LECTURE 13: LATIN AMERICA DURING THE LONG BOOM
In this lecture, we will examine the performance of the Latin American economies during the long postwar boom
from roughly 1950 until roughly the mid-1970s, a period in economic history that is conventionally bounded by
the Korean War at one end and at the other by the first round of OPEC oil price rises. I also want to use this
opportunity to reinforce points that were insufficiently emphasised in the earlier lectures. We begin is with the
changing structure of the Latin American economies during the long boom. Table 14.1 provides the details.
Table 14.1: Changes in Latin American Economic Structures, 1930-94
Percent of GDP represented by:
Agriculture
Industry Services Exports
1930
1955
1960
1970
1980
1994
45
20
16
12
10
10
15
32
31
35
38
33
40
48
53
53
50
55
30
12
15
13
16
15
Manufactures
as a share of
total exports
n.a.
n.a.
5
8
30
34
Source: John Ward, Latin America, p. 19.
There was clearly a relative contraction in agriculture and a relative expansion of industry and services in the long
boom, and a relative decline in the importance of exports for the region as a whole. However, the expansion of
industry and services was a predominantly urban phenomenon and, especially at the start of the postwar period,
urbanisation and industrialisation were highly regionalised, within both the continent as a whole and within
individual nations.
Diversity Within the Continent
The main urban centres in 1950 were Buenos Aires in Argentina, which was Latin America’s first modern
metropolis, the Rio de Janeiro/Sao Paulo conurbation in Brazil and some substantial cities in Central America,
notably Mexico City. The Figures showing employment structure show the limited extent of the spread of industry
and services outside Argentina. ; even in Mexico and Brazil, which have become designated as newly
industrialising countries in the 1970s, the majority of the employed population could be found in agriculture even
in 1960.
Figure 14.1: Argentina, Structure of Employment, 1950-94
100%
Percentage of the Employed
90%
80%
70%
60%
Services
50%
Industry
40%
Argiculture
30%
20%
10%
0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1994
Note the relative smallness of Argentine agriculture. When this is compared with Brazil, which has been
designated a newly industrialising country in the 1970s, you will see quite a difference. Both Brazil and Mexico
(another NIC) have the majorities of their populations in agriculture, even as late as 1960. The question of diversity
has important implications for both patterns and extent of development during the long boom, and I would like to
explore this a little further. Table 14.2 gives some basic economic and social statistics for Latin America from both
the beginning and the end of our period. The main purpose of these statistics is to show not only the diversity
within Latin America, but also the different scales of the domestic market in each country.
2
Figure 14.2: Brazil, Structure of Employment, 1950-94
100%
Percentage of the Employed
90%
80%
70%
60%
Services
50%
Industry
40%
Agriculture
30%
20%
10%
0%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1994
Table 14.2: Basic Socio-economic Indicators for Latin America, 1950
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Venezuela
Population
(millions)
GDP
(m 1990
intntnl $)
GDP/cap.
(1990
intntnl $)
Rel. labour
productivity
(USA=100)
Education
level
17.2
53.4
6.1
11.9
28.5
7.6
5.2
85,524
86,909
23,274
24,955
57,069
17,270
37,377
4,987
1,673
3,827
2,089
2,085
2,263
7,424
35
19
39
25
22
22
38
5.12
1.98
4.85
2.66
2.16
2.02
The level of labour productivity measures output per person employed as a
percentage of output per person employed in the USA in 1950: i.e. the average
Argentine worker produced 35% of that produced by the average US worker in
1950.
The level of education estimates the average number of years of formal education
per person in 1950. Each year of primary education is weighted as 1, each year of
secondary education as 1.4, and each year of higher education as 2.
Sources: Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, various tables; Angus Maddison, The World Economy
in the 20th Century, p. 94; A. Hofman, The Economic Development of Latin America, p. 104.
3
Compare for example Peru with Argentina in 1950. The former was a small country with comparatively low
income per head. The latter was by no means large, but its income per head was more than twice as large as that of
Peru and the total size of its economy was roughly five times bigger than that of Peru. The size of the Argentine
market was much larger, and if we take the basic proposition from Adam Smith that the division of labour depends
upon the extent of the market, Peruvian entrepreneurs who concentrated solely on the domestic market would tend
to be inefficient by comparison with Argentina, and by the same token Argentine industry and services would
almost certainly be inefficient by comparison with the USA and Western Europe. This is a lengthy introduction to
a simple statement that the range of options in economic development diminish for small, poor countries.
The Smaller Economies and the Latin American Big 6
There has been a famous study of smaller European economies by Katzenstein, which showed that these
economies developed distinctive political-economic systems because of the limitations of their size. They had
almost no prospect of meeting their material needs from within, so they tended to develop strong export sectors to
produce the foreign exchange revenue to pay for the imports they needed. As a result, they tended to develop
institutions whose main function was to ensure that exports remained competitive in world markets. Thus far, I
have tended to emphasise the extent to which the Latin American economies withdrew from foreign trade after the
First World War, albeit hesitantly and partially. This option of import substitution was one only for the richer and
larger Latin American economies. For the small, relatively poor nations in Latin America, there was little real point
in pulling back from export-led development. They had neither the resources nor the scale of markets to pursue
inward-oriented development. During the long boom in particular, there was an increasing divergence between the
policies pursued by the larger nations of inward-oriented development and the export-led policies of the smaller
countries.
The Postwar International Settlement and Latin America
At the start of the postwar period, there were apparently well-founded expectations in Latin America that a new
international economic order would be created from the rubble of the 1930s and the Second World War and would
bring greater prosperity. The new organisations of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the promised International Trade Organisation raised the prospect of
overcoming the difficulties that most Latin American economies had experienced to a greater or lesser degree since
1914. The IBRD (now the World Bank) was established to resume international lending and give greater access to
international capital for borrowing countries. The ITO was intended to reduce the barriers to trade that had spread
in the 1930s in particular and had effectively cut Latin America from its main markets. The USA had become the
dominant power in the international economy (symbolised by the location of the IMF and the IBRD in Washington
4
and the expectation that the ITO would be located there also), and the growth of US influence in the region since
1920 left many Latin American countries broadly supportive and positive towards the proposals for the new
international economic order proposed in the later 1940s. However, these promises were largely unfulfilled.
The structures of both the IMF and the IBRD ensured that European rather than Latin American needs
would be at the top of their agendas, thus leaving the Latin American economies once again dependent largely on
the USA for new capital. The onset of the Cold War however ensured that Latin America took a peripheral position
in the US strategic vision, at least until the Cuban revolution in 1959 led to hasty recalculations. Access to
developmental capital thus remained a problem for Latin America, as it had been since 1914. The ITO was even
more disappointing. Plans for a thorough liberalisation of trade had been part of US thinking since the 1930s, but
the huge agricultural lobby in the USA drew the line at opening US markets to imported foodstuffs. For a variety
of reasons, the plans for international finance were decided first and the discussion of international trade began
only in any real depth in 1947, with the signing in Switzerland of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which was intended as an interim agreement. The real bargaining was scheduled for a second major conference in
Havana in 1948, and the Latin American representatives at that conference led a drive by primary producing
countries to repair what they considered to be the deficiencies of the GATT as far as their needs were concerned.
The USA did not however ratify the Havana Charter, and world trade during the long boom was regulated by the
principles of GATT. It reduced tariffs on manufactures but only in the last decade of the 20th century did it begin to
tackle impediments to trade in primary products. The GATT did make a major difference to world trade, but before
1990 its major impact was to encourage trade in manufactures between developed countries. This might have had
favourable repercussions for the exporters in Latin America, but the GATT also allowed customs unions, or
regional trading blocs. The most famous customs union was undoubtedly the European Common Market, which
had two distinct elements. The first was to liberalise trade in manufactures among the members and between the
Common Market and other industrial countries. But it also had a very protectionist agricultural policy, the
Common Agricultural Policy, which had the effect of making inefficient European farmers prosperous by keeping
out imports from efficient farmers in areas like Latin America. This is the real reason for the failure of Latin
America to participate in the golden age of the international economy between 1950 and 1973; it was in large part
excluded.
The Smaller Economies and New Export Products
This was of course a problem for all Latin American economies, but the larger economies had already anticipated
that the world market would not provide a sufficiently buoyant base for further economic expansion. Prebisch had
concluded during the Second World War that the potential gains were higher for inward than from export-oriented
5
development, but the formation of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA in English but
CEPAL when authors use the original Spanish) in 1948 enabled him to build up a corps of trained and influential
technocrats who took the message to Latin American politicians and bureaucrats. As we have already seen, it was
much more difficult for the smaller countries to act on the message that there was no future in being a primary
products exporter. The biggest 6 Latin American economies saw quite a dramatic fall in their share of world trade
in the early postwar years, from roughly 9 per cent in 1946 to roughly 3.5 per cent in 1960. The other 14, however,
experienced a much more modest decline, which could be entirely explained by the relatively slow growth of trade
in primary product upon which they were totally dependent. They had to negotiate this rather unfriendly world
with whatever comparative advantage they possessed or could manufacture. Some countries remained dependent
upon a single, long-standing export specialism; Venezuela remained a major petroleum exporter, more expensive
than the Middle Eastern economies, but better placed to supply the growing US market.
Table 14.3: Exchange rates and Inflation, 1950-70
Exchange Rate: 1960 = 100
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Uruguay
1950
17
10
3
28
69
17
1960
100
100
100
100
100
100
1970
482
2439
1109
269
100
2273
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela
100
100
4
56
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
144
138
Annual Average Percentage Rate of
Inflation
1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70
17
38
27
20
18
28
62
48
47
24
29
29
4
10
14
11
10
6
2
3
13
25
35
44
11
0
47
6
1
-2
0
11
8
2
2
1
5
10
0
3
1
5
9
1
The exchange rate is the index of the nominal value of the national currency
against the dollar.
Source, Bulmer-Thomas, An Economic History of Latin America, p. 286.
Bolivia remained a major tin exporter, but thoroughly reorganised its nationalised exporting company. Cuba had to
search for new markets for sugar. Many small countries tried to develop new export products, with cotton growing
and livestock expanding rapidly in Central America. Panama managed to use the canal to broaden its economy into
manufacturing and services. It created a free port at one end of the canal, and this led to the promotion of
6
processing industries and light manufacturing. The creation of this trading centre encouraged the Panamanian
government to develop insurance, banking and financial activities related initially to shipping and turn the country
to a major off-shore centre of international finance. It was especially useful to the illicit drugs industry as a money
laundering centre. To promote these export activities, the small Latin American states needed to pursue policies
that produced stable prices and stable exchange rates, and you get some measure of this from Table 14.3.
The differences between the monetary experiences of the smaller and the larger Latin American
economies is very clear. The Katzenstein study that I have just mentioned noted that small, open European
countries devised very distinctive methods of maintaining price stability by bringing into economic policy-making
representatives of employers and labour. This system, commonly called neo-corporatism had no real counterpart in
Latin America, but instead the smaller countries pursued a distinctive path. They had pegged exchange rates and
not infrequently experienced balance of payments problems and had to resort to aid from the IMF. It was almost as
if the IMF was used to discipline wage bargainers and price setters. It would always insist upon orthodox policies,
which would be pursued for a while, with balanced budgets and control over government spending. But these
policies created tensions, which called for more government spending, another balance of payments deficit and a
severe talking to from the IMF. And so the cycle would begin again. The smaller countries certainly had better
inflation records than the big 6, but there was no any real difference in the rate of growth, as far as I can tell. The
smaller countries do not figure in Maddison’s set of detailed statistics, so we have to use less reliable data. This
suggests, however, that the growth rates in income per head of the small, relatively open, low inflation countries
were not significantly different from those of the large, inward looking, high inflation nations, at least in this
period. This suggests that inward-looking development was not a solution to the very obvious problems of the
international economy, which the smaller countries had to negotiate.
Protectionism and the Big 6
The problems for the lager, inwardly-oriented countries are not difficult to define. The larger countries began to
switch into import replacement industrialisation before the first world war, and had some success in the first phase,
especially in the lighter, consumer oriented industries, like cotton textiles and those which processed local
materials, like grain milling, meat processing, the leather industry, footwear, etc. These tended to use relatively
unsophisticated technologies, but they required commercial and entrepreneurial skills that Latin American
countries began to accumulate. Even in the unsophisticated manufactures, Latin American markets tended to be too
small, so that industries could not operate at minimum efficient scale and they needed to be protected by large
tariffs to be competitive within their domestic markets. This problem became more acute as the bigger economies
began to seek to broaden their industrial bases and develop more sophisticated industries. In the last lecture we saw
7
that tariffs of the interwar years attracted US manufacturing firms in particular to establish branch plant by FDI in
Latin American nations during the 1920s and the 1930s. These were, however, very small scale operations and
tended to be mere assembly plant that imported most of their materials, skilled manual and managerial expertise
from the USA. Thus the big Latin American economies in the 1930s had found themselves with a broadening
industrial base but with a balance of payments position that was little different from actually importing these more
sophisticated products in the first place. As the Prebisch analysis was absorbed, the bigger Latin American
economies attempted more resolutely to broaden their industrial bases as the central plank of their policies for
development. There were a variety of specific measures designed to meet these aims. The most obvious measure
was heavy tariff protection.
Table 14.4: Nominal protection in the Latin America Big 6 in c. 1960
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Uruguay
EEC
Nondurable
consumer
goods
176
260
328
247
114
23
17
Durable
SemiIndustrial
consumer manufactures
raw
goods
materials
Capital Average
goods
266
328
90
108
147
24
95
80
98
28
28
23
55
106
111
57
38
14
98
84
45
18
14
27
131
168
138
112
61
21
19
7
1
13
13
Source: Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, p. 280.
Table 14.4 captures the essence of the situation because it gives comparisons with the EEC at a time before the
major reductions in tariffs on imports had been completed. There are some very understandable points here. The
high level of protection in the ‘non-durable consumer goods industries’ is absolutely typical of countries following
ISI. Many of these industries – from cotton to soap – utilise relatively simple technology and there are good
grounds for believing that developing countries can blend simple technology and their own cheap labour to
establish these industries to withstand international competition. This in essence is the infant industry argument for
protection. But the further rightwards you move in Table 14.4, the less understandable becomes the strategic
decision-making. Consumer durables are motor cars, fridges, cookers ad that sort of thing. They need to be
produced in huge volume to be competitive, and there is no way that Latin American economies could have
justified met those needs before the globalisation of production began in the 1970s. The most common form of
8
semi-manufactures is steel, in the form of girders, plates, wire, bars, etc. The iron and steel industry has been at the
centre of late industrialisation, but creating and protecting your own steel industry is a big risk. If domestic
industry does not achieve minimum efficient levels of production, then domestic producers will be producing
uncompetitively and domestic users of steel will have to use expensive, inefficient local production and be denied
access to cheaper imports by tariffs. The same is even more true of capital goods, the machinery and equipment
needed for manufacturing industry. There is a very strong suspicion from the levels of protection that Latin
America needed in 1960, that it was simply building inefficient industries. These levels of protection are only
sustainable in the short term. Latin America needed to make its ‘higher level’ industries (those to the right of ‘Nondurable consumer goods’ in Table 14.4) more efficient as an urgent priority.
Foreign Direct Investment and the Big 6
One method of doing this was to acquire more advanced technology from the developed countries by means of
foreign direct investment from the multinational companies of the developed countries. Those who wrote in their
first essay that FDI by MNCs was a problem for LDCs needed a bit more context to the relationship. The essential
problem for Latin American governments was that their manufacturing industries were too small for efficient
production, so they needed to produce for international markets, and for that they needed access to the technologies
developed in the rich nations. For that they needed the MNCs. Latin American governments did not reach this
decision easily; much of the philosophy of Prebisch and the structuralists, and especially of the schools, like
dependency, that followed structualism, rested on suspicion of western capitalism, but some of the Big 6 were
prepared to bite the bullet. For their part, the MNCs were running big risks in countries with unstable political
regimes and a growing emphasis on nationalism. In these negotiations, the MNCs held most of the cards. They
tended to insist on a monopoly supply position, so only one MNC per country per industry. Frequently they
entered the Latin American economy by buying up their main potential domestic competitor. They also retained
control of the internal supply chain, allowing them to earn profits where the tax regime was most favourable, but
they pursue these policies in every state.
Nationalisation in the Big 6
However, FDI could plug only some of the gaps in the industrial structures of the Latin American Big 6. There
were also areas where neither domestic private capital nor foreign private capital would establish, notably in the
provision of basic services like power and transport. Most of the major economies provided these services through
nationalised, public sector suppliers. There were also great strains upon the state to provide basic infrastructure:
schools, housing, roads, public buildings, dwellings, hospitals and the like. Much of this was seen by Latin
American governments as a necessary foundation for industrialisation, but all this activity was inadequately
9
funded. The nationalised industries were often built on a scale to meet future anticipated needs rather than actual
present needs. They had in-built excess capacity and were inefficient. They lost money. The infrastructural
spending of governments was not fully funded because the MNCs evaded taxes and the wealthy commercial and
industrial elite tended to have more practice at political lobbying than at responding to market competition and so
used pressures to avoid taxation. The Latin American economies had major budget deficits, which they covered by
borrowing from the banking system and other equally inflationary devices. Inflation meant substantial balance of
payments deficits, falling exchange rates, higher imports, higher protection and higher prices, so more inflation.
The gist of this was very clear from Table 14.3.
Half-hearted Export Promotion
One way of escaping this trap was to promote exports, and although the main Latin American economies followed
ISI, they also undertook an export drive in the 1960s, which took several forms. A number of important Latin
American countries introduced land reforms in the 1960s to establish more responsive and flexible agriculture, but
the main effort was geared to promoting manufactured exports. At this time, Taiwan and South Korea recognised
that they would have to specialise and concentrate on relatively few manufactured products in order to achieve
international competitiveness. But the Latin American economies, with much more substantial inflation and
balance of payments problems did not have that luxury. They tried to export as wide a range of manufactures as
possible, and certainly changed the structure of their exports (Table 14.1), but did not succeed in balancing trade
flows (Table 14.5).
Table 14.5: Economic Indicators for Selected Latin American States, 1950-70
average annual compound growth rates, percent
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Venezuela
GDP per
capita
2.3
3.1
1.6
1.9
3.3
2.9
Export
values
0.7
1.8
5.1
4.2
5.6
4.6
Import
values
2.9
4.9
6.6
4.9
7.8
5.9
Export
volumes
2.7
5.2
2.2
3.0
4.2
1.9
Import
volumes
1.7
3.9
5.3
5.2
4.6
2.9
Source: Andre Hofman, The Economic Development of Latin America, pp. 169,
252-9.
Export revenues grew more slowly than import costs. One aspect of this move to expand exports was an attempt at
regional economic co-operation. Having seen the creation of the EEC with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Treaty
10
of Montevideo of 1960 created a Latin American Free Trade Area, and was quickly followed by a Central
American Common Market in late 1960 and the Andean Pact in 1969. However, European experience has shown
that regional economic co-operation and political nationalism are not a happy mix, and in Latin America political
nationalism tended to win out. Little effective was achieved by these regional initiatives, and although there were
many who questioned the effectiveness of inward-looking development in the major Latin American economies,
but there was no change in the strategic direction of these countries until the debt crisis of the 1980s.
Social Consequences of Arrested Latin American Development
Some of these economies grew rapidly during the long boom (Table 14.5) and some of them also saw considerable
expansion in manufacturing. But we know that faster growth was possible by countries that began the postwar
period with much lower levels of income per head than in Latin America. The problem for Latin America was that
its rate of economic growth per capita was disappointing largely because of population growth rates.
Table 6: Social Indicators for Selected Latin American States, 1950-70
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Uruguay
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
Population GDP per
growth capita in
rate
1970
(1990
intntnl $)
1.7
7,302
3.0
3,067
2.3
5,217
2.9
3,104
3.1
3,774
1.0
4,222
2.8
2.8
3.1
3,235
3,807
10,827
Under-employment rate
1950
1970
Gini co- Poverty
efficient
rate
(c. 1970)
22.8 (7.6) 22.3 (6.7)
48.3 (37.6) 48.3 (33.4)
31.0 (8.9) 26.0 (9.3)
48.3 (33.0) 40.0 (22.3)
56.9 (44.0) 43.1 (24.9)
19.3 (4.8) 23.7 (6.9)
0.425
0.574
0.503
0.520
0.567
0.449
(c.
1970)
8
49
17
45
34
-
58.8 (47.0) 47.5 (31.7)
56.3 (39.4) 58.4 (37.7)
38.9 (22.5) 42.3 (26.9)
0.558
0.591
0.531
39
50
25
Sources: Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America, pp. 309-14; Maddison, Monitoring, pp. 112-3,
218.
Population growth rates for Panama and Uruguay are for 1950-90.
The per capita income level for 1970 is in 1990 international $, but figures for Uruguay and Panama are less
reliable than the others.
The under-employment rate is the proportion of the economically active who are not fully employed. The figures
in brackets refer to under-employment in the agricultural workforce.
The Gini coefficient measures income (in)equality. It takes the value of 0 when there is perfectly equal distribution
of income (when everyone gets the same) and 1, under perfect inequality (one person receives everything). In
Western Europe in the period 1950-73, the value typically ranged between 0.3 and 0.4, though it has since risen.
The poverty index defines the proportion of the population living on incomes below half average income.
11
Table 14.6 gives some of the more obvious socio-economic indicators for Latin America in the 1970s. A
population growth rate of 2.5% p.a. is high, so one of the main problems for Latin America was its demographic
situation. The demographic problem indeed comes through very clearly in other parts of Table 6. Quite clearly, the
growth of the economies of most Latin American economies had been insufficient to absorb their population into
full-time, regular employment. Under-employment persisted in 1970 and at levels not so very far below those of
1950. Reasonably rapid growth did not therefore transform employment during the long international boom of
1950-70. However, the location of the under-employed population was changing. In 1950 they were predominantly
located in agriculture and in rural areas. In 1970, underemployment was becoming a more urban phenomenon.
This is the traditional sector of the dual economy about which Arthur Lewis wrote in the 1950s. High birth rates
resulted in large numbers of ill-educated and unskilled workers clustering in agriculture and then in the cities and
driving down the wage rate, just as Lewis said that it would. The distribution of income therefore remained highly
unequal, as the Gini co-efficient illustrates. Even Argentina, which is the most egalitarian of the Latin American
states, has an income distribution markedly more skewed to the rich than either the UK or the USA, and these two
have more unequal income distributions than most developed market economies. The poverty rate was also
extremely high, as the last column illustrates. I mentioned briefly that a number of Latin American nations had
implemented land reform in the postwar years, but this had had no profound impact on income distribution, as the
last two columns of Table 14.6 indicate.
Political Consequences of Arrested Latin American Development
At the other end of the social scale, the composition of the elite changed to absorb the urban commercial and
industrial elite into the previously dominant landowning families. But long-standing Latin American customs of
highly personalised social relations tended to ensure that much of the growing private manufacturing sector came
under the control of a relatively small network of well-connected groups, with extremely good contacts in the
political and administrative elite. In such circumstances, firms collude to fix markets and lobby governments for
favours and entrepreneurship becomes more a test of managing political contacts rather than the active pursuit of
efficiency and competitiveness. The system is exposed to moral hazard on all sides and was not at all helped by the
common practices of patronage to reward favours. The party political system might have reformed this corrupt
system, but party politics were highly unstable. Between the 1940s and the mid-1960s Latin American
governments were generally democratic, often led by populist coalitions that brought together affluent business
and professional people with the lower middle classes and manual workers. The best example is the Peronist
regime in Argentina. These populist movements were however notoriously unstable and very much dependent on
12
the ability of the leader to keep everything together. However, there were obvious points of conflict within these
movements and they were exaggerated by any tendency of the economy to slow down, at which point political
paralysis and in-fighting appeared to exacerbate the economic problems. Military coups d’etat were not
uncommon; in Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966, Panama two further years later. In every case, political paralysis
had led to popular unrest, and fears among the military and industrial/commercial elite that social revolution was to
hand. However, the problems of Latin American development were much more intractable than the generals and
the colonels had imagined, but that is for next time.
13