COMM 158: Representations of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict
Professor Gary Fields
April 28, 2015
Benny Morris vs. Nur Masalha
A Debate on Zionist Transfer Thinking
Throughout “Bullets in My Inbox”, Ethan Bronner explains how “there is almost no higher value
than Zionism among Israel’s Jews; but go anywhere else in the Middle East and Zionism stands for theft,
oppression, and racist exclusionism.”1 His statement can be further illustrated by the colorful “dispute
over real estate” that emerged from growing Israeli and Palestinian nationalist movements over the past
century, in which both sides hold unwavering claims to the land stretching from Lebanon in the north to
the Negrev Desert in the south.2 On one end, the Jewish nation asserts its right the region as the rightful
home of Hebrew descendants. Centuries of oppression and anti-Semitism had made it increasingly clear
that Israeli Jews desperately needed a place to call their own, and the Zionist movement intended to lead
them toward achieving that end goal. The Jewish claim that Palestine had once belonged to their ancestors
and that they had a divine right to return to the land that was rightfully theirs; however, this prized
territory was inhabited by Palestinian Arabs for generations. To the Arabs who continued to live there, it
seemed incredibly unjust for any religious group to think they could simply arrive and claim ownership of
an area that they and so many of their forefathers had called home.
Astute nationalism and competing agendas rendered compromise nearly impossible, with the
Jews alleging God’s will as their justification for claiming Palestinian land and the Arabs asserting their
natural right to the territory as the home of their ancestors. A bitter conflict thus ensued in 1948. As the
Israeli Jews emerged victorious, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs were displaced and forced to
1
2
“Bullets in my Inbox” – Ethan Bronner – The New York Times, 2009.
“The Land and Its Lure” – James L. Gelvin – The Israel Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War – pp. 4
leave as refugees. This result was extremely controversial given the circumstances of their expulsion,
which was cruel and violent according to many records.
In The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, Benny Morris contends that a massive
declassification of archival documents can help us draw revised conclusions about these events by
providing a fresh perspective on the Palestinian refugee problem. He suggests that the controversy
surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict arises from the nature of Zionism and the degree of Zionist
premeditation to what occurred. Morris insists that transfer thinking existed early on, but was never
pursued in the form of official policy before the 1948 war. Nur Masalha disagrees with Morris and
deconstructs his argument in Journal of Palestine Studies, asserting that Israeli Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion and other Zionist leaders had actively advocated the transfer solution all along. Although
both scholars present compelling arguments, it is undeniable that Masalha’s logic is based more on
evidence rather than interpretation, making his claim significantly stronger.
Benny Morris explains that Israeli Jews saw four possible strategies for reclaiming the land of
their ancestors— out of immigration, apartheid, partition, and transfer, the last seemed to be the most
rational solution. Therefore, they began to believe as early as 1937 that creating a homogenous Jewish
state (or at least a state with an overwhelming Jewish majority) by moving or transferring all or most
Arabs out of its prospective territory was their best option for reclaiming the territory.3 The significance
of this early development of transfer thinking lies in its perceived vitality and pervasiveness. According to
Morris, newly-surfaced material from Jewish military archives made a “historiographic breakthrough”
possible that would help determine Israeli Jewish intent and strategy in the years preceding the war in
1948.4 These documents, although yet to be fully studied in their entirety, indicate a strong possibility that
transfer thought existed but was never adopted as an official policy before the war. Such a resource of
information provides Morris’ groundwork for a new approach toward Palestinian displacement that is
much more forgiving to the Zionist leaders in the eyes of history.
3
4
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 40
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 37
Several statements and observations can support Morris’ claim that David Ben-Gurion did not
necessarily intend to implement transfer policies or even think it would be possible at first, although he
concedes that Ben-Gurion did personally advocate the solution. Entries in Ben-Gurion’s diary and a letter
to his son both demonstrate his belief that “transfer of Arabs is easier than any other type of transfer… it
is clear that if the Arabs [of Palestine] are sent [to the Arab countries] this will better their situation and
not the contrary.”5 He had also pointed to recent European history to prove the attainability of mass,
compulsive population transfers with the use of force. However, Morris maintains that Ben-Gurion was a
strategic leader and knew the time was not right to “preach openly or advocate compulsory transfer, as
this would be impolitic and would antagonize many in the West.”6 He and his colleagues therefore
abstained from talking on the subject in order to avoid the judgment of public opinion as well as a
defensive response from Palestinian Arabs. Considering this logic, Morris argues that it would not make
sense to assert that the early transfer thinking of Ben-Gurion and other Zionist leaders were directly
connected to the consequences of the 1948 War; rather, their sporadic expressions of support indirectly
conditioned high-ranking military officers to carry out the transfer of Palestinian Arabs on their own
accord. Ben-Gurion never issued explicit orders to remove the Arabs—he merely set the tone for their
expulsion and should not be incriminated for the discretion of his officers.
In an interview with General Moshe Carmen, Morris discovered that most Jewish commanders
also never adopted a blanket policy of expulsion although Carmen himself did admit to authorizing
expulsions for military reasons. He directed his brigade to clear “all hostile elements,” but with soft orders
to “assist the inhabitants who wish to leave the conquered areas.”7 Because a great number of the Arab
population somehow remained after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) took over, Morris suggests that “a
lack of initiative on the part of [Israeli] forces enabled a great number of villagers to return to their homes
after they had first evacuated” and proves that there was no clear nor predetermined order instructing the
5
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 46
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 45
7
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 51
6
troops to get rid of existing inhabitants.8 His rationale here is that both inconsistency and absence of
strong determination to eradicate Arabs from the region demonstrate that local initiatives rather than
strategic orders from Zionist leaders were most likely the cause of the 1948 Palestinian exodus.
Despite Morris’ persuasive interpretation of early transfer thinking, Nur Masalha points out
several flaws in his argument and proposes an alternative line of reasoning. He remarks that Morris was
first, not fully critical in his analysis of Hebrew chronicles, and second, biased toward discourses
emerging from debates among Zionist scholars and neglecting Palestinian perspectives.9 Masalha
therefore concludes that Morris “deflects serious responsibility for the 1948 exodus from Zionist
leadership.” Resting his work on carefully released and partial documentation, Morris constructed a
theory minimizing the influence of early transfer thinking that is neither credible nor fully supported.
According to Masalha, Israeli explusion policy did in fact exist— as a matter of fact, Yishuv leaders such
as Ben-Gurion, Lavi, Herzl, and Weitz “obsessively” pursued transfer schemes from the mid-1930’s
onwards.10
Nur Masalha analyzes Morris’ interpretations of key statements throughout “Debate on the 1948
Exodus” and points out flaws in his logic to prove that transfer thinking was not only pervasive, but also
well-established going into the pivotal war. For instance, Morris wrote that “the Haganah cleared various
areas completely of Arab villages... But in most cases, expulsion orders were unnecessary; the inhabitants
already fled, out of fear or as result of Jewish attack.”11 Essentially arguing that the Palestinians
abandoned their homes as result of military invasion rather than a master plan of blanket expulsion,
Morris is making an assumption that cannot be factually proven— though his theory is possible, it is
backed by reasoning rather than evidence. Addressing Morris’ statement, Masalha indicates that
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” actually contradicts itself in some ways by using pieces of
evidence that suggest the contrary to its core conclusion. He points out that although Morris
8
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 53
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 91
10
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 93
11
“Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948” – Benny Morris – War for Palestine – pp. 21
9
acknowledges the existence of transfer thinking in the early 1930’s, his reference to Yosef Weitz’s
creation of transfer committees between 1937 and 1948 proves that transfer thinking was more than a
radical idea.12 It therefore evident that the concept had taken root and begun to spread by the 1930’s.
At this point, Masalha’s use of direct quotation and analysis of concrete events construct a
stronger argument in the sense that it is more logically sound. He cites Shlomo Lavi’s statement in 1948
that the “transfer of Arabs out of the country in my eyes is one of the most just, moral, and correct things
that can be done. I have thought this… for many years” as verbal confirmation of the long existence of
transfer mindset in the long-term goals of Jewish leaders.13 Furthermore, Masalha suggests that the
endorsement of transfer by a Peel Commission report in 1937 seemed to provide an initial source of
encouragement for more open discussion on the topic as well as a sense of urgency to implement the
transfer solution as soon as possible. Although they disagree on the extent of this effect on concrete
policy, Morris and Masalha both recognize that the report was a significant factor in giving Israeli leaders
comfort in knowing that transfer thinking now possessed credibility with British support. This backing
gave leaders such as Ben-Gurion the courage to begin cautiously advocating transfer in writing and in
speech. Masalha provides evidence of this through a letter written from Ben-Gurion to his sixteen year
old son where Ben-Gurion stresses that Zionists “must expel Arabs and take their places… and if we have
to use force—not to dispossess the Arabs but to guarantee our own right to settle those places—when we
have force at our disposal.”14 Here, it is explicitly shown that Ben-Gurion associated transfer with
expulsion, indicating a clear extent of premeditation to the events of 1948. Through this sound line of
reasoning and analysis of fact, Nur Masalha builds a convincing argument that incriminates the malicious
intentions of Yishuv leaders.
In the end, Masalha points out that it matters not whether expulsion policy was actually
formulated or whether some disconnect existed between the transfer thinking of Jewish leadership and the
Palestinian exodus that took place. Ideas and intentions are irrelevant in light of the expulsion that
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 95
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 93
14
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 94
12
13
occurred—what matters is that 700,000 Palestinians were forced to flee from their homes as result of
Israeli attack. Using Morris’ framework against him, Masalha agrees that it is the “nature of Zionism”
advocating an exclusivist state that led to the events that transpired. He asserts that Morris misconstrued
this fact to “treat the Arab exodus largely in a historical and political vacuum, without any intrinsic
connection to Zionism.”15 The question should therefore not be why the Arabs left or whether they are
returning, but rather, whether they were expelled and what caused their expulsion. The Palestinian exodus
was clearly no coincidence or accident; “the nature of Zionism” clearly had something to do with it.
This debate between Morris and Masalha provides a classic example of how transcripts of
historical events can be manipulated to support the respective agendas of particular groups. Differing
perspectives as well as interpretations of these perspectives produce varied records of history that can
never be confirmed as completely accurate. Nevertheless, those who support one account believe that
their side is objectively correct just as strongly as those who support another account. Conflicts in opinion
such as that of Morris and Masalha are therefore inevitable; however, they are not necessarily a negative
consequence. Discussion and debate among scholars foster exploration of analysis from every point of
view, producing an oversight of all possible options. Although we may never know for certain whether
Zionist leaders entered the 1948 war with a master plan of eradicating the Arab population of Palestine,
the thorough arguments of both Morris and Masalha reveal patterns and themes in the conflict that hold
value for future investigations on the subject matter.
15
“Debate on the 1948 Exodus” – Nur Masalha – Journal of Palestine Studies – pp. 96