Assortative Mating and Marriage Markets: Theories and Explanations
Nikki Graf and Tanya Pudrovska
February 9, 2006
Individual-level explanations:
The concept of “marriage markets”:
“unmarried men and women operate within marriage markets where each individual
considers a set of potential spouses. Potential spouses are evaluated on the basis of
resources they have to offer and individuals compete with each other for the spouse they
want most by offering their own resources in return” (Kalmijn, 1998, p. 398)

Socioeconomic resources: people maximize their income and status by searching for a
spouse with attractive socioeconomic resources. Most attractive candidates select among
themselves while the least attractive candidates have to rely on one another.
o The role of women’s labor-force participation:
 Low female labor force participation: when there are gender differences in
the division of paid and unpaid labor, men do not compete for women’s
socioeconomic resources (Becker 1981).
 High female labor force participation: when married women participate
actively in the labor market, women’s socioeconomic resources become
increasingly attractive to men (England and Farkas 1986; Mare 1991;
Oppenheimer 1994; Sweeney and Cancian 2004). With both partners
working, the family may experience problems of status incompatibility of
the occupational statuses of the spouses are too far apart; thus, potential
marriage partners may prefer similarity in SES (Oppenheimer 1977,
1988).

Cultural resources: the preference to marry someone who is similar in terms of cultural
resources (values, opinions, tastes, knowledge, etc.) Cultural similarity enables couples to
develop a common lifestyle.
Group-level explanations:
 Third parties: because mixed marriages may threaten group cohesion and homogeneity,
“third parties” have an incentive to keep new generations from marrying outside the
group.
o Two mechanisms of preventing intermarriage:
 Group identification: Children are typically brought up with a sense of
group identification. The stronger the feelings of group identification, the
more people have internalized norm of endogamy, and the more likely it is
that they marry within the group. The notion of group identification has
been particularly important for racial and ethnic groups.
 Group sanctions: People may avoid intermarriage because of the sanctions
third parties apply. The three most important parties that may sanction
intermarriage are the family, the church and the state.
Structural explanations:
 The chances of marrying endogamously depend on the frequency of within-group contacts.
Contact opportunities are shaped by structural factors, such as:
o group size (the larger group size, the higher chances to marry within the group);
o geographic location (groups concentrated in specific regions have more
opportunity to marry endogamously);
o local marriage markets (neighborhoods, schools, workplaces; e.g., colleges
promote educational homogamy more than neighborhoods do, while
neighborhoods promote ethnic homogamy).
 Wilson’s (1987) “marriageable male” hypothesis: declines in marriage
rates among blacks result form decreased employment opportunities for
young black men. Other factors, such as high rates of incarceration and
mortality among black men, may also contribute to the sex ratio
imbalance on the marriage market (see studies by Fossett and Kielcolt
1991; Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, and Landry 1992).
o residential segregation;
o “limited activity spheres”
Macro-level explanations (Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998):
 The relationships between industrialization and educational homogamy:
o The status attainment hypothesis: Educational homogamy increases as
industrialization increases because the effect of family background on
occupational achievement declines and the effect of education grows;
o The general openness hypothesis: Educational homogamy decreases as
industrialization increases because of proliferation of contacts between
persons form different status groups.
o The inverted U-curve hypothesis (Smits et al. 1998): with increasing
industrialization, educational homogamy will first rise, and then subsequently
decline.
 Other macro-level factors that may influence homogamy: political regime, dominant religion,
the level of technological development.
Multiple dimensions of homogamy (Kalmijn 1991, 1998)
 Because partners choose each other based on multiple characteristics, several factors in
marriage choice should be analyzed. Two hypotheses:
o By-product hypothesis: because the various social characteristics on which
individuals select a partner are correlated, homogamy in one dimension may be
the by-product of selection in another dimension. E.g., social class homogamy is
largely a by-product of educational homogamy (Kalmijn 1991).
o Exchange hypothesis: people may trade characteristics when choosing a spouse.
E.g., members of ethnic groups whose prestige in society is low would have better
chances of marrying outside their group if they offered high SES resources in
return (Davis 1941; Merton 1941).
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