taxonomy includes the ability to conduct high-intensity (HIC), mid-intensity (MIC), and
low-intensity (LIC) conflict. These are roughly equivalent to strategic nuclear warfare, force-on-force
interstate warfare with conventional weapons, and unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare
includes both the ability to promote and to counter insurgency, generally intrastate. Some military
operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum have been called military operations other than war. These
include peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Standoff warfare—attacking targets from a safe distance over the horizon with air-delivered ordinance
including cruise missiles launched from aircraft, submarine, or surface combatant ship—is the modern
equivalent of gunboat diplomacy (or coercive diplomacy) when used in tandem with diplomatic efforts.
The same standoff capability can be used alone for punitive strikes or for interdiction, but it is almost
always part of a larger diplomatic or military effort.
Not all military operations are conducted by the uniformed services of the Defense Department. The
capability of civilian intelligence agencies to conduct paramilitary operations, directly or through
surrogates, is properly considered as part of the military instrument rather than the intelligence
instrument.
A major issue for the military instrument is force development. In the late Cold War era and the decade
following, transformation of the force was widely discussed across the defense establishment. The more
popular notion was of transforming the industrial-age force designed for great-power war into the
information-age force designed for great-power war—the revolution in military affairs. The less popular
6
Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security
Reform,” a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 April 2008.
7 Armitage and Nye. Hillary Clinton referred to smart power during her 13 January 2009 Senate confirmation hearings for
the position of secretary of state.
Instruments of Power | 3
notion was of transforming from the industrial-age great power force to a force for small wars or lowintensity conflict. The Defense Department pursued the equipment-centric revolution in military affairs
force and failed to provide the field commanders with the types of forces required for wars actually being
waged.
The military has become the default choice of instruments, the first choice, because the other
instruments are weak or distained by some political decision makers. Military operations can represent
hard, coercive power, or soft, attractive power, e.g., when providing humanitarian assistance. Military
operations can be judged on whether they increase or decrease the power over opinion at home and
abroad. Using the military instrument consumes resources and weakens the economic instrument,
although military force can be used for economic benefit, e.g., assuring the free flow of oil and freedom
of the seas.
The Information Instrument
The information instrument disseminates and collects information. Narrowly defined, as the term is used
here, it is limited to US government efforts to disseminate information to, and collect information on,
foreign audiences—public audiences. Government information exchanges with foreign public audiences is
often called public diplomacy. When addressed to domestic audiences, it is referred to as public affairs. And
government to government exchange, that is, information exchanged through official interstate channels,
is discussed separately under the diplomatic instrument.
A central objective is to communicate America’s story, its image, to the world. The message is about
who we are and what we hope to achieve. The most prominent programs associated with the information
instrument are Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, public-access libraries established abroad, and
cultural and educational exchange programs.
The information instrument also collects information about the histories, cultures, and attitudes of
foreign populations. This puts the information instrument in apparent competition with the intelligence
instrument. The DIME construct merges the information and intelligence instruments, while MIDLIFE
attempts the distinction.
There are two major issues associated with the information instrument. The first is about defining the
target audience. The United States has taken a strong position on separating dissemination of information
to domestic and foreign audiences. Agencies authorized to disseminate abroad are strictly prohibited from
addressing domestic audiences. Taxpayers resent paying to have their views potentially manipulated by
their own government. But given the advances of the information age, enforcing a strict division is
virtually impossible.
Truthfulness is a second major issue regarding the information instrument. The strong majority
position is that the information disseminated must be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. Lies and half truths eventually will be exposed and discredit the entire effort. This position is
arrived at independently for reasons of morality and for effectiveness. The minority view is that the
objective is to influence an audience and manipulating the facts may be necessary and therefore
acceptable.
The American story includes slavery and residual racism, unpopular wars and violent public protest,
and displacement and genocidal warfare waged against an indigenous population. Attempting to project an
American image that minimizes these aspects of history is seen as false and casts doubt on the positive
history. A lie of omission poisons the message. Telling the entire story, good and bad, communicates
honestly and portrays self-examination and progress on the ills that plague all mankind—it portrays hope.
Some choose to minimize (or even reject) the darker aspects of American history even for domestic
consumption, and it logically follows that they would project only a positive, albeit incomplete, image
abroad.
The US Information Agency (USIA) was the organization chartered to communicate the American
message abroad. The Agency fell victim to reforms as part of the “peace dividend” imagined due at the
end of the Cold War. USIA was disestablished in 1999. After 9/11, it became clear that the need to
communicate an image abroad persisted. The culture at State and Defense gives priority to gathering,
analyzing, and protecting information. State gives additional priority to official communications between
Instruments of Power | 4
governments. USIA’s culture, in contrast, is about engaging foreign societies and explaining US policies to
them. Attempts to recreate the capability in the State Department and separately in the Defense
Department failed miserably. There is no functioning information instrument today.
Perhaps the greatest issue is how the current view of the information instrument differs from Carr’s
earlier description of the power over opinion. Carr’s earlier admonition that power is inseparable still applies.
The United States’ power over opinion rests collectively on its military, economic, and cultural substance.
The current view is of an instrument somehow separate and isolated from the other instruments of
power. Talking about America, through a variety of media, cannot be separate from the reality of
American action. The message is the sum of action and word. The message is indivisible.
The Intelligence Instrument
The intelligence instrument was excluded in the original formulation of the DIME construct but its
conspicuous absence quickly required that it be subsumed under the information instrument. Intelligence
is considered separately and explicitly under MIDLIFE.
Intelligence operations include the collection and analysis of information, some of it jealously
guarded by foreign actors. Valuable intelligence is increasingly gathered from open sources.
Counterintelligence—denial of undesirable information collection efforts—is also included under the
intelligence instrument. Intelligence operations might also inject false information into foreign decision
making processes, deception.
The Central Intelligence Agency is the best known organization responsible for intelligence collection
and analysis, but the intelligence community is large and distributed widely across the departments and
agencies of government. The community’s means of intelligence collection include human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), image intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT). All source analysis brings these different sources together. A major issue for the
Community is restoring the HUMINT capability that once lost favor to technical means.
Not all intelligence operations concern collection, analysis, or protection of information. Elements of
the intelligence community are authorized to conduct operations that influence or disrupt political
processes abroad. Historically, these operations have been referred to as political warfare, psychological
warfare, and strategic operations. Along the spectrum of warfare, these operations are adjacent to
operations conducted by the special operations forces of the military. Accordingly, these operations are
considered to be part of the military instrument. Another possibility is to include it as part of the
diplomatic instrument. Associating these capabilities with the military or diplomatic instruments may be
minority views, and the association certainly is arguable by honest and knowledgeable people. Attempting
to resolve the issue here would require effort without reward.
The most prominent and persistent issue for the intelligence community is that its work is cloaked in
secrecy and where there is secrecy there is suspicion. Some detractors would prefer the abolition of
certain agencies, and a larger group argues for greater transparency and oversight. The majority view is
that intelligence operations are a necessary even if unattractive activity.
Another major issue for the intelligence community is the politicization of the intelligence process.
Some administrations have influenced the process to produce intelligence estimates that supported the
desired political action. Such politicization is usually detected and is a key component of faulty decision
making processes that produce bad policy.
Secrecy works against the intelligence community in other ways. The community cannot advertise its
successes, and it cannot defend itself against accusations of failure. Congress and the president find the
intelligence community to be a convenient scapegoat for their own poor decision making. The public’s
expectations for the intelligence community are unrealistically high, approaching perfection.
Senior decision makers must make critical decisions based on information that is incomplete, out of
date, inaccurate, and even contradictory. Information provided by the intelligence community is and
always will be flawed. Intelligence officers and mature decision makers know and acknowledge that fact.
Only the decision maker is responsible for his or her decisions.
Instruments of Power | 5
The Economic Instrument
Wielding the economic instrument leverages the nation’s wealth to influence others. Narrowly defined, the
economic instrument includes economic sanctions and foreign aid. More broadly defined, the instrument
includes export controls and trade policies that range from granting liberal to restrictive access to US
markets. Such use of the economic instrument is a hard, coercive use of force. In its broadest definition, it
includes the sheer size of the US economy as having an influence on the rest of the world. The vitality of
the US economy and the attendant standard of living is a soft, attractive power felt around the world.
Every move in US economic, fiscal, and monetary policy has global effect.
Perhaps the most traditional view, however, is that the economic instrument is wielded abroad by
providing or withdrawing foreign aid to developing countries and imposing economic sanctions. A major
issue with the economic instrument is that sanctions (sticks) and aid (carrots) have not worked with
dictators, and especially not with dictators who rule over an extractive economy (e.g., with a nationalized
oil industry). The common result is the “punishment of innocents.” The government we are trying to
influence through sanctions is able to ignore the sticks and carrots and live comfortably, while the
population at large goes without food, water, and public services.
Foreign aid comes in at least two major forms: military assistance and foreign assistance. Military and
foreign assistance differ in kind as well as in delivery mechanism. Foreign assistance tends to concern the
development of the economy and the institutions of government, and the preponderance of aid is
delivered through USAID-administered contracts with foreign nationals. Military assistance tends to be
training and equipment related and is delivered directly by DOD personnel.
Beyond the difference in kind and delivery mechanism, a tension exists between military and foreign
assistance. The military is more inclined to shift aid to countries where immediate benefit may accrue to
the United States in dealing with the crisis de jour.8 USAID tends to take a longer term, steadier approach.
The State Department has the responsibility to guide both USAID’s and DOD’s efforts and to balance
the objectives of the different missions in accordance with overall foreign policy objectives and long-term
strategic interests. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), later renamed the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is the dominant organization administering military assistance. DSCA has
increased its share of foreign aid from 7 to 20 percent in recent years.9
In the broadest definition of the economic instrument, the effects of the massive US economy are
included. National security rests on a robust economy. In this broad view, Federal Reserve Board policy on
money supply and interest rates, promotion of international trade activity by the Commerce Department,
State Department, and the American Trade Representative, are all considered applications of the
economic instrument. So, too, are activities conducted via a variety of international organizations
supported by the United States.
Increasingly, the economic instrument addresses issues that inhibit economic development. Health
issues like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and avian flu can swamp local government capacities and prevent any type
of development, either economic or governmental. The Department of Health and Human Services’
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) bring capability to bear. And other departments, like
the Agriculture Department, have significant contributions to make in developing countries.
Historically, developmental efforts abroad have not been supported by any natural constituency in the
United States. Funding is miniscule by federal standards. A burst in foreign aid budget does not result in a
larger administrative staff. The same number of staff disperses more money and oversees more programs.
Some money inevitably goes to unsavory characters and enterprises. Stories of fraud and corruption
attract negative attention and damage the entire effort. Detractors of foreign aid argue that private
industry, rather than government, is better at pursuing economic development through investment abroad.
But the private sector does not assist in governmental development.
In the traditional view, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is the dominant
organization administering foreign assistance. It focuses on economic development in states receiving aid,
but it does more. It is also the vehicle through which the United States assists states in developing the
8
9
John M. Donnelly, “Battle Brewing Over Five-Sided Diplomacy,” CQ Weekly (11 June 2007): 1727.
Walter Pincus, “Taking Defense’s Hand out of State’s Pocket,” Washington Post (9 July 2007): 13.
Instruments of Power | 6
institutions of government. One aspect of good governance is establishment of the rule of law, including
legislation, independent courts, and law enforcement. USAID has never attempted quick fixes. Theirs is a
deliberate process designed not to outstrip the pace suited to the nation assisted. In this more complete
view, the economic instrument might be more accurately called the developmental instrument.
The Developmental Instrument
The developmental instrument has already been introduced under the economic instrument. This section
focuses on a major issue facing US developmental efforts specifically and Western efforts more generally.
Modernization is ideology that rests on the assumption that modernization is good and necessary. Next is
deciding whose version of modernization should govern. Economic and governmental systems are both
objects of modernization, and there are competing views on both.
William Easterly takes a critical look at the West’s past development efforts in the underdeveloped
world.10 Easterly asserts that Western development efforts are characterized by centrally planned
economies in developing countries, something Westerners would never tolerate at home. He argues
instead for grassroots, bottom-up efforts like those fostered by micro-grants and loans.
Rudyard Kipling encouraged the United States to “pick up the white man’s burden” in 1898 after the
United States defeated Spain in the Philippines. The old world powers were in decline, but the European
sense of cultural supremacy was not. Europeans had the right and moral duty to bring civilization to the
uncivilized. In the colonial era, one spoke of civilized, semi-civilized, and uncivilized societies. During the
Cold War, one spoke of the first world (the West), the second world (the East), and the third world (the
South). In the post-Cold War era, one speaks of the developed, developing, and underdeveloped worlds.
The labels have changed but the assumptions and logic of white man’s burden remain.
There are different motives for US development efforts. Some may be acts of simple generosity. Some
may derive from a sense of supremacy. And other developmental efforts may be enlightened self interest,
believing that developing other societies will provide greater security and access to wider markets.
Progressives in the targeted states are more likely to embrace modernization. Conservatives will view it
with cautious suspicion. Fundamentalists and reactionaries will oppose it, some violently, and prefer a
reversion to past ways. How the international community interprets US motives will increase or decrease
American power over opinion.
The Financial Instrument
The financial instrument is implicitly included in the economic instrument under the DIME construct, but
it is called out separately under the new MIDLIFE construct. Developing countries require access to the
financial markets of the developed world. The United States assists directly and assists indirectly through
international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, multilateral development banks, and the
Export-Import Bank. The financial instrument includes the ability for restructuring the debt of
underdeveloped countries. The financial instrument—specifically the World Trade Organization and
International Monetary Fund supported by the US government—is vigorously opposed by a complex
collection of small, disparate political factions who often call for debt forgiveness, among other things, for
the developing world.
The Law Enforcement Instrument
The law enforcement instrument is a new addition to the list of instruments of power, but there is a
significant legacy. Law enforcement agencies are numerous and diverse, including local, national, and
international agencies. Law enforcement, narrowly defined, includes the investigation and prosecution of
crime. Its successful employment requires cooperation with foreign and international law enforcement
agencies. A broader definition—required when considering the nation building mission—includes
developing the law enforcement capacities of failed and failing states. Because these broader activities
10 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New
York: Penguin Books, 2006).
Instruments of Power | 7
involve building the governmental capacities of weak states, they might better be included under the
development instrument.
The law enforcement approach to terrorism attributed to the Clinton administration was much
maligned by the Bush campaign of 2000. After-the-fact collection of highly reliable evidence followed by
prosecution, in court or perhaps with military means, was considered too little too late. But conspiracy to
commit crimes, including terrorist acts, is also a crime, and the law enforcement instrument has shown its
ability to prevent terrorist acts and to disrupt terrorist networks just as it has demonstrated the ability to
disrupt organized crime.
But the nation building mission requires a much broader definition of law enforcement, and history
offers lessons. In the decades surrounding WWI, the US Marine Corps conducted nation building
operations—typically in Central America and the Caribbean—under the rubric of small wars.11 It was not
uncommon for marines to establish a judiciary and a constabulary. After deposing a dictator and building a
constabulary, it was not uncommon for a new dictator to rise up from the constabulary and use it to seize
and hold power. And the marines would come again.
Providing aid to foreign police reemerged in the 1950s.12 In 1961, Kennedy initiated the Public Safety
Program under the new Agency for International Development. The Program was to build police forces
for internal security as part of Kennedy’s efforts to counter communist-inspired insurgencies.13 After the
United States sided with right-wing dictators against communist encroachment, US-trained internal
security forces were accused of human rights abuses while quashing political opposition. In response,
legislation in the post-Vietnam era prohibited “U.S. agencies from using foreign economic or military
assistance funds to assist foreign police.”14 Kennedy’s Public Safety Program was specifically terminated in
1974. The prohibition did not apply to funds beyond the Foreign Assistance Act, for example, the
Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) activities.
Since 1981, Congress began adding numerous exemptions from the prohibition and the law is now
effectively neutered. Allowed activities include training for criminal investigation, patrolling, interrogation
and “counterinsurgency techniques,” riot control, and weapon use. Weapons, communications, and
transportation equipment may be provided.
Nation building will require development of internal security forces to provide for public safety.
Training and equipping foreign police in countries with a long tradition of authoritarian rule will likely
prove to be a bad idea in some cases. There is no effective unifying oversight of the many efforts of the
departments and agencies.
Today, the Justice Department houses the principal national law enforcement agency, the FBI, as well
as significant capabilities in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the DEA.
The State Department administers programs to train foreign police in international narcotics control and
counterterrorist activities. The Defense Department is authorized to assist national police forces. The
Coast Guard, until recently part of the Treasury Department and now part of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), houses significant law enforcement capabilities in the maritime. The Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center also resides under DHS. The Treasury Department houses the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which contributes a significant capability to law enforcement
efforts by monitoring money flows associated with the illicit narcotics trade, money laundering, financing
terrorist organizations, or common tax evasion.
11
12
Worley, Shaping U.S. Forces, 177-180.
United States General Accounting Office, “Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance,” GAO/NSIAD-92-118, March
1992.
13
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (P.L. 93—184, sec. 2, 87 stat. 714, 716) and Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559,
sec. 30(a), 88 stat. 1795, 1804).
14
Instruments of Power | 8
The Diplomatic Instrument
The diplomatic instrument is sometimes called the political instrument. It represents the power of
persuasion. Narrowly defined, diplomacy includes negotiations pursued through international institutions
like the UN and NATO, and it includes negotiations pursued through bilateral relations—state to state
negotiations. It produces treaties and lesser international agreements. Broadly defined, diplomacy includes
the above and all declaratory policy statements issued to influence others, and is underwritten by the other
instruments of power. The State Department is, of course, the principal organization housing the
diplomatic instrument.
Two important facts characterize the international system of states: the interests of states are
divergent and states are unequal in power. Foreign policy describes the objectives of states, and diplomacy
is the intercourse between states attempting to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Not all foreign
policy objectives are matters of national security. Foreign policy objectives might include advancing
human rights in China, but China’s failure to guarantee human rights to its citizens does not constitute a
threat to American national security. Foreign policy objectives include security, trade, and investment.
Diplomacy is the power of suasion—convincing foreign governments to take desired actions without
resort to more forceful methods. General George C. Marshall—who after serving as the Army chief of
staff during WWII, secretary of state, and secretary of defense—said, military force without diplomacy is
pointless and diplomacy not backed by military force is mere posturing. One can easily add other types of
force to the military. Diplomacy is conducted backed by all the instruments of power.
Most diplomacy—influencing the behavior of other governments—takes place outside public view.
Examples include moderating foreign police treatment of US citizens and gaining access to foreign
markets for a commercial product. Strong relations between states make easier the resolution of specific
issues, and weak relations make resolution harder. Relations must be built and maintained, and State
Department personnel make long-term relations a high priority. Foreign embassies in Washington and
American embassies abroad provide early warning of crisis and the opportunity to understand host nation
interests.
Diplomacy takes place through the enunciation of US policy and negotiations. Ensuring that US
positions are known in advance might well avoid misunderstandings and confrontations. Negotiating
agreements is another important function of diplomacy, whether those negotiations are public or private
and whether they are formal or informal. These functions take place more fluidly when regular relations
are maintained, and the maintenance of relations is itself an important function of diplomacy.
While there is a great deal of information exchange associated with diplomacy, information
exchanged between the US government and other sovereign states, is properly viewed as part of the
diplomatic rather than the information instrument. Diplomacy is the standard way the United States
interacts with the international system of states to communicate its intentions and views. It achieves
influence through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, negotiations, and engagement with states, the
UN, non-governmental organizations, and other international organizations.
Other negotiations within the purview of the diplomatic instrument include nuclear arms control,
conventional arms control, cooperative threat reduction, confidence building regimes, non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and export controls. These functions were under the purview of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until merged into the State Department in 1999.
The diplomatic instrument includes the power of recognition. Through recognition, the United States
receives representatives of other sovereign states, recognizes them as equals, but recognition does not
imply approval of the recognized state’s policies. The quick recognition of Panama by Teddy Roosevelt in
1903 after it was “liberated” from Colombia and of Israel by Truman in 1948 is demonstration of the
power of recognition. The refusal to recognize is equally important. Below refusal are the recall of US
diplomats and the ejection of foreign diplomats. Through diplomatic channels, the United States
expresses its official dissatisfaction with the “demarche” and the “strongly worded demarche” before
resort to more coercive actions.
The major issue facing the diplomatic instrument today is its relevance and role. It once was the
preeminent instrument that orchestrated all instruments of power. When negotiating an agreement with
Instruments of Power | 9
another country, the diplomat is well positioned to consider the specific issue on the table in the context
of all other issues between the two states, and the diplomat can put options on the table that draw from
the resources of the other instruments of power. One view, recently prominent, is that diplomacy is
tantamount to appeasement. From this camp, the military instrument is preferred, and is perceived as the
dominant instrument through which foreign policy and national security objectives are pursued.
To equate the diplomatic instrument with the State Department is simply wrong. While the great
majority of State’s work is diplomacy, and State may lead in many diplomatic efforts, the diplomatic
instrument is spread across the departments and agencies of the executive branch. And since the Vietnam
War, the legislative branch became increasingly involved in diplomacy as congressional delegations rose in
prominence.
The Defense Department challenges State in diplomacy. The office of the under secretary of defense
for policy is sometimes referred to as the state department inside the Pentagon. The undersecretary and
assistant secretaries lead in diplomacy through the military alliance structure, including NATO (1949-),
CENTO (1955-1979), and SEATO (1955-1977). The Joint Staff policy and planning staff (J5) plays an
important role and its director is the military advisor to the US ambassador to the UN. The regional
combatant commanders are deeply and continuously engaged abroad through the European, African,
Pacific, Central, Southern, and Northern Commands. Their regional orientation often gives them greater
diplomatic weight than ambassadors representing US interests in single countries. The Defense
Department also places defense attaches in foreign embassies.
Several single-issue agencies also perform diplomatic functions, making public statements, negotiating
agreements, and conducting their missions through international organizations. The former US
Information Agency (USIA) led in educational cultural exchange efforts and in communicating to foreign
publics. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) leads in economic and governmental
development. The US Trade Representative (USTR), with direct reporting responsibilities to both Congress
and the president, has responsibility for bilateral trade negotiations and can deny or grant access to US
markets.
Other departments contribute to the diplomatic effort. The Treasury Department leads in foreign
investment and engages with international financial institutions like the World Bank. The Departments of
Agriculture and Commerce play strong roles. The Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS) and
its National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continually
engage with international health organizations. The Justice Department (DOJ) conducts liaison with
foreign police agencies.
The State Department, in general, is not structured to plan or operate programs (exceptions include
counterdrug, counterterrorism, and refugee issues). Each of the single-issue agencies provides staff with
specialized skills and knowledge. The agencies typically lead in policy formulation and execution with
overall State Department policy guidance. The president’s National Security Council and presidential
special envoys compete with State.
For Consideration
Carr defined the instruments of power in a highly abstract way that remains useful today. Carr’s
instruments—military power, economic power, and the power over opinion—convey a three-legged stool
metaphor that national security rests upon. The instruments must be strong and in balance. One weak leg
and the imbalanced stool tips over. Our strategic actions, in addition to achieving objectives, must also be
evaluated as to whether they increase, preserve, or weaken the instruments of power that assure national
security. The stool needs to remain tall and balanced.
First we’ll use Carr’s instruments as a way to consider the current strategic condition, and then we’ll
turn to more recent interpretations of the instruments of power.
Status of the Instruments
The wellbeing of the military and economic instruments receives a great deal of public attention. But the
power over opinion is neglected by many. And some realists equate power solely with the military
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instrument. But as Carr reminds, no instrument can long stand alone. Roger Altman and Richard Haass
provide a recent assessment of the instruments with an emphasis on fiscal profligacy.15 They argue that
reduced expenditures are necessary to stop the deficit spending and that increased taxes are necessary to
pay off accumulated debt.
The United States reached its peak of power relative to the rest of the world’s economies at the end
of World War II. Much of Europe’s and Japan’s industrial base lay in rubble and their workforce
dislocated. As the world recovered, US relative economic power declined. The increasingly integrated
economy of the European Union exceeds that of the United States. The strengthening of the BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) represents continuing relative economic decline for the United
States. And relative economic decline implies a weakened ability to “lead and shape international
relations.”
American power over opinion is weakened on two fronts, making the ability to lead and shape
international relations more of an uphill climb. During the Cold War, the “thriving economy and high
standard of living” of US capitalism compared to conditions of Soviet communism contributed greatly to
US power over opinion in the third world. But during the recent global recession, the United States was
compared not to the Soviet Union but to China whose economy continued its economic expansion while
the West’s contracted. The Chinese system; “a top-heavy political system married to a directed hybrid
form of capitalism,” has greater appeal in the developing world than does the US system and what appears
to be “lax government oversight and regulation.” The world sees a country debt ridden and unable to
cope as congressional Republicans and a Democratic president agreed to postpone the inevitable and
continue to borrow from China.
On another front, the Guantanamo prison and incidents at Abu Gharaib weakened the US claim on
the rule of law. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created more negative than positive
sentiment in the Muslim world. Waging war in Iraq in opposition to international sentiment expanded the
divide between the United States and its allies in Europe and East Asia.
Offensive realism would predict expansion of US interests following the demise of its Cold War
competitor. Paul Kennedy’s 1989 The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers concludes that “the costs of carrying
out an ambitious overseas policy can undermine the economic foundations of a state.” The United States
spends more on defense than China, the European Union (including its NATO member states), Japan, and
India combined. Rather than narrowly deterring actions against the United States, deterrence was
extended to Western Europe, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Israel during the Cold War. Extended
deterrence was expanded into Eastern Europe after the Cold War.
Pursuing preponderance of power, whether in the name of primacy or cooperative security, extends
the US security umbrella even further. Proponents of both strategies assert “the responsibilities of the last
remaining super power.” No national, international, natural, or biblical law is cited as the basis for these
putative responsibilities. The last remaining super power is well positioned to choose its obligations, and it
is the ultimate act of responsibility to choose those obligations carefully and wisely.
There are political forces that demand a strong response under the assumption that a strong response is
an effective response. To be effective, US actions must be judged on whether they preserve, erode, or expand
US power. As the late Walt Kelly, creator of the Pogo comic strip said, “We have met the enemy and he is
us.”
From Instrument to Mechanism
Carr’s meaning has been supplanted over time. DIME moved us away from Carr’s instruments and toward
assignment of responsibilities to departments and agencies. The more recent MIDLIFE and longer lists
moved us even further from Carr’s formulation. Today, instrument is often used as a synonym for the
concrete capabilities or mechanisms spread across the departments and agencies of government. In the
context of ends, ways, and means, some use these concrete capabilities as an expression of means. Means
15 Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, “American Power and Profligacy: The Consequences of Fiscal Irresponsibility,”
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 25-34.
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are assembled and applied to produce the ways of the strategy. Orchestrating these widely distributed
instruments is exceedingly problematic.
MIDLIFE conveys more of a mechanistic or tool mindset. Other than normal wear and tear, the
mechanic isn’t inclined to think much about whether using a wrench increases or decreases its value. The
tool is there to use. As Madeline Albright said, “what’s the point of having this superb military … if we
can’t use it?” Still, the tool kit must be balanced, like Carr’s instruments, but that is a matter of investment,
what the military calls force development policy. The uniformed services have well developed and
rigorous force development practices variously referred to as combat development or warfare
development, and Congress pays considerable attention. No such emphasis is apparent for the other
instruments of power.
As a guide to action, Carr’s instruments support strategic thought at the highest levels. As a guide to
organizing government and allocating resources, DIME and MIDLIFE appear better suited. The capacities
of the several departments and agencies must be adequate to the purposes of the national security
strategy. The next chapter surveys the relevant parts of the departments and agencies that house the
instruments of power, that is, the mechanisms to implement policy, the means of strategy.
It might be useful to retain the distinction between the original and the new meanings. A less used
term, instruments of statecraft, better conveys the meaning of DIME and MIDLIFE as action channels, or
mechanisms, that can be applied to achieve the objectives of state. Instruments of power and instruments
of statecraft could then structure and facilitate two distinct and important discussions.
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