Psy 401 Junior Seminar
Fall, 2006
First writing assignment: essay on basic emotions
Due in class Sept 7: copies of a one paragraph summary of the article you’ve read
(you’ll sign up for one of these papers on Aug 31)
The three articles are:
Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). Appraisal processes in emotion, In Davidson,
R.J., Scherer, K. & Goldsmith, H. (2002). Handbook of Affective Sciences,
Oxford University Press, pp. 572-595. (LR).
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and
the experience of emotion, Personality & Social Psychology Review, 10(1),
20-46.
Panksepp, J. (2000). Emotions as natural kinds in the brain. In Lewis, M. &
Haviland-Jones, J.M. (Eds). Handbook of Emotions, 2nd ed., NY: Guilford
Press, pp. 137-156. (LR)
Each of these articles requires some background that you may not have. However, the
positions taken in these three articles are dramatically different from one another, so a
good debate should ensue from an understanding of the main point(s) each is trying to
make. Brief summaries of the positions taken in each paper are provided below, and
more detailed reading guides will be provided Aug 31.
Due in class September 12: an essay on the topic of basic emotions
Length: 4-6 pages, double-spaced
The purpose of this essay is to encourage you to integrate your thinking about the
opening readings and the class debate/discussion concerning what an emotion “is.”
Although we will continue to grapple with definitional issues throughout the semester, I
think it will help to pull together some thoughts early on.
Your essay should focus on the question of whether there is a set of “basic” emotions.
To address this question, you’ll first need to adopt a particular approach to identifying an
emotion as “basic” (cf. Averill, 1994; my thoughts distributed in class on Aug 31). You
should do this whether you’re going to argue that there IS a set of basic emotions or
that there is NOT such a set. You’ll also need to be clear about the set of phenomena
you’re considering to be “emotions.”
Don't hesitate explicitly to adopt the perspective of one or another author (if one of them
has got it right, or wrong, in your judgment), but if you do so, don't stop with a summary
of that author’s perspective -- be sure to indicate why you believe this perspective to be
superior to or undermined by those forwarded by specified others. It may be that a
combination of perspectives across authors best characterizes your view of things -- if
so, be sure to indicate how the different perspectives complement each other and ways
they may be incompatible.
I expect this essay to incorporate your reactions to the paper you read for Sept 7.
However, your main focus could be on another reading from that set, or on Russell
(2003) or on Shaver et al. (1987). I intend this paper to reflect the work you've done
thinking about and integrating the assigned readings, so cite as many of the readings as
you can, within the limits of a coherent essay. If you cite a work you’ve not read
yourself, follow the instructions for indirect citation provided in the SOURCES AND
CITATIONS hand-out.
There is no “right” approach to this topic, so I’ll be looking at the logic and coherence of
your arguments and at your understanding of the positions forwarded by the authors
you cite. I strongly advise you to make a small number of arguments clearly than to
summon every argument you can think of.
(Very) brief summaries of the positions taken in each paper:
Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). Appraisal processes in emotion
This paper lays out so-called “cognitive appraisal” theory, which holds that
evaluation of the current situation is the defining aspect of an emotion
episode. Further, it claims that, due to strong similarities in the kinds of
situational challenges encountered by humans and in the structure of our
motivational/ psychological systems, there are a limited number of
essentially “universal” appraisal dimensions.
Feldman Barrett, L. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the
experience of emotion
This paper presents a point of view similar to that espoused by Russell,
summarizing evidence against basic emotions theory and in support of core
affects. However, it rejects prototype theory, which it replaces with the
currently popular notion of “embodied cognition.” In essence the act of
categorizing ongoing experiences is itself the experience of emotion.
Panksepp, J. (2000). Emotions as natural kinds in the brain
As the title of this paper suggests, Panksepp in an advocate of basic
emotions theory based on his assessment that there are distinguishable
brain bases for a set of “biologically given” emotion systems. Although
there are more widely accepted spokesmen (gender attribution intended)
for basic emotions theory, I thought it important to introduce the
physiological arguments in their strongest form at this time.
Panksepp, J. (1994) Emotions as natural kinds within the mammalian brain.
This will be a somewhat difficult read for those of you with no background in
physiological approaches. However, I think the primary arguments being made are
quite clear. Although the physiological details are in principle important (indeed, some
argue that Panksepp’s claims are empty because the physiological support is weak), his
general line of reasoning has gained a strong foothold in recent years. This is partly
because some of his physiological predictions have begun to gain empirical support
(e.g., re: love/lust/nurturance, which we’ll consider later in the semester), partly because
functional approaches to emotions have led theorists to try to define the
physiological/developmental roots of all emotions, and partly because of a reaction to
the simplistic thinking underlying many neuroimaging approaches to the study of
emotions (i.e., if we must neurologize, let’s at least try to do so responsibly).
Therefore, read the section on the basic (category 2) emotional systems of the brain
only for gist. These summaries are mere shadows of those presented in Affective
Neuroscience, and I think they lose a lot in the translation. But it’s helpful to get a sense
of the basic emotion categories Panksepp forwards.
Focus instead on:
(1) Panksepp’s assertion that it makes no sense to talk about basic emotions without
an understanding of the underlying physiology. Psychologists are divided into
essentially two camps based on their dis/agreement with this type of assertion,
so it’s important to think through your views on it.
(2) What Panksepp thinks that an understanding of the physiological systems does
and does not do for the study of human emotions. (N.B. Panksepp is often
caricatured as saying that we only need to identify the basic neural systems – is
this what he seems to be saying here?)
(3) How Panksepp’s “taxonomy” of emotions and the basic emotions he identifies as
falling within category 2 correspond to those identified by others.
(4) How one would go about testing Panksepp’s system of classification. Some
hints are provided below.
Some implications of the specifics of Panksepp’s work:
(1) Panksepp focuses on subcortical systems to a much greater extent than other
physiologically-oriented theorists. This makes his assignations difficult to study
in humans (why?), so Panksepp relies largely on data from animal studies. To
what extent does this limit the usefulness of his assertions?
(2) Panksepp differentiates his basic emotion systems neurochemically, as there is
considerable overlap in the neuroanatomically defined areas he specifies as
important to each emotion category. This, too, makes it difficult to study his
theories in humans (why?).
This paper lays out so-called “cognitive appraisal” theory. This dimensional
theory holds that evaluation of the current situation is the defining aspect of
an emotion episode. It claims that, due to strong similarities in the kinds of
situational challenges encountered by humans and in the structure of our
motivational/ psychological systems, there are a limited number of
essentially “universal” appraisal dimensions. These account for the
similarities in emotions across individuals and cultures and, due to the
influence of socially-based learning processes and of individual differences
in temperament, the differences as well. It is a cross between dimensional
theories of emotion and categorical theories, as the appraisal dimensions
themselves can be thought of as “basic,” and some theorists (Scherer and,
notably, Ira Roseman) have developed structural theories of emotions
based on patterns of appraisals. It is also important to note that Scherer
and (especially) Ellsworth emphasize that emotion episodes are temporally
dynamic.
This paper presents a point of view similar to that espoused by Russell. It
goes into more detail regarding why we should abandon basic emotions
theory and provides a more broad-based summary of evidence for core
affects. It differs from Russell’s approach in its rejection of prototype theory,
which it replaces with the currently popular notion of “embodied cognition.”
In essence the act of categorizing ongoing experiences is itself the
experience of emotion. There is no previously existing mental
representation – the componential stew is more like a physiological
porridge. For historical reasons, Feldman Barrett is trying hard (though
implicitly) to distinguish her theory from Russell’s and, as you can probably
tell, I think the distinctions are less remarkable than she thinks they are.
That said, Feldman Barrett is much more plugged into the current work on
patterns of activity in the central nervous system and (although it’s not
particularly evident in this paper) more fluent with cognitive appraisal
theories.