Virginia Review of Asian Studies
THE ROLE OF EMPEROR HIROHITO IN THE PACIFIC WAR 19411945: THE VIEWS OF THE REVISIONISTS
KAZUO YAGAMI
SAVANNAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Abstract
More than a half century after the end of the Pacific War, the scholarly debate on
the role of Emperor Hirohito in the war shows no sign of ending. The driving force for this
debate stems from the revisionist scholars who contend that the image of Hirohito as a
pacifist and mere figurehead during the war had been distortion and falsification of the true
personality and role of Hirohito by those who engaged in the reconstruction of Japan. As
discussed in this article, such contention by the revisionists is hardly supported by any of
the primary sources available today. It is an irony that distortion and falsification took
place, not by those responsible for the reconstruction of Japan but by the revisionists.
_____________________________
Today, more than six and half decades since the end of the Pacific War, the
historians continue to debate the question of the true role of Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989)
in Japan’s war efforts. In the aftermath of the war, despite the growing demand from the
Western public to see Hirohito be indicted as a war criminal, Hirohito managed to keep
himself free from taking any responsibility for Japan’s “war crime.” Although he was
stripped of his divinity and constitutionality as Emperor and the supreme commander and
became a mere symbolical figure, he remained until his death in 1989 well respected, and
handled well his new image of being an “icon” of postwar Japan, where peace and
tranquility, not aggression and uproar, prevailed.
This pacifist image of Hirohito has been well established throughout the postwar era
of Japan. There have been, however, the ceaseless efforts from people who firmly believe
that such image of Hirohito as a pacifist is nothing but the deliberate falsification and
distortion of the true personality of Hirohito and his role in the Pacific War by those who
engaged in the reconstruction of Japan.1 Among those who take this revisionist view
against Hirohito, the most vociferous is Herbert P. Bix. He has won the Pulitzer Prize over
his 2000 book Hirohito and Making of Modern Japan. In the book, Bix portrays Hirohito
as someone who was completely opposite from his prewar image of a powerless
figurehead. He says, “Hirohito and his key advisers participated directly and decisively as
independent forces in policy making. Acting energetically behind the scenes, Hirohito
influenced the conduct of his first three prime ministers, hastened the collapse of political
party cabinets, and sanctioned opposition to strengthening the peace machinery of the
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League of Nations. When resistance to his interventions provoked open defiance from the
army, he and his advisers drew back and connived at military aggression.”2
As discerned from the above quotation, according to Bix, contrary to his generally
accepted image of being docile, tacit, and lonely, Hirohito was energetic, shrewd,
calculative, and manipulative; he was an active participant, taking a leadership role in
decision-making and war planning.3 So Hirohito, Bix argues, was the main architect of
Japan’s war of aggression and territorial acquisitions and, instead of a “puppet” of
militarism of Japan, he became actively involved in promoting it.4
This view of Bix on Hirohito’s personality and role in the Pacific War, shared by
other revisionists such as Edward Behr, continues to provoke scholarly debates. While
contentious, Bix and other revisionists are correct in one thing in their arguments. That is,
contrary to the generally accepted image of Hirohito as a mere figurehead, Hirohito was by
no means just a by-stander regarding the unfolding events and mounting problems Japan
faced internally and externally in the 1930s and early 40s. He showed strong concerns and
actively engaged in expressing his opinion and even outrage from time to time over the
political and military decisions, giving an impression that Hirohito was far from the
generally accepted image of mere figurehead and pacifist.
There is truth regarding such active involvement of Hirohito in expressing his
concerns and views over the national affairs. It does not, however, constitute what the
revisionists claim – the Emperor as an “architect” of Japanese aggressions.5
Bix argues that the kodo (the imperial way) became the catalyst for Japan’s
execution of “holy war” against things Western.6 Here the connotation of the imperial way
is the Emperor as a divine figure. It was used as a means for justification and rationalization
of the acts of Japan in the name of helping and leading the rest of the world to the
benevolence of divine Emperor of Japan. Bix calls it Japanese version of “Manifest
Destiny.”7 Utilizing this setting of the imperial way, Bix argues, the Emperor actively
engaged in decision-making and manipulation behind scenes. Although it sounds
convincing, this argument of Bix has almost no substance.
In February 26, 1936, by mobilizing more than 14,000 men of the infantry
regiments of the First Division and the Imperial Guards Division, the young military
officers known as the Kodo-ha (the imperial way-faction) carried out the massive uprising.
They attacked and occupied the key government buildings and killed a number of senior
statesmen. Their aim was “purification” of Japan from Western influence to restore “old”
Japan under Yamato (Japanese) spirit. They expected the Emperor to be on their side. After
all, they were carrying out the uprising in his name. It turned out that they were wrong in
their assumption. The Emperor had no intention to be part of it. Instead, despite the plea
from the top military officers for lenience to the rebels, he expressed his desire to see those
young military officers punished promptly and harshly. Not having the Emperor‘s support,
this quest of the Kodo-ha, later known to be the Showa Restoration, was doomed.
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The Emperor’s cold and apathetic response to the Kodo-ha contradicts Bix’s
assertion that the Emperor utilizing the imperial way as prerogatives was a driving force of
Japanese aggressions. One may argue that the Emperor did not quite agree to the scheme of
the Showa Restoration and therefore he had no intention to associate himself with it; it did
not mean the Emperor’s indifference to the imperial way. It does not quite explain,
however, his desire to see such harsh punishment against the Kodo-ha if, as Bix and other
revisionists claim, the Emperor truly believed in an idea of imperial way as the catalyst of
his prerogative and prestige, creating common theme between the Emperor’s scheme of
using imperial way as justification of his holy war to establish his quest, “greater Asian
empire” in his name and that of the Kodo-ha, the purification of Japanese society from the
Western influence to revive Yamato spirit by utilizing the Emperor’s divinity and prestige.
So, it is a tough argument that the Emperor acted upon his conviction of his divinity
as prerogative to achieve his quest. It is true that his prerogatives were used as a driving
force to achieve political and military objectives, as shown repeatedly in the history of
Japan, but not for the Emperor but for his “surrounding figures.” The above-mentioned
Showa Restoration is a typical paradigm of such use of legacy and divinity of Emperor as
prerogative to achieve political goals. The young military officers, lamenting the decadence
of Japanese society by things Western as they saw, tried to restore “Yamato” spirit by
utilizing Emperor’s divinity as prerogatives. That was “their” vision, not Hirohito’s.
Yet Bix and other revisionists argue otherwise. Bix contends, “Though the time
span of his great Asian empire was brief, its potential was enormous. He [the Emperor] had
presided over its expansion and had led his nation in a war that cost nearly 20 million Asian
lives, more than 3.1 million Japanese lives, and more than sixty thousand Western Allied
lives.”8 This was quite a charge against Hirohito, suggesting that he was primarily
responsible for Japan’s war and aggression; it was this quest of his, an “establishment of
the greater Asian empire in his name by deliberately and manipulatively utilizing his
prerogatives as divine Emperor,” that brought Japan into the path of war of aggression.
As Bix points out, today there are a great number of sources, which provide
excellent accounts of Hirohito’s personality and role in the war, such as The Memoir of
Prince Konoe, The Sugiyama Memorandum, The Diary of Harada Kumao: Prince Saionji
and Political Situation, The Diary of Kido Koichi, or The Diary of Ogura Kuraji. Contrary
to Bix’s and other revisionists’ assertion, close examinations of these primary sources
refute the revisionists’ view of Hirohito.
For example, Bix points out that Hirohito favored Japan’s territorial expansion in
China and provided direct leadership to promote it.9 There is absolutely no collaborating
source that even slightly supports this assertion. Numerous sources suggest otherwise. In
the entry of Ogura Kuraji’s diary dated January 9, 1941 the following Emperor’s remark
was quoted: “Japan has underestimated China. It is wise to end the war as soon as possible
and make effort for next ten years to restore national strength.” 10 A similar remark is also
found in the diary of Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji and Political Situation. According to
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the entry of the diary dated on July 4, 1938, when the Emperor asked the Minister of Army
and the chief of the Army General Staff about their view over his thought of ending the war
against China as promptly as possible, both the Minister of Army and the chief of the Army
General Staff responded by saying, “We will continue to fight until we achieve the
downfall of Chiang Kai-shek,” the Emperor was vividly dismayed by their response. 11 This
was only a year after the outbreak of the war against China in August 1937. These are clear
indications that the Emperor was consistently against Japan’s territorial expansion in China
and apprehensive about it and critical toward the military officers who repeatedly expressed
their optimistic views to him over Japan’s involvement in China.
In the late 1930s, the quagmire of Japan’s involvement in China and increasingly
deteriorating relation with the Western powers brought Japan closer to war against the
United States and her allies. As a further supporting case for his assertion of Hirohito as a
driving force for Japanese aggression, Bix argues that in this development no one played
more pivotal role than Hirohito. According to Bix, it was Hirohito who manipulatively led
decision-making over the crucial issues with regard to dealing with the United States and
the Britain. Here Bix agues that, caught up in his passion of territorial expansion of Japan,
Hirohito dared to go to war against the United States and Britain, if that was inevitable to
achieve his “quest.”12
Once again this argument of Bix does not carry much substance. Contrary to Bix’s
assertion, Hirohito was against an idea of bringing Japan into war against the United States
and apprehensive about the unfolding events, which were edging Japan into that direction.
Such apprehension of Hirohito is shown in his actions and thoughts, particularly in his
conversations with the contemporary leading statesmen or military figures of Japan.
On September 16, 1940, when Hirohito met Prime Minister Konoe, he made the
following remark with regard to the on-going ratification process of the Tripartite Pact:
“After giving this matter deep consideration, I think the ratification of the Tripartite Pact
today is unavoidable if there is nothing else to be done to come to peace terms with the
United States. I wonder, however, how well the navy would do if Japan faces confrontation
with the United States. I often hear that, according to maneuvers outlined on the map at the
Naval Academy, Japan is always defeated by the United States.”13 This remark of Hirohito
manifests that he desired peace with the United States and he was opposed to the
ratification of Tripartite Pact.14 It also shows Hirohito’s apprehension about the outcome if
the war indeed had to come.
A year later, on September 6, 1941, when Hirohito summoned the chief of the
Army General Staff Sugiyama Hajime and the chief of the Naval General Staff Nagano
Osami to see where the army and the navy stood regarding the imperial national policies
over the increasingly deteriorating situation Japan faced in her relation with the United
States, Hirohito asked Sugiyama, “If the war breaks out between the United States and
Japan, how long does the army need to end the war?” Sugiyama responded, “Regarding the
fight in the southern Pacific, we perhaps need three months.” Hirohito replied, “You were
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the Army Minister when the China Incident took place. I remember you saying to me at
that time, ‘The incident will be solved within a month.’ It has been four years since then. It
has not been solved yet.” When Sugiyama tried to defend himself by telling Hirohito about
the vastness of the Chinese interior that made the military operation more difficult than
anticipated, Hirohito responded by saying, “You say that the Chinese interior is vast. The
Pacific is even vaster. So how can you say that you can end the war in three months?”
Sugiyama absolutely had no word to respond.15 This conversation also indicates Hirohito’s
reluctance and apprehension about going to war against the United States.
In October 1941, after having failed in his last endeavor to restore peace with the
United States by holding the summit meeting with Roosevelt, Konoe stepped down from
his premiership. Home Minister Kido Koichi recommended General Tojo to Hirohito as a
successor to Konoe. Hirohito sanctioned the recommendation. Tojo was formally appointed
as Prime Minister. Seeing that Tojo was a militant and strong advocate for opening hostility
against the United States, the West saw this appointment of Tojo as Prime Minister by
Hirohito as Japan’s ultimate decision to go to war and, to Bix, it is “manifestation” of true
color of Hirohito. Nothing, however, is farther from the truth. After the appointment
Hirohito said to Kido, “You do not get a baby tiger unless you are brave enough to get into
a tiger cave.” What Hirohito meant by saying this is that, knowing that Tojo was absolutely
loyal to him as Emperor, he thought he was able to restrain Tojo from his advocacy of
opening a confrontation with the United States by giving Tojo duty as Prime Minister.16
Contrary to Bix’s assertion, it was a counter measure to “control” Tojo, indicating that,
even at this late stage of Japan-the U.S. dispute shortly before the Japan’s Pearl Harbor
assault, Hirohito hoped to avoid confrontation with the United States.
Thus, Hirohito’s opposition to Japan’s territorial expansion and apprehension about
going to war against the United States were irrefutable, rendering the revisionist view of
Hirohito desiring to go to war against the United States if that was what take to achieve of
his quest of an establishment of greater Asian empire, nothing but erroneous.
Then, what did bring Bix and the other revisionists to such erroneous assertions? A
key to answer this question is found in the failure of the revisionists in their assessing
correctly Hirohito’s thought on Japan’s experiences throughout the turbulent period from
the late 19th Century to the early 20th Century until the end of WWII.
On September 27, 1945 when Hirohito met General MacArthur, now American
“Shogun,” as Edward Behr, an author of Hirohito behind the Myth, calls him, and was
asked about where Japan stood about the war responsibility, he said to MacArthur, “It was
not clear to me that our course was unjustified. Even now I am not sure how historians will
allocate the responsibility for the war.”17 In the same meeting Hirohito was asked why he
could not prevent the war from breaking out if he had capacity to end the war in August
1945. Hirohito told MacArthur that such idea of intervention to prevent the war never
occurred to him.
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These remarks of Hirohito reveal a great deal about how he thought about Japan’s
aggression and ultimate decision to get into the war against the United States. What is
crystal clear from his remarks is that he did not share the revisionists’ view that the war
broke out primarily due to Japan’s naked and lawless acts of aggression to establish
hegemonic power of Japan over Asia.
Then, how did Hirohito see Japan’s aggression and the ultimate breakout of the
Pacific War against the United States? One clue to this question is found in the article,
“Reject Anglo-American Centered Peace,” written by one of major political figures during
this turbulent period of modern Japan, Konoe Fumimaro. In it Konoe argued that by the
early 20th Century, the United States and the British as “Haves” nations had established
their dominance over world politics and economy, giving little room for nations like Japan
as a “Have-not” nation to expand; and the advocacy of establishment of lasting peace by
the United States and the British was nothing but a gimmick to maintain this status-quo of
their dominance. Konoe believed that it was this setting that created the stage of Japan’s
aggression, meaning Konoe saw Japan’s aggression as an outcome of this “Haves” and
“Haves-not” structure. When the Manchurian Incident took place in 1931, therefore, while
it is not clear that how he viewed about the way the incident was carried out, Konoe was
not against it18 He accepted as a needed step for Japan’s challenge to end the status quo. To
him it was “necessary” aggression. Konoe thought that the takeover of Manchuria by Japan
would save Japan from her economic crisis and population problem and at the same time
would contribute to China economic development, thus establishing the solidified
relationship between China and Japan. After the incident and throughout the 1930s Konoe
had become a strong advocate of the triple alliance of Japan, Manchukuo, and China and
worked tenaciously to earn Chiang Kai-shek’s agreement to his master plan for the
establishment of “Asia for Asia” by eradicating Western imperialism from Asian soil.19
Accordingly, while he saw the Manchurian Incident as “necessary” aggression,
Konoe was against any further provocative act toward China that might jeopardize his
quest. The China Incident in July 1937, therefore, became upsetting to Konoe now as Prime
Minister.
If not identical, Hirohito agreed to Konoe’s above points of view. Although Konoe
was eight years older than Hirohito, both grew up during Japan’s epoch making period of
the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, sharing the similar cultural and political
background, and experienced as young adults one of the most turbulent periods of modern
Japan and had the same concerns and apprehension about Japan’s fate. When Konoe
formed his cabinet in July 1937 for the first time, Hirohito was pleased about it, believing
that Konoe would strictly follow the constitutionality of Japanese politics.20 This indicates
that, although they did not have any direct interaction between them until Konoe was
selected as Prime Minister, Hirohito formed a favorable view of Konoe and his thoughts.
As mentioned above, when Hirohito was asked about war responsibility by
MacArthur, he told MacArthur that he was not sure about an idea that Japan alone should
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be responsible for the war. This response of Hirohito to MacArthur suggests that Hirohito
shared Konoe view that the war did not break out just because of Japan’s aggressions but
primarily because of Japan’s effort to end the status quo of Anglo-Saxon dominance.
Accordingly, when the Manchurian Incident took place, like Konoe, Hirohito did not
express his opposition to it. He was silent, signifying that Hirohito was basically in
accordance to Konoe’s view of the Manchurian Incident, “necessary aggression.”
Regarding the China Incident, as stated earlier, Hirohito actively expressed his concern and
apprehension about it, sharing Konoe’s trepidation that Japan’s territorial expansion into
China after the Incident might derail a chance to end the status quo.
With regard to the war against the United States, the various remarks and actions of
Hirohito suggest that Hirohito shared Konoe’s view—avoiding the war against the United
States. While hoping that it might be possible for Japan to achieve the end of the status quo
and to establish Asia for Asia without getting into the war against the United States, it was
clear to Konoe that the war against the United States was not winnable and could bring
national ruin. From the 1937 China Incident until his resignation as Prime Minister in
October 1941, almost all the acts of Konoe were carried out with his determination to avoid
the war against the United States. For example, when the military and general public was
showing strong desire to make an alliance with Germany by signing the Tripartite Pact in
1939, Konoe was not in favor of the idea of the Tripartite Pact, being apprehensive about its
negative impact on Japan’s relation with the United States.
Later Konoe agreed to the pact when he saw the possibility to bring the Soviet
Union into it. Konoe calculated that by having the Soviet Union on the side of the pact, it
would be possible to deter the United States from coming into the war in Europe and Asia,
creating a chance for Japan to end the status quo of Anglo-Saxon dominance by
establishing Asia for Asia without facing the United States as an enemy. Although such
calculation of Konoe was shattered by German invasion of the Soviet Union, changing the
Soviet Union overnight from a possible “friend” of Japan to an “adversary,” it is undeniable
that Konoe signed the pact for the same reason why he was reluctant to accept, that is,
primarily to avoid the confrontation with the United States.
Now the situation was grim for Japan in facing the United States. Having had the
Soviet Union on her side, the United States became assertive in its dealing with Japan.
Putting an embargo against Japan on raw materials, including Japan’s vital commodity, oil,
the United States demanded the end of Japan’s aggressions with the complete withdrawal
of her troops from China and Indo-China and relinquishment of all the territorial
acquisitions of Japan as the conditions for ending the embargo. While the military was in
defiance toward the United States’ demand and willing to go to war if that was a choice
Japan had to take to defend Japan’s interests, Konoe was determined to avoid it. He worked
tenaciously to achieve that end. From April 1941 to October 1941, Konoe as his “last”
endeavor to avoid the war against the United States engaged in diplomatic negotiations
with the United States, hoping to find a way of solution. Konoe even proposed a summit
meeting between himself and Roosevelt. As history tells us, despite Konoe's tenacity and
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determination, nothing worked in Konoe’s favor. In October Konoe stepped down as Prime
Minister. Tojo replaced him. At this point, clear to almost anyone, the outbreak of the war
against the United States was eminent. Thus the quest of Konoe to save Japan from the fatal
confrontation with the United States had failed.
Hirohito stood for Konoe throughout this endeavor of Konoe. The numerous
remarks and actions of Hirohito indicate his high expectation of Konoe as Prime Minister
and also sympathy toward Konoe for his facing an “impossible” task. In late 1937, when
Konoe told Hirohito about the autonomous nature of Japanese army, which made it difficult
for Konoe as a head of the civilian government to carry out foreign, financial, and other
government affairs in coordinating fashion with military, Hirohito responded saying that he
would personally and directly inform Konoe of anything about supreme command.21
Similarly when Konoe, frustrated by his dealing with Chiang Kai-shek to settle the
quagmire of Sino-Japanese War and the army persistence to use military force to make
Chiang Kai-shek to give in that was in return feeding strong sense of anti-Japan among the
Western powers, tried to put pressure on the military by forcing the Army Minister
Sugiyama Hajime to resign, Hirohito personally placed his pressure on Sugiyama to assist
Konoe.22 In July 1941 in the midst of peace negotiations with the United States Konoe was
increasingly concerned with Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s hawkish remarks in dealing with
the United States.
Having noticed those remarks of Matsuoka causing negative impact on the
negotiations and generating the counter remarks from the United States officials against
Matsuoka, Konoe tried to get rid of Matsuoka from his cabinet by having his whole cabinet
resign. Equally apprehensive and concerned with Matsuoka’s remarks and their negative
impact on the peace talk, Hirohito supported Konoe’s decision to remove Matsuoka and
even made a suggestion to Konoe to make Matsuoka alone resign.23 Then, on August 6,
1941 when Konoe met Hirohito to tell his decision to meet Franklin D. Roosevelt in order
to rescue the failing negotiations, Hirohito understanding significance of Konoe’s decision
to meet Roosevelt as the last hope to avoid the war against the United States and wanting to
encourage him summoned Konoe on the following day and said to him, “There is
information that the United States would totally ban Japan’s import of oil from the United
States. So your meeting with the President needs to be prompt.”24
Thus, Konoe and Hirohito were on the same page with regard to the idea of going to
war against the United States. Both shared absurdity and fatality of Japan as nation if the
war broke out. Hence, Hirohito, contrary to Bix‘s and other revisionists’ assertion, never
made himself inclined to support the idea of going to war against the United States under
any circumstance and made tenacious effort along with Konoe to save Japan from getting
into that direction. Then there is an important question that both MacArthur and Bix asked,
why did not Hirohito, if he was so opposed to going to war against the United States and
able to end the war in August 1945, stop Japan from going to war against the United States
in 1941?
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Two points can be raised here to answer the above question. One is that, as
mentioned above, when Hirohito was asked by MacArthur about the war responsibility of
Japan and why he did not prevent the war from coming, Hirohito responded by saying that
he was not sure where the war responsibility should be placed and the idea of intervention
to stop the war never occurred to him. What one can discern from these responses of
Hirohito is that, while he was against the war against the United States because of no
prospect of Japan’s victory and great possibility of rendering Japan totally ruined, like
Konoe, Hirohito was convinced that the war against the United States was a “just” war to
end the status quo of the Anglo-Saxon domination and it was forced upon Japan under the
given situation.
The other is that Hirohito as Emperor simply followed the traditional custom of
Emperor’s role as a figurehead. Although he was a supreme commander in chief under the
monarchial system of Japan, he was always faithful to this long established tradition and so
never desire to defy it, as demonstrated his actions and thoughts throughout this ordeal of
Japan in the 1930s and early 40s. Shortly before Japan’s assault on Pearl Harbor, Konoe,
after the exhaustion of all the maneuvers to prevent Japan from going to war against the
United States and believing that now the only person who could achieve that was the
Emperor, lamented that Hirohito did not make any decisive effort to turn the situation
around to avoid the war by using his constitutionally given prerogative. At the same time,
however, as he stated in his postwar memoir, Konoe understood how difficult it was for
Hirohito to take such action that was against long established custom, that is, the passivity
of the role of the Emperor as a figurehead.25 So, contrary to Bix’s assertion, he did not even
once directly intervene in the decision-making process of Japan. The only exception to this
was of course his decision to end the war in August 1945 by using his constitutionally
given prerogative as a supreme commander.
Why then did Hirohito break a long established custom against his will? It does not
take the mind of a genius to discern that. It was nonsense to contend about whether or not
keeping tradition when the national survival was at stake. Three days after the U.S.
bombing of Hiroshima, on August 9, the same day, the second bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki, the Imperial Conference was held. At the conference the decision was made to
surrender by accepting the Potsdam Declaration on the condition if the Allied Powers
would make some sort of guarantee to Japan with regard to maintenance of sovereignty.
After the conference, the inquiry regarding the condition for accepting Potsdam Declaration
was sent to the Allied Powers. The positive response to the inquiry came on August 13.
Hirohito promptly decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration to end the war when Japan
still had a chance to maintain the national sovereignty. Hirohito knew that by continuing
the war Japan would lose even that chance.
So Hirohito broke the tradition. He did so to save Japan’s sovereignty. His imperial
power was required for the sake of maintaining national polity. He was compelled to do so
to save the nation. Was there the same urge of compulsion that might have made Hirohito
to take an action to prevent Japan from initiating a fight against the United States in the late
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1941? He knew that Japan would face dire consequence by going to war against United
States. It is, however, unreasonable and unrealistic to expect Hirohito to act in the same
way as he did in August 1945 with mere “anticipation” of the consequences of the fighting.
So for the afro-mentioned two reasons Hirohito did not take an action to prevent the war.
As he told MacArthur, an idea of the intervention to stop the war from coming did not even
occur to Hirohito. He opposed the war but if that had to be only choice for Japan to take, he
was ready to accept it and he hoped the best in the worst circumstance Japan faced. The
circumstantial conditions did not outweigh his desire to follow the long established role of
Japanese monarch as “figurehead.”
_______________________________________________
Thus, it is an irony that, contrary to Bix’s assertion, falsification and distortion
of the personality of Emperor Hirohito and his role in the Pacific War fall on the
revisionists, not those who maintain orthodox views of Hirohito.
Notes
1
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, Douglas Macarthur, was most notable figure in the effort of
preserving Japanese monarchism as an indispensable element for speedy reconstruction of Japan. Equally
notable was a former Prime Minster of Japan, Konoe Fumimaro. In fact they met each other on October 4,
1945. In this meeting Konoe told Macarthur passionately how essential it was to maintain the right-wing force
in the postwar society of Japan, particularly monarchism, if Japan was to have a quick recovery and defend
itself from the encroaching tide of communism. Macarthur was deeply impressed by this Konoe’s argument
and wholeheartedly shared it. See Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1958), pp. 586-9
2
Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 2000),
pp. 11-12
3
Ibid, p.12
4
Ibid, p.12
5
Bill Emmott wrote the following in his book, The Sun Also Sets: the Limits to Japan’s Economic Power,
“Throughout the 124 reigns known to history, Japanese imperial families have never really sought the public
eye, nor usually have they been allowed to. Emperors have always been symbols or, occasionally, puppets,
which is why it is wholly irrelevant for the West to debate endlessly Hirohito’s role in World War II or in
Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s. Even if Hirohito had been in favor of war, conquest, torture, and
experimenting on prisoners, it would have made little difference. The decisions were not his to make, so his
view was beside the point. That is also why it is futile to speculate about whether he opposed wartime
atrocities, since even if he did he had no power to prevent them. A Japanese emperor simply could not be a
driving force in the style of Adolf Hitler. He is in the background, not foreground.”
6
Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, pp. 10-11
7
Ibid, p. 11
8
Ibid, p. 4
9
Ibid, pp. 4-5
10
Ogura Kuraji, Jijyu Diary of Ogura Kuraji in Bungei Shunju V. 85 (April 1, 2008), p, 141. This diary of
Ogura Kuraji recently discovered source is considered to be one of the most precious and indispensable
documents with regard to the study of the role of Hirohito and his personality during the crucial period of
Japan’s endeavor between 1939 and 1945. It carries Emperor’s own voices regarding Japan’s war effort.
11
Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji and Political Situation (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Vol. 7, 1951) p. 32
12
Herbert Bix, Hirohito and Making of Modern Japan, p. 12
13
Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji and Political Situation, Vol. 8 pp. 346-7
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14
When Army Minster Itagaki Seishiro met the Emperor on July 5, 1939 regarding the issue of the army
personnel and the dispatch of general Terauchi to the party convention of the Nazi, Hirohito literally
expressed his outrage against Itagaki, saying “No one is as stupid as you are.” Hirohito was infuriated by the
army’s secret maneuvering to bring Japan to ratification of Tripartite Pact when Japan was still in dispute with
Germany with regard to conditions of the Pact. See Ogura Kuraji, Jiju Dairy of Ogura Kuraji pp. 123-4
15
Konoe Fumimaro, “The Las Imperial Conference”, Jiyu Kokumin (Tokyo: Jikyoku Geposha, Vol. 19,
1946), p. 41
16
Ogura Kuraji, Jijyu Diary of Ogura Kuraji in Bungei Shunju, p. 152. It is interesting to note that this remark
by Hirohito was completely misinterpreted by Bix. He translated Hirohito’s remark as followed, “Nothing
ventured, Nothing gained,” meaning that Hirohito was ready to venture into the war if that was what to take to
gain his wish. Truth was completely opposite. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan,
p. 419
17
Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. xvii
18
It all started when the Japanese army blew up the section of the railroad and put blame on China to create a
pretext for putting whole Manchuria under Japanese control.
19
After the occupation of the whole Manchuria, Japanese army set up a new nation in Manchuria in 1932, socalled Manchukuo.
20
Harada Kumao, Prince Saionji and Political Situation, Vol.6, p. 86
21
Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1958), p. 91
22
Kazuo Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan 1937-1941: A Critical Appraisal of the
Three-Time Prime Minister (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.), p. 61
23
Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Diary, (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, Vol. 2, 1966), p. 890
24
Konoe Fumimaro, “Saigono Gozenkaigi” (The Last Imperial Conference), Jiyu Kokumin (Tokyo: Ikyoku
Geposha, Vol. 19, 1946), p. 35
25
Kazuo Yagami, Koneo Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan 1937-1941, p. 132
Reference
Behr, Edward. Hirohito: Behind the Myth. New York: Vintage Books, 1989
Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: Harper-Collins
publishers, 2000
Emmott, Bill. The Sun Also Sets: the Limits to Japan’s Economic Power. New York:
Times Books, 1989
Goto, Ryunosuke. “Konoe Fumimaro o Kataru” Koen (December 15, 1968), pp. 1-34
Harada, Kumao. Prince Saionji and Political Situation. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951
Kido, Koichi. Kido Koichi Kankei Bunsho (Documents regarding Kido Koichi). Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1966
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Kido, Koichi. Kido Koichi Diary. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, Vol. 2, 1966
Konoe, Fumimaro. “The Last Imperial Conference” Jiju Kokumin, Vol. 19 (1946), pp. 1-55
Ogura, Kuraji. “Jijyu Diary of Ogura Kuraji.” Bungei Shunju, Vol. 85 (April 1, 2008), pp.
118-190
Yabe, Teiji. Konoe Fumimaro. Tokyo: Jiji Tushinsha, 1958
Yagami, Kazuo. Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan 1937-1941: A
Critical Appraisal of the Three-Time Prime Minister. North Carolina: McFarland &
Company, Inc., 2006
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