PART III
CASE STUDIES
196
CHAPTER 6
BROAD NATIONAL AGENDAS AND A TWO-LEVEL GAME
In a country as big and as poor as ours, if we don’t try to increase production, how
can we survive? How is socialism superior, when our people have so many difficulties in
their lives? The Gang of Four clamoured for “poor socialism” and “poor communism”,
declaring that communism was mainly a spiritual thing. That is sheer nonsense!….
Between the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee and the Twelfth
National Congress, we have blazed a new path: concentrating on economic development.
- Deng Xiaoping, September 18, 19821
The supreme interest of China is peace and nation-building. As to all threats to peace
and development, no matter where they come from, the Chinese people will join hands
with the people of the rest of the world to prevent and eliminate all of them.
- Jiang Zemin, Chinese President, October 17, 19972
Each society’s leadership faces both internal and external contradictory pressures.
On the one hand leaders are tempted to play the nationalism card, but on the other hand
the world system will punish them if they push nationalism to the degree that global
markets and investors become alarmed.
- David Lampton, China expert, 20013
1
2
3
Deng Xiaoping, “We Shall Concentrate on Economic Development,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. III (1982-1992), translated by the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1994), pp. 21-22.
“Jiang: The Supreme Interest of China Is Peace and Nation-Building,” Washington Post, October 19,
1997, p. A22.
David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), p. 8.
197
I. Economic Development
In light of three decades of trauma resulting from Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
policies (such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), and the successes
of China’s non-communist neighbors (Japan and the Asian newly industrialized
economies), by the late-1970s the Chinese leadership believed that the only way for the
party to hold onto its weakened mandate was to improve the standard of living for the
majority of the population. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out in 1982, “[T]hat communism
was mainly a spiritual thing…is sheer nonsense!”4 On the eve of the Tiananmen Incident
on June 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping recognized, “[I]f we didn’t have that economic base, the
farmers would have risen in rebellion after only ten days of student protests – never mind
a whole month.”5
The Chinese leadership understands the legitimacy crisis quite well. Prior to the
Tiananmen Incident, Tianjin Mayor Li Ruihuan said in a Politburo meeting that in the
past forty years “our Party has learned some painful lessons – in the Anti-rightist
Campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and so on. From the looks of things now, another
major political mistake might cost us all of our remaining popular support.” CCP General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang had also conveyed the same concern to other Chinese leaders in a
Politburo Standing Committee meeting prior to the violence of June 4.6
This sense of a legitimacy crisis is still the prevailing view among Chinese officials
4
5
6
Deng Xiaoping, “We Shall Concentrate on Economic Development,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. III (1982-1992), translated by the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1994), pp. 21-22.
Liang Zhang (comp.), Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds.), The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public
Affairs, 2001), p. 218.
Liang Zhang (comp.), Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds.), The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public
Affairs, 2001), pp. 134, 192.
198
and scholars. One Beijing senior official bluntly stated, “Poverty is not communism! The
Cultural Revolution was a disaster! Without economic development, Chinese people
would not support the CCP.”7 An international relations scholar in Beijing and two other
international relations scholars in Shanghai agreed that only economic development could
sustain the one-party ruling power of the CCP.8 Two other international relations senior
fellows in Shanghai stressed that there is a strong consensus among the majority of
Chinese elites and the public that economic development is the number one priority.9 An
international relations senior scholar in Beijing emphasized, “Economic development is
the most important pillar to maintain domestic stability and the legitimacy of the CCP
regime.”10
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing stated, “The Cultural Revolution was a
catastrophic lesson. Socialism or communism should bring better living standards for
people. It is nonsense for the result of the Cultural Revolution.” 11 An international
relations scholar in Beijing went further to say, “Currently, China has a strong sense of
worship for economic development!”12 Another international relations scholar in Beijing
emphasized, “Chinese people have a deep repulsion for the instability, turmoil, and
warfare of Chinese history. To avoid history repeating itself, economic development is
imperative.”13 A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai argued, “After experiencing
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China has learned profound lessons.
7
A senior official in Beijing, interview with author, August 2, 2001.
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 11, 2001. Two
international relations scholars in Shanghai, interview with author, July 4, 2001.
9
An international relations senior fellow in Shanghai, interview with author, June 15, 2001. An
international relations senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 21, 2001.
10
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001.
11
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 29, 2001.
12
An international relations scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 10, 2001.
13
An international relations scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 10, 2001.
8
199
China used to be at the edge of economic collapse. Deng Xiaoping’s policies reversed this
situation. China will be very pragmatic.”14
In order to improve their legitimacy, Chinese leaders accelerated economic
modernization through economic reforms and integration of China into the broader
international political and economic order. For instance, in discussing who should
succeed Zhao Ziyang as Party General Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen incident,
Deng Xiaoping emphasized that new Chinese leaders “should be chosen for their
commitment to reform and opening,” and reform and opening is the only way to “win the
people’s confidence.” In addition, he said, “Without reform and opening our development
stops and our economy slides downhill. Living standards decline if we turn back. The
momentum of reform cannot be stopped. We must insist on this point at all times.”15
When Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was executed at the end of 1989, some
Politburo members and veteran cadres viewed this as confirmation that the decision to
repress the “reactionaries” in the Tiananmen Square had been the right one for insuring
the Party’s survival. Facing Western sanctions and the collapse of communism in the
former Soviet Union and East Europe, Deng Xiaoping, however, concluded that the
Chinese leadership would share Ceaucescu’s fate, “if we don’t carry out reforms and
bring about benefits to the people.”16 In addition, during his southern trip [nan xun] in
early 1992, Deng said that to depart from reform and opening would lead the people to
“overthrow whoever does so,” and the result “would be chaos, and the chaos would give
rise to civil war.” “Therefore, the military and the state power must safeguard this path,”
14
15
16
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 25, 2001.
Liang Zhang (comp.), Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds.), The Tiananmen Papers (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 311, 360-361.
Benjamin Yang, Deng: A Political Biography (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 257.
200
Deng concluded.17
A Taiwan studies senior scholar and an international relations senior scholar in
Shanghai agreed that economic reforms and opening-up are strongly supported by the
Chinese public as well as the elites.18 A scholar in Shanghai even warned, “Whoever
does not continue reforms and opening-up is a Chinese national criminal.”19
In September 1997, the CCP enshrined Deng Xiaoping Theory into the Party
constitution at the Fifteenth Party Congress and made Deng’s “sange youli yu [three
conducives]” the fundamental criterion for action – “whether it is conducive to
developing the productive forces of our socialist society, augmenting the overall strength
of our socialist state, and improving the living standards of the people.” 20 On December
18, 1998, on an occasion marking the twentieth anniversary of the Third Plenary Session
of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, President Jiang Zemin stressed, “Development
is the last word. The key to resolving all China’s problems is through China's own
development.”21 Furthermore, in his report to the NPC on the 10th Five-Year Plan on
March 5, 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said, “Development is the last word. In the
face of various social contradictions, we have always maintained economic development
as the central task and adopted effective measures to promote a sustained, rapid, and
healthy development of the national economy, thus providing a foundation for handling
other contradictions.” Premier Zhu mentioned the term “reform” in his report 70 times.22
17
18
19
20
21
22
“ ‘Main Points’ of Deng Xiaoping’s Talks” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, November 5,
1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-214, pp. 21-26.
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, July 3, 2001. An international
relations senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 21, 2001.
A scholar in Shanghai, conversation with author, July 2, 2001.
“China: Comparison: Jiang’s Political Report” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service,
September 21, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-264.
“Chinese President’s Speech to Mark 20 Years of Reform - Third and Final Part,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, December 18, 1998.
“China: Full Text of Premier’s Report to NPC on 10th Five-Year Plan” (in Chinese), China Central TV,
201
II. Domestic Stability
To pursue economic modernization, China must have a stable domestic environment.
In a meeting with leading members of the CCP Central Committee on March 4, 1989,
Deng Xiaoping said, “The key to our success in modernization, the reform and the
opening to the outside is stability…. We must counter any forces that threaten stability,
not yielding to them or even making any concessions. We must send out a signal that
China will tolerate no disturbances.”
23
In addition, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a May
13 meeting with CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Chinese President Yang
Shangkun, “I’ve said over and over that we need stability if we’re going to develop.”24
On December 18, 1998, President Jiang Zemin stressed, “Stability is the basic
premise for reform and development. Without stability, nothing can be achieved…In the
process of carrying out reform, opening-up, and developing a socialist market economy,
contradictions among the people may notably increase, and some may even become
increasingly prominent…We need to nip those factors that undermine social stability in
the bud, no matter where they come from.” 25 Even in 2001, stability was still the
foremost goal for Chinese leaders. In a March 6, 2001 meeting with Hong Kong Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hua on the Falun Gong spiritual movement in Hong Kong,
President Jiang stressed, “Stability is overriding. Any countries or societies will have no
23
24
25
March 5, 2001, in BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, March 5, 2001.
Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982-1992), vol. 3, translated by the Bureau of the
Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1994), p. 279.
Liang Zhang (comp.), Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (eds.), The Tiananmen Papers (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001), p. 148.
“Chinese President’s Speech to Mark 20 Years of Reform - Third and Final Part,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, December 18, 1998.
202
prospects if they have no stability. Only stability will make the economy develop and
prosper.”26
Deng Xiaoping and President Jiang Zemin also explicitly conveyed their concerns
about stability to foreign guests. In a meeting with President George Bush on February 26,
1989, Deng Xiaoping emphasized, “In China the overriding need is for stability. Without
a stable environment, we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have
gained…. China is now in period when it must concentrate on economic development.”27
During his televised debate in Beijing with President Bill Clinton on June 27, 1998,
President Jiang also stressed China’s serious concerns about stability in defense of the
resolute measures that had been taken to end the 1989 student demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square.28
In fact, the Chinese public is also aware of the need to maintain stability. An
international relations scholar in Beijing stressed, “After experiencing the Cultural
Revolution, mainland people’s greatest fear is to experience the Cultural Revolution again.
This is why the mainland stabilized so quickly after the Tiananmen incident. People fear
turmoil.”29 Another example of this innate fear of instability is found in the Chinese
suppression of the Falun Gong movement. An international relations senior scholar in
Beijing asserted that although Chinese authorities used too much force in suppressing the
Falun Gong, people basically supported the government’s policy because they saw the
Falun Gong as jeopardizing social stability.30
26
27
28
29
30
“Chinese President Says Hong Kong to Deal With Falungong on Its Own,” Agence France Presse, March
6, 2001.
Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982-1992), vol. 3, translated by the Bureau of the
Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1994), p. 277.
Erik Eckholm, “Clinton in China: News Analysis,” New York Times, June 28, 1998, p. 1.
An international relations scholar in Beijing, conversation with author, August 13, 2001.
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 11, 2001.
203
III. Opening Policy and Stable International Environment
Since the late 1970s, the external environment has served as a very important factor
in China’s economic modernization. For example, Deng Xiaoping said in the wake of the
Tiananmen incident, “We must never close our door. China can never go back to the days
of isolationism. Isolationism brought about disasters like the ‘cultural revolution’…. The
world today is progressing by leaps and bounds…. It will be difficult for us to catch
up.”31
Because of its need to develop foreign trade, attract foreign investment, and acquire
foreign advanced technology, China has a crucial stake in maintaining a cooperative
foreign policy and stable international environment. Therefore, whatever appears good for
China’s domestic economic development is reflected in Beijing’s foreign policy. Chinese
leaders have consistently articulated China’s focus interests in stability, prosperity and
peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In August 1994, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
expounded that China pursue three basic objectives with its foreign policy: first, stability
and prosperity; second, a lasting, peaceful, and tranquil situation in the surrounding
region; and third, dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality. 32
In his governmental work report of March 1997, Chinese Premier Li Peng argued that a
long-lasting peaceful international environment and stability are prerequisites for China to
achieve its economic modernization goals.33
31
32
33
Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982-1992), vol. 3, translated by the Bureau of the
Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1994), p. 291.
“China’s Position on Asia-Pacific Security,” Beijing Review, August 8-14, 1994, p. 22.
“Governmental Work Report for the 8th National People’s Congress,” Renmin Ribao [People’s daily]
(Overseas edition), March 17, 1997, p. 2.
204
In explaining Chinese policy to an American audience, President Jiang Zemin said in
October 1997, “The supreme interest of China is peace and nation-building. As to all
threats to peace and development, no matter where they come from, the Chinese people
will join hands with the people of the rest of the world to prevent and eliminate all of
them.”34 In the ninth meeting of diplomatic envoys in August 1998, President Jiang
reiterated that the most important task of China’s diplomatic work is “to strive for peace
and to serve the socialist modernization of our country. To realize socialist modernization
and to do a good job in reform and opening, we need a domestic political situation of
stability and unity, and an international peace environment.”35
In order to promote economic development, China has shown an ability to rebuild
co-operative ties with former adversaries, as its relations with the United States after 1969,
Japan after 1972, the Soviet Union after 1982, and India after the mid-1980s illustrate. In
all these cases, Chinese leaders came to acknowledge both the costs of further
confrontation and the benefits that could be achieved through greater cooperation. In the
early 1990s, China normalized relations with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and South
Korea, hosted the first-ever visit by Japan’s emperor, and agreed to participate actively in
multilateral organizations like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China has played a constructive role in the
Cambodian peace process and cooperated with other countries to prevent North Korea
from developing nuclear weapons. China has ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty in 1992, abides by the ban on atmospheric nuclear tests, signed the chemical
weapons convention in 1993, and agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control
34
35
“Jiang: The Supreme Interest of China Is Peace and Nation-Building,” Washington Post, October 19,
1997, p. A22.
“President Makes Speech on Diplomacy” (in Chinese), Xinhua Domestic Service Beijing, August 28,
205
Regime (though it is not yet a formal member of the regime). In addition, although China
conducted nuclear tests in 1995, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in
1996.36
In the 1990s and early 2000s, five events – the post Tiananmen sanctions of 1989-90,
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in
1999, and the 2001 reconnaissance plane incident with the United States – prompted a
debate over whether to continue the 1980s foreign policy line stressing peace and
development. In each case the debate concluded with a renewed commitment to Deng’s
policy of placing primacy on China’s domestic economic development, though this
position was modified by an accelerated effort to modernize China’s defense capacities.37
This research will use the following four case studies to further evaluate China’s
broad national agendas, all involving the most sensitive sovereignty issues for China
and/or nationalism. They will help clarify whether and to what degree China’s priorities
really center on economic development, domestic stability, and a stable international
environment.
IV. Case Study: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute
36
37
1998, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 1, 1998, FE/D3320/G.
Harry Harding, “China’s Co-operative Behaviour,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.),
Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 375-376.
Barry Naughton, “The Foreign Policy Implications of China’s Economic Development Strategy,” in
Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 65-66.
H. Lyman Miller, and Liu Xiaohong, “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s ‘Third Generation’ Elite,”
in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 141. Jiang Zemin, “Text of Speech by Jiang Zemin at
Opening Banquet for the Fortune' Global Forum, 2001, in Hong Kong” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua
206
In 1972, the United States returned control of Okinawa and the Senkaku (in Japanese)
or Diaoyu (in Chinese) Islands to Japan. At that time, Chinese Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping agreed that both the Chinese and Japanese governments would set aside the
dispute over the Diaoyu Islands for a later date. During the bilateral negotiations over a
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan in 1978, Vice Premier Deng
said, “Our generation don’t [sic] have the wisdom to solve the Diaoyu Islands dispute.
Let’s leave it to future generations to solve.”38
In mid-July 1996, the Japan Youth Association, a Japanese right-wing group,
constructed a lighthouse on one of the Senkaku islands. Moreover, on August 28, during
talks with Hong Kong officials, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda reiterated the
Japanese claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Beijing said Minister Ikeda’s
remarks “were most irresponsible. The Diaoyu Islands have been an inherent part of
China since ancient times…. They are a part of China and this is irrefutable.”39 Despite
its rhetoric condemnation, however, Beijing did not adopt any action to intervene in the
Diaoyu Islands issue.
This event triggered a surge of nationalism in Hong Kong and China, as well as in
Taiwan. On September 1, a group of 257 Chinese civilians from Beijing and Tianjin wrote
a letter to Chinese leaders to demand that Chinese authorities “send navy boats to remove
the lighthouse and all structures put up by the Japanese group [on Diaoyu islands].” In
addition, students from nine universities in Shanghai applied for permits to demonstrate
against Japan. At the same time, about 35 journalists in Beijing signed an open letter
urging the Chinese government to mobilize its navy to protect Chinese fishing boats
38
Domestic Service, May 8, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0508.
“Facts About Disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands,” Deutsche-Agentur, September 21, 1996, 14:07
Central European Time.
207
heading for the Diaoyu Islands. On September 8, thousands of people took to streets of
Hong Kong calling on Japan to give up its claim to the Diaoyu Islands. On September 13,
President Jiang Zemin reportedly met with some generals in Zhongnanhai, including
Zhang Aiping, Chen Xilian, and Liao Hansheng, who appealed for efforts to “resist
Japanese militarism and recapture the Diaoyu Islands.” On the spot, General Zhang
Aiping presented President Jiang with an eight-character scroll in his own handwriting:
“We would rather lose a thousand pieces of gold than an inch of land.”40
According to a September 14 report carried by Trends, a publication of the CCP
Central Committee, relevant central departments and official media received some 37,300
telegrams and letters with a total of 152,000 signatures, including those of 18,000 people
from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and from overseas. They urged Beijing to adopt a
tougher stance against Japan and even to use warships to recover the islands for China. In
addition, on September 15, over 10,000 people marched through Hong Kong’s streets in
the largest protest ever against Japanese claims to the Diaoyu Islands.41
Nevertheless, it was reported that as early as September 6, Beijing decided to
discourage Chinese fishing boats from getting close to the Diaoyu Islands to avoid
triggering an armed conflict with the Japanese navy. Beijing also banned all newspapers
and magazines from carrying articles containing sharp words against Japan. The official
Xinhua News Agency did not even cover the mass demonstration held by Hong Kong
39
40
41
“China Blasts Ikeda’s Remarks on Senkaku Islands,” Japanese Economic Newswire, August 29, 1996.
“Civilian Group Demanded Troops Be Sent to Diaoyutai Island,” Agence France Presse, September 1,
1996, 01:11 GMT. Andy Ho, “China Reluctant to Back Patriotic Cause,” South China Morning Post,
September 10, 1996, p. 19. Graham Hutchings, “Hong Kong Backs Beijing in Islands Row With Japan,”
Daily Telegraph, September 9, 1996, p. 13. Lo Ping, “Army, Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account” (in
Chinese), Hong Kong Cheng Ming, October 1, 1996, no. 228, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI-96-213.
Lo Ping, “Army, Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Cheng Ming, October
1, 1996, no. 228, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI-96-213. Nicholas D. Kristof, “An Asian Mini-Tempest Over
Mini-Island Group,” New York Times, September 16, 1996, p. A8. “Thousands March to Protest Japan
Claims to Disputed Islands,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 15, 1996, 17:25 Central European
208
people on September 15. Moreover, September 18 was the 65th anniversary of the
“September 18th Incident,”
42
but the Chinese government did not hold any
commemorative activities nor did any Beijing newspaper carry articles about the
“September 18th Incident.”43
In addition, Beijing gave orders to disperse rallies, protest marches, and
demonstrations against the revival of Japanese militarism and occupation of Diaoyu
Islands. While anti-Japanese demonstrations raged in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the
Chinese government denied requests from students and other groups to stage public
protests. Five leaders who headed a petition drive to protest Japanese possession of the
islands were ordered to leave Beijing. One of the banished petitioners, Tong Zeng, said
the government accused him of “interfering in foreign affairs and affecting
Chinese-Japanese relations.”44 Beijing worried that the “campaign to protect Diaoyu
Islands may trigger social disturbances which are aimed against a corrupt and
incompetent government.”45
42
43
44
45
Time.
On the night of September 18, 1931, Japanese troops used the pretext of an explosion along the
Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway to occupy Shenyang City. This incident was followed by
the Japanese invasion of all of Manchuria and the establishment of the Japanese-dominated state of the
Manchukuo in the area.
“Beijing Treads Warily on Island Issue,” South China Morning Post, September 7, 1996, p. 3. Andy Ho,
“China Reluctant to Back Patriotic Cause,” South China Morning Post, September 10, 1996, p. 19. Lo
Ping, “Army, Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Cheng Ming, October 1,
1996, no. 228, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI-96-213. Wang Ling, “Voice of Protecting Diaoyu Islands Dies
Down in Beijing on Eve of ‘18th September’, Fudan Students Send Letters of Protest Instead of Holding
Sit-In” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Ming Pao, September 18, 1996, p. A9, in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, September 19, 1996, FE/D2721/G.
“Beijing Warns Diaoyu Activists,” South China Morning Post, September 13, 1996, p. 1. Maggie Farley
and Rone Tempest, “Japan Blocks Flotilla Claiming Islands for China,” Los Angeles Times, September
24, 1996, p. A6.
Lo Ping, “Army, Civilians Call Jiang Zemin to Account” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Cheng Ming, October
1, 1996, no. 228, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI-96-213. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “’Sacrifice’ Mourned by Students,”
South China Morning Post, September 28, 1996, p. 4. Chin-yi Lin, “State Education Commission Sends
a Message to Institutions of Higher Education Nationwide Warning Them Against Too-Drastic Words
and Deeds” (in Chinese), Hong Kong Ming Pao, September 17, 1996, p. A4, in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, September 18, 1996, FE/D2720/G.
209
China’s official response to the Diaoyu Islands issue was moderate and cautious. On
September 17, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “We believe that the Japanese
side must quickly adopt active measures to do away with the negative influences. But the
circumstances surrounding the Diaoyu Islands are complex, so we believe that we must
caution the sending of [Taiwan and Hong Kong civilian] ships there.”46 On September 24,
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen expressed China’s serious concern to Japan while at the
same time referring to the importance of relations between the two countries.47
Nevertheless, by late September a rusty freighter with 18 Hong Kong protestors
sailed for the Diaoyu Islands. The protesters vowed to retake the Diaoyu Islands in
China’s name by removing the Japanese lighthouse. As they neared their destination,
Japanese coast guard ships shadowed the freighter, which was flying the Chinese flag,
repeatedly urging it not to approach. Unfortunately, one Hong Kong man drowned on
September 26 after leaping from the freighter in an attempt to swim to the islets. While
expressing its condolences for the accident, Japan continued to assert its sovereignty over
the islands.48
Thereafter, several anti-Japanese protests took place in Hong Kong. On two
occasions in 1997 and 1998, activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan attempted to land on
the Diaoyu Islands only to be turned back by Japanese coastguard vessels. On two
occasions in 1999 and 2000, activists in Hong Kong called on the Japanese government to
halt its intrusions into the Diaoyu Islands and repeatedly called on Beijing to intervene
with the slogan, “We would rather lose [a thousand pieces] of gold than an inch of our
46
47
48
“China Cautions H.K., Taiwan on Disputed Islands Issue,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 17,
1996.
“China Rift Is Raising Doubts About Hashimoto Diplomacy,” Asahi News Service, September 26, 1996.
Edward A. Gargan, “Man Drown During a Protest Over Asian Islets,” New York Times, September 27,
1996, p. A8.
210
territory.”49
However, Beijing took no steps to intervene on the issue and sought to restrain
popular protest in China itself. For example, in response to Japan’s damaging of a Hong
Kong ship near the Diaoyu Islands in 1998, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said,
“[T]he Chinese side has, through diplomatic channels, expounded China’s position to the
Japanese side, and strongly demanded that the Japanese side draw lessons from the past,
refrain from taking stern acts or moves, and refrain from intensifying conflicts.”50
Japan’s importance as a source of technology, capital, and market is the likely reason
for China’s moderate response. In 1996, China was negotiating the resumption of Japan’s
yen loans that had been suspended after China’s 1995 nuclear tests. From 1979 to 1998,
Japan offered $23.1 billion in financial aid to China. In 1996, Japan was China’s fourth
largest source of cumulative FDI, with realized FDI totaling $14.2 billion, and its largest
trading partner, with two-way trade reaching $60.1 billion.51 An international relations
senior scholar in Beijing explained the Chinese position in this way, “This issue is
difficult to resolve so China proposes to shelve disputes. China does not want to risk a
military conflict with Japan over a small island, which would disrupt the progress of
China’s economic development and modernization.”52 Another international relations
senior scholar in Beijing also agreed that the economic factor is very important for the
49
50
51
52
“Taiwan, Hong Kong Activists Head Home After Failing to Land on Islands,” Kyodo News Service,
May 26, 1997, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 27, 1997. “H.K. Isles Activists Abandon
Damaged Protest Ship,” Japan Economic Newswire, June 24, 1998. NG Kang-Chung, “Scuffles Break
Out As Policy Try to Bar Protesters From PLA Barracks,” South China Morning Post, August 2, 1999, p.
3. “PRC FM Spokesman on ‘Shrine’ Set Up on Diaoyu Islands” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic
Service, April 29, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0429. “Hong Kong Protestors Demonstrate Against Japan’s
Claims on Diaoyus,” Agence France Presse, May 2, 2000.
“FM Spokesman on Diaoyu Island Issue,” Xinhua News Agency, June 25, 1998.
Mei Cheng, “Japan Will Review Its Policy of Financial Aid to China,” Gongshang Shibao [Commerce
Times], May 11, 2000. Mainland Affairs Council (ed.), Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, no. 56
(April 1997).
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001.
211
Chinese government in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations.53
V. Case Study: The South China Sea Islands Dispute
In late January 1995, the Philippine navy discovered Chinese-built concrete
structures on Mischief (“Meiji” in Chinese) Reef, an atoll claimed by both China and the
Philippines, two hundred kilometers west of the major Philippines island of Palawan.
Despite Beijing’s claims that the structures were only shelters for fishing boats, in late
March the Philippine government ordered its navy and air force to destroy the structures
on Mischief Reef and dismantled survey markers installed by the Chinese on several reefs
and atolls in the disputed Spratly islands. Nevertheless, when the Philippines government
arranged for local and foreign journalists to visit other islands claimed by Manila, their
boat was blocked by Chinese ships. On March 27, the Philippines navy retaliated by
arresting sixty-two Chinese seafarers near Mischief Reef and charging them with
trespassing. In mid-June, the Philippine military blew up a PRC boundary marker on
another atoll.54
To diffuse this tension, Beijing told Manila that the Chinese would not build any new
structures in the disputed area and subsequently offered to discuss the South China Sea
dispute with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a group at its 1995
summit in Bangkok. In their August 11, 1995 joint communiqué, the Philippines and
China agreed that the bilateral territorial dispute should be resolved in a peaceful and
53
54
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, August 2, 2001.
“China Warns Manila Over Spratlys,” Agence France Presse, March 25, 1995, 22:33 Eastern Time. “70
Chinese Seafarers Detained in the Philippines,” Agence France Presse, March 27, 1995, 09:56 Eastern
Time. Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel
and Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 105-113.
212
friendly manner and not by force or by the threat of force. These principles were
confirmed in later bilateral meetings regarding Mischief Reef.55
However, by March 1996, the Chinese had rebuilt its structures on Mischief Reef. In
late 1998, the Philippines realized that China had completed what appeared to be military
structures on the Reef. China insisted Mischief Reef facilities were shelters for fishermen
and would serve no military purpose. In March 1999, the Philippines found that China
had built two more concrete structures on the Reef.56
Aside from building these “shelters” on Mischief Reef, Beijing did not take any
further provocative action against the Philippines. Instead, Beijing took a cooperative
stance. On May 4, 1997, China abandoned a hut-like structure in the disputed Spratly
Islands near an island claimed by Manila. In addition, China withdrew four armed vessels
from two islands claimed by the Philippines after Manila protested. On November 30,
1998, the Philippines navy arrested 20 Chinese fishermen who were found near Mischief
Reef. Beijing made no assertive intervention despite these arrests.57
There is another serious territorial dispute in the South China Sea over Scarborough
Shoal (“Huangyan Island” in Chinese). The PRC raised a sovereignty marker on
Scarborough Shoal in 1991. The Philippines blew this up in 1996 and the following year
planted its national flag on the island. In addition, on eight occasions between May 1997
and March 2001, twenty-nine Chinese fishing boats in the waters near Scarborough Shoal
55
56
57
Chien-peng Chung, “The Spratlys and Other South China Seas Islands Disputes,” Journal of Social,
Political & Economic Studies, Spring 1999, pp. 17-36. Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South China Sea
Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol. 36, no. 4
(July/August 2000), pp. 108-113.
Chien-peng Chung, “The Spratlys and Other South China Seas Islands Disputes,” Journal of Social,
Political & Economic Studies, Spring 1999, pp. 17-36. “China Completes Structure on Disputed Spratlys
Reef: Philippines,” Agence France Presse, January 5, 1999, 08:38 GMT. “Two More Chinese Structures
Sighted in South China Seas Outcrop: Philippines,” Agence France Presse, March 5, 1999, 08:47 GMT.
“China Abandoned Structure on Disputed Island,” Washington Post, May 4, 1997, p. A23. “World in
Brief/Philippines,” Los Angeles Times, November 30, 1998, p. A14.
213
were chased and rammed by the Philippine navy and a few sank as a result. Furthermore,
on three occasions between May 1997 and March 1998, the Philippine navy arrested 72
Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.58
The Chinese government urged the Philippines to punish those responsible for the
incidents, provide compensation for the losses, and take measures to stop the
reoccurrence of such incidents. But a Philippine presidential spokesman said that the
Chinese fishermen were to blame for entering Philippines waters and called on Beijing to
“respect Philippine sovereignty.” In turn, China called on the Philippines to “refrain from
creating any new trouble so as to work with China to maintain peace and stability in the
South China Sea.”59
Since the late 1980s, China has advocated the shelving of sovereignty disputes,
settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful means, cooperative economic ventures in
the South China Sea, and negotiation of disputes consistent with the 1982 United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention. China did not change this policy even after severe
confrontations with the Philippines and Vietnam. In order to maintain a stable
international environment and diplomatic relations with the countries around the South
58
59
Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and
Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 105-115. “Philippine Military,
Chinese Fishing Boats in South China Sea Standoff,” Agence France Presse, January 31, 2001. Nirmal
Ghosh, “Philippine Navy Arrests 21 Chinese,” Strait Times (Singapore), May 28, 1997, p. 15. “Chinese
Fishermen Freed in Philippines, Agence France Presse, July 16, 1997, 16:12 GMT. “Philippine Navy
Arrests 22 Chinese Fishermen,” Japan Economic Newswire, January 20, 1998. “China Demands Release
of 29 Chinese Fishermen,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 18, 1998. “China – Sovereignty Violated
Ramming of Boat Hurts Ties,” China Daily, May 26, 1999. Martin Abbugao, “Chinese Fishing Boat
Sunk in Collision with Philippine Navy Vessel,” Agence France Presse, July 20, 1999, 09:13 GMT.
“Chinese Boats Boarded, Driven Away by Philippines Navy,” Agence France Presse, January 27, 2000.
“AFP: Philippine Navy Says 10 Chinese Boats Repelled From Disputed Shoal,” Hong Kong AFP, March
18, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0318.
“No Punishment for Philippine Navy After Chinese Fishermen Collision,” Agence France Presse, May
26, 1999, 12:03 GMT. “Philippines, China Renew War of Words Over South China Sea Dispute,”
Agence France Presse, January 27, 2000. “China Makes Representations Over South China Sea
Dispute,” Agence France Presse, February 6, 2001. “China Calls on Philippines to ‘Show Real Respect’
for Sovereignty” (in Chinese), Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service, February 6, 2001, in BBC
214
China Sea, the PRC behaved with self-restraint and sought to reduce tension through
negotiations. In the Mischief Reef case, China did not adopt more assertive action when
the Philippines dismantled survey markers and structures installed by the Chinese and
arrested hundreds of Chinese fishermen near Mischief Reef and Scarborough shoal. In a
dispute over Chinese oil drilling activity near Vietnam, China suspended its activity after
Vietnam protested in April 1997. About a year later, Vietnam again complained when a
Chinese exploration ship and two armed fishing boats sailed near the Spratly Islands.
These vessels also withdrew without any incident. Moreover, China did not take greater
action during the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and 1998, considering its relative
military strength and Southeast Asia’s economic and political disarray at the time.60
Beijing’s preference for peaceful resolution was reaffirmed, for example, by the joint
statement by the heads of the ASEAN and China on December 16, 1997. On at least six
occasions between March 1999 and March 2000, Chinese leaders have reiterated China’s
stance toward the Spratly Islands by saying that the principle of “making joint
development while leaving disputes aside” will help maintain peace and stability in the
region though China has never really done anything to promote joint development. They
contend that China’s sovereignty over the Spratlys Islands and surrounding sea areas is
unarguable, but, paradoxically, China hopes to solve the problem through dialogue and
consultation. Despite China’s preference for a bilateral approach to the Spratly disputes,
on November 25, 1999, China agreed to negotiate multilaterally with the ASEAN for a
60
Summary of World Broadcasts, February 8, 2001, FE/D4065/G.
Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and
Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 120-121. Hsin-Chih Chen,
“ASEAN Member States’ Attitudes and Responses Toward the ‘China Threat Theory’,” Wenti yu Yanjiou
[Issues & Studies], vol. 35, no. 11 (November 1996), pp. 24-29. Michael D. Swaine, China: Domestic
Change and Foreign Policy (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1995), p. 92. “Drawn to the Fray,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, April 3, 1997, pp. 14-16. Flex K. Chang, “Chinese Energy and Asian Security,” Orbis,
vol. 45, no. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 211.
215
“code of conduct” aimed at easing territorial disputes in the South China Sea.61
The contradiction between Chinese rhetoric of peaceful resolution and military
intervention at both Johnson (“Chigua” in Chinese) Reef in 1988 62 and creeping
expansionism in the Spratly Islands in the 1990s is explained by Chung Chien-peng, H.
Lyman Miller, and Liu Xiaohong. They argue that China’s concern is that its claims will
be marginalized unless it actively asserts its presence in the Spratlys. In 1996 Vietnam
controlled 20 of the Spratly islands while eight were held by the Philippines, six by China,
three by Malaysia, and one by Taiwan. By 2001, the number of Spratly islands controlled
by Vietnam increased to 27. Thus, Chinese contradictory assertion is at most a reaction to
the active claims of others in the region.63
In 1984, Deng Xiaoping explained China’s position in this way, “One alternative is
to take all these [Nansha] islands [occupied by Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia] back by force; another is to set aside the question of sovereignty and develop
them jointly…. We Chinese stand for peace and wish to settle all disputes by peaceful
61
62
63
Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and
Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 121-122. “FM Spokesman
Reiterates Stance on Nansha Islands,” Xinhua News Agency, March 30, 1999. Anthony Kuhn, “China
Says Philippines Ramping Up Spratlys Rift,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1999, p. A13. “Chinese
Foreign Ministry Says Nansha Islands Sovereignty Indisputable,” Xinhua News Agency, May 20, 1999.
“Chinese Defense Minister Reiterates China’s Stand on South China Sea Issue,” Xinhua News Agency,
September 15, 1999. “China Agrees to Negotiate for Spratlys ‘Code of Conduct’,” Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, November 25, 1999, 12:37 Central European Time. Jamie Tarabay, “China Makes
Proposal in South China Sea Dispute,” Associated Press, November 29, 1999. “China Calls for Ban on
Military Exercises in S. China Sea,” Japan Economic Newswire, March 15, 2000.
In 1988 Chinese military forces took six Spratly atolls and sank three Vietnamese ships in the process.
Several smaller exchanges of fire followed in subsequent years. Hurng-yu Chen, “The PRC’s South
China Sea Policy and Strategies of Occupation in the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Issues & Studies, vol.
36, no. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 98-103.
Chien-peng Chung, “The Spratlys and Other South China Seas Islands Disputes,” Journal of Social,
Political & Economic Studies, Spring 1999, pp. 17-36. “AFP: Vietnam Holds Firm in Spratlys Dispute
During Chi Haotian Visit,” Hong Kong AFP, February 10, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0210. H. Lyman
Miller, and Liu Xiaohong, “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s ‘Third Generation’ Elite,” in David
M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 141. Mingming Wang, in Teng Teng (ed.), Deng Xiaoping Lilun
yu Shiji zhi Jiao de Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue [Deng Xiaoping Theory and China’s International Strategy
on the Eve of New Century] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), p. 597.
216
means.”64 An international relations senior scholar in Beijing further explained, “China
never seized the Spratly islands by force. China just built some shelters on unmanned
shoals, as other countries did. Currently China occupies too few shoals and too late.
China cannot help but respect the status quo and avoid the use of force. China’s goal is to
maintain stability. China does not want to risk disturbing a generally peaceful
environment because of small territory dispute. China does not want to disrupt its
economic development.”
65
VI. Case Study: The U.S. Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade
Since NATO began bombing targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without
UN authorization on March 24, 1999, Beijing feared that a resurgent United States was
putting humanitarian intervention above the traditional concept of state sovereignty and
that it planned to use a non-UN mechanism as its preferred tool. Furthermore, facing
domestic opposition, Premier Zhu Rongji traveled to Washington to secure China’s
accession to the WTO in early April. However, the United States rejected the offer and
thus gravely undermined the position of Chinese leaders who wanted to compromise with
the United States. These two events together provoked strong anti-American sentiments
among China’s elites and the Chinese public at large. Nevertheless, Beijing did not intend
to manipulate nationalism to confront the United States. Beijing did not encourage its
citizens to protest nor did it adopt more assertive policy against the United States prior to
64
65
Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Renmin
Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 87-88.
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001.
217
the U.S. mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.66
However, on May 8 (Beijing time) five bombs from an American plane slammed
into the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three and wounding more than twenty
others. Despite the explanation that the embassy had been misidentified as a legitimate
Serb military target, on May 9 up to 100,000 demonstrators besieged the U.S. embassy in
the biggest protests seen in Beijing since the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Tens of
thousands of protestors marched past the U.S. and British embassies, throwing stones,
burning the U.S. flag and effigies of President Bill Clinton and shouting slogans like
“Down with U.S. imperialism.” In addition, according to China’s official media, more
than 100,000 people protested in other major Chinese cities, including Xian, Hangzhou,
Guangzhou, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Guilin. Demonstrators set fire to the U.S.
consulate in Chengdu and all consulate personnel were evacuated.67
During the demonstrations, the Chinese government not only helped transport
demonstrators but police seemed indifferent to the damage inflicted on U.S. property. The
Chinese explanation, as David Lampton points out, was that by allowing a “controlled”
reaction a bigger explosion was averted. 68 Beijing understood full well, as Joseph
Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen argue, that “students are going to take to the streets in any
event and that if they did not throw stones at the American embassy they would throw
them at Zhongnanhai (the leadership compound).”69 If students and others had not been
66
67
68
69
David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), pp. 57-59.
“AFP Views Nationwide Fury in China Over NATO Bombing,” Hong Kong AFP, May 9, 1999, in
FBIS-CHI-1999-0509.
David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), p. 60.
Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public
Opinion’ Matter?,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in
the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 173.
218
permitted to vent their feelings against the United States, they no doubt would have found
release through criticism of the Chinese government.
After allowing the Chinese people to vent their frustration with the United States, the
Chinese government tried to control the damage and maintain its focus on economic
development. First, Beijing emphasized the importance of social stability and reassured
foreign investors that China would continue its reform and opening policy and protect
foreigners and their assets. In his televised speech on May 9, Chinese Vice President Hu
Jintao said, “The Chinese government firmly supports and protects all the protests that
tally with the law…. [However,] we must guard against any overreactions, watch out for
people who may take advantage of the opportunity to disrupt the normal social order, and
take firm actions to safeguard social stability…. We will uphold the reform and opening
up policy. To fully demonstrate the fine, civilized traditions of the Chinese nation, we
will…protect foreign diplomatic establishments and their personnel in China, foreign
nationals in China, and foreign personnel who are in China for economic, trade,
educational and cultural activities.” [emphasis added]70
Second, Beijing tried to divert the people’s focus back to economic development
with its emphasis on social stability and continuing reform and opening. On May 11,
President Jiang Zemin said, “[The demonstrations against the United States have]
demonstrated the enthusiasm, will, and power of the great patriotism of the Chinese
people. The whole country is now determined to study and work harder, so as to develop
the national economy continuously, enhance national strength, and fight back with
concrete deeds against the barbaric act of U.S.-led NATO.” [emphasis added]71 On May
70
71
“Chinese Vice-President Hu: Broadcast to Nation on NATO Strike – Domestic Report” (in Chinese),
Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service, May 9, 1999, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 9, 1999.
“Jiang Zemin Meets Chernomyrdin on NATO Bombing,” Beijing Xinhua, May 11, 1999, in
219
13, he emphasized, “China will unswervingly take economic construction as its central
task.” In addition, he asserted that China “will continue to unswervingly adhere to the
policy of reform and opening up, which is the only way to invigorate the country” and
“continue to unremittingly maintain the social stability, which is the fundamental
assurance for implementing our reform and construction tasks.” [emphasis added]72
On May 18, the Renmin Ribao urged the Chinese people to put aside the NATO
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and make efforts to improve the
investment environment.73 On May 25, a Renmin Ribao editorial repeated President Jiang
Zemin’s call on the whole country to focus on economic development. The paper said that
taking economic development as the central task all the time was the key to the resolution
of all problems China faced. The editorial went on to say, “We must focus on economic
development while handling both domestic and international issues.” [emphasis added]74
On June 2, a Renmin Ribao editorial again emphasized, “Stability is of utmost
significance for the Chinese people who are now concentrating their efforts on launching
reform, opening up to the outside world, and embarking on socialist modernization
drive…. Stability is of paramount importance…. Unrest will result in destruction,
catastrophe, and regression…. Why China cannot afford to be in chaos must be stressed
over and over again openly…. All forms of conduct that undermine political stability and
unity must be immediately stopped decisively and lawfully no matter when and where
they appear.” [emphasis added]75
72
73
74
75
FBIS-CHI-1999-0511.
“Jiang on Foreign, Internal Policy,” Beijing Xinhua, May 13, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0513.
“AFP: People’s Daily Urges People to ‘Put Aside’ Bombing,” Hong Kong AFP, May 18, 1999, in
FBIS-CHI-1999-0518.
“Unswervingly Adhere to Taking Economic Development as the Central Task” (in Chinese), Renmin
Ribao [People’s Daily] (Overseas edition), May 25, 1999, p. 1.
“Firmly Maintain Social Stability” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, June 1, 1999, in
FBIS-CHI-1999-0601.
220
The following three examples of U.S.-China relations further demonstrate Beijing’s
emphasis on stability and economic development. First, in early May 2000, Beijing
reportedly issued a nationwide circular calling on university students to cancel their plans
to conduct demonstrations marking the first anniversary of the bombing event. The
circular emphasized that the most important and urgent issue was to maintain social and
political stability.76
Second, at a joint meeting with members of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference on March 6, 2001, Vice Premier Qian Qichen said that it was
impossible to change the U.S. basic standpoint on the Taiwan and human right issues, but
China and the United States had common economic interests. He emphasized that China
should bring the contradictions between China and the United States “under control and
not have an outburst. We should reason things out and, if we fail, we should put aside
minor differences so as to seek common ground [economic interests].”77
Third, on April 1, 2001, China held onto 24 U.S. military personnel and a U.S. Navy
surveillance plane that made an emergency landing on Hainan Island after an airborne
collision with a Chinese fighter jet. This triggered a severe standoff between the United
States and China. Despite arousing rhetoric in official media, the Chinese government
strictly prohibited or stopped protests against the United States on the streets and
campuses of China. On April 11, Beijing decided to release the American crew despite the
fact that the United States did not formally apologize to China. In a letter written by the
American Ambassador to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, the U.S. only went as
76
77
“Beijing Calls for Students to Cancel Their Plan of Demonstration,” Zhongguo Shibao [China Times],
May 2, 2000.
“Qian Qichen Speaks at Meeting with Hong Kong, Macao, CPPCC Members” (in Chinese), Hong Kong
Ta Kung Pao, March 7, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0307.
221
far as saying “very sorry” twice, not an official apology by Chinese standards.78 On the
next day, a commentary article in the Renmin Ribao stated, “We must…gather up our
strong patriotic fervor into all the work of promoting reform, opening up, and socialist
modernization.”79
On May 8, speaking to the Fortune Global Forum, President Jiang Zemin publicly
reconfirmed China’s national agendas, “The Chinese government will unswervingly
implement the opening up policy…continued efforts will be made to promote economic
growth and social progress, with development as the main theme, restructuring the key
link, reform, opening up and technological advancement the driving force, and higher
living standards the ultimate goal…. A peaceful environment is indispensable for national,
regional and even global development. Without peace or political stability, there would be
no economic progress to speak of.”80
Although most Chinese scholars strongly suspect U.S. intentions of containing China,
Beijing continues to expand cooperation and economic exchange with the U.S. in order to
develop its economy. For example, an international relations senior scholar in Shanghai
candidly explained the Chinese position, “Even while western countries want to confront,
westernize, and split China, China still wants to expand cooperation and economic
exchange with the West.”81 An international relations senior scholar in Beijing asserted,
“The U.S. was too hegemonic and China was the victim in these incidents. In addition,
78
79
80
81
Philip P. Pan and John Pomfret, “U.S. Words of Regret Ease China Tension,” Washington Post, April 6,
2001, p. A1. Jeremy Page, “China Dampens Anti-U.S. Protests, Frustrates Students,” Reuters, April 6,
2001, 8:08 AM ET. “Internet Users Criticize Weakness,” Hong Kong Ming Pao (internet version), April
12, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0412.
A Renmin Ribao commentator, “Translate Patriotic Fervor into Strength to Make the Country Strong,”
Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, April 11, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0411.
Jiang Zemin, “Text of Speech by Jiang Zemin at Opening Banquet for the Fortune' Global Forum, 2001,
in Hong Kong” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, May 8, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0508.
An international relations senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 29, 2001.
222
the U.S. obviously intends to restrain China’s rising. However, China as a developing
country would not and could not afford to antagonize the United States.”82
Another international relations senior scholar in Beijing stressed, “Sino-U.S.
relations reflect the importance of economic development to China. China makes every
effort to maintain stable Sino-U.S. relations. It is impossible for China to face off with the
United States. The Sino-U.S. relationship is not a question of face, but of economic
development. China also showed extraordinary restraint in its reaction to Lee Teng-hui’s
visits to the U.S. and Japan, and Chen Shui-bian’s visit to the United States [in 2001]. All
these reflect the importance of economic development to the Chinese government.” 83 An
American studies senior scholar in Beijing elaborated, “The Sino-U.S. economic
relationship is very important for China. Trade accounts for 40 percent of China’s GDP,
and 40 percent of China’s trade goes to the United States. As a result, China must
maintain a good relationship with the United States. The importance of the U.S. to China
is much greater than China’s importance to the United States. If Sino-U.S. relations
worsen, it will bring severe damage to China.”84
Many other Chinese scholars had the same perspective. For instance, an international
relations senior scholar in Beijing underscored, “China wants economic development, not
Sino-U.S. confrontation.”85 An American studies senior scholar in Beijing emphasized,
“Regarding the issue of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy and the airplane
collision, China does not want conflict. All China wants is to develop its economy!”86
Two other American studies senior fellows in Beijing, an American studies senior scholar
82
83
84
85
86
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001.
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 17, 2001.
An American studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, August 10, 2001.
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, August 2, 2001.
An American studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 10, 2001.
223
in Shanghai, and a Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing agreed that economic interest
is the essential consideration for China to deal with the issues of the U.S. bombing of the
Chinese embassy and the airplane collision.87
VII. Case Study: The Taiwan Issue
Although most people would speculate that the Taiwan issue would be an exception
to China’s overall foreign policy because of historical sentimental factors and geopolitical
politics, the following analysis shows that China has handled this most sensitive issue in a
way that remains consistent with its national agendas – focusing on economic
development, domestic stability, and cultivating an international environment conducive
to domestic growth. China has shown its prudence and patience on the Taiwan issue,
especially after 1978, and has made its Taiwan policy responsive to both the domestic and
international situations.
According to Michael Swaine, China’s decision to shift the basic thrust of its Taiwan
policy from confrontation to peaceful reunification through negotiations did not emerge
fully until the late 1970s/early 1980s. He argues that it was the logical consequence of
other major policy initiatives, including the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations and the
adoption of economic reform and opening policies. In particular, the economic reform and
opening policies required the development of a peaceful and stable external environment
conducive to economic growth, including amicable ties with the major powers and with
87
An American studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with China, July 12, 2001. An international
relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 19, 2001. An American studies senior
scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, July 4, 2001. A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing,
interview with author, July 13, 2001.
224
Asian neighbors.88 In the reform era between 1978 and 1995, China did not threatened to
unify with Taiwan by force, despite the fact that China did not renounce the use of force.
Despite the fact that President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in June 1995
and his statement of “two-state theory” in July 1999 triggered military threats from China,
Beijing showed the same restraint in addressing cross-Strait relations and U.S.-China
relations. For example, although Chinese leaders at the Beidaihe meeting in early August
1995 reconfirmed their view that the United States likely sought to contain China, they
recognized that Beijing needed to maintain workable relations with Washington. Both
President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng espoused the argument that China could not
afford to confront the West and that Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding emphasis on economic
reform and development must remain dominant in China’s overall strategy. This theme
was repeated by President Jiang in a series of leadership meetings held in August and
September.89
Beijing escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 and 1999-2000 but never
went beyond posturing, both rhetorically, and more seriously, militarily. Through its
limited force deployments to the Strait region, China signaled that it did not intend to
actually attack Taiwan – China referred to its force buildup as “deterrence” (against
Taiwan independence). China did not deploy the material means to realize an actual
invasion. In addition, even Chinese analysts believed that U.S. leaders (and Taiwanese
leaders) knew from intelligence gathered by U.S. satellite reconnaissance that Chinese
88
89
Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000,” in David M. Lampton
(ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2001), p. 311.
Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Beijing’s Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?” Issues & Studies,
vol. 36, no. 1 (January/February 2000), p. 94. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding
Taiwan, 1979-2000,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in
the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 324.
225
intentions were limited to influencing Taiwanese leaders and public psychology.90
In February 1996, the U.S. embassy in Beijing was informed that no attack on
Taiwan was planned. In February and March, Li Zhaoxing, China’s vice foreign minister
(and later ambassador to the United States), and Liu Huaqiu, director of the Foreign
Affairs Office of China’s State Council, held a series of intensive meetings with officials
from the U.S. State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security
Council. During these meetings, the PRC officials gave strong assurances about the limits
in time, scale, and location of its military exercises and missile tests. They gave the
United States government explicit assurance that the PLA would not attack Taiwan while
it urged the United States to stay out of the cross-Strait quarrel. According to a U.S.
Defense Department spokesman, the PRC had told the United States, in both public and
private conversations, that it had no intention of attacking Taiwan. Even the chance of
accidental “incidents” was minimized. The PLA’s Front Line Command strictly ordered
the participants to avoid any “unwanted situation to emerge.” Beijing’s assurances truly
reflected this intention because they were made before the heated missile-test exercises in
early March 1996 and before the United States deterred China by sending two aircraft
carriers to the waters near the Taiwan Strait.91
90
91
John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1997), p. 104.
Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 26, no. 2
(Fall 2001), p. 123. Gary Klintworth, “Lessons Learned,” in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and
Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power (Canberra, Australia: Australian National
University, 1997), p. 253. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion,
Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 108. Suisheng
Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy of National Reunification with
Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 27, no. 4 (1999), p. 511. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making
Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and
Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 326. Denny Roy,
“Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, p. 80. You Ji, “Changing
Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games,” in Shuisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the
Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 90.
226
It seems contradictory that, on the one hand, China needs stability and peace, but, on
the other hand, Beijing engaged in sabre rattling. In fact, Beijing’s military brinkmanship
involved both war games and war avoidance. Beijing’s logic, as You Ji explains, is that:
“(1) China would have to wage a war against Taiwan if the latter declares independence;
so (2) military threats would reduce the likelihood of a declaration of independence; and
so (3) military threats would make a war less likely.”92 Ultimately, China wanted to avoid
a military conflict with Taiwan.
In March 1996, having used brinkmanship throughout the crisis, Beijing finally
accepted the fait accompli of Taiwan’s election results and referred to the re-elected Lee
Teng-hui as a “local” leader. The military exercises ended without escalating into a war.
Even though the Chinese government had tried to focus its anti-Taiwan independence
attack on Lee Teng-hui for several months prior to the presidential election, Beijing’s
post-election comments mainly targeted Peng Ming-min, the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) candidate. With the substantial reduction of votes received by
Peng compared with votes received by the DPP in previous elections, Beijing declared a
victory for pro-unification forces in Taiwan.93
Through much of February and March 2000, China’s top leaders threatened trouble
if Chen Shui-bian, the DPP presidential candidate, won the election. Premier Zhu Rongji
suggested that if Taiwan chose pro-independence leaders, it might not get the chance to
choose again. However, right after Chen’s victory on March 18, a Chinese government
statement said, “The election of the leader of Taiwan and its outcome cannot alter the fact
that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory…. We will listen to the words and observe the
92
93
You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, no. 15
(March 1997), p. 300.
“PRC: Results of Taiwan Election Reported” (in Chinese), Xinhua Domestic Service, March 23, 1996, in
227
actions of Taiwan’s new leader and wait and see in which direction he takes cross-Strait
relations.”94 As of early 2002, Beijing had yet publicly condemned Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian in the official press.
In late November 1995, polls commissioned by the General Office of the CCP
Central Committee showed that about 90 percent of the China’s population supported
military action against Taiwan if the pro-independence movement gained momentum.
According to a March 2000 telephone poll conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou by the China Social Survey Affairs Institute, 95 percent of those interviewed
said that “if Taiwan independence elements come to power, we will resolutely support the
government in going to war against Taiwan.” However, in these two Taiwan Strait
incidents, Beijing did not manipulate Chinese nationalism to escalate the crises or even to
support its military action toward Taiwan. By contrast, Beijing was cautious and
prudent.95
Nevertheless, Chinese authorities found themselves boxed in by their own rhetorical
excesses. Right after acknowledging that Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election on
March 18, 2000, some five thousand students marched through the streets of Chongqing
City as well as Wuhan City demanding a tough response. Nonetheless, demonstrations
were stopped early on by the local police. The government was apparently able to prevent
similar protests from developing in Beijing and Shanghai. The police immediately
rejected the application of so-called “Anti-Taiwan Independence Demonstrations” by the
students in those two cities.96
94
95
96
FBIS-CHI-96-058.
Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Decision in Taiwan,” New York Times, March 19, 2000, p. A18.
Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Cadres Cautious on Force Against Taipei,” South China Morning Post, December 1,
1995, p. 12. “China Prepared to React to Election” (in Chinese), Sing Tao Jih Pao, March 18, 2000, p.
A2, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 20, 2000, FE/D3793/F2.
Ze-hong Lin and Dao-cheng Li, “What Happens to Cross-Strait Relations would not affect the interests
228
In order to minimize the emotional reaction by the Chinese people, the government
reportedly issued an “internal circular” pledging Beijing’s “determination and ability” to
recover Taiwan within a certain (albeit unstated) time frame. In particular, the circular
urged the public, including students and soldiers, not to take any rash action, including
demonstrations. It said, “We understand the angry reaction of the public to the rise of the
DPP. However, the nation must concentrate on economic construction and remain in
unison with the center.” [emphasis added]97
Despite Beijing’s cautious use of military threats toward Taiwan, China’s missile
tests and military exercises in March 1996 sparked international concerns. In order to
minimize international suspicion, China’s top generals and Foreign Ministry spokesman
repeatedly provided assurances that China had neither aggressive intentions nor invasion
plans. Liu Huaqing, first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, said
reassuringly, “China will neither invade any other country nor join in the arms race.”
General Fu Quanyou, chief of the PLA General Staff, said China needed not only political
and social stability at home, but also a peaceful international environment, especially a
stable surrounding environment. In addition, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
asserted that China had no intention of hurting the economies of the region with its war
games. After the missile crisis, from March 1996 to mid-1997, Chinese civilian and
military leaders traveled to cities in Asia and Europe in order to reassure the world that
China remained committed to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and would not
97
of Taiwan Businesspeople in China,” Gongshang Shibao [Commerce Times], March 20, 2000, p. 4.
Henry Chu and Jim Mann, “Chen Says Preserving Peace Is Top Priority,” Los Angeles Times, March 21,
2000, p. A12. Ze-hong Lin and Dao-cheng Li, “What Happens to Cross-Strait Relations would not affect
the interests of Taiwan Businesspeople in China,” Gongshang Shibao [Commerce Times], March 20,
2000, p. 4. Jing-ping He, “TIEs’ Interests Are Not Impaired So Far,” Zhongguo Shibao [China Times],
March 26, 2000, p. 4.
Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Beijing ‘Has Timetable for Unity,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2000, p.
1.
229
threaten the peace, stability, and growth of Asia.98
In addition, Beijing strongly and repeatedly reassured Taiwan’s investors in China
during the 1995-96 and 1999-2000 incidents that their legitimate interests would be
protected. Furthermore, Chinese leaders repeatedly reassured Taiwanese investors that
there would be no war in the Taiwan Strait. These reassurances reflect China’s national
agenda and will be discussed further in Chapter 10.
VIII. Conclusion
Since 1978, China’s foremost national goal has been to develop its economy through
its reform and opening policy emphasizing domestic stability and a conducive
international environment. Domestic stability is a very important factor not only for the
development of China’s economy but also for attracting foreign investment. In addition, a
peaceful and stable international environment is also necessary to develop the economy,
attract foreign investment, and facilitate international trade. Moreover, China needs to
show its prudence and willingness to cooperate within the international system in order to
attract foreign investors as well as maintain a peaceful and stable international political
and economic environment.
The four case studies in this chapter have significantly confirmed China’s broad
national agendas as described above. In each case, Beijing tried to minimize the impact of
surging nationalism on its overall economic development and domestic stability.
Moreover, Beijing has adopted a low profile in elaborating its sovereignty claims and has
98
Tan Tarn How, “No Invasion Plans, Say China’s Top Generals,” Strait Times (Singapore), March 15,
1996, p. 1. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000,” in David M.
Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA:
230
avoided direct military confrontation over disputed territories, including Taiwan. Even
when facing other countries’ aggressive claims and actions in disputed territories by Japan
and the Philippines from Chinese perspective and the resulting nationalism among
Chinese people, Beijing never went beyond rhetorical and limited military posturing.
Far from fanning nationalism, Beijing tried to minimize public overreaction. Beijing
banned demonstrations and protests in the cases of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and
Taiwan, and only allowed “controlled” demonstrations and protests followed by calls to
focus on economic development, as was the case after the embassy bombing. In the case
of the South China Sea Islands, Beijing’s action was mostly defensive compared with that
of the Philippines and Vietnam. Beijing did not adopt any concrete action against the
Philippines and Vietnam when they destroyed Chinese structures on Mischief Reef and
dismantled Chinese markers in many atolls. In addition, the Philippines arrested hundreds
of Chinese fishermen near the disputed islands claimed by both sides while China
refrained from enforcing its own law banning unauthorized passage through the Spratlys
by foreign military vessels and fishing boats. Beijing consistently emphasized the
importance of maintaining peace and stability in the region through shelving sovereignty
disputes and joint development and without resorting to force or the threat of force.
An American studies senior scholar in Beijing explained China’s position in this way,
“The fundamental goals of Chinese foreign policy are to sustain long-term development,
peace, and stable international environment. China needs not only an international
environment conducive to development, but also requires no distractions from economic
development. Therefore, China does not want to antagonize other countries. For example,
in the case of the Diaoyu Islands, China was very self-restrained. In addition, Beijing
Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 328.
231
would not allow students to protest against the South China Sea or the Sino-Indian border
issues.”99 Another American studies senior scholar in Beijing emphasized, “Economic
development is the core of Chinese foreign policy. All diplomatic lines are conducted
along with peace and development.” 100 An international relations senior scholar in
Beijing also agreed, “The Mainland attaches great importance to economic development
and modernization in considering its foreign policy.”101
Regarding the sharp contrast between Beijing’s rhetoric assertiveness and actual
prudence, a Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing frankly stated, “The most important
priority for China is economics. It is fraud that China puts politics as its first priority.
Beijing needs to consider people’s living standards and welfare. This is a prevailing
consensus among the public and elite. Beijing should have acted stronger against the U.S.,
Japan, and Taiwan, but Beijing had economic interests in mind. Beijing still puts
economy as the first priority, including when considering whether to use force against
Taiwan.”102
China’s broad national agendas provide us an overall picture and value system to
assess China’s Taiwan policy in proceeding chapters. In particular, the two-level game103
framework helps illuminate China’s complicated calculation and decision-making
regarding its foreign policy as well as Taiwan policy as discussed above. Theories on the
initiation of economic sanctions discussed in Chapter 4 also suggest a two-level
framework to analyze China’s economic leverage. Chapters 7 through 10 will further
99
An American studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 30, 2001.
An American studies scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 12, 2001.
101
An international relations senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 16, 2001.
102
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 29, 2001.
103
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” in Peter B.
Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining
and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 431-468.
100
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analyze China’s consideration of both internal and external stakes in the cross-Strait
economic relations in the framework of a two-level game.
233