PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
RUNNING HEAD: PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Personality, Uncertainty, and Economic Preferences
Christopher D. Johnston
Department of Political Science
Duke University
christopher.johnston@duke.edu
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Stanley Feldman, Howard Lavine, Matthew Lebo,
Chris Federico, Ben Newman, and James Wilfred Jenkins III for comments and discussions on
earlier versions of this manuscript.
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
ABSTRACT
Contemporary work on economic preference formation in both political economics and political
psychology has emphasized the importance of certainty and security concerns as key factors
underlying mass preferences for more or less government intervention in economic matters. The
qualitative nature of the relationship between needs for certainty and security and economic
preferences, however, is quite distinct across these literatures. The former emphasizes the social
protective functions of social welfare, and thus hypothesizes a positive relationship between
security and certainty needs and economic liberalism, while the latter emphasizes symbolic
factors related to institutional stability and change, and thus implies a positive relationship
between needs for certainty and security and economic conservatism. The present paper seeks a
synthesis of these literatures through the consideration of heterogeneity in the dispositional
foundations of economic preferences and ideology across political engagement. It is theorized
that the politically engaged, in their greater exposure to elite discourse, understand economic
issues through the more symbolic lens of institutional stability and change, while the unengaged
default to a concrete understanding of economic intervention as social protection. Across three
datasets it is shown that economic preferences are strongly determined by certainty and security
needs, but in exactly opposite ways across levels of citizen engagement with elite politics. The
implications of these findings for the political psychology literature on personality and ideology,
for integrated approaches to preference formation in political science, and for American politics
more broadly, are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Few theoretical conflicts appear more fundamental than that of self-interest-based and
personality-based approaches to understanding economic preference formation. The differences
between these literatures echo historical divisions between political economic and political
psychological approaches to mass politics more generally (e.g. Sears and Funk 1991).
Contemporary manifestations of these literatures, however, share a common focus on the
concepts of uncertainty and security. In political economics, recent work suggests the
importance of risk aversion and labor market uncertainty to preferences for government-provided
social welfare (Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Rhem
2009; Sinn 1995). As Iversen (2005) explains, “workers…do not know with certainty how they
will fare in terms of future employment and income. In this situation, risk-averse people will
demand insurance against loss of employment and income.” An extension of this basic logic
suggests that citizens in labor market positions which entail higher levels of income and
employment uncertainty will prefer social welfare at higher rates, and that citizens who are
dispositionally risk and uncertainty-averse will prefer social welfare at higher rates than citizens
who are less risk-averse (see also Ehrlich and Maestas 2010; Kam and Simas 2010).
In political psychology, the role of uncertainty and security for economic preference
formation takes on a more ideological character. Recent theorizing argues that the dispositionally
risk and uncertainty-averse oppose government redistribution and social welfare in order to
protect status quo institutions, values, and socioeconomic arrangements (Gerber et al. 2010; Jost
et al. 2003; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009; Mondak 2010). As Thorisdottir and Jost (2011, p.
789) argue, “The status quo, no matter how aversive, is a known condition and is therefore easier
to predict and imagine than a potentially different state of affairs that could be either better or
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worse…Thus, status quo conservatism offers more familiarity and certainty than do alternative
ideologies that are characterized by preferences for social change and innovation; for this reason,
it is likely to be more accessible and attractive when people are seeking stability and security.”
Several lines of empirical research suggest that personality indicators related to needs for
certainty and security are associated with conservative political orientations (e.g. Amodio et al.
2007; Gerber et al. 2010; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Jost et al. 2003; Mondak 2010; Oxley
et al. 2008).
Thus, while sharing a common bond in a focus on the importance of uncertainty and
security to economic preference formation, these two literatures come to very different
conclusions about the direction of the relationship. The political economics literature sees these
needs as driving a preference for government-provided social protection and insurance, while the
psychology literature sees uncertainty and security needs as the basis for opposition to changes in
status quo institutions and hierarchies. The present paper seeks a reconciliation of these
perspectives by positing heterogeneity in the association of psychological needs for certainty and
security to economic preferences. I argue that the two theoretical paradigms can be distinguished
by the level of abstraction upon which economic issues are represented, and that citizens will
vary with respect to representational abstraction as a function of political engagement. I thus
hypothesize that the relationship between personality and economic preferences will vary in
qualitative form across levels of political engagement. More specifically, I hypothesize that the
politically unengaged, viewing economic issues through the lens of social protection, will show a
positive relationship between needs for certainty and security and economic liberalism. The
politically engaged, by contrast, viewing economic issues through the more abstract and
symbolic lens of institutional stability and change, will show a positive relationship between
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needs for certainty and security and economic conservatism. I test these claims across three
distinct datasets in the realm of American politics, utilizing two distinct measures of needs for
certainty and security, and two distinct measures of preferences for government-provided social
welfare, finding very strong support for theoretical expectations in all cases.
The present paper thus represents a reconciliation of two seemingly competing literatures
in a way which maintains the importance of each. Moreover, the theoretical logic which
underpins these expectations suggests avenues for future integration and, perhaps, a more unified
science of mass preference formation.
PERSONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND CONSERVATISM
Recent research on personality and mass politics, despite diversity of theoretical
paradigm and language, converges on the importance of certainty and security as key concepts
underlying stable differences in political orientations. This conceptual convergence is made
explicit by John Jost and his colleagues within their theory of political ideology as motivated
social cognition (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). They argue that political
conservatism (as opposed to liberalism), in its emphasis on institutional stability, and in its
provision of a justification for the socioeconomic status quo, is palliative for citizens with
psychological needs for epistemic certainty and existential security. As Jost and Hunyady (2005)
argue, “There is a good match between needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system
justification, because preserving the status quo allows one to maintain what is familiar while
rejecting the uncertain prospect of social change. For many people, the devil they know seems
less threatening and more legitimate than the devil they don’t” (p. 262).
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This general hypothesis finds empirical support in a number of studies. Jost et al. (2003),
in a meta-analysis of over eighty studies on the topic, find that psychological indicators related to
these needs (e.g. intolerance of ambiguity, mortality salience, dogmatism) are associated with
several indicators of general political conservatism (e.g. authoritarianism, ideological selfplacement). More recent work also shows converging evidence. Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
find that needs for security and certainty are strongly related to preferences over social and
foreign policy, and have become an increasingly important predictor of partisan orientations in
the American mass public since 2000. Van Hiel, Pandelaere and Duriez (2004) find strong
associations between the need for nonspecific epistemic closure and cultural conservatism (see
also Chirumbolo et al. 2004; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2004), and Federico and Goren (2009) find
that the need for closure predicts conservative ideological self-placements.
Converging evidence can be found within recent work on personality within political
science. Mondak (2010) finds strong associations between the “Big Five” personality traits of
openness to experience and conscientiousness and political liberalism and conservatism,
respectively. It is notable that these two traits are the strongest predictors of political ideology
and identification, as they represent the “Big Five” analogues of the more basic needs for
certainty and security. As Mondak argues, “the openness and conscientiousness hypotheses are
best understood in terms of traditional views in which liberalism corresponds with a willingness
to see government tackle new and varied problems, while conservatism implies a more cautious
approach in in which presumption favors the status quo” (p. 127). This logic is echoed by Gerber
et al. (2010) in their examination of ideology across the social and economic domains. They
argue that openness to experience implies a positive response to “unconventional and complex
stimuli,” and thus, “It follows that this attraction to novelty and tolerance for complexity
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encourage not only overall liberalism, but also support for liberal social and economic policies,
which typically involve new programs or interventions that overturn existing practices” (p. 116).
Similarly, with respect to conscientiousness, which involves “socially prescribed impulse
control,” there should be a connection with conservatism as “identifying as conservative involves
supporting traditional norms in both the economic and social policy domains” (p. 115).
The biology and politics paradigm also finds supporting evidence. Amodio et al. (2007),
for example, find that conservatism is associated with lower levels of conflict monitoring, as
evidenced by less activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) among conservatives relative
to liberals. The ACC is implicated in the detection of situations that require a shift from habitual
responses, and thus attention to uncertainty in the environment (e.g. Botvinick, Cohen and Carter
2004; Cunningham et al. 2003; Kerns et al. 2004). Oxley et al. (2008) find that several indicators
of sociocultural conservatism are associated with both galvanic skin responses and startle blink
responses to threatening stimuli, which indicates greater threat sensitivity among conservative
individuals. Settle et al. (2010) additionally find that a specific gene variant known to be
associated with novelty-seeking predicts political liberalism.
LIMITATIONS
Taken as a whole, this literature provides robust empirical support for the statistical
association of a wide variety of indicators of uncertainty aversion and security-seeking with
several measures of conservative political orientations. The literature is nonetheless limited in
breadth of application. More specifically, empirical support for the association of personality
indicators related to uncertainty aversion and security-seeking is much stronger for cultural
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conservatism than economic conservatism. Several studies which distinguish between social and
economic manifestations of conservatism fail to find support in the latter domain.
Van Hiel, Pandelaere and Duriez (2004) find that uncertainty aversion is strongly related
to cultural conservatism, but is minimally and insignificantly related to economic conservatism.
Chirumbolo et al. (2004) examined the (bivariate) associations between the need for nonspecific
cognitive closure and a variety of political and social attitudes, and found significant associations
of this indicator with anti-immigration, nationalism, support for autocratic leadership, pluralism,
and multiculturalism, but no associations with either support for free enterprise or the welfare
state. Feldman and Johnston (2009) examined the relationship of authoritarianism, need for
nonspecific cognitive closure, and the need for cognition on social and economic conservatism in
the 2000 and 2004 American National Elections Studies. While all three predictors were
significantly related to social preferences (e.g. gay marriage, abortion), none significantly
predicted economic preferences (e.g. health insurance, government spending). Carney et al.
(2008) found associations of openness to experience, extraversion and conscientiousness with
self-identification as a social conservative, but not self-identification as an economic
conservative. Similarly, Van Hiel and Mervielde (2004) found associations of openness and
conscientiousness with social but not economic conservatism. Thorisdottir et al. (2007), in a
study of Western Europe, found that “rule-following” strongly and significantly predicted both
general left-right orientations and value traditionalism, but only weakly, though significantly,
predicted acceptance of inequality. Similarly, the need for security significantly predicted leftright orientations and value traditionalism, but, contrary to expectations, substantially and
significantly predicted economic liberalism. In other words, citizens with dispositional security
needs were less accepting of inequality, not more.
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A smaller number of empirical studies, however, do find theoretically expected
associations, but the nature of the data and models suggest a more complex model underlies the
personality-based origins of economic preferences. Gerber et al. (2010) find that openness to
experience and conscientiousness predict economic liberalism and conservatism, respectively,
but utilize a sample consisting of registered voters, and thus citizens who are likely more
engaged with elite politics. Federico, Fisher and Deason (2011) find that authoritarianism
predicts (anti-) egalitarianism among the politically sophisticated. Golec (2001; as reported in
Jost et al. 2003) finds that uncertainty aversion predicts economic liberalism among Polish
adults, but finds the expected relationship with economic conservatism among student political
activists. This research suggests that political engagement moderates the relationship of
personality with preferences in the economic domain. I return to this issue of moderation below.
PERSONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
The political economics literature takes a very different approach than the recent work on
personality, arguing that concerns with economic uncertainty and security provide a key
foundation of public support for social welfare. From this view, redistribution, income, and
employment protection serve as forms of publically-provided insurance against the vagaries of
free market capitalism (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Sinn 1995; Varian 1980). Iversen (2005;
Iversen and Soskice 2001), for example, shows that citizens with skills specific to industries,
occupations, or firms support social welfare to a larger extent than citizens with more general
skills. The former are more likely to suffer a loss in the value of their labor due to, say,
technological change or changes in the structure of the labor market, and thus support social
welfare as a means of insuring against future income loss. In a similar vein, Rhem (2009) finds
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that citizens within occupations with relatively high unemployment rates prefer social welfare
more than citizens in low unemployment arenas. Again, this suggests that they are hedging
against risks associated with their personal labor market position.
This theoretical framework suggests that stable differences in citizens’ levels of risk and
uncertainty aversion should, all else equal, be associated with their support for social welfare.
More specifically, at any given position in the labor market, citizens high in needs for security
and certainty should prefer government-provided social welfare more than those low in such
needs, all else equal. Social welfare, in this sense, constitutes a “functional match” to personality
profiles characterized by uncertainty aversion and security-seeking (Jost, Federico and Napier
2009). Recent research provides some support for this general hypothesis. Kam and Simas
(2010) find that dispositional risk aversion is associated with stronger preferences for certain
over probabilistic outcomes in Prospect Theory games (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quattrone
and Tversky 1988). While they limit their conceptualization of this personality trait to risk
aversion, the items utilized to measure the trait bear striking resemblance to those used by
psychologists to measure more general constructs such as the need for epistemic closure (e.g.
Kruglanski, Webster and Klem 1993) or openness to experience (Gerber et al. 2010). For
example, one item reads, “I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable,” while another
reads, “I would like to explore strange places.” Ehrlich and Maestas (2010) find that
dispositional risk aversion predicts support for trade protectionism among low-skilled workers,
and predicts opposition to immigration among citizens in occupations exposed to potential
displacement by immigrant workers. Thus, citizens high in risk aversion preferred government
intervention for reasons of income and employment protection. Finally, recall that Thorisdottir et
al. (2007) find that dispositional needs for security predict economic liberalism in Western
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Europe. They suggest that “a preference for inequality seems motivated more by acceptance of
risk than by needs for security” (p. 196).
SYNTHESIS
The implications of this review suggest exactly opposite theoretical expectations for the
relationship of personality traits related to needs for certainty and security to economic
preferences. While recent work in political psychology suggests that such needs should be
associated with economic conservatism qua opposition to government intervention, the political
economics literature suggests that such needs should be associated with economic liberalism and
support for social welfare as social protection. Furthermore, the former literature has found
minimal support for this hypothesis except among politically engaged citizens. The latter
literature, by contrast, has found some support for expectations, but empirical tests are fewer in
number and the focus has not been on domestic economic preferences or ideology.
A potential resolution of these literatures is suggested by a consideration of differences in
how each “understands” the economic domain, more specifically, with respect to the level of
abstraction each assumes for citizen representations of economic issues. The hypotheses of the
political psychology literature assume that citizens understand economic policy in a highly
symbolic fashion. From this perspective, economic conservatism represents adherence to status
quo norms, institutions, and socioeconomic hierarchies, and thus certainty and security needs are
best served by opposition to liberal interventionism. The traditional view in political science,
however, suggests that only a subset of citizens achieve such ideological understandings of
political issues (Converse 1964), especially ones as difficult as those in the economic domain
(Carmines and Stimson 1980; Pollock, Lilie and Vittes 1993). From this view, elites construct
the symbolic content of difficult issues, and it is through exposure to elite discourse that citizens
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come to understand the broader symbolic implications of such issues. As Pollock, Lilie and
Vittes (1993) explain, the extent to which citizens utilize abstract and symbolic representations
of policy conflict to form their preferences, as well as the nature of the abstract content applied,
“will depend on whether opportunistic ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ can successfully frame the issue
as a battle over core values and whether individuals are alert to what these social agents are
saying” (p. 31).
In the absence of such exposure, we should expect citizens engaged in preference
formation to rely on considerations which are available to them (Zaller 1992), which are more
likely to concern personal or familial interests. As Converse (1964) argued in his seminal work,
“moving from top to bottom of this information dimension, the character of objects that are
central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from the remote,
generic, and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or ‘close to home.’ Where potential
political objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract, ‘ideological’
principles…to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates”
(p. 213).
These considerations suggest that the question raised by a review of this literature is not
of an “either/or” form, but rather “for whom?” I posit that each model applies to mass preference
formation, but for distinct subsets of the citizenry defined by levels of political engagement. I
thus offer the following two hypotheses to be tested in the empirical sections of the paper:
(1) For politically unengaged citizens, increases in needs for certainty and security will be
associated with increases in economic liberalism.
(2) For politically engaged citizens, increases in needs for certainty and security will be
associated with increases in economic conservatism.
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One of the most interesting aspects of these two hypotheses is that they offer a potential
explanation for the weak to null findings of recent research in political psychology which has
explicitly examined the economic domain in the context of dispositional influences.
Specifically, a failure to account for heterogeneity across levels of political engagement, to the
extent that the effects are of opposite sign for the engaged and unengaged, would result in
marginal effects of zero as a result of such aggregation. This hypothesis thus offers an elegant
solution to the problem of null and minimal findings in recent work within the economic domain:
needs for certainty and security are actually highly influential factors influencing the economic
preferences of citizens, but in unique ways conditional on how these issues are understood, and
thus on political engagement. Moreover, the present perspective suggests that these two
seemingly disparate literatures share a common perspective, and do not differ at a fundamental
level. In both cases citizens may meaningfully pursue goals which are personally relevant (e.g.
security), but the ways in which such pursuit manifests at the level of economic preferences is
conditional on how citizens actually understand the issues at hand.
DATA AND METHODS
To test my hypotheses I rely on data from the 2000, 2004 and 2008 American National
Elections Studies. In 2000, the ANES utilized both face-to-face and telephone interviews, the
former via a national probability sample, and the latter via random digit dialing. In 2004 and
2008, all interviews were conducted face-to-face. The 2008 ANES included an oversample of
Black and Latino Americans. Information regarding all aspects of these studies can be accessed
at the ANES public website. In the analyses to follow I rely only on self-identified White
Americans. Recent work suggests that personality may operate differently in the economic
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domain across racial and ethnic groups (Gerber et al. 2010), and thus analyses should examine
such groups separately rather than make general inferences that do not hold across all
subsamples. In 2000 and 2004 the sample sizes for minority group members are simply too
small to accurately assess these hypotheses.
In 2008, however, the ANES conducted an oversample of Black and Latino Americans. I
estimated identical models for these subsamples and found no evidence of an influence of
personality on preferences. This is consistent with the findings of Gerber et al. (2010). These
results are reported in Appendix A. I also estimated the full sample models for both 2000 and
2004, and the results are included in Appendix A. The pattern of results is similar but the effect
sizes are weaker. This is consistent with a “dilution” of the influence of personality when
including minority groups in the analysis. Needless to say, all inferences throughout the
remainder of the paper apply to White Americans only. At this time, little theoretical or
empirical work has sought to address racial and ethnic heterogeneity in the influence of
personality on political attitudes and behavior. This is clearly an important topic for future
research, but beyond the theoretical scope of the present paper.
Dependent Variables
I test the two hypotheses of the present study utilizing two distinct measures of economic
conservatism, one concerning broad preferences over government intervention in economic
matters, and one more policy-oriented.
Preferences for Limited Government. I draw on three items in each survey to measure
general orientations toward government intervention in economic matters. Each survey
contained an identical set of items. For each, respondents were asked to choose from two
statements. The first item contrasted the statement, “The main reason government has become
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bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for
themselves,” with, “government has become bigger because the problems we face have become
bigger.” The second contrasted, “We need a strong government to handle today’s complex
economic problems,” with, “The free market can handle these problems without government
being involved.” Finally, the third contrasted, “The less government, the better,” with, “there are
more things the government should be doing.” I recoded these items so that each takes on a value
of one for the limited government response. I then created a summative index with higher values
indicating greater preferences for limited government.
Economic Policy Conservatism. I measure economic policy conservatism in each study
as a scale constructed from responses to specific policy items. In 2000 and 2004, I rely on three
items: preferences for more or less government spending and services, preferences for
government guaranteed jobs and income, and preferences over the government provision of
health insurance. In 2000, the respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of two item
formats. The first utilized the typical ANES seven-point scale format, while the second utilized
a branching format resulting in a five-point scale. The three middle options of the former were
combined to form a five-point scale, and the two samples were combined to maximize sample
size. In 2004, all respondents received the seven-point branching format. In 2008, I rely on only
two items: preferences over government spending and services and over the government
provision of health insurance. In this study only half of the sample received the government
guaranteed jobs and income item. In addition, half of the sample was randomly assigned to
receive new versions of the health insurance and spending items. Both of the new versions of
these items utilized slightly different wordings and a branching format. I again combine the two
subsamples to maximize sample size. The exact wordings for all items from all three studies are
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contained in Appendix B. The reliability of the scales in 2000 and 2004 were .59 and .71,
respectively. In 2008, the correlation between the spending and insurance items was .42. Each
scale was recoded to range from zero to one prior to analysis.
Independent Variables
Needs for Certainty and Security. I operationalize dispositional needs for certainty and
security in two ways. In all three studies I rely on four items utilized by recent work to measure
the construct of “authoritarianism.” The scale was constructed equivalently in each study. Each
item asked respondents to choose which of two values is more important for a child to possess.
The pairwise comparisons include: “Independent or Respect for Elders,” “Curiosity or Good
Manners,” “Obedience or Self-Reliance,” and “Considerate or Well-Behaved.” Some
respondents volunteer “Both,” and these are coded at an intermediate point. The four items were
then summed to create a single measure. Much work in political psychology suggests that
“authoritarianism” is derivative of more basic needs for certainty and security (see Jost et al.
2003 for much evidence in this regard; see also Duckitt 2001; Feldman 2003; Lavine et al. 1999;
Lavine et al. 2002; Stenner 2005). More recently, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) demonstrated
the convergent validity of this operationalization. Moreover, the items themselves have face
validity with respect to their ability to distinguish respondents on the basis of epistemic and
existential needs. Each item considers potential solutions to dealing with a dangerous or
uncertain world, more specifically, by adhering to established norms, rules and institutions, and
respecting legitimate authorities. As Duckitt (2001) argues, “A view of the world as dangerous,
unpredictable, and threatening…would activate the motivational goal of social control and
security. This motivational goal would be expressed in the collectivist sociocultural values of
conformity and traditionalism and in…authoritarian social attitudes” (p. 50). Personally, I
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believe the term “authoritarianism” is unnecessarily pejorative, and should be reserved for
certain forms of overt, anti-social behavior and attitudes, not underlying dispositions and traits,
and thus continue to refer to this scale as needs for certainty and security despite its recent usage.
In 2008 I rely on a second measure for replication purposes which tap the need for
nonspecific cognitive closure (Kruglanski 1989; Kruglanski and Webster1996). The need for
closure is defined by citizens’ relative comfort with, or aversion to, uncertainty generally, and
thus to substantial changes in their social environment. As Jost et al. (2003) explain, “contents
that promise or support epistemic stability, clarity, order, and uniformity should be preferred by
high-need-for-closure persons over contents that promise their epistemic opposites (i.e.
instability, ambiguity, chaos, and diversity)” (p. 348). One item included in the 2008 ANES was
modeled after related items from the dispositional need for closure scale (Kruglanski, Webster
and Klem 1993). This item read, “Of the situations when you see two people disagreeing with
one another, in how many of them can you see how both people could be right?” Response
options ranged from zero (“All of them”) to four (“None of them”).1 Higher values imply a
greater need for closure.
Political Engagement. I operationalize political engagement with two variables: political
sophistication and partisan strength. Political sophistication has commonly been utilized to
proxy for attention to elite discourse, and the propensity of citizens to seek out and assimilate
information from the elite space (e.g. Berinsky 2007; Zaller 1992). Partisan strength taps the
extent to which citizens have a developed political identity, and thus the extent to which they are
personally invested in elite level partisan politics. In this sense, partisan strength can be seen in
Related items from Kruglanski et al.’s (1993) need for nonspecific cognitive closure scale
include: “When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be
right,” and, “In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.”
1
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terms of the extent to which a given citizen feels a part of their political “team” (Green,
Palmquist and Schickler 2002), and should thus be related to political information seeking, and
the tendency to assimilate rhetoric from in-partisans. Thus, both political sophistication and
partisan strength are intended to tap citizens’ exposure to elite rhetoric.2
In 2000 and 2004, political sophistication was operationalized with six knowledge items.
At the time of this writing, the knowledge items for 2008 had yet to be released by the ANES. I
thus rely on two items: the citizen’s self-reported interest in politics, and the interviewer’s
subjective rating of the respondent’s knowledge of politics. These two items were highly
correlated (r=.42) and were combined to form a single scale. To check the validity of this
operationalization, I generated an identical variable in the 2004 ANES, and correlated this scale
with the political sophistication operationalization constructed from the six knowledge items in
that study. The correlation was large, indicating that the former provides a reasonable proxy for
this indicator (r=.57). Partisan strength was operationalized by folding the traditional ANES
seven-point partisan identification measure about its midpoint, resulting in a four-point scale
ranging from “pure” independent to strong partisan. The exact items used to construct the
sophistication scales can be found in Appendix B.
Controls. I additionally control for several variables which are exogenous to needs for
certainty and security, but which may be correlated with both the latter and the dependent
variable. These include age, gender (1=male), education (six categories, entered as dummy
variables to allow for non-linearity), income, and employment status (1=unemployed).
All variables were recoded to range from zero to one prior to analysis.
With respect to partisan strength, the “sports analogy” is a good one. Someone with a strong
attachment to a sports team (i.e. a highly developed identity) is more likely to seek out
information about their team, and about sports generally, than someone with little attachment to,
and thus investment in, a team.
2
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Results for Preferences over Limited Government
I first consider the results for preferences over limited government for all three years, and
then turn to the estimates for economic policy conservatism. In each year, I regressed
preferences for limited government on needs for certainty and security (hereafter NCS), the two
measures of political engagement, the interactions of these with NCS, and all controls. As
limited government is ordinal, I estimated the model with maximum likelihood using an ordered
probit link function. The results for these first analyses are shown in Table 1. As the dependent
variable is coded in the conservative direction, hypotheses (1) and (2) imply negative coefficients
on the NCS constituent terms (i.e. NCS increases support for a government role when
engagement is low) and large and positive coefficients for the NCS interactions with political
engagement (indicating a reversal at high levels of engagement).
Across the three models, I find strong support for both hypotheses. In all three cases the
constituent term on NCS is substantively large, in the expected negative direction, and
statistically significant, implying an increase in support for government intervention across NCS
when political engagement is at a minimum. Moreover, and in support of hypothesis (2), the
interaction term of NCS and political sophistication is positive, large and statistically significant
in all three cases. While all three coefficients for the interaction of NCS with partisan strength
are in the expected positive direction, none attain conventional levels of statistical significance.
Knowledge thus seems to be the better indicator of exposure to, and assimilation of, symbolic
elite discourse and the resulting abstract representation of the economic domain which drives the
reversal.
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Table 1. Regressions of Preferences for Limited Government on Needs for Certainty and
Security (NCS) and Controls
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable
2000 ANES
2004 ANES
2008 ANES
______________________________________________________________________________
NCS
-.76 (.34)*
-1.03 (.42)*
-1.94 (.41)*
NCS X Soph
1.51 (.51)*
1.22 (.55)*
2.49 (.54)*
NCS X Strength
.69 (.46)
.61 (.47)
.54 (.40)
Sophistication
Partisan Strength
Age
Male
HS Degree
Some College
Associate Degree
BA Degree
Professional Degree
Income
Unemployed
-.48 (.35)
-.49 (.32)
.08 (.17)
.39 (.07)*
.18 (.15)
.35 (.15)*
.18 (.17)
.25 (.16)
.10 (.18)
.85 (.27)*
-.14 (.20)
.24 (.36)
-.48 (.29)^
.45 (.19)*
.24 (.09)*
.00 (.19)
.14 (.20)
-.16 (.23)
.19 (.21)
-.36 (.23)
.38 (.19)*
-.16 (.24)
-.97 (.38)*
-.17 (.26)
.68 (.16)*
.27 (.07)*
.14 (.15)
.31 (.17)^
.29 (.17)^
.40 (.17)*
.37 (.20)^
.45 (.16)*
-.06 (.16)
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
-.15 (.27)
.38 (.27)
.89 (.27)
-.09 (.34)
.52 (.34)
1.09 (.35)
-.31 (.32)
.29 (.32)
.93 (.32)
Pseudo R^2
.04
.05
.05
N
1127
699
975
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entries are maximum likelihood ordered probit estimates and standard errors
(in parentheses). Estimates are for self-identified Whites only. *p<.05; ^p<.10.
Ordered probit coefficients are not easily interpretable. I thus converted these estimates
into predicted probabilities of support for limited government, across levels of NCS, for low and
high levels of political engagement. I graph these estimates for each of the three models in
Panels A-C of Figure 1.
20
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Figure 1. The Influence of Needs for Certainty and Security on Preferences for Limited Government
Panel A. 2000 ANES
Low Engagement
High Engagement
High Engagement
.6
.5
.4
.3
.1
.1
.2
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Pr(Restrict Government)
.7
.7
.8
.8
Low Engagement
Panel B. 2004 ANES
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
Needs for Certainty and Security
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Needs for Certainty and Security
Panel C. 2008 ANES
Low Engagement
High Engagement
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Notes: Plots represent predicted probabilities of
giving two or three (out of three) limited
government responses. Estimates were generated
holding all controls at their central tendencies.
“Low Engagement” represents independent
citizens at the 5th percentile of political
sophistication, while “High Engagement”
represents strong partisans at the 95th percentile of
political sophistication.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Needs for Certainty and Security
21
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
The points represent the predicted probabilities of giving two or three conservative
responses to the three limited government items. Low engagement corresponds with an
independent citizen at the 5th percentile of sophistication (zero correct responses for 2000 and
2004), while high engagement represents a strong partisan at the 95th percentile of sophistication
(five correct responses in 2000 and six in 2004). These estimates can thus be interpreted as the
effective bounds on the influence of NCS in terms of absolute magnitude. All controls were held
at their central tendencies.
Looking first at the estimates for the 2000 ANES, a change from low to high on NCS for
unengaged citizens corresponds with an expected decrease in the probability of giving two
limited government responses of about .29 (95% CI = [-.53, -.04]), while for engaged citizens
this same change in NCS corresponds with an increase in the probability of .44 (95% CI = [.24,
.62]). These are both substantial effects with respect to magnitude, but as expected by the
theorizing above, are in exactly opposite directions substantively. The results for 2004 are
highly similar. For low engaged citizens the marginal effect of NCS is -.34 (95% CI = [-.60, .07]), while for the highly engaged it is .30 (95% CI = [.09, .51]). Finally, turning to the 2008
study, a change from low to high on NCS for low engaged citizens corresponds with a decrease
in limited government of 56 percentage points (95% CI = [-.74, -.33]), while the same change for
the highly engaged corresponds with an increase of 41 percentage points (95% CI = [.24, 57]).
Overall, these results strongly support theoretical expectations. There is, however, an
interesting nuance to the findings which is worth mentioning, and which reinforces the basic
theoretical mechanism thought to underlie the patterns observed. Specifically, consider the
asymmetry in the magnitude of the absolute marginal effect of NCS across engagement across
the different years. While only so much can be gleaned from this small number of (yearly)
22
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
observations, the patterns across the years with respect to this asymmetry make good sense in
light of theory. In 2000, a culmination of the late-1990s economic boom, the marginal impact of
NCS on liberalism for the unengaged is 15 percentage points lower (in absolute terms) than its
impact on conservatism for the engaged. In contrast, in 2008 in the midst of the recent economic
crisis, this pattern reverses, with the absolute effect for low engaged citizens 15 percentage
points larger than that of the highly engaged. If citizens at low levels of engagement are indeed
more likely to view the economic domain through the personal lens of economic certainty and
security, then this pattern is exactly what we should expect to see, namely, an increase in the
importance of basic needs for certainty and security on preferences for government intervention
when the economy itself suggests objective reasons to be uncertain and insecure.
Results for Economic Policy Conservatism
I turn now to the results for economic policy conservatism, which are shown in in Table
2. For each year, I estimated identical models to those for limited government, except that I
utilized ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to correspond with the
pseudo-continuous dependent variable. When interpreting coefficients, recall that all variables
are coded from zero to one. The patterns in Table 2 once again strongly support theoretical
expectations, and largely replicate the findings above with a distinct measure of economic
preferences. In 2004 and 2008 the constituent term for NCS is negative, large, and statistically
significant, while in 2000 it is marginally significant (p<.10). Moreover, the interaction term of
NCS and political sophistication is once again strong, positive, and significant in all three
models. As with the analyses for limited government above, despite being in the correct
direction, I find no significant moderating effect of partisan strength in 2000. I do, however, find
a large moderating effect in both 2004 and 2008 which is consistent with my more general
23
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
expectations regarding political engagement. Overall, looking across all six models, it appears
that political sophistication matters more than strength of political identity, although there is
some evidence that such strength matters given the consistently positive moderating influence of
the variable, and its significance in two of the models.
Table 2. Regressions of Economic Policy Conservatism on Needs for Certainty and Security
(NCS) and Controls
___________________________________________________________________________
Variable
2000 ANES
2004 ANES
2008 ANES
___________________________________________________________________________
NCS
-.11 (.07)^
-.27 (.08)*
-.34 (.10)*
NCS X Soph
.23 (.11)*
.26 (.11)*
.39 (.13)*
NCS X Strength
.09 (.09)
.34 (.10)*
.22 (.10)*
Sophistication
Partisan Strength
Age
Male
HS Degree
Some College
Associate Degree
BA Degree
Professional Degree
Income
Unemployed
Constant
-.09 (.07)
-.02 (.06)
.05 (.03)
.03 (.02)^
.05 (.03)
.11 (.03)*
.07 (.04)*
.08 (.03)*
.07 (.04)*
.19 (.05)*
-.06 (.04)
.43 (.06)*
-.06 (.07)
-.11 (.06)*
.08 (.04)*
.03 (.02)^
.02 (.04)
.03 (.04)
.04 (.05)
.04 (.04)
.00 (.05)
.21 (.04)*
-.03 (.04)
.35 (.07)*
-.16 (.09)^
-.08 (.07)
.18 (.04)*
.09 (.02)*
.05 (.04)
.08 (.04)*
.07 (.04)^
.07 (.04)^
.02 (.05)
.24 (.04)*
.03 (.04)
.29 (.08)*
R^2
.07
.15
.14
N
1182
729
1005
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entries are ordinary least squares estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
Estimates are for self-identified Whites only. *p<.05; ^p<.10.
24
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Once again, I facilitate interpretation of these dynamics by translating model estimates
into predicted values of the dependent variable. These are graphed in Panels A-C of Figure 2.
Looking first at 2000, the marginal effect of NCS for low engaged citizens is -.11 (95% CI = [.25, .03]), while for the highly engaged it is .17 (95% CI = [.05, .29]). Thus, NCS decreases
conservatism (albeit insignificantly) by about 11 percentage points for low engaged citizens, and
increases policy conservatism by about 17 percentage points for highly engaged citizens. The
results for 2004 are quite a bit stronger in terms of magnitude. At low levels of engagement, a
change from low to high on NCS corresponds with a decrease in policy conservatism of about 27
percentage points (95% CI = [-.42, -.10]). For the highly engaged, the effect of NCS is an
increase in conservatism of about 33 points (95% CI = [.21, .45]). Finally, in 2008 the estimates
for low and high engaged citizens were -.29 (95% CI = [-.47, -.10]) and .28 (95% CI = [.17,
.40]), respectively.
Taken as a whole, this second set of analyses provides converging evidence for
hypotheses (1) and (2). In contrast to the limited government analyses, however, the strong
asymmetry between 2000 and 2008 is not full replicated. While the marginal effect of
authoritarianism for low engaged citizens is indeed lower in 2000, the effects in 2004 and 2008
were comparable.
25
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Figure 2. The Influence of Needs for Certainty and Security on Economic Policy Conservatism
Panel A. 2000 ANES
Low Engagement
High Engagement
High Engagement
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Predicted Economic Conservatism
.8
.8
Low Engagement
Panel B. 2004 ANES
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
0
1
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Needs for Certainty and Security
Needs for Certainty and Security
Panel C. 2008 ANES
Low Engagement
High Engagement
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Notes: Plots represent predicted values of
economic policy conservatism. Estimates were
generated holding all controls at their central
tendencies. “Low Engagement” represents
independent citizens at the 5th percentile of
political sophistication, while “High Engagement”
represents strong partisans at the 95th percentile of
political sophistication.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Needs for Certainty and Security
26
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Replication with the Need for Nonspecific Cognitive Closure
I sought to replicate the findings above with a distinct measure of the key independent
variable; specifically, the need for nonspecific cognitive closure. I substituted this variable for
the “authoritarianism” operationalization in identical models of limited government preferences
and economic policy conservatism. These results are shown in Table 3 and Figures 3 A-C. In
both cases, the results are weaker with respect to statistical significance, which is understandable
given the single-item operationalization of this construct. Nonetheless, the patterns show support
for theoretical expectations and hypotheses (1) and (2). In the model for limited government
preferences, the constituent term on the need for closure (NFC) is negative, although fails to
attain statistical significance (B=-.57, p<.25). The interaction term with political sophistication is
large, positive and marginally significant (B=1.32, p<.06). Thus, the basic pattern of results is
identical to the analyses above, although the estimates are rather inefficient. In addition, the
interaction of NFC with partisan strength in the limited government model is in the incorrect
direction and insignificant. I thus plot the predicted probabilities of giving two limited
government responses in a way identical to that above, as well as holding constant partisan
strength at its median value. These are panels A and B in Figure 3.
Turning to the results for economic policy conservatism, I find stronger support for
theoretical expectations, and a cleaner replication. The constituent term for NFC is substantively
large, negative, and statistically significant (B=-.25, p<.05). The interaction term with political
sophistication is large, positive, and marginally significant (B=.32, p<.06). The interaction term
with partisan strength is much smaller and not significant (B=.07, n.s.). The predicted values of
economic conservatism, across values of NFC, for low and high engagement are plotted in panel
C of Figure 3. The characteristic pattern is again evident. Thus, while weaker overall, I have
27
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
replicated the basic pattern of findings utilizing an entirely distinct measure of needs for
certainty.
Table 3. Regressions of Preferences for Limited Government (LG) and Economic Policy
Conservatism (EPC) on Needs for Nonspecific Cognitive Closure (NFC) and Controls
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable
LG
EPC
______________________________________________________________________________
NFC
-.57 (.49)
-.25 (.11)*
NFC X Soph
1.32 (.70)^
.32 (.17)^
NFC X Strength
-.46 (.52)
.07 (.13)
Sophistication
Partisan Strength
Age
Male
HS Degree
Some College
Associate Degree
BA Degree
Professional Degree
Income
Unemployed
Constant
-.07 (.38)
.37 (.27)
.69 (.16)*
.26 (.07)*
.18 (.15)
.35 (.16)*
.32 (.17)^
.43 (.17)*
.34 (.19)^
.44 (.16)*
-.07 (.16)
-
-.08 (.09)
.02 (.07)
.19 (.04)*
.10 (.02)*
.04 (.04)
.07 (.04)^
.06 (.04)
.06 (.04)
.00 (.05)
.23 (.04)*
.03 (.04)
.21 (.07)*
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
.67 (.31)
1.25 (.31)
1.89 (.32)
-
Pseudo R^2/R^2
.04
.13
N
979
1008
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entries are maximum likelihood ordered probit estimates and standard errors (in
parentheses) for LG, and ordinary least squares estimates and robust standard errors for EPC.
Estimates are for self-identified Whites only. *p<.05; ^p<.10.
28
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Figure 3. The Influence of Needs for Nonspecific Closure on Economic Policy Conservatism, 2008 ANES
Panel A. Limited Govt.
High Engagement
Low Soph
High Soph
.4
.3
.2
.1
.1
.2
.3
Pr(Restrict Government)
.4
.5
.5
Low Engagement
Panel B. Limited Govt. (Strength Constant)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
Need for Closure
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Need for Closure
Panel C. Economic Policy Conservatism
Notes: Plots represent predicted probabilities of
limited government and values of economic
policy conservatism. Estimates were generated
holding all controls at their central tendencies.
“Low Engagement” represents independent
citizens at the 5th percentile of political
sophistication, while “High Engagement”
represents strong partisans at the 95th percentile of
political sophistication. Panel B holds partisan
strength constant at its median value.
High Engagement
.2
.3
.4
.5
Low Engagement
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Need for Closure
29
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The present paper seeks a synthesis of two research paradigms through a deeper
examination of their common focus on the concepts of security and certainty. Both political
economics-oriented and political psychology-oriented research in recent years emphasizes the
importance of needs for security and certainty as antecedents of economic preferences, but do so
in very distinct ways. While the former argues that such needs (whether common to all or in
terms of individual differences) should be related to preferences for publically-provided social
insurance, and thus economic liberalism (in its contemporary American sense), the latter
suggests that such needs should drive opposition to government redistribution and social welfare
in order to preserve status quo values, institutions, and socioeconomic arrangements. The present
paper suggests that both perspectives identify an important dynamic existing within the mass
public, but that there is heterogeneity across citizens defined by different levels of political
engagement. The politically engaged, as a function of their attention to elite discourse, view
economic conflicts as highly symbolic and ideological, and thus as battles over institutional
stability and change. The politically unengaged, lacking exposure to the rhetoric which draws out
the symbolic content of such issues, view these in more concrete and personal terms, and thus
consider their implications for personal interests qua social protection.
The punch line of this theoretical analysis is that the influence of personality qua needs
for certainty and security should vary in qualitative form across levels of political engagement,
with these needs predicting economic conservatism for the politically engaged, and economic
liberalism for the politically unengaged. Across three years of American politics, two distinct
measures of economic preferences, and two distinct measures of needs for certainty and security,
I find very strong support for these expectations. In all cases, the “crossed” interactive pattern of
30
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
marginal effects is evident and of a substantial magnitude. Indeed, the effect sizes for needs for
certainty and security rival, and in several cases exceed those of income. Simply put, the role of
personality traits related to these dispositions is critical for understanding economic preference
formation in U.S. politics among White Americans. The replications utilizing the oversamples of
Black and Latino Americans yielded no meaningful influence of such needs, but given the small
sample sizes, and limited number of tests, additional work is clearly needed to understand racial
and ethnic heterogeneity in personality processes at a deeper level.
The theory and findings of the present paper are important for a few reasons. First,
scholars in political psychology, with few exceptions (e.g. Gerber et al. 2010), have struggled to
find empirical support for the role of dispositions to preference formation in the economic
domain. The present paper provides the strongest evidence to date of the importance of needs for
certainty and security in the economic domain. Critically, however, the way in which such needs
translate into economic preferences is distinct relative to other ideological domains. Lack of
attention to this heterogeneity has likely hampered previous work, generating null results as a
function of aggregation over political engagement (see also Feldman and Johnston 2009). The
present theory offers an elegant solution to this problem, and suggests future lines of research.
One potential avenue involves direct examination of citizens’ cognitive representations of
economic issues, and how these moderate the translation of dispositions into preferences. This
approach would be more in line with the social cognitive approach to personality in psychology
(e.g. Cervone and Shoda; Mischel and Shoda 1995), and thus offers integrative potential with a
literature focused on general psychological principles.
Second, the present theory transcends debates over self-interest versus symbolic politics
(e.g. Sears and Funk 1991), showing that both forms of political preference formation can be
31
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
rooted in identical antecedents, and that both are operative within the mass public. This implies
less of a division between political economics and political psychology than is traditionally
thought. It is my feeling that these literatures can be further integrated through theorizing which
utilizes the common language of motivated social cognition (Jost et al. 2003; Kruglanski 1996;
Kruglanski and Kopetz 2009; Sorrentino and Higgins 1986). This approach focuses on general
cognitive principles of knowledge representation and accessibility in concert with the concepts of
motivation and goal-directed behavior; the so-called “warm look” on social judgment (see
Kruglanski and Kopetz 2009). In the present context, I have identified a basic set of
psychological motives (i.e. needs for certainty and security), and argued that these interact with
citizens’ representations of issues to predict preferences. By viewing such dispositions as goals
or motives rather than “traits,” a junction point is created with more classical treatments of
preference formation emphasizing rational choice and self-interest.
Third, the critical role of political engagement to this dynamic suggests that future
theorizing and research needs to reexamine the construct of engagement more generally.
Historically, political science has focused on the political knowledge, or “sophistication,” aspects
of this construct. From this view, lack of sophistication is akin to political ignorance, and
preferences for such individuals are often considered rather meaningless, as “non-attitudes” in
the classic words of Converse (1970). As shown above, however, lack of “sophistication” may
simply imply a distinct way of viewing politics rather than a lack of systematic thought about
politics. Far too little theorizing and empirical work has taken seriously the potential systematic
nature of preferences among those who pay little attention to politics. The present paper suggests
that there may be much “baby” in this supposed “bathwater.”
32
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Finally, the present results speak to contemporary debates over the importance of cultural
conflict in American politics. Recent empirical work in political science has questioned the
importance of the culture war on the basis of demonstrations that economic preferences remain
the dominant predictor of voting behavior (e.g. Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder 2006; Bartels
2006; 2008; Gelman 2008). The present results, however, suggest that such analyses may not
fully account for the importance of “cultural” factors, because they take economic preferences as
givens in their models. As I have shown, such preferences are endogenous to psychological
dispositions which constitute the dominant foundations for cultural orientations (see
Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Jost et al. 2003). Recent work has considered whether the
economic domain has been displaced by cultural conflict, but the present theory argues that
economic preferences are actually shaped by dispositions related to culture, providing a distinct,
and more subtle, mechanism by which cultural conflict impinges on American politics.
33
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS
Table A1. Regressions of Preferences for Limited Government on Needs for Certainty and
Security (NCS) and Controls for Full Samples (2000 and 2004) and Blacks and Latinos
(2008 ANES)
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable
2000 ANES
2004 ANES
Blacks
Latinos
______________________________________________________________________________
NCS
-.78 (.30)*
-.86 (.35)*
-.92 (.79)
-.18 (.70)
NCS X Soph
1.48 (.46)*
1.06 (.46)*
.26 (1.08)
-1.09 (1.06)
NCS X Strength
.60 (.41)
.35 (.39)
.69 (.80)
1.41 (.75)^
Sophistication
Partisan Strength
Age
Male
HS Degree
Some College
Associate Degree
BA Degree
Professional Degree
Income
Unemployed
-.36 (.32)
-.58 (.29)*
.19 (.15)
.31 (.07)*
.17 (.12)
.31 (.13)*
.16 (.15)
.24 (.14)^
.10 (.16)
.98 (.25)*
-.14 (.16)
.30 (.32)
-.41 (.26)
.52 (.16)*
.16 (.08)*
-.07 (.15)
.15 (.16)
-.23 (.18)
.12 (.17)
-.33 (.19)^
.42 (.16)*
-.14 (.19)
-.22 (.88)
-.90 (.66)
.53 (.27)*
.34 (.11)*
.23 (.17)
.21 (.19)
.05 (.23)
.17 (.25)
-.59 (.41)
-.21 (.26)
-.26 (.18)
.86 (.83)
-1.16 (.57)*
.52 (.28)^
.38 (.12)*
.36 (.17)*
.32 (.19)^
.67 (.25)*
.67 (.23)*
.50 (.28)
.27 (.29)
-.19 (.21)
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
-.13 (.24)
.42 (.24)
.93 (.24)
.03 (.29)
.66 (.29)
1.22 (.29)
-.37 (.67)
.76 (.67)
1.60 (.68)
.80 (.58)
1.73 (.58)
2.53 (.59)
Pseudo R^2
.04
.05
.03
.05
N
1415
971
478
417
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entries are maximum likelihood ordered probit estimates and standard errors
(in parentheses). *p<.05; ^p<.10.
34
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Table A2. Regressions of Economic Policy Conservatism on Needs for Certainty and
Security (NCS) and Controls for Full Samples (2000 and 2004) and Blacks and Latinos
(2008 ANES)
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable
2000 ANES
2004 ANES
Blacks
Latinos
______________________________________________________________________________
NCS
-.08 (.06)
-.15 (.07)*
.21 (.17)
-.03 (.17)
NCS X Soph
.22 (.10)*
.22 (.09)*
-.16 (.23)
.09 (.25)
NCS X Strength
.08 (.09)
.15 (.08)^
-.25 (.16)^
.03 (.18)
Sophistication
Partisan Strength
Age
Male
HS Degree
Some College
Associate Degree
BA Degree
Professional Degree
Income
Unemployed
Constant
-.03 (.07)
-.06 (.06)
.06 (.03)*
.01 (.01)
.05 (.03)^
.09 (.03)*
.08 (.03)*
.07 (.03)*
.07 (.03)*
.20 (.05)*
-.08 (.03)*
.40 (.05)*
-.02 (.06)
-.07 (.05)
.10 (.03)*
.02 (.02)
.04 (.03)
.06 (.03)^
.02 (.04)
.05 (.03)
.00 (.04)
.18 (.03)*
-.08 (.04)*
.29 (.06)*
.10 (.18)
.13 (.13)
.12 (.06)*
.03 (.02)
.03 (.04)
-.01 (.04)
.01 (.05)
.04 (.06)
.00 (.07)
-.04 (.06)
-.04 (.03)
.15 (.14)
-.05 (.20)
-.08 (.15)
-.02 (.06)
.01 (.03)
.07 (.03)^
.10 (.04)*
.09 (.06)
.10 (.06)^
.06 (.07)
.16 (.06)*
.02 (.05)
.23 (.14)
R^2
.07
.12
.04
.06
N
1468
1003
476
416
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Entries are ordinary least squares estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
*p<.05; ^p<.10.
35
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
APPENDIX B. QUESTION WORDINGS
Government Spending and Services
2000 (Face-to-Face; reduced to 5 points), 2004 and 2008 (Old)
Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health
and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at
point 1. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even
if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of
course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5 or 6.
2000 (Phone)
Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health
and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government
to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. [Respondents
volunteering “stay the same” are coded at the midpoint] [If “Fewer” or “More” services, “should
the government reduce/increase services a great deal, or only some?”].
2008 (New)
Do you think the government should provide MORE services than it does now, FEWER services
than it does now, or ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER of services as it does now? [If “more” or
“fewer,” “do you think the government should provide A LOT more/fewer, SOMEWHAT
more/fewer, or SLIGHTLY more/fewer services than it does now?”]
Government Health Insurance
2000 (Face-to-Face; reduced to 5 points), 2004 and 2008 (Old)
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical
and hospital expenses for everyone. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.
Others feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance
plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose these people are at the other end, at
point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3,
4, 5, or 6.
2000 (Phone)
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical
and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that all medical expenses should be paid by
individuals through private insurance plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Which
is closer to the way you feel or haven't you thought much about this? [Respondents could
volunteer “Should stay the same”] [If R chooses one of options, “Do you feel strongly or not
strongly?”]
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PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
2008 (New)
Do you FAVOR, OPPOSE, or NEITHER FAVOR NOR OPPOSE the U.S. government paying
for all necessary medical care for all Americans? [If “Favor” or “Oppose,” do you favor that A
GREAT DEAL, MODERATELY, or A LITTLE?”]
Government Jobs and Income
2000 (Face-to-Face; reduced to 5 points) and 2004
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and
a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think
the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at
the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in
between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.
2000 (Phone)
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and
a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on
their own. Which is closer to the way you feel or haven't you thought much about this?
[Respondents could volunteer “Should stay the same”] [If R chooses one of options, “Do you
feel strongly or not strongly?”]
Political Sophistication
2000 and 2004
Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in
Washington BEFORE the election (this/last) month?
Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate BEFORE the
election (this/last) month?
Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much
information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.
2000 Only
2004 Only
JANET RENO
TRENT LOTT
DENNIS HASTERT
DICK CHENEY
Both 2000 and 2004
WILLIAM REHNQUIST
TONY BLAIR
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PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
2008
For political interest, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two operationalizations:
A. Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you
say that you have been VERY MUCH interested, SOMEWHAT interested or NOT MUCH
interested in the political campaigns so far this year?
B. How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics?
EXTREMELY INTERESTED, VERY INTERESTED, MODERATELY INTERESTED,
SLIGHTLY INTERESTED, or NOT INTERESTED AT ALL?
For political knowledge, the interviewer was asked the following: “R's general level of
information about politics and public affairs seemed: Very high, Fairly high, Average, Fairly
low, or Very low.”
Both items were recoded to range from zero to one and averaged to form a single scale.
38
PERSONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY
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