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Meditation II: The Cogito
The Archimedean Point
In Meditation 2, Descartes says that if he could find just one thing he was certain of,
then perhaps he could use that as a foundation to prove many other things. He
compares himself to Archimedes, reputed to have invented the lever, who said that if
he was given one fixed point, he could move the earth: the fixed point would be the
fulcrum for his lever.
The cogito is the name given to the claim Descartes makes that he can be certain
that he exists just when he is thinking. Cogito is the Latin for “I think”. Descartes
makes this claim in two passages in two slightly different ways:
But immediately I noticed that while I was trying thus to think everything
false, it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And
observing that this truth “I am thinking therefore I exist” was so firm
and so sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics
were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it as the first
principle of the philosophy I was seeking”
But I have convinced myself there is absolutely nothing in the world, no
sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it follow that too do not exist?
No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there
is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and
constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist if he is
deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never
bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I think I am
something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally
conclude that the proposition “I am, I exist” is necessarily true
whenever it is put forward be me or conceived in my mind.
The certainty of one’s knowledge of one’s existence depends not upon an isolated
act of thought, but upon the fact that at this very moment one is thinking. In
translating ‘je pense / cogito’, it might be clearer to employ the present continuous, ‘I
am thinking’ rather than the simple present tense, ‘I think’. Descartes is aware of the
point, and makes it clear later in Meditation II that as long one is engaged in thinking,
then one’s existence is certain. The point is reinforced by comments in Principles.
I am, I exist – that is certain, but for how long? For as long as I am thinking. 1
It is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not at the very same time when
it is thinking exist.2
Is The Cogito An Argument?
The cogito in the first passage has the form is “I think, therefore I am” and the second
“I think, I am”. We’ll call these the inferential and the non-inferential versions.
It was soon pointed out that if Descartes is trying to prove formally that he exists from
the premise that he is thinking, the argument is invalid. The argument Descartes
gives is:
1
2
Meditation II.
Principles.
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(1)
(C)
I think
I exist
It would have to be
(1)
(2)
(C)
I think
Anything that thinks exists
I exist
Descartes agrees that he has not established Premise 2. In the Second Replies,
however, he says that he was not wanting to present an argument:
When we observe that we are thinking beings, this is a sort of primary notion, which is
not the conclusion of any syllogism; and, moreover When someone says “I am
thinking therefore I am or I exist”, he does not deduce existence from thought by
means of a syllogism but recognises it as something self-evident by a simple intuition
of the mind.
Does the Cogito Rest On An Argument?
While we may accept Descartes’ response the Cogito may nonetheless be seen as
depending on an underlying claim of greater generality than the major premise
above, and as having the form of an argument. The underlying claim is that:
(1)
If anything has an attribute (property), then the subject of that attribute
exists.
The next step is the assertion:
(2)
I have the attribute of thought
(3)
I exist
Hence
Again, though, it is doubtful that the certainty Descartes has established via the
Cogito arises from this line of reasoning. Descartes is committed to the maxim that
‘nothingness has no attributes’, and so would agree that there can be no properties
freely ‘floating’ about, unattached as it were or not instantiated through some
substance. Properties always belong to a subject according to Descartes. However,
we can assign properties to objects without thereby committing ourselves to their
actual existence. He gives the example of a triangle in the Meditations. Further
examples would include unicorns and Santa Claus. We attribute the properties to a
subject (e.g. having a body like a horse, possessing a magical horn, being able to fly,
etc.) without supposing the subject actually exists. The maxim that nothingness has
no attributes does not entail that all property attribution presupposes an actually
existing subject. There is reason then to suppose that Descartes is not attempting to
provide a formal argument from the premise that I am thinking to the conclusion that
the presence or act of thinking entails I exist.
The Self-Verifying Nature Of The Cogito
Following Hintikka’s (a contemporary philosopher) discussion of the Cogito we could
regard the statement, ‘I do not exist’ or ‘ I doubt that I exist’ as existentially
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inconsistent. This is not to say that the statements are necessarily false. For it is of
course true that my existence is not necessary – I am a contingent object, I might not
have existed. Rather, a statement such as ‘I do not exist’ cannot be made except in
circumstances that immediately defeat them. To deny or doubt one’s existence is
self-defeating. As Descartes put matters in a dialogue composed around the same
time as the Meditations:
If it is true that I am doubting (I cannot doubt that) it is equally true that I am thinking,
for what is doubting if not thinking in a certain kind of way?
I exist, and I know this fact because I am doubting. That is, because I am thinking.3
The Cogito then has a validity deriving from the particular indubitability of first
personal thought. As long as I am thinking, then my own existence is entailed
thereby.
The question now arises whether any first personal thought will do. We have focused
on having a certain belief (or doubt) – in the form of a proposition such as ‘I think’ or ‘I
am’. Could I establish with the same certainty that I exist if I begin from the thought
that ‘I am willing’ or ‘I am intending’ or ‘I am feeling’. The nature of sensations have
attracted much attention in modern philosophy and our experience of, say, being in
pain appears to be immune to error and doubt. Should we extend the Cogito to allow
claims such as ‘I am in pain, I exist’? This is a matter of some debate.4 One might be
worried that allowing any kind of mental act or thought or idea to play a role in
establishing certainty about one’s existence is that they could be open to doubt.
Willings or feelings do not appear to have the same kind of self-verifying aspect of
purely cogitative or intellectual acts. Recall:
I doubt that I am thinking entails I am thinking
But
I doubt that I am willing/I doubt that I am in pain do not entail that I am willing or in
pain.
One might then hold that willings and feelings are not indubitable in the right way so
that we can move from ‘I am in pain’ to ‘I exist’. Yet, this is perhaps not quite the right
approach to adopt. We do seem to have an immediate awareness of our conscious
beliefs, willings and sensations, even if we there may be some (many) among them
which we can doubt. Here, though, the doubt is not as to whether we are
experiencing that thought, but over its content. Does the dog in front of me really
have horns? The point (according to Descartes) is that whatever (conscious) mental
act we are engaging in, we are aware of it. Thought is defined as that which is within
us in such a way that we are aware of it. Whether we are having a belief or a
sensation, the awareness of that mental act is reflective. Now, to doubt that one is
reflecting or reflectively aware is going to be defeated in just the right way by the
performance of the act so that awareness of any mental state provides the basis for
the certainty that one exists.
3
4
The Search for Truth.
See pp. 38-41 of Cottingham, Descartes.
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What Is The "I"?
Lichtenberg (1742-1799), Russell (1872-1970) and Sartre (1905-1980) all objected
that Descartes is not entitled to say that he exists. The most that he can conclude is
the impersonal there is thinking. Descartes has not managed to establish anything
about himself via the cogito:
We should say it thinks, just as we say it lightens. To say cogito is already to say too
much as soon as we translate it I think. To assume, to postulate the I is a practical
requirement.’ [Lichtenberg, Aphorisms, tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin, 1990, p. 168.]
We should distinguish what we might call a thin and a thick sense of the self. When
we ordinarily use “I” of ourselves, it seems we are talking about ourselves: complex
entities that not simply think but have beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, memories,
personalities and so on. Importantly, these selves are things that exist over time. This
is the thick sense of self.
Descartes doesn't manage to establish the existence of a thick self. Suppose
Descartes thinks "I exist!" at 12.00 p.m. and then thinks "I exist again!" again at 12.01
p.m. He is not entitled to say that he – the same self – exists now as did a minute
ago. For this would be to rely on memory and his memories can't be trusted. So, all
he can say is "thinking is happening again!"
Descartes does establish – or rather, point out – that there must exist a thin sense of
self. Thoughts are essentially subjective. They are something's thoughts. The same
is true of pains and sensations. A mental life has an intrinsic "point of view" or
"perspective". We are aware of the subjectivity or "thin self" of thought when we
reflect on thinking.
In thinking about thick and thin selves, consider the following. You have had an
accident. You wake up in hospital. All your memories are gone. All your senses are
disconnected. All your motor functions are disabled. You don’t know anything about
yourself. You can’t interact with the world and the world can’t interact with you. Yet
you could still be aware of something going on. You’d still be able to think “I’m alive!”
or “Who am I?” So long as you can think, you can be aware that there’s something
there – you – doing the thinking even if this thing can’t be called a self in the
everyday sense.
The thin self is the self of pure subjectivity. Kant (1724-1804) used the certainty of
the existence of the thin self as the starting point of his argument to prove the
existence of the external world and the possibility of metaphysics, in the face of
Hume’s empiricist criticisms.
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