FIRES IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
CASE STUDY – THE PETROTRIN OIL REFINERY
By
Dr. Victor Coombs
Chief Medical Officer, Petrotrin
Consultant Occupational and Environmental Health
Abstract
Fires in the Oil and Gas industries may be accidental or deliberate as in act of war. The
consequences are heavy property damage losses, negative impact on the environment and
the economy as well as untold damage to workers and surrounding communities from
injuries, death and morbidity. Disaster Management Agencies and the Health Sector’s
Response is critical to mitigate significant loss of lives and morbidity. A brief overview of
consequences is done using the Petrotrin Oil Refinery as a case study.
FIRES IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
CASE STUDY – THE PETROTRIN OIL REFINERY
Introduction
During the Gulf War in 1991, 640 odd wells ignited in Kuwait. Fires raged for more than eight
months, consumes 2 billion barrels of oil and cost Kuwait US$100 Billion. Economist 91.11.09 Vol. 321
During the operation Allied Forces in Yugoslavia in 1999, precision bombing caused widespread
damage to oil and petrochemical facilities. The results were oil product releases, pollutant releases,
ground water pollution, soil pollution, chemical emissions, widespread injuries and death. Gopal and
Deller (IEER)
Between 1970 and 1999 accidents at major hydrocarbon plants and facilities around the world with
property damage over US$10 Million were 379, and amounted to over $22 Billion in property
damage at January 2000 dollars. (James Coco of Marsh Risk Consulting)
At Petrotrin Oil Refinery in Trinidad West Indies, we experienced an explosion and fire on a Fluid
Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) Plant on June 05, 1991, which claimed one life and injured 17 and on
October 17, 1985 a fire on #5 berth claimed the lives of 14 workers. Proper safety practices can
reduce the incidence of many refinery fires and good emergency medical response can save lives
and limbs in any such disaster.
Methodology
A search was done for documents related to the FCCU explosion/fire and the#5 berth fire. This
was indeed a challenge. A review was also done on accidental fires/explosions in the hydrocarbon
industry. Finally, a report by Gopal and Deller of the Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research was reviewed for the consequences of precision bombing on oil and petrochemical
facilities.
Results
The Piper Alpha Disaster in the North Sea on July 06, 1988 had the highest death toll in the Oil
and Gas Offshore Operations. 165 of the 226 on board died. The vast majority died from smoke
inhalation (109).
A 30 year review of major property losses between 1970 – 1999 revealed 6 refineries losing
US$597 Million, 6 offshore installations losing US$440 million and one each chemical plant ($75
Million), Gas Processing Plant $200 Million and one Terminal $30 Million.
In the on-shore category, $839 MM was lost at a petrochemical plant in Texas October 23, 1989 by
a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE), $368 MM was lost at a refinery in Louisiana may 05, 1988 again by
a VCE. $268 MM was lost at a refinery in Illinois by a VCE, $262 MM was lost in France at a
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refinery by a VCE. A refinery in the Virgin Islands lost $207 MM in hurricane September 18, 1989
and in Turkey $200 MM was lost at a refinery as a result of an earthquake.
In the offshore category, $1,085 MM was lost in an explosion and platform in the North Sea July
07, 1988, $931 MM was lost in a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico when a platform was destroyed
August 26, 1992. In Brazil, a platform blowout caused $421 M in losses on April 24, 1988.
In major refinery losses 47% are due to fires, 30% explosions, 15% vapour cloud, 5% mechanical
breakdown and 5% other. The operating units most affected were Catalytic Cracking Units, Crude
Distillation Units, Hydrocracking Units, Hydrotreating Units and Storage Tanks.
At Terminal installations, 39 losses resulted in property damage of $1,620,300,000 for the period
1970 to 2000. Tankage and ship/barge accounted for 41%. Fires accounted for 41% of the losses,
explosions 33% and mechanical failures 13%. The majority of losses occurred at storage units.
Petrotrin Refinery June 05, 1991
An explosion and fire occurred at the FCCU at 2.53 am on Wednesday June 05, 1991. Equipment
damaged/destroyed included the Slurry Settler, Slurry pumps, Steam Blowdown Drum, Steam
Superheater Exchanger, Piping, Structures, Instrumentation, Buildings and Electrical Equipment.
Three was one fatality and 12 injuries. Several workers both injured and non-injured suffered post
Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Much of the ancillary damage was apparently due to the “shrapnel” effect of the slurry Settler and
was concentrated in the northeast, the path of trajectory. At the FCCU and Gas Con Control
Rooms, the blast damaged roofs, ceiling and windows. Breakage of window glass occurred 200
metres away.
On the FCCU main structure, there was fire damage mainly on the north side of the reactor where
the steam drum is located. The FCCU charge pre-heater and related piping suffered damage due to
fire caused by a ruptured feedline. The East Area Guard Basin became ignited by flying debris.
It was found that the Slurry Settler vessel showed tensile failure typical of internal explosion.
Failure of the head in the area adjacent to the reinforcing pad around the 18” manway nozzle. The
manway nozzle complete with bolted over was found about 200 metres north east of the vessels
original location.
The Engineering Findings were:
A 480 – 565 psi pressure in the Slurry Settler was required for rupture; vessel-operating
temperature was 610oF. Calculations on blast effect were equivalent to 120 – 200 pounds
TNT. A vapour space was most likely present in the vessel. Air was most likely trapped
inside the vessel during start up.
It was concluded that an internal detonation explosion in the Slurry Settler caused the failure of
the vessel head, rupture of the vessel itself, release of hydrocarbon, explosion and fire. It was
very fortunate that the direction of the predominant ballistic or impact type of damage was
confined to the NE direction, which was unoccupied hillside. Furthermore, several workers had
gone to the canteen to eat and were delayed there by a shower of rain.
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Berth #5 Petrotrin Pointe a Pierre
On October 17, 1985 at 12.35pm, a fire started on Berth #5. The Fire Service arrived at 12.45 pm
and the fire was brought under control at 12.50 pm. The all clear was given at 3.00 pm. When the
smoke evaporated 14 workers were dead and several others injured.
In June 1985, a decision was taken to recommission the entire length of the 30-inch diameter
sealine (S/L No. 33) running from Pile Bent 80 manifold to No. 5 Berth and terminating at No. 6
berth.
The section of the line between No. 5 and No. 6 Berths (length 1200 ft) was the only inoperative
part and was positively isolated from the rest of the line in 1975. This section had to be tested and
repaired first. Between July and October 1985, the other portion of the line was in crude oil
service, the last being the receipt of 319,000 bbls of Algerian Condensate on September 01. By
October 11, all activities related to the repairs of the disused section were completed.
On October 17, equipment was mobilized and manpower allocated to the task of completing the final
job. The last task was to remove the 30-inch diameter slip blind installed in 1975 from between the
bolted flanges on the riser section of the line at No. 5 berth, located approximately 22” above sea
water level.
A maintenance work permit was prepared and signed off by (1) Assistant Area Maintenance
Superintendent West; (2) Port Captain; (3) Oil Stocks Superintendent and delivered on site just
prior to start of the job.
Around 12 noon after the flange was loosened on S/L 33, heavy crude trapped in the dead leg
followed by light hydrocarbons (Algerian Condensate API 64.9 and vapour pressure 9.1 psig) flowed
at an estimated rate of 40 barrels per minute for 8-9 minutes.
This line was under positive pressure from an operating crude transfer system in the foreshore
area. During the 8-9 minutes period the 30inch slip blind, weighing 250 lbs was removed by the
crew.
At 12.33 pm vapours from the light hydrocarbons, which had surrounded all floating craft were
ignited by an open flame or spark, resulting in a muffled explosion. Flames were driven by strong
winds over 20 knots and engulfed all men and equipment on the job.
In all 14 men died and several were injured. The fatalities included 6 men assigned to the Pile
Driver Atlas, 6 men assigned to the Maintenance Crew and 2 men who comprised the Launch Crew.
Fire fighting and search and rescue operations were activated. Launches “Star Fish” and “Flying
Fish” were involved in search and rescue. Tug “Plaisance” and Tug “Plein Palais” were involved in fire
fighting.
Post mortem reports revealed 6 men died from drowning, asphyxia and burns, 4 died from inhalation
of gas and burns, 3 died from gas inhalation and charring burns and 1 died from inhalation of gas,
burns and brain haemorrhage.
It was concluded that the probable cause of the ignition were –
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a) A spark from the slip blind striking against the deck of the tray barge or
b) The back firing of the boiler during the process of shutting down in an emergency.
Effects of Bombing Oil Refineries
During war, enemy forces often engage in precision bombing of specific targets, which can cause
widespread harm, weaken the opposition and result in an earlier “victory”.
Gopal and Deller of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research published a report in
November 2002 on two case studies of the bombing of industrial facilities at Pancevo and
Kragujevac during Operation allied Force, Yugoslavia 1999.
This study despite some limitations showed clearly that not only was there human losses in death
and injury and illnesses but there was also oil products released, pollutants released, ground water
pollution, soil pollution and chemical emissions of toxic substances. The study was triggered by
concerns over health and environmental impacts of modern war.
In Pancevo, the bombings resulted in major releases of 1,2 dichloroethane and mercury, pollution
created by bomb-related fires, and other environmental damage. In Kragujevac, environmental
concerns surround PCB spills that resulted from bombed transformer stations.
Over 160,000 metric tons of products were destroyed at NIS Oil Refinery. Pollutants released
included Ammonia, Phosphates, Calcium Ammonium Nitrate, Vinyl chloride, 1-2 dichloroethane,
Mercury, among others. Numerous chemicals polluted the ground water including Benzene, Xylene,
Toluene, PHC’s, Chlorobenzene, Chloroform, Tetrachloroethane among others.
Soil pollution
included BXT’s lead and ethyl benzene. Emissions included 1500 metric tons of particulates, 820
metric tons of Carbon Monoxide, 62,000 metric tons of Carbon Dioxide, 2,500 metric tons of
Sulphur Dioxide among others.
Industrial Disasters
The common causes are fire, explosion, and toxic release and vapour cloud explosion. However,
hurricanes, earthquakes and floods can also precipitate a disaster. Well blow out, mechanical
breakdown can also lead to a major disaster.
Medical Management of Mass Casualty
The key elements of success are preparedness, mock drills and resource allocation and networking.
The initial response of emergency medical services are search, rescue, first aid, triage, transport
to health facility and treatment, and later redistribution of patients between hospitals. Ancillary
services include shelter, food, warm clothing and sanitation.
A disaster situation may be defined as any emergency that overwhelms the available medical
resources. Triage is a French word meaning ‘to sort”. A Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) is defined as
a situation in which the medical care required exceeds the ability to provide that care.
Scene evaluation is critical to avoidance of further injuries and death. Always ensure relative
safety before entry. At critical command center, all personnel must know what is specifically
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required of them, data collection must be accurate and clear, communication, and coordination with
a cool head is vital to successful operations.
There are three major rules of triage:
1.
Only immediate life-threatening conditions are identified and treated in the initial
triage round, i.e. airway obstruction, open chest injuries or major external
haemorrhage.
2.
Salvage of life takes precedence over salvage of limbs.
3.
The Triage Officer must survey all the patients as quickly as possible in order to
determine the number of victims and to obtain an overall evaluation of the disaster
scene.
In the two Petrotrin case studies, emergency response was very good. There is a Medical Centre
near to the refinery and a 60-bed hospital near to the Port/Terminal. We were short of body bags
in 1985. The need for more skilled first responders was recognized for MCI’s in remote locations.
Dr. Victor Coombs
Chief Medical Officer, Petrotrin
Consultant Occupational and Environmental Health
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