Comment:
After the first quick reading I thought that there was a rupture between the two parts of James’s
text. My conviction was that there was no real connection between the actual analysis of the two
regions and the theoretical considerations. From my point of view the nature of the gap could be
summarized in the following question: Could the comparison be constructed in the same way
without developing that special theory? I would say yes. The comparison seems to be a very
traditional one: the sections enumerate characteristics and mark their similarities or differences.
The practice of comparative history in a traditional manner implies that the phenomena under
question share common or identical features or fulfil the same function. This statement, however,
has to be proved: evidence has to be presented to justify the possibility of comparison. This is
what James did in a latter section of the paper.
Nonetheless, this practice is inconsistent with a crucial point in the first part. James argues that
there are no comparable entities beyond the intervention of the historian, or there is no inherent
relationship between any sort of distinct phenomena. Historians construct comparison; therefore
they establish links. It implies that no continuum of history exists beyond or before the
appearance of historians. If this is correct, than there is no need to justify comparison as it does
not depend on the qualities of the chosen phenomena.
After a second reading then, it seems that there is a secondary meaning in the text, perhaps
unintentionally. If comparison is nothing but a means of construction of historical meaning, then
is it possible to carry out a comparison without any justification acquirable from the features of
structures or events. No, it is even possible to make a comparison that leaves the reader uncertain
as to whether the compared phenomena are similar or dissimilar. A representation like this could
demonstrate the fragmented and discontinuous nature of history and call the attention to the
constructive act of the historian. (It seems to be a very Foucaultdian project.)
Peter Apor, IUE
Reply:
I am excited by the opportunity to clarify (anticipating a revised version) the thoughts I proposed
in my seminar paper “Comparison, A Contingent Juxtaposition of Austria and Sweden” by responding
to Peter Apor, Renate Huber and Erik Tängerstad’s comments.
I will begin by addressing Peter’s comments. To the first reading (I will treat them separately
because Peter’s conclusions following his second reading seem to allay the doubts he raised in the
first which I would like to address):
I am aware that a synapse between the theoretical and practical sections of the text has not been
sufficiently bridged, in fact I am still unhappy with the theoretical framework and understanding
of the significance and utility/necessity of comparison that I have begun to develop within the
framework of the paper. I hope to narrow this gap in the revision considering the comments
received during the seminar. Particularly to reconsider and better define what I mean by Pale.
Nevertheless I remain convinced that a theoretical consideration of the significance and effect of
comparison is central to the work and introspectively an apprehension of what I actively succour
in terms of knowledge, or belief, by exploiting the comparisons that I propose in the manner that
they are constructed. In my opinion, the question/answer proposed by Peter “Could the
comparison be constructed in the same way without developing that special theory? I would say
yes.”, although it is difficult to deny, appears to be misleading. A theoretical understanding is not
a precondition for comparison, comparison is I believe a tool exploited in daily-life without
which we would be hard pressed to construct an understanding of our environment. Nevertheless,
we do not have to understand comparison to make sense of our lives. As historians, scientists as
well as artists however, we professionally subject our work to criticism both our own and that of
others within and outside of our field. This criticism is of both and conclusions that we arrive at
as well as the questions we ask as these questions and their relevance determine any conclusions
that may be drawn.
By confronting the contingency or discursive limits of my work I not only imply but attempt
consciously to liberate history from the, bounds of right and wrong, as well as any inherent
essentialism, determinism and causality. That is to stress that history does not transcend the work
of historians, and to claim otherwise appears to be an act of self-deception. From this perspective
it is impingent upon us to explain or draw attention to the character of the works we construct and
the contingencies that brought us to the conclusions we make. It is just this that makes the
investigation and questioning of comparison, in this case, practically requisite.
Peter’s second reading is very much in line with the manner in which I conceive the text,
although, I hope, consciously. I do not aspire to produce any ultimate truths or answers, but to
raise questions, possibly immanent questions about constructions such as, in the case of the paper,
the symbolic central landscape, as well as the contingent means I exploit to arrive at these
questions.
James Kaye