Do UN Sanctions Strengthen the International Presence of the EU?
Spyros Blavoukos* and Dimitris Bourantonis**
Abstract
In many cases, the EU not only participates in the imposition of UN sanctions but
actively sets the agenda and shapes their content, as a coercive means to bring a
recalcitrant state into order especially when protracted negotiations fail to deliver. By
default, this course of action constitutes an act of actorness, raising the international
profile of the EU and signaling a significant presence in varying degrees in
multilateral negotiations. However, some of these cases are also indications of limited
effectiveness in the EU international interactions, revealing a considerable actornesseffectiveness gap. We account for this gap by reference to the bargaining power of the
EU, identifying its key determinants that are related with the modality of EU
engagement in multilateral diplomacy and revolve around the EU structural assets and
institutional features as well as the bargaining environment. We use this analytical
framework to account for the EU role in the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear
program, questioning whether the UN sanctions do indicate always a strong EU
international presence.
* Spyros Blavoukos, Lecturer, Department of International and European Economic
Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, sblavo@aueb.gr
** Dimitris Bourantonis, Associate Professor, Department of International and
European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business,
bouranto@aueb.gr
FIRST DRAFT
PLEASE, DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHORS’ PERMISSION
Paper prepared for the Third Global International Studies Conference
August 17-20, 2011 - Porto, Portugal
1
Introduction
For an international organization (IO) that legitimately expresses the international
community, imposing sanctions suggests that all other means of intervention have not
brought the targeted recalcitrant international actor into order. Such sanctions usually
constitute an indication of the IO’s strength and commitment, illustrating the degree
of cohesion and homogeneity among its constituent member-states that have agreed to
this course of action. However, they may also reveal certain weaknesses of the IO in
question, most important of which is the IO’s limited bargaining power and
effectiveness, especially if they follow protracted negotiations that have led to a deadend.
For the EU, participating within the UN framework in the imposition of such
sanctions has by default positive connotations, considered an illustration of
international actorness. The argument goes that such collective actions strengthen the
EU international presence, indicating the EU capacity to engage in a constructive
manner with the rest of the international community in actions with possible far
reaching political implications. Drawing on the EU engagement in the negotiations
over the Iranian nuclear program, we argue that a more nuanced and focused look of
the EU participation in sanction imposition at the UN level is necessary. Whereas
there is little denying the fact of the positive EU role in the building up of the sanction
regime against Iran per se, questions arise as to why the EU failed to achieve a
breakthrough in the preceding negotiations in which she was the primary interlocutor
of the Iranian government. In that light, should sanctions be seen as a failure of the
EU international aspirations, rather than emphasizing the success of having all EU-27
on board for such a political course of action? In other words, could sanctions send
opposite signals undermining the EU international presence rather than strengthening
it? Thus, we do not ask whether the EU has been an actor or not in the negotiations
over Iran’s nuclear program. This has been well documented in the literature and the
answer comes clearly to the positive. We ask whether the EU has been an effective
actor in this process.
To our understanding, actorness and effectiveness are not linked directly.
Analytically, the concept of actorness reflects the intra-EU dimension of the EU
international interactions, that is the internal capacity of the EU to emerge as a
cohesive, authoritative and autonomous player in the international arena and become
recognized by the other negotiating partners as such. Effectiveness is related mostly
2
with the output dimension of these interactions, capturing primarily the degree of goal
attainment for the EU (Groen and Niemann 2011: 7). In that respect, effectiveness
along side other criteria like efficiency and relevance for the priority stakeholders of
the EU – i.e. the constituent member-states- constitute indicators of the EU
international performance (Jørgensen and Oberthür, forthcoming).
We argue that the missing link between actorness and effectiveness is
bargaining power. In the EU case, this link revolves around how EU structural
features filter the EU political and economic assets to create the EU negotiating
capital that leads to tangible negotiating outcomes within a specific bargaining
environment. In that respect, we draw on institutionalist accounts of the EU
bargaining behavior that have well captured the idiosyncratic modus operandi of the
EU (Groenleer and van Schaik 2007; Meunier 2000; Clark et al 2000). In fluid and
dynamic negotiations, these features may either hinder agreement or become a
blessing in disguise, allowing ‘tied hands’ bargaining tactics and the realization of the
maximum of concessions from the other side of the table. We complement them by
insights of the negotiation literature that contribute to our better understanding of the
Iranian case that constitutes the empirical focus our work.
In the next section, we elaborate on the institutionalist and political
determinants of the EU bargaining power, linking the concept of actorness with
effectiveness in international negotiations. Then, we present an overview of the EU
engagement in the negotiating quagmire over the Iranian nuclear program. Following
that, we discuss this engagement in light of the insights of the first section, before
concluding with the possible generalizable findings of our paper.
Bargaining Power in Multilateral Negotiations: Bridging the ActornessEffectiveness Gap
The discussion over the international dimension of the EU was long held captive to
the overarching ontological question about the ‘nature of the EU beast’, creating a
tense academic debate about whether the EU could and should be analyzed along the
lines of traditional approaches to International Relations (IR). In parallel to the
inconclusive
academic
debate,
intra-EU
policy advances
and
institutional
developments in the European integration process have always had important
externalities, forcing interactions of the EC/EU structures with the outer world. They
shape the perceptions and expectations of other international actors, thus clearly
3
indicating some form of international presence for the EU (Allen and Smith 1990).
However, presence does not necessarily connote purposive external action, but may
derive as an unintended consequence of domestic policy-making processes, like the
creation of the Single Market or the Economic and Monetary Union.
The concept of actorness has taken the debate a step forward in the sense that
it assumes deliberative and active functioning in international politics (Jupille and
Caporaso 1998; Sjöstedt 1977; Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970). In other words,
actorness relates to the capacity to act, whereas presence simply indicates a function
of being rather than acting. It entails a degree of independence from the external
environment, i.e. no full subjection to another actor, but also a degree of autonomy
from the internal constituents, thus indicating a political entity capable of formulating
purposes, reaching decisions, and engaging in purposive action (Bretherton and
Vogler 2006). Thus, internal and external delimitation is crucial in the understanding
of the concept. The second important point is that it is a relational concept, in the
sense that its attribution to any political unit is an intersubjective process not only
based on own perceptions but also requiring the recognition of the other units
involved in any political process. In the EU context, it does not suffice for the EU to
claim international actorness, it also needs to be recognized by states, non-state actors,
and international organizations as an actor in the world stage.
There are different sets of criteria in the literature used to assess actorness.
Cosgrove and Twitchett (1970) identify three mutually interdependent tests of
actorness: the degree of autonomous decision-making power, performance of
continuing functions with an impact on inter-state relations, and an acknowledgement
of the importance of the would-be actor by its members and other international actors.
Jupille and Caporaso (1998) ascertain actorness on the basis of four criteria:
recognition, authority, cohesion, and autonomy. The first criterion refers to the
acceptance of the actor in question by other actors as a legitimate interlocutor; the
second one to the would-be actor’s legal competence to act in a specific field; the
third to its capacity to articulate consistent policy preferences; and the fourth, to
institutional distinctiveness, i.e. capacity to function independently from its
constituent members. Groen and Niemann (2011) use a variation of these criteria,
focusing for reasons of parsimony only on cohesion and autonomy, arguing that the
other two are redundant. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) propose five basic
requirements for actorness: shared commitment to a set of overarching values and
4
principles, the identification of policy priorities and the formulation of coherent
policies, the ability to negotiate effectively with other actors in the international
system, the availability of appropriate policy instruments, and the domestic
legitimation of decision-making in the relevant fields with an external dimension.
The latter set is the only one that explicitly associates actorness with effective
bargaining, considering it a prerequisite for actor capacity. We posit that this criterion
is problematic, simply because a political unit in lack of bargaining capacity may still
be an international actor albeit an ineffective one. More specifically for the EU,
limited bargaining capacity may undermine the EU outreach and impact in
international interactions (cf. Jørgensen 2009: 203-207), but does not nullify the
actorness potential of the EU altogether. However, purposive actors do engage in
international interactions in pursuit of own goals and objectives and effectiveness is
attained on the basis of achieving these objectives. Setting aside very few cases of
power asymmetries of such magnitude that bring about unilateral actions by some
actors to meet their objectives, all external activities of an actor entail negotiations, in
which bargaining capacity and power are crucial for the accomplishment of the
identified goals. Thus, bargaining power emerges as the missing link between
actorness and international effectiveness.
Then, the question arises what are the determinants of the bargaining power of
an international actor? Obviously, structural determinants of socio-economic and
political-military nature constitute the starting point of any such discussion, together
with any other form of cultural or historical influence that can be translated into
negotiating capital. However, institutionalist accounts have also pointed out the
significance of internal policymaking processes and the aggregation function of
heterogeneous domestic preferences (Tsebelis 2002, 1995; Clark et al 2000).1 The
underlying point is that domestic actors embrace or reject the outcome of an
international negotiation considering its impact on their prosperity. Every
international agreement with economic and political implications has a (re)distributive
aspect, which triggers private and aggregate welfare shifts and affects subsequently
domestic actors’ policy preferences (Milner and Keohane 1996: 15-16).2 In that
1
Clearly, this line of analysis assumes a political actor of non-unitary nature, departing from traditional
realist perceptions about the nature of the state and the indivisibility of the national interest.
2
For example, an international economic agreement generates an exogenous easing of economic
exchanges (the resurgence of protectionism, leading to exogenous worsening of exchanges, cannot be
precluded a priori; this changes the direction but not the essence of the following analysis). As a result,
5
respect, how the negotiating positions are moulded in the first place and how
negotiating outcomes are ratified in the end also affect crucially the bargaining power
of a political actor in international negotiations (Hagan 1995: 122-3; Huelshoff 1994:
265-266).3
The EU case does not depart too much from the logic of the ‘two-level
games’, that connects the domestic (i.e. intra-EU) and international levels of analysis,
attributing to the statesmen the role of the ‘hinge’ between the two levels (Putnam
1988). Therein as well, the institutional architecture casts its impact on the bargaining
power of the EU in international negotiations, the standard assumption being that the
EU is handicapped internationally by the complexity of its institutional functioning
and the limitations on the competence of the negotiators. Furthermore, the protracted
process of intra-EU policymaking to aggregate member-states’ preferences in
preparation of the coming negotiations demarcates clearly the contract zone of the EU
depriving the negotiators from one crucial element, i.e. uncertainty. Finally, the
multilateral nature of the EU and the hard-fought intra-EU negotiations to forge a
common position suggests that the EU negotiators at the international level are
inflexible, heavily constrained by the tight mandate they have received from the
constituent member-states (Meunier 2000: 105-6). However, these constraints may
also advance the bargaining power of the EU in line with Schelling’s ‘paradox of
weakness’ (Schelling 1960: 19), turning the liability of internal institutional
bottlenecks into assets (cf. Evans et al 1993; Mayer 1992).
relative prices of the different sectoral outputs change, since production surpluses can be disposed
internationally instead of suppressing commodities prices in the domestic market. Consequently, the
owners of production factors in abundance in the country will experience an appreciation of the value
of the factors they own, whereas factors in scarcity before liberalisation will lose some of their value.
The analysis here is limited to flows of goods, but, mutatis mutandis, the arguments hold for capital
flows and investments. In addition, aggregate social welfare may be improved, given that in a closed
economy, price differentials distort resources allocation. Without protection and existing barriers,
production factors will be invested in a more efficient manner into production activities closer to the
country’s international comparative advantage.
3
In direct ratification processes (i.e. referendums), democratically elected statesmen usually have small
‘win sets’, suggesting there is an inverse relationship between the scope of political enfranchisement
and the win set size (Putnam 1988: 448-450). The more groups and private domestic actors participate
in the ratification process, the greater and more direct the need of statesmen to accommodate their
preferences. In cases of indirect ratification (e.g. through the Parliament), domestic political and
partisan practices affect the win set size. Strong partisan discipline can increase the relative autonomy
of national negotiators. United, single-party governments with a solid parliamentary majority face less
constraints than coalition governments in a parliament where no party commands a majority or than a
single party government politically fragmented. ‘Strong’ governments, based on solid parliamentary
and electoral majority, are expected to enjoy a greater negotiating autonomy, which enhances the
chances of an international agreement. ‘Weak’ governments, suffering from divided decision-making
capacity and intra-partisan strives, are more easily penetrated by interest groups, thus restraining their
negotiating flexibility.
6
In that respect, internal decision-making rules and negotiating competence
emerge as the crucial institutional determinants of the EU bargaining power,
delimiting the framework of delegation to EU negotiators (Meunier 2005). In terms of
the former, the degree of fragmentation4 and the set of rules that defines the
policymaking mode among and within executive poles have a strong effect on the
capacity of an actor to adopt and support negotiating positions that depart from the
status quo (Tsebelis 1995). Multiple veto points and unanimity are assuring that
narrow national interests of member-states will be warranted by the final outcome. In
contrast, majority voting facilitates the smooth functioning of the EU governance
system, but does not provide enough reassurance to particularistic national
preferences (Kerremans 1998: 88). Thus, the fragmented EU policymaking system
and the constraining decision-making rules in most thematic areas make life hard for
EU negotiators, affecting also their negotiating competence. The modality of
ratification of an international agreement at the EU level by member-states at the
Council level and the European Parliament offers numerous opportunities for agency
controlling, curtailing the autonomy potential of the EU negotiator. At the same time,
the membership heterogeneity of the Council restrains severely the negotiating
flexibility, authority and credibility of the EU negotiator, for example, in making
concessions, offering side payments, etc. The EU negotiator has to bear in mind
constantly the tight mandate to avoid ratification failures at the cost of bargaining
effectiveness, missing important opportunities to broker an international agreement
(Meunier 2000: 111-2; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999).
This discussion on the decision-making rules and the negotiating competence
is very much related with the degree of preference heterogeneity among the EU
member-states in the first place and whether the aggregation function operates
smoothly. Considerable congruence of the constituent principals in the first place -or
goal cohesion in the language of Jupille and Caporaso (1998)- clearly strengthens the
EU international actorness but has an ambivalent effect on the EU bargaining power.
It does convey an image of unity and solid backing to the EU negotiators but it does
not allow for the instrumental exploitation of internal strives. In contrast, tactical or
4
By fragmentation, we refer to the existence or not of multiple executive poles, like in the Presidential
or bicameral systems, as well as the cohesion within a single executive pole. At the EU level, this
reflects the heterogeneity of member-states, each one pushing forward an own policy agenda. In
fragmented policymaking systems, capacity to reach decisions is constrained to the benefit of control,
since shared competence among autonomous executive poles suggests a number of restrictive
checkpoints to the final outcome (Tsebelis 2002: 19-63).
7
procedural cohesion, i.e. the EU capacity to overcome internal divergence of
preferences by means of side payments, issue linkages etc., may on the one hand
undermine negotiating flexibility, in the sense that deviation from the negotiation
mandate may lead to the unraveling of the package deal, but on the other hand it also
renders the other negotiating partners more receptive to the EU proposals. Thus, the
type of EU cohesion also affects her bargaining power.
Besides these endogenous parameters that condition the EU bargaining power
(structural assets, institutional features, and type of cohesion), we need to be aware
that bargaining power is also a relational concept and that it takes two to tango. In that
sense, the outcome of multilateral negotiations are not solely dependent on the EU
inputs in the bargaining process; multilateral negotiations are inherently complex
processes with their own characteristics and dynamics. Thus, any account of the EU
intervention should be heavily contextualized, looking at the structure and content of
the specific multilateral negotiations under examination. The negotiation structure
refers to the number and attributes of the negotiating partners, revealing patterns of
power asymmetries and influence, as well as the stages and sequencing of the
negotiations per se.5 The negotiation content captures mainly the nature of the
bargaining agenda, the main issue there being whether the EU is a reformist
demandeur or a conservative proponent of the status quo (Meunier 2000: 112-15).
The EU and the Negotiations over the Iranian Nuclear Program
Stage 1: Setting the agenda and delimiting the negotiating space
The starting point of the EU engagement with the Iranian nuclear program is the
articulation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the EU strategy against the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in 2003. This brought the EU
in a course of direct confrontation with Iran that had been long accused for pursuing a
5
International negotiations consist normally of a series of phases, comprising a pre-negotiation stage
where participants agree basically on the negotiation agenda, the formal negotiation stage, where the
actual negotiations take place, and the post-negotiation stage where either the details of the agreement
are finalised or the agreement is implemented (Gulliver 1979; Saunders 1985). Multilateral
negotiations conform to this general rule, with additional analytical concerns regarding the number of
participants and their status/role in the negotiations (Touval 1989: 160-162). The preparatory nature of
the pre-negotiation stage often leads to a common understanding or an agreement framework, within
which the detailed and formal agreement will be sought afterwards (Zartman 1978: 67-86). This
underlying agreement can be reflected in the content of the negotiation agenda, the clarification of
which delimits the boundaries of the potential agreement. In an adversary relationship, in particular, a
proposed agenda is more often than not prejudicial rather than neutral; thence the agreement on it
consequently outlines the content of the final agreement (Berridge 2005: 33).
8
scientific program of uranium enrichment, aiming at the development of nuclear
weaponry. The attempted EU efforts to dissuade Iran from entering the club of
nuclear powers have been closely associated with the motivation of EU memberstates and their desire to re-establish the EU international credentials after the highly
divisive Iraq crisis (Dryburgh 2008). The original minilateral format of the
negotiating team in charge of the talks with Iran comprised only France, the UK, and
Germany. In realist terms, these three countries constituted the two main political
powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council and the main trading
partner of Iran in the EU. Following intra-EU pressures for a closer collective EU
engagement and addressing calls for the explicit recognition of the EU role in the
negotiating process, the High Representative (HR) joined the trio in autumn 2004 to
increase the authority and legitimacy of the negotiating team that now spoke more
authoritatively on behalf of the EU as a whole (Harnish 2007: 5).
Taking distances from the US approach that regarded the use of force as an
essential component of addressing non-proliferation challenges, the EU firmly placed
the negotiations with Iran on the basis of diplomatic containment, with emphasis on
the use of political and economic ‘sticks and carrots’ rather than military means. The
EU negotiating course of action was already identified in the context of the EES, the
WMD strategy and the successive EU Council decisions. The latter, taken under
unanimity rule, had to accommodate the divergent preferences of the EU memberstates and especially their reluctance in varying degrees to adopt a more muscular
approach to the issue. These official documents that constituted the backbone of the
EU policy and were parts of the broader holistic EU approach to international
relations delimited the agenda of the EU negotiating team with Iran, i.e. the EU-3 and
the HR, providing a clear picture of the EU negotiating objectives. The advantage was
that this strong emphasis on non-military ways of handling the crisis made the EU a
more attractive negotiating partner for Iran. At the same time, though, it deprived the
EU from a very powerful coercive mechanism to achieve the declared negotiating
objectives. Having explicitly rejected the use of military force as counter-productive,
the EU had to invoke the potential intervention of the US factor to the negotiations to
exercise additional pressure on the Iranian government for further concession along
the demands of the international community.
According to the Council, negotiations with Iran should lead to a long-term
verifiable arrangement with Tehran to suspend permanently and fully its nuclear
9
program (based on uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities) as well as
implement relevant international legal instruments.6 In that respect, the EU demanded
the maximum from Iran, offering though little for exchange. The EU was blamed to
follow a constraint-based strategy rather than an incentive-based one, not
accompanying exercised pressures with concrete and credible assurances to the
Iranian government that a commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime would
not jeopardise the national economic interests. Whereas the ‘sticks’ were evident,
setting for example strict preconditions for holding talks with Iran for a long-term
arrangement, like an immediate halt to the ongoing uranium conversion, the ‘carrots’
failed to catch up. Only a series of vague incentives were offered, at various stages of
this first phase of the negotiations, including cooperation in the areas of trade,
technology exchange and security, without, however, entering into details on their
contents and implementation modality (Santini 2010: 476).
Still, at this stage, this hard line bore fruit and Iran publicly declared its
intention to suspend voluntarily the enrichment process in January 2004. The driving
force behind such move on the part of Iranian government was its concern of being
referred by the IAEA, and under the US pressure, to the UN Security Council that
would set an uncomfortable parallel with Iraq. Iran also sought to establish better
relations with the international community and especially with the EU that appeared
an appealing interlocutor, willing to seek progress in the full spectrum of EU-Iranian
relations as soon as the nuclear issue was settled. In that context and after successive
visits of the HR to Tehran, the EU-3 plus the HR proposed a deal to Iran on 21
October 2004 that led to the EU-Iran agreement signed in Paris on 14 November
2004. Iran agreed to freeze its uranium enrichment activities and to sign the IAEA
Protocol, allowing intrusive inspections of nuclear sites in exchange for trade,
technology benefits and security guarantees the EU promised to offer.7
However, the follow up to the Paris agreement was stigmatized by the EU
failure to deliver on the promises made in the course of the negotiations and meet the
Iranian expectations.8 By March 2005, Iran became very frustrated with the EU and
perceived the Paris Agreement as extremely long on demands and absurdly short on
6
Council of the EU, 2004. Presidency Coclusions, 14292/04, Brussels, 4-5 November.
Security guarantees entailed entertaining the Iranian security concerns for its neighbours, especially
Israel.
8
The only ‘carrots’ the EU was able to offer at this time were those of membership in the World Trade
Organization and spare parts of airplanes. Even these timid offers became possible only after intense
negotiations with and final approval by the US.
7
10
offers. The Iranian government threatened to resume uranium enrichment and in May
2005 took the initiative to elaborate and present to the EU its own counter-proposal
for resolving the nuclear issue.9 The EU never responded to the Iranian proposal,
counting on the expected victory of former President Rafsajani in the coming
Presidential elections in Iran just three months away. According to the EU
expectations, the new President, who was considered a moderate political figure,
would provide a more convenient interlocutor for the settling of the issue in line with
the EU preferences (Sauer 2008: 277).
Stage 2: The involvement of the UN and the imposition of sanctions
The mid-2005 Iranian Presidential elections constitute the critical milestone in the
negotiations. To the great surprise of the EU, the hardliner fraction of Ahmadinejad
won the August 2005 elections, opening the second phase of the negotiations. This
second phase was more complicated and confrontational, differing from the first one
in terms of institutional format and political context. Without prior consultation with
the international community, the new regime took immediately the decision to resume
its uranium enrichment activities declaring publicly that Iran was entitled to its own
nuclear fuel cycle. In parallel, Iran denied the IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear
facilities, crossing the EU red line.
The EU response was to stop negotiations with Iran and start contemplating
the option of a coercive diplomacy as the only viable route to compel Iran to stop its
uranium enrichment program and return to the negotiating table. In this context, the
EU referred, for the first time, the issue of Iran’s non-compliance to the IAEA and,
managing to forge the necessary consensus among the veto-bearer states (principally
Russia and China), ensured the passage of an IAEA Resolution in September 2005.
The EU-drafted Resolution called Iran to comply with its IAEA obligations, otherwise
its file would be sent to the UNSC for further action.10 In the light of the continued
intransigence of Iran, the IAEA finally sent the Iran file to the UNSC in February
9
Iran offered to produce only low enrichment uranium including the assembly, installation and testing
of 3000 gas centrifuges at Natanz under strict continuous inspections procedures conducted not only by
the IAEA but also by EU-3 nationals. In exchange, Iran sought from the EU to provide it with new
light-water nuclear power reactors; to guarantee Iran’s access to advanced and nuclear technology and
to the EU markets for its goods, to recognize Iran as a major source of energy supply for Europe, etc.
See ‘General Framework for objective guarantees, firm guarantees and firm commitments’, 3 May
2005, available at http://www.css.ethz.ch/Documents/20050323_Iran_Proposal_Steering_Cmte.pdf.
10
IAEA, Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Vienna, 24 September 2005.
11
2006, after an EU initiative that materialized the EU Council decision of 30/31
January 2006. This decision marked a significant shift in the EU attitude with regard
to the Iranian issue. While this decision reiterated the EU’s commitment to a
diplomatic solution to the issue, the EU called and prepared the ground for the direct
involvement of the UNSC, recognizing that this was not a dispute between Iran and
Europe, but one between Iran and the international community. In that context, the
EU called its member states to coordinate closely their future actions in the UN in
collaboration with non-EU partners.
This development stiffened further the position of the Iranian government that
publicly announced the acceleration of its enrichment program. The EU attempt to
raise the stakes at the negotiating table by involving directly the UNSC and the other
permanent members failed as Iran did not feel at least threatened. In the words of the
German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, ‘…the disastrous US-led war in Iraq had
caused Iran’s leaders to conclude that the leading Western power has been weakened
to the point that is dependent on Iran’s goodwill and that high oil prices have made
the West all the more wary of a serious confrontation’.11
From mid-2006 onwards, initially the US and subsequently the two other
permanent UNSC members, i.e. Russia and China, joined the EU-3 group. In this
process, the HR emerged as the prime interlocutor for the ‘EU3+3’ team in the direct
negotiations with the Iranian government, playing a critical role in the efforts to
cement the team’s unity. In a final effort to bring the controversy to an end, Solana
presented in June 2006 to the Iranian government an offer of technological assistance
to develop a modern civil nuclear power program and a framework of expanded
cooperation with the EU3+3 in political and economic fields in exchange for the
immediate suspension of the uranium enrichment process and implementation of the
Additional Protocol of IAEA.12 At the same time, he conveyed orally the message to
the Iranian negotiations that there would be serious consequences for Iran if it failed
to comply with its international obligations.
As Iran did not respond positively to the offer, the EU Council by its decision
of 17 July 2006 paved the way for the imposition by the UNSC of punitive measures
(i.e. sanctions) against Iran. The decision provided that ‘since Iran has given no
See Joschka Fischer, ‘The Case for bargaining with Iran’, Washington Post, 29 May 2006.
See EU Doc. S202/06, ‘Elements of a proposal to Iran as approved on 1 June 2006 at the meeting in
Vienna of China, France, Germany, The Russian Federation, the United States of America and the
European Union’.
11
12
12
indication of willingness to engage seriously on the basis of the proposals …we will
work for the adoption of measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter’. According to the German Foreign Minister, the stick of economic sanctions
was the most feared one in Tehran (Santini 2010: 480). Given the high Iranian
dependence on economic cooperation with the West, the international community
should take swift action in the UNSC against Tehran along these lines (Di Lorenzo
and Ulrich 2006). Based on this EU decision, the EU-3 in close cooperation with the
other three permanent members orchestrated a UNSC resolution imposing sanctions
against Iran. However, due to the reservations raised by China and Russia, Resolution
1696 of 31 July 2006, drafted by the EU-3, gave only an ultimatum to Iran to suspend
uranium enrichment by 31 August or face a subsequent UNSC resolution imposing
economic sanctions.
The subsequent rejection of the UNSC ultimatum sealed the EU turn to
sanctions as engaging diplomacy seemed to have reached its limits.13 Whereas at the
EU level the decision on sanctions appeared straightforward and non-controversial, in
the UNSC things were more complicated. The EU3 had to mediate between the US on
the one hand, which demanded the imposition of a comprehensive set of sanctions,
and China and Russia on the other that still questioned the necessity and the extent to
which Iran should be sanctioned (Sauer 2008: 279). Russia, in particular, that
maintained close ties with Iran, was very sceptical on the sanctions option, citing the
failure of the sanctions regime against Iraq in the 1990s (Santini 2010: 481). In an
attempt to reconcile the positions of the two sides, the EU-3 watered down in
successive drafts their sponsored resolution to accommodate the concerns of Russia
and China. By Resolution 1737, of 23 December 2006, the UNSC imposed for the
first time, a limited range of economic sanctions, including a ban on export and
import of nuclear related materials and technological equipment and the freezing of
the financial assets of a number of Iranian individuals and companies. The UNSC
requested a report within 60 days from the Director General of IAEA on whether Iran
had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the
Resolution and affirmed that the reviewing of the case in light of this report. In the
statements of the five permanent members, these measures were characterised
reversible if Iran suspended its enrichment-related activities, with the EU-3 in
13
See EU Council Decision of 16 October 2006; see also European Council Presidency Conclusions,
14-15 December 2006.
13
particular making it clear that they were still committed to a diplomatically negotiated
solution.
In February 2007, the IAEA Director-General submitted its report to the
UNSC, as requested by UNSC Resolution 1737, clearly demonstrating Iran’s noncompliance. The submission of the report came at a time tensions between the US and
Iran had been rising at the highest level. At the EU level, the HR circulated a
document among the 27-member states that concluded that Iran was on course for
acquiring nuclear weapons, constrained only by technical difficulties rather than
UNSC resolutions.14 It also stated that it was hard to believe at least in the short run
that Iran would be ready and willing to resume negotiations. These developments
along with the US accusations of EU firms that continued to do business with Iran led
the EU harden her position and ask for further sanctions.15 The effective interventions
of the EU-3 culminated to the drafting and sponsoring of Resolution 1747 on 24
March 2007.16
In the mid-2007, the first cracks in the EU cohesion began to appear, as
Germany embraced a more moderate approach towards Iran. These second thoughts
on the adopted sanction strategy came after the statement of the IAEA’s Director, who
called for greater flexibility since the current strategy to stop Iran’s nuclear program
had been superseded by the achieved progress in the meantime.17 Other EU members,
like Austria, Spain, Italy and Greece, expressed similar reservations about the
continuation of this strategy, but the U-turn was avoided by increased US intervention
that came in support of the EU hard liners, like the UK, France and the Netherlands.
A compromise intra-EU package deal, in the form of two successive Council
Decisions, comprised the authorisation of the HR to resume negotiations with the
Iranian government and at the same time the reinstatement of the EU determination to
consider additional measures in the immediate future to support the UNSC policy.18
See Daniel Dombey and Fidelius Schmid, ‘Iran on course for nuclear bomb, EU told’, Financial
Times, 12 February 2007.
15
See EU Council decision of 5 March 2007.
16
The resolution imposed an arms embargo and a freeze on the assets of a number of Iranian
individuals and companies, targeting the Iranian regime (especially the Revolutionary Guard Corps). It
also blocked loans and other forms of financial assistance to the Iranian government and requested Iran
to comply until the end of May 2007.
17
Daniel Dombey and Stephen Filder, ‘Strains grow over Strategy to reign in Iran’, Financial Times, 3
June 2007.
18
See the EU Council Decisions of 18 June 2007 and 15 October 2007.
14
14
This sealed the intra-EU cohesion and paved the way for the UNSC Resolution 1803,
of 3 March 2008, again with the EU3 playing an instrumental role in its drafting.19
This new EU initiative for further sanctions shattered in the eyes of the Iranian
government the EU as a credible negotiating interlocutor, with President
Ahmadinejad stating that from that point onwards Iran would not talk to the EU
anymore. The EU relations with Iran further deteriorated in June 2009 when
Presidential elections were held and the EU (together with US) voiced doubts about
the authenticity of the results and Ahmadinejad’s win. Only after the new US
administration threatened Iran with additional sanctions that would bite after
disclosures about a second uranium enrichment plant, did the Iranian government
show some willingness to resume talks with the EU3+3. In this renewed effort to
build an agreement framework, the EU diplomacy showed a more constructive face,
suggesting some concessions, like the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research
Reactor, in exchange for the suspension of the nuclear problem. However, the
negotiations led to nowhere.
From the beginning of 2010, the relations between the two sides reached the
lowest ebb as Iran started to enrich low-enriched uranium to 20 per cent, which
brought it even closer to a military threshold. This along with the agreement Iran
reached with Turkey and Brazil, in May 2010, whereby the latter undertook to
provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, led the EU-3 plus the US to call
for a new set of sanctions. Insisting on an all-or-nothing approach with no further
offers or alternative options for Iran, they drafted and cosponsored Resolution 1929 of
9 June 2010.20 However, very much like their predecessors, they have not yet
accomplished their primary objective vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program.
Discussion
Both negotiation stages feature a strong and active involvement of the EU, either in
the form of the three member-states in the beginning, the addition of the HR at a
subsequent stage, the forging of the ‘EU3+3’ team, or the intra-UNSC negotiations
for the scope and content of the sanctions regime from 2006 onwards. Thus, EU
19
The Resolution called member states to inspect cargo bound to or from Iran and extended financial
sanctions to additional Iranian companies and travel bans to additional Iranian individuals.
20
Expanding on the previous UNSC arms embargo, the Resolution prohibited Tehran from investing in
sensitive nuclear activities abroad and banned all Iranian activities related to ballistic missiles that
could deliver a nuclear weapon. It also imposed a comprehensive framework of cargo inspections to
detect and stop Iran’s smuggling and acquisition of illicit materials or nuclear items.
15
actorness is seemingly undisputed, satisfying almost to full extent the main criteria of
recognition, authority, cohesion, and autonomy. The EU was recognized as a
legitimate interlocutor both by the Iranian regime and the international community –
or at least the three permanent UNSC members. The authorization derived from
successive Council and European Council decisions that authorized the HR plus the
troika to speak in the negotiations on behalf of the EU. The EU3 enjoyed considerable
autonomy in their diplomatic undertaking if we take into account the relatively vague
mandate and the ex post legitimization of several initiatives, not without some
grudging from other member-states for the limited consultation and information
exchange in the name of confidentiality. Finally, intra-EU cohesion was high from the
beginning, with the Iranian case fitting the policy objectives of the ESS and the EU
strategy on the WMD.
Still, in terms of stopping Iran from ‘going nuclear’, the EU appears
ineffective in both stages, although of course the effectiveness of the imposed
sanction regime remains to be assessed conclusively. Has that been due to limited
bargaining power? From the endogenous parameters (i.e. structural assets,
institutional features, and type of cohesion), structural assets are translated to
bargaining power in a subjective way. In the first stage of the negotiations, the EU
suffered from an overestimation of her own bargaining power, relying much on the
economic and trade ties with Iran, their significance for the regime and the undisputed
orthodoxy of conditionality policy. The EU perception was that the threat of halting
economic cooperation or the ‘carrot’ of enhancing it would work miracles in
convincing the regime to upturn the chosen policy. However, bargaining power
asymmetries rely not only on structural features but also on the relative value
attributed to each of them by the negotiating partners, as the EU realized bitterly from
the successive rejections of her proposals.
Institutional features, i.e. veto points and decision-making rules, are related
with the type of cohesion in a given issue. Unanimity rule entailed significant
potential institutional bottlenecks with an ambivalent effect on the EU negotiating
power. But that is not of such relevance in the Iranian case since as mentioned above
there already existed a large degree of congruence as a result of the articulation of
ESS and WMD strategy. In a sense, the proactive engagement of the EU with these
issues, in view also of the 2005 NPT negotiations, had already led to a considerable
osmosis of the varying national preferences, taking away possible hurdles among EU
16
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) and their
diverging commitment to disarmament (Jørgensen 2009: 202).
Having said that, although a common position had been forged in advance and
military intervention was excluded from the beginning, there still existed within the
EU some varying approaches on the exact balance between ‘sticks and carrots’ and
this variation can arguably account for the EU ineffectiveness (Sauer 2008: 283-9).
Although this constituent condition of the EU multilateral order did not paralyze the
EU, as was the case in previous major international crises from the dissolution of
Yugoslavia to Kossovo and Iraq, it did undermine the EU negotiating power in
another respect. This intra-EU division was exploited not so much by the Iranian
regime that counted more on the repercussions of the earlier transatlantic rift over Iraq
and the exclusion of a military response, which the EU involvement in a way
guaranteed rendering her the preferred interlocutor for Iran, but rather from the US.
Every time the ‘EU doves’ seemed to prevail in the intra-EU game, the US factor
would intervene to avoid a reversal of the EU policy to a more accommodating
stance. In that respect, another external actor –not necessarily the direct negotiating
interlocutor- capitalized on the internal heterogeneity to undermine a potentially more
effective strategy.
The latter point takes us directly to the issue of bargaining strategy and tactics
and especially their interplay with cohesion. In the first stage, the EU relied heavily
on a conditionality policy based on economic incentives, having a priori excluded the
option of a more muscular response. Although it did provide some timid progress, like
the 2004 Paris Agreement, it failed to achieve major breakthroughs, not least because
the EU did not show the necessary flexibility to respond swiftly to the Iranian counter
proposals. Acting by default rather than by tactical considerations, the EU did not take
advantage of the 2005 Iranian agreement proposals, waiting for the Iranian electoral
results. The results took everybody by surprise, changing completely the negotiating
setting and leading to the securitization of the intra-EU debate and the inevitable
hardening of the EU stance. A coercive discourse became hegemonic at the intra-EU
level, leading to the active and effective pursuit of a sanction regime at the UNSC
against Iran. Thus, the two negotiating stages may feature different underlying
political discourses but share one common element, in the sense the EU has engaged
in the negotiations in rather a monolithic way, very much again the result of her own
17
constitutive nature. The lack of even considering for tactical reasons alternatives has
had a negative impact on the EU negotiating power (cf. Lax and Sebenius 1985).
Conclusions
Our point of departure is the gap between the EU international actorness and
effectiveness. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, research focused on the EU
international presence in the first place; in the 1990s and early 2000s, emphasis
shifted from presence to actorness, illustrating the emerging consensus in the EU
literature on the international role and modality of EU engagement in international
interactions. We posit that this is also a saturated topic, with relatively little dispute on
whether the EU is an international actor or not. We should now move on to the third
generation of research and examine issues of effectiveness and performance. Our
contribution is the concept of the EU bargaining power as the missing link between
actorness and effectiveness. We argue that the EU bargaining power depends on
endogenous parameters like the EU structural assets, institutional features, and type of
cohesion as well as the heavily contextualized structure and content of the specific
multilateral negotiations under examination.
Our empirical evidence draws on the EU experience with the Iranian nuclear
program. Tentatively, our research suggests an overestimation of the EU bargaining
power, revealing the subjective dimension of this concept. This brings into mind
unfortunate memories of impressive past EU failures in the CFSP domain, like the
infamous ‘hour of Europe’ in the Yugoslavian crisis in the beginning of 1990s. Has
nothing changed since then? Our answer would come to the positive, arguing that the
Iran case does not feature the structural divergence of member-states’ preferences,
without claiming of course that this is necessarily due to a well operating intra-EU
‘aggregation function’. Still, the Iran case shows that more flexibility, authority and
autonomy is required for the EU negotiators, be they institutional figures or groups of
states, for strategic or tactical reasons.
18
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