FCC Neg – CFFP
Oversight Counterplan
Top Shelf
1NC Congressional Oversight CP Shell
Text: The United States Congress should adopt a committee-based prior
review of executive amendments or interpretations of surveillance laws.
The review should take placed in closed proceedings and be comprised of
a committee of members that have relevant expertise and interest in
surveillance issues drawn from both chambers. The committee should
establish functional legislative veto over executive surveillance policies
through a report and wait provision. The United States congress should
instruct the Government Accountability Office to conduct on-going
investigations to monitor executive surveillance practices.
The counterplan solves the case while avoiding the deference, politics, and
circumvention disads – ONLY the counterplan’s congressional oversight
mechanism is free from Executive Interference and doesn’t require
legislation
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
This position is appealing from the standpoint of democratic principles. But we find it too simple. There will inevitably be intelligence methods that offer major benefits for investigations and that require secrecy—
even about general practices or capabilities—to be fully effective. These methods will often raise new issues of policy, or require change in existing policy; but discussing the policy openly will, in itself, reveal the
there are only three options for Congress: forego using the new
methods, despite the resulting sacrifice of investigative effectiveness; delegate the decisions about them, without
legislative guidance, to the intelligence agencies; or adopt secret laws or interpretations to control their use. We believe the last
option—acknowledging the need for secret policies—is the preferable course. Instead of abolishing secret laws, amendments, or
interpretations, reformers should try to establish processes for making them that help
minimize their frequency and provide some degree of accountability to Congress and
the public.59 To those ends, we think that Congress should attempt to negotiate with the president to adopt
a mutually agreeable, committee-based prior review of secret executive amendments or
methods and undermine their effectiveness. In such cases,
interpretations of surveillance laws . The review should take place in closed proceedings
of a modest-sized committee whose members have relevant interest and expertise—perhaps, for
example, a select committee with members drawn from the Intelligence and Judiciary panels
of both chambers. Such a review could take different forms. In our view, the ideal would be a full-blown committee
legislative veto —in which the committee would be required to vote to accept or reject a
proposed secret interpretation before it would go into effect. However, because legislative-veto
provisions operate under a constitutional cloud and are not ultimately enforceable in court, a plausible alternative
is a report and-wait provision.60 Such a provision would require the executive to present
its intended action to the committee and wait for a specified period of time before
implementing it; the measure should also oblige the committee to take up the proposal
and render a (non-binding) approval or disapproval . Either way, the committee and each of its members would formally, though in secret,
approve or disapprove the executive proposal. Such a review is hardly guaranteed to provide strong protection for privacy interests. But unlike merely providing briefings for members, with attendance optional,
the committee review would give an identified group of legislators specific responsibility to vote
up or down on proposed secret policies. With direct responsibility to render judgment,
they would have strong incentives to attend to the information made available to them.
They could not defer to the executive, without taking responsibility for doing so, by
pleading non-involvement. Such a process, even if achievable, would be far from fully democratic. But it would provide far
more accountability to Congress and the public than do secret executive interpretations
reviewed simply by the FISA Court. Beyond the matter of secret policies, a second reform goal should be an institutional means to make concern for privacy a steadier, more reliable element
of the policy process—so that effects on privacy are at least considered and managed, even if enhanced security is usually the top priority. To ensure that legislators
have comprehensive, up-to-date analyses of surveillance programs, we believe that Congress
should instruct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct ongoing investigations of the NSA
and other intelligence agencies . The executive branch has a several watchdogs that
monitor surveillance practices, including the Inspectors General of the NSA and Justice Department, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). Although all serve important oversight functions, they have mandates that minimize privacy concerns
or they are vulnerable to White House interference . The inspectors general are concerned about waste and fraud, among many other types of
violations, while the Intelligence Advisory Board serves exclusively the president, making sure that executive orders and other directives are followed. Currently, only the PCLOB has a mission that considers and
advocates for civil-liberties protections. Over the last year, it has produced several important reviews that weigh the surveillance benefits of eavesdropping programs against the privacy costs to Americans.
A
president hostile to oversight and accountability could take similar steps to undermine the Board’s
However, prior to the Snowden leaks, both Presidents Bush and Obama let the Board sit empty for long periods, ensuring that it produced no oversight reports for most of its ten-year history.61
activities, especially once the Snowden scandals have faded. As
the
investigative wing of Congress, the GAO faces no risk of
presidential intrusion or obstruction and has both the authority and
,
know-how to conduct comprehensive intelligence oversight.62 At one time, in fact, it had a fully
staffed office at NSA headquarters where it monitored surveillance activities on an ongoing basis.63 To be
sure, resurrecting the GAO’s investigations and analysis of surveillance practices would not force policymakers or intelligence agencies to protect privacy
interests. But it could ensure that legislators are made aware of the privacy considerations in all
major decisions, and that at least one institutional unit seeks ways to minimize harm to those interests.
And, no solvency deficit – their ONLY solvency advocate says the only
reason congressional oversight fails in the status quo is because members
of congress don’t have the expertise to provide a necessary check on the
nsa – the counterplan remedies that situation by mandate
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
The executive and legislative mechanisms currently in place to provide oversight of the NSA are
inadequate in promoting public confidence and effective national security. Ostensibly, the activities of the NSA are generally governed by the Constitution, federal
law, executive orders, and regulations of the Executive Branch. 41 On the legislative side, there are two congressional
bodies—the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) —that are
responsible for ensuring that the NSA follows the applicable laws and regulations.42 In the
executive branch, NSA oversight is vested in the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Justice. 43
Ostensibly, in addition to these legislative and executive oversight mechanisms, the NSA has also implemented internal controls: the Office of the Inspector General performs
audits and investigations while the Office of Compliance operates to ensure that the NSA follows relevant standards.44 However, despite the appearance of effective controls,
these oversight mechanisms have failed to prevent the current public crisis in confidence that the NSA is fulfilling its mission with the least possible adverse impact on the
privacy of U.S. citizens. The authority of the NSA, subject to the above controls, is very limited on paper. Every intelligence activity that the NSA undertakes is purportedly
constrained to the purposes of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.45 For instance, Executive Order 12,333 provides the authority for the NSA to engage in the
“collection of communications by foreign persons that occur wholly outside the United States.”46 Additionally, FISA authorizes the NSA to compel U.S. telecommunications
companies to assist the agency in targeting persons who are not U.S. citizens and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.47 However, despite the
appearances of controls, both external and internal, the “communications of U.S. persons are sometimes incidentally acquired in targeting the foreign entities.” 48 The varying
types of data gathered can produce a “detailed map” of a given person’s life based on those persons with whom they are in contact.49 For instance, metadata can be used to
piece together substantial information about relationships; this information includes who introduced two people, when they met, and their general communication patterns, as
well as the nature and the extent of their relationships. 50 The recently disclosed collection of contact lists by the NSA has not been authorized by Congress or FISA.51
Additionally, while other collection policies that touch upon domestic communications, such as those under Section 702, have authorization, often neither lawmakers nor the
public have even a rough estimate of how many communications of U.S. citizens are being acquired.52 The NSA is easily able to operate around its apparent lack of authority.
One anonymous official has been quoted as saying that the NSA consciously avoids the restrictions placed on it by FISA by collecting this information from access points all
over the world.53 This method means that the NSA is not required to restrict itself to collecting contact lists belonging to specified intelligence targets.54 The collection
mechanism ostensibly operates under the assumption that the bulk of the data collected through the overseas access points is not data from American citizens.55 However, this
is not necessarily true due to the globalized nature of the Internet as a communications infrastructure, as “data crosses boundaries even when its American owners stay at
home.”56 The oversight mechanisms currently applied to this collection program require the NSA only to satisfy its own internal oversight mechanisms or to answer possible
congressional oversight is not
effective because members of Congress have candidly said they do not know precisely the right
inquiries from executive branch that there is a “valid foreign intelligence target” in the data collected. 57 Moreover,
questions to ask NSA officials . 58 Often in congressional hearings, NSA officials and other senior
members of the intelligence community are evasive unless directly pressed, and the congressional
committees are stymied by their lack of knowledge regarding just which questions need
asking .59 Given the realities of the NSA overstepping its authority, there is no indication to the public that the agency,
even as it has been collecting data from American citizens, has been required to answer to its various oversight
mechanisms in an effective manner. In response, President Obama directed the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) to
conduct two reports about NSA intelligence gathering methods. 60 The PCLOB is an independent, bipartisan agency within the executive branch tasked with reviewing and
analyzing executive branch actions taken in the name of national security to determine whether appropriate consideration has been afforded to civil liberties in the development
and implementation of national anti-terrorism policy.61 The recent PCLOB Report emphasizes that there is a: compelling danger . . . that the personal information collected by
the government will be misused to harass, blackmail, or intimidate, or to single out for scrutiny particular individuals or groups . . . . while the danger of abuse may seem remote,
given historical abuse of personal information by the government during the twentieth century, the risk is more than merely theoretical.62 The second report addressed more
specifically Internet surveillance activities of the NSA—specifically those undertaken pursuant to Section 702.63 These reports demonstrate that there is a serious risk of abuse
of the data collected by the NSA, as well illustrating the failings of current governmental oversight of NSA data collection policies.
2NC Overview
It’s game over on the counterplan – this is why you don’t read a version of
the aff that only has one solvency advocate – the counterplan fixes the
SINGLE issue identified by Healey as the reason that current congressional
oversight fails – lack of educated and reliable checks on NSA __________
There is NO quantifiable solvency deficit – you should evaluate the
counterplan through the lens of sufficiency – that’s best
And, this is the only oversight evidence we’ll need – GAO is the ONLY way
to check corruption and ensure accountability within the executive branch
– the cp builds trust and spills-over to the FISC
Aftergood 14
(Steven, Federation of American Scientists, “GAO Oversight of NSA: A Neglected Option,” pg
online @ http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/01/gao-nsa/ //um-ef)
Years ago, the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, conducted routine
audits and investigations of the N ational S ecurity A gency, such that the two agencies were in
“nearly continuous contact” with one another. In the post-Snowden era, GAO could
perform that oversight function once again.
“NSA advises that the GAO maintains a team permanently in residence at NSA,
resulting in nearly continuous contact between the two organizations,” according to a 1994 CIA memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence. “NSA’s practice has been
to cooperate with GAO audits and investigations to the extent possible in accordance with DOD regulations,” the CIA memorandum said. “This includes providing the GAO with
documents requested, including CCP CBJB’s [congressional budget justification books for the consolidated cryptologic program] as long as (1) the request was in support of a
valid audit or investigation and (2) the recipients of the classified material had the requisite accesses and could meet security requirements for classified data control and
storage. Documents provided in the past have included CCP CBJBs.” At a 2008 Senate hearing, Sen. Daniel Akaka asked the GAO about its relationship with NSA. “I
GAO even had an office at the NSA,” Sen. Akaka noted. “We still actually do have space at the NSA,” replied David M. Walker,
then-Comptroller General, the head of the GAO. “We just don’t use it. And the reason we don’t use it is we are not getting any
requests [from Congress]. So I do not want to have people sitting out there twiddling their thumbs.” Today, the justification for
restoring the type of on-site, investigative oversight of NSA that GAO could provide may
be newly apparent– though no one seems to have noticed that GAO could actually
provide it. The recent report of the the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies includes an appendix citing the various components of
oversight of U.S. intelligence, but it does not mention GAO at all. Whether NSA bulk collection programs are ultimately
extended, modified, or terminated , GAO could play a useful role as the eyes and ears of
Congress at NSA. While there are several other oversight mechanisms in place, GAO would bring some unique features
to the mix. NSA has a fairly robust Office of the Director of Compliance to perform internal oversight, but
it answers to the NSA Director, and reflects his priorities, not necessarily those of
Congress. Inspector general oversight focuses on compliance with the letter of the law, and it is probably less well-suited than
GAO to consider systemic problems, performance issues and policy alternatives. (Last
understand that
November, the IC Inspector General deflected a request from Senator Leahy to conduct oversight of NSA surveillance programs, citing resource limitations and other issues.)
If it were directed to conduct audits and investigations on behalf of Congress, there is
reason to believe the GAO could add a valuable dimension to NSA oversight . Just as a
proposed third-party advocate might “thicken” the deliberations of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court concerning surveillance law, so too might GAO
investigators enrich the oversight of NSA programs as they are executed in practice. In
Intelligence Community Directive 114, issued in 2011 following years of stagnation in GAO oversight of intelligence, DNI James Clapper instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to
be responsive to GAO, at least within certain boundaries. “It is IC policy to cooperate with the Comptroller General, through the GAO, to the fullest extent possible, and to
provide timely responses to requests for information,” the DNI wrote.
And, no solvency deficit – congressional information and preparation is the
issue
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
During the last five years of legislative debates over the PATRIOT Act, Congress has failed to
define or control surveillance policy. Prior to the Snowden leaks, most members had
little awareness of NSA activities and Congress had little capacity to impose constraints.
Now, more than 18 months after Snowden exposed the mass seizure of phone records, not
much has changed . To a great extent, the source of difficulty has been the inadequacy of
the institutional arrangements for legislative deliberation on secret programs. Some
members have declined opportunity to learn about domestic-spying practices, while
others have opposed placing restrictions on the NSA for fear of giving terrorists any
tactical advantage. If Congress had conducted thorough, informed deliberations at all
stages, we suspect it would have endorsed extensive collection of communication
records, but it would have also imposed limitations and constraints to minimize the harm
to privacy interests. Instead, it gave the executive branch essentially unfettered authority to
operate a massively intrusive program.
More evidence – Healey’s ONLY argument for legislative oversight failing is
a lack of focused inquiry by congress – the cp remedies that situation
Healey
(Audra, J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School, May 2015; B.A. magna
cum laude, in Political Science, concentration in Public Policy and Administration, minor Law
and Public Policy, Northeastern University, December 2011, “A Tale of Two Agencies: Exploring
Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal Communications Commission,”
pg online @ http://www.fclj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/67.1.5-Healey.pdf //um-ef)
Thus,
the current oversight system suffers from some serious failings. First, it does not allow for a
focused inquiry by the congressional committees . Additionally, the NSA can get around requirements imposed on it by FISA by conducting
Internet surveillance abroad that nonetheless captures U.S. data flows, many of which traverse foreign networks. Moreover, the NSA has over-collected data with little value to the agency’s national security
This all suggests
deficiencies in the NSA’s oversight structure, as all preventive executive, legislative, and internal controls have
not been effective.
mission, and therefore must sift through masses of data involving regular American citizens while fighting a public battle about how much information the agency collects. 67
And, even if you believe there is SOME quantifiable solvency deficit you
shouldn’t evaluate it – the ONLY person that says the FCC could do the
plan, or that it is essential is lawyer who doesn’t specialize in surveillance
issues – her best qualification is a B.A. in political science – prefer our
authors – they says the GAO is sufficient and they study surveillance every
day – they are experts in their fields and __________
And, any solvency deficit to the counterplan is irrelevant because Obama
will just circumvent the FCC anyway – prefer our 1NC Quirk evidence – it’s
a sweeping indict of any Executive action –
And, ANY attempt by the executive to constrain itself fails and results in
circumvention – it’s try or die for the counterplan and our evidence is
comparative
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
, Congress appears to have gone out of the business of determining
policy for antiterrorism surveillance. In the near term, the best hope for privacy interests is for President Obama to make good on his postFor the immediate future, however
Snowden pledge, repeated in his 2015 State of the Union Address, to reform surveillance programs in order to instill “public confidence…that the privacy of ordinary people is
If Congress is not capable of acting, the executive
branch can impose its own constraints on surveillance practices.57 But the maintenance of selfnot being violated.” He promised to work with Congress on the issue.
imposed executive-branch constraints would depend entirely on the strength of the
administration’s commitment —and, in two years’ time, on the disposition of the next president. Because of the president’s central responsibility for
the presidency is hardly a reliable institutional champion for privacy interests. If
over the long run surveillance practices are to afford significant protection to privacy interests, Congress will need to overcome its partisan gridlock and
strengthen the institutional framework for surveillance policymaking . We suggest two long-term goals. First,
Congress should seek some means of enhancing its capacity for oversight and policymaking on secret
national security,
surveillance practices. Some reformers have called for abolishing or prohibiting any secret laws or interpretations that control investigations. In his 2011 speech mentioned
above, Senator Wyden acknowledged that surveillance activities are necessarily secret.58 He insisted, however, that the policies governing those activities should be debated
and decided openly, through normal democratic processes. He argued that secret laws, or secretly sanctioned interpretations of laws, are incompatible with democracy.
2NC Solvency (Cong Education)
And, it’s just a lack of understanding and education – prefer our evidence
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
Overall, ignorance and misinformation marred congressional deliberations on the
renewal of the business-records provision. Prominent members, including committee
chairs, made specious claims to suggest that records requests had a limited scope,
much like subpoenas in criminal probes. These comparisons reinforced the general view
that agents only used FISA Court orders in traditional types of investigations where only one or
a few suspects were targeted. Opponents could not refute these inaccurate statements
without exposing the classified metadata program, and thus they faced an
insurmountable deliberative challenge: to persuade colleagues of privacy violations
without identifying the nature of the violations or providing any evidence of them.
Wyden’s speech presented the sharpest, most detailed rebuttal. But the many members who
had not attended classified briefings lacked a basis for evaluating Wyden’s claims against the
many assurances from committee chairs that the PATRIOT Act authorized only modest,
uncontroversial surveillance tools.
More evidence – ineffective oversight is due to lack of preparation and
understanding
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
Feingold’s statement revealed that some members of Congress were engaged in closeddoor deliberations over domestic surveillance. We do not have direct reports on those
discussions. As a result of the Snowden leaks, however, we know a good deal about the
classified briefings and the information they provided to members. The Intelligence and
Judiciary panels had access to all FISA documents and reports, and they were briefed regularly
about the dragnets.33 In contrast with Bush, the Obama administration took steps to involve all
members of Congress in the debate over metadata collection. It prepared a five-page letter on
the business-records provision and the NSA bulk programs, and instructed the intelligence
panels to provide all House and Senate members access to the letter before any reauthorization
vote.34
Nevertheless, we have grounds for skepticism about the effectiveness of those closeddoor deliberations. We do not know what questions were asked, what claims were made,
or what materials were presented in the closed sessions. Moreover, and perhaps more
important, we do not know how many members read the Obama letter or sought
information from intelligence officials or the committees. But as we discuss later, most
members apparently failed to learn about the metadata programs until the Snowden
leaks—indicating that the procedures for classified deliberations did not succeed in
providing the essential information to a critical mass of members.
And, lack of effective oversight is due to lack of congressional preparation
and deference that the counterplan reverses
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
The congressional response: Deference and avoidance By the time the PATRIOT Act came
up for its second renewal in 2009, the executive branch had abandoned the strategy of secrecy
and unilateralism on the metadata programs. Starting in 2007, after the dragnets had received
court approval, the Bush administration provided full and regular disclosures to the Intelligence
and Judiciary committees.27 Going further, the Obama administration made repeated efforts
to provide all members of Congress, through secret briefings, with the essential
information on the metadata programs.28 The reauthorization thus gave Congress the
opportunity to respond to the vast executivebranch expansion of phone and email
surveillance. But Congress neither sought to reassert the privacy protections of the
existing business-records provisions— forcing an end to the dragnet programs—nor
attempted to establish legislative standards to regulate the collection and use of
metadata. In effect, Congress surrendered control to the executive branch . Congress’s
passivity partly reflected the incentives of individual members to defer to the executive
and avoid the security and political risks of imposing constraints on investigatory
methods. But the restricted flow of information on secret intelligence capabilities and
practices also contributed heavily. Most legislators did not attend classified briefings—
some because they lacked interest in surveillance policy, others because they were
intentionally excluded from meetings by congressional leaders. A few highly engaged
members, mostly Democrats, made use of the executive briefings to become well informed. But
these members could not speak publicly about the actual practice of bulk collection and, as a
result, could not make an effective case for policy change. Meanwhile, leading members who
wanted to protect the metadata program from legislative interference took advantage of the
widespread ignorance to misrepresent business-records orders as narrowly-focused
investigative tools. As the later reaction to the Snowden leaks made clear, most members
remained serenely clueless about metadata collection. Congress in the end opted for two shortterm extensions before reauthorizing the business-records provision, without change, until June
2015. The debates over renewal stretched over three years, from 2009 to 2011, giving the
appearance of thorough deliberation. But that appearance was utterly false. While maintaining
the secrecy of the metadata program, Congress failed to assess the security value of mass
records seizures, to weigh the resulting harm to privacy interests, or to impose standards or
requirements to minimize that harm.
2NC GAO Solvency
GAO oversight of the NSA is the best solution
Aftergood 2014 directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy (steven, “GAO Oversight of
NSA: A Neglected Option”, http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/01/gao-nsa/0)//AN
Years ago, the G overnment A ccountability O ffice, the investigative arm of Congress, conducted routine audits
and investigations of the N ational S ecurity A gency, such that the two agencies were in “nearly continuous contact” with
one another. In the post-Snowden era, GAO could perform that oversight function once again. “NSA advises that the GAO maintains
a team permanently in residence at NSA, resulting in nearly continuous contact between the two organizations,” according to a 1994
CIA memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence. “NSA’s
practice has been to cooperate with GAO
audits and investigations to the extent possible in accordance with DOD regulations,” the CIA memorandum said. “This
includes providing the GAO with documents requested, including CCP CBJB’s [congressional budget justification books for the
consolidated cryptologic program] as long as (1) the request was in support of a valid audit or investigation and (2) the recipients of
the classified material had the requisite accesses and could meet security requirements for classified data control and storage.
Documents provided in the past have included CCP CBJBs.” At a 2008 Senate hearing, Sen. Daniel Akaka asked the GAO about its
relationship with NSA. “I understand that GAO even had an office at the NSA,” Sen. Akaka noted. “We still actually do have space at
the NSA,” replied David M. Walker, then-Comptroller General, the head of the GAO. “We just don’t use it. And the reason we don’t
use it is we are not getting any requests [from Congress]. So I do not want to have people sitting out there twiddling their thumbs.”
Today, the justification for restoring the type of on-site, investigative oversight of NSA that GAO
could provide may be newly apparent – though no one seems to have noticed that GAO could
actually provide it. The recent report of the the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies includes an
appendix citing the various components of oversight of U.S. intelligence, but it does not mention GAO at all. Whether NSA
bulk collection programs are ultimately extended, modified, or terminated, GAO could play a useful role
as the eyes and ears of Congress at NSA . While there are several other oversight mechanisms in place,
GAO would bring some unique features to the mix . NSA has a fairly robust Office of the Director of
Compliance to perform internal oversight, but it answers to the NSA Director, and reflects his priorities, not necessarily those of
Congress. Inspector general oversight focuses on compliance with the letter of the law, and it is probably
less well-suited than GAO to consider systemic problems, performance issues and policy alternatives. (Last November, the IC
Inspector General deflected a request from Senator Leahy to conduct oversight of NSA surveillance programs, citing resource
limitations and other issues.) If
it were directed to conduct audits and investigations on behalf of
Congress, there is reason to believe the GAO could add a valuable dimension to NSA oversight . Just
as a proposed third-party advocate might “thicken” the deliberations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court concerning
surveillance law, so too might GAO investigators enrich the oversight of NSA programs as they are executed in practice. In
Intelligence Community Directive 114, issued in 2011 following years of stagnation in GAO oversight of intelligence, DNI James
Clapper instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to be responsive to GAO, at least within certain boundaries. “It is IC policy to
cooperate with the Comptroller General, through the GAO, to the fullest extent possible, and to provide timely responses to requests
for information,” the DNI wrote.
2NC Solvency
Report and wait solves – provides a legislative check on the president
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
To the dismay of many close observers of legislative-executive relations, the legislative
veto was ruled unconstitutional in a 1983 Supreme Court decision (INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 [1983]). Thus such provisions are not
enforceable in the federal courts. But that limitation has not ended a practice that both the legislative and
executive branches sometimes find useful . The executive branch often accepts legislative veto
provisions in legislation and then generally complies with any resulting vetoes—primarily
because the arrangement makes it easier for Congress to permit broader grants of
discretionary authority. See Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, Congressional Research Service, RS22132 (May 2, 2005); Walter J. Oleszek,
Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 9th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014), pp. 394-395. Jessica Korn argues not only that the “reportand-wait” provision is on sounder constitutional footing than the legislative veto, but that it is also nearly as effective in
ensuring meaningful legislative participation. See Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth
of the Legislative Veto (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Legislative Veto Now
And, legislative veto exists and is used effectively by congress now – no
solvency deficit
Fisher 5
(Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Government and Finance Division, pg
online @ http://www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/4116.pdf //um-ef)
Congress often enacts limitations, prohibitions, and provisos in statutes that prevent
agencies from engaging in certain actions or activities. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Supreme
Court addressed a particular type of “legislative veto,” an oversight mechanism used by Congress for half a century to monitor and control the
executive branch without having to pass a law. Congress could approve or disapprove executive decisions through legislative actions that were short of
a public law: one-house vetoes, two-house vetoes, and committee vetoes. Those legislative actions were not submitted to the President for his
signature or veto. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger invalidated the legislative veto. The Court ruled that whenever congressional
action has the “purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations” of persons outside the legislative branch, Congress must act
through both houses in a bill or resolution submitted to the President. 462 U.S. 919, at 952. Congress therefore had to comply with two elements of the
Constitution: bicameralism (passage by both houses) and the Presentation Clause (presenting a bill to the President for his signature or veto). All
legislative vetoes violated the latter principle because they were not presented to the President. Some legislative vetoes violated bicameralism
because only one house (or committee) had to exercise the congressional approval or disapproval. Under Chadha, Congress could no longer exercise
executive control merely by passing “simple resolutions” (adopted by either chamber), “concurrent resolutions” (passed by both chambers but not sent
to the President), or by committee action. In
response to Chadha, Congress eliminated the legislative veto
from a number of statutes. The legislative veto continues, however, as a practical
accommodation between executive agencies and congressional committees. A CRS
review of statutes enacted since 1983 reveals that more than 400 new legislative vetoes
(usually of the committee variety) have been enacted since Chadha. In addition, legislative vetoes of an
informal and nonstatutory nature continue to affect executive-legislative relations . Practice in
this area has been determined more by pragmatic agreements hammered out between the elected branches than by doctrines fashioned and
announced by the Supreme Court.
Congress Solvency
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
Ideally, in the aftermath of the Snowden scandals, Congress would undertake to restore order and legal
regularity to surveillance policy by passing new legislation on the metadata program.
Conceivably, it could choose to end bulk collection of phone records and reaffirm the original
requirement of individual orders for the seizure of a target’s business records. Given the prevailing
sense of urgency about antiterrorism security, however, we think a constructive measure would more likely
sanction metadata collection, subject to conditions and requirements designed to avoid
unnecessary harm to privacy interests.
Deference Net Benefit
Too Much Deference Now
Too much deference now – its convenient and politically palatable
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
Finally, and very important, Congress has particular difficulties with policies that must be
decided in secret—such as those for controlling technologically advanced surveillance
methods. To prevent profuse leaks, Congress and the executive have imposed severe
restrictions on members’ access to information. When the full House or Senate decides
policy, however, the restricted information encourages some members to opt out of
serious participation , degrading the intelligence of deliberation and promoting deference to
the executive. Lacking any settled disposition on surveillance issues, Congress will respond to
the leadership, and sometimes merely the political cover, provided by other institutions—
especially the president, the intelligence agencies, and the FISA Court. It may take cues from
the Justice Department or other executive agencies, and it will defer to rulings by the regular
federal courts. In the end, Congress’s performance in protecting privacy may depend on the
design of the legislative arrangements for dealing with secret programs and on the structures
and missions of relevant administrative and judicial institutions.
Lack of effective congressional oversight due to deference to the Executive
– results in failed and ineffective policies
Bendix and Quirk 15
(William Bendix, is an assistant professor of political science at Keene State College. His
research focuses on Congress, legislative deliberation, and homeland security and civil liberties
policies and Paul J. Quirk, is the Phil Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the
University of British Columbia and a former research associate at the Brookings Institution. His
work focuses on debate and deliberation in Congress and the mass Public, “Secrecy and
negligence: How Congress lost control of domestic surveillance,” pg online @
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligencecongres-surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf //um-ef)
Our account of the development of the metadata surveillance programs centers on Congress
and its interactions with several institutions—the president, the FISA Court, and the Justice
Department, among others—and proceeds through several phases. We begin with brief
theoretical remarks on the central institutional properties that drive the account. We argue that
Congress as an institution has great difficulty acting in any consistent, balanced way to protect
privacy interests on surveillance issues. On one hand, when setting broad priorities in general
terms, it attaches considerable weight to privacy interests. On the other hand, when faced with
specific issues of investigatory authority, it readily makes sweeping, indiscriminate sacrifices of
those same interests—even without distinct evidence of serious threat. The lack of consistency
in defending privacy interests has several sources. Most fundamental, legislators reflect the
attitudes and demands of their constituencies. The American public has generally been quite
willing to surrender privacy rights for the sake of enhanced security, against even unspecified,
highly indefinite terrorist threats.1 In addition, there are generally no well-organized, powerful
constituencies for privacy interests.2
But several factors exaggerate the effect. First, decisions on surveillance are largely about risk
(for example, the probability of an abusive “fishing expedition” versus that of a major terrorist
attack). Congress members have strong temptations to defer to the executive branch on
decisions that could, therefore, turn out badly. Second, the president’s party is more interested
in defending the executive than in checking its decisions.3
Third, surveillance politics is complicated by long-term partisan and ideological divisions that
were shaped by the particular conflicts of the Cold War era. For generations, the main targets of
intelligence-agency surveillance have been mostly on the political left. This history may inhibit
the response of many Republicans to the threat of intrusive government, even though the main
targets and likely victims of intrusive surveillance are no longer a well-defined ideological
category. Fourth, the committee system has been another impediment: overlapping jurisdictions
among the Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Judiciary panels prevent any one of them from
being held accountable for stalled policy or lapses in oversight.4
PCLOB CP
1NC CP Shell
**Plan Text:
The United States Federal Government should strengthen the oversight of the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board of the National Security Agency by
--expanding hiring authority
--granting all necessary enforcement powers and resources
AND
--amending the National Security Agency organic statute to provide for collection of data
and requiring the agency to comply with requests for data for the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board
PCLOB is terrible—but hiring new workers and granting authority solves
Calabrese 2012 Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office (Chris, “The Limits of
Oversight and the PCLOB”, https://www.aclu.org/blog/limits-oversight-and-pclob)//AN
Today, the nominees to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board (PCLOB) were voted from the Senate Judiciary Committee for full consideration in the Senate. It looks like the
Senate is finally going to act to nominate five people to fill this vital oversight board. While this is an important step, it’s also something of a good government scandal and
certainly a cautionary tale about the limits of oversight. The scandalous part is simple: it took us five years to get here. Back in 2007, the PCLOB was reconstituted from an
Executive branch function with limited authority and independence to a stronger independent body (i.e., an independent commission like the FTC, FCC etc.). It was formally
tasked with two purposes: (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced
with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations,
and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. Apparently that level of oversight and independence was too much for both Democratic and Republican
administrations to stomach. Through the simple expedient of not nominating anyone to fill the vacant seats, the PCLOB was a dead letter from 2007 until now. In spite of
numerous appeals from advocates and lawmakers, neither President Bush nor President Obama wanted an independent eye on what was happening with counter-terrorism
policy in the U.S. Here are at least three guesses why that might be the case. Seemingly, it was only the pressure of an election year that forced action. A pretty straightforward
there is the question of resources or
the lack thereof. We wrote an in-depth report on this a few years ago, but one of the basic takeaways is that the national security establishment is huge, with
tens of thousands of employees and a budget of more than $60 billion . The NSA alone has
more than 30,000 employees. Contrast that with the PCLOB. It’s currently authorized (if it finally gets
filled) to spend a whopping $900,000 and hire ten full-time employees for the 2012 fiscal year. With this
level of staffing, it’s hard to imagine that the Board and its investigators can even begin to understand
this vast national security infrastructure, never mind properly oversee it. Nor are all resource issues just about
money. To give just one example, the PCLOB does not have subpoena authority—it cannot force an agency to
produce documents or answer questions on its own. Instead it has to ask the Attorney General to
enforce a subpoena when it gets stonewalled. That’s another cumbersome barrier and a real threat to its independence. In addition,
lesson: if there is no one doing the oversight job, there is no danger of bad practices being uncovered. Then
Congress has an almost infinite expectation of what the PCLOB can accomplish. When it was created, the Board was tasked with reviewing all proposed and existing
legislation, regulations, and policies related to terrorism, and advising the President and executive branch on whether there was an appropriate balance between terrorism
It’s exhausting just thinking about ten
people trying to do all that. One final example. Recently the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) made a huge change to how intelligence agencies
power and civil liberties. More recently it was suggested that the board oversee cybersecurity as well.
handle information that is gathered about U.S. persons. Instead of treating such collection as a mistake and requiring the data be discarded within 180 days (the old policy), it
now allows information on innocent Americans with no connection to terrorism to be held, analyzed, and shared for up to five years. Information on millions of Americans is
flowing through the NCTC and its enormous intelligence apparatus, used in a wide variety of ways and shared for almost any security-related reason. Who has the responsibility
We’ll happily work with and try to assist the PCLOB,
and if and when they uncover real wrongdoing we’ll applaud them for it. But realistic policy making
demands that we understand the limits of what this institution can do and how much oversight
work is still left to be done. Congress should act to ramp up the Board and expand its
for monitoring and overseeing this entire system? The PCLOB, of course.
hiring authority. With all the billions we spend on our national security establishment, we need
to make sure we have checks and balances that are commensurate with the challenge.
The CP is the best oversight mechanism for the NSA—however it lacks
enforcement powers—Congressional support solves any reasons why
PCLOB would fail
Stanley 2013 - Senior Policy Analyst, ACLU Speech, Privacy & Technology Project (Jay, “What
Powers Does the Civil Liberties Oversight Board Have?”, https://www.aclu.org/blog/whatpowers-does-civil-liberties-oversight-board-have)//AN
At a time when the Snowden revelations have focused new attention on the question of oversight over our giant national security establishment, many are closely watching the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB). The
PCLOB is a brand new organization and still quite small, but it holds great promise as a truly
independent mechanism for much-needed oversight over the national security state . In coming
months and years, we will see whether it is able to live up to that potential. So far the
PCLOB seems to be doing a commendable job with
limited resources in tackling the biggest privacy issue confronting us today, NSA surveillance. Today they’re holding a public hearing on NSA and FBI spying that will
feature officials from those agencies and the Justice Department, as well as some outside experts. What powers does the PCLOB have? We issued a report in late
2009 about how the United States needs institutions equivalent to the privacy commissioners that nearly every other advanced-industrial democratic nation has. In writing that report, we evaluated this new
institution (as reconstituted by Congress in 2007; see timeline) and its powers (which are set out in Section 801 of this law).
Like many independent federal commissions ( FCC,
FTC, etc), the
PCLOB consists of a chairman and four additional members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They serve for overlapping six-year terms with no more than three members being
from the same party. Mandate The board’s mandate is to “analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation
from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties” and to “ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and
implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.” Note that this mandate appears to restrict the board’s oversight powers to the government’s anti-terrorism
programs, and that its oversight role does not extend to other areas that can raise civil liberties issues such as the War on Drugs, crime prevention, or benefits programs. Functions The PCLOB is directed by
Congress to fulfill five primary functions: Provide “advice and counsel on policy development and implementation” by reviewing proposed legislation, regulations and policies. Provide oversight by “continually
review[ing]” implementation of the regulations, policies, and procedures, “information sharing practices,” and “other actions” of the executive branch. Work with the privacy officers and civil liberties officers of
and “when appropriate,” “coordinate the activities” of those officers. Submit semiannual reports to Congress and the President.
Inform the public by releasing its reports “in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible,” by holding public hearings, or
through other methods. Powers and limitations Congress gave the board significant powers to access information. The statute directs that “If determined by the Board to be necessary”
to carry out its functions, the PCLOB “is authorized to” “Have access from any department, agency, or element
of the executive branch” to “all relevant” records or material, “including classified information consistent with
federal agencies—receive reports from, make recommendations to,
applicable law. “ “Interview, take statements from, or take public testimony from personnel” of any element of the executive branch. “Request information or assistance from any State, tribal, or local government.”
Compel testimony by subpoena from persons “other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch,” a majority of the board can submit a written request to the Attorney General to issue a
subpoena on behalf of the board. Within 30 days, the AG must either comply or provide a written explanation for a denial to the board and to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. This is a strangely
contorted way of giving the board subpoena power, and inserts a powerful executive branch official whose agency may be a subject of the board’s oversight into the process—but at least it only applies to
What Congress did not give the PCLOB the power to do, unfortunately, is challenge
agencies’ secrecy powers when it finds those powers have been abused to cover up
wrongdoing or incompetence or to prevent legitimate public debate. At a time when such abuses of secrecy powers are widespread, it is not clear how the
PCLOB would or could proceed if, for example, it uncovers brazen violations of the law that are
classified (as they most likely would be). The PCLOB also has no enforcement power. Other than by going to court like anyone else, it cannot order any
subpoenas directed outside government.
government agency to change its practices or otherwise enforce the law. Other countries give their privacy commissioners such powers; in 2008, for example, the Italian government decided to publish the income
tax returns of all Italian citizens on the Internet. The Italian data protection authority did not just condemn the action, or hold hearings, or file a court case—it ordered the information taken down, and it was. In
some countries, such as Slovenia, the data protection commissioner also has the power to unilaterally declassify information. Ultimately, as we laid out in our 2009 report,
we would like to
see Congress bolster those powers—broadening its mandate, giving it powers against
overclassification, and giving it enforcement powers. It’s also, as I’ve said before, crucial that the
board be given resources to grow into its giant task of overseeing our $80 billion
national security establishment. But for now we are glad to see the PCLOB off to such a promising
start in making use of the powers it has been given.
Strengthened PCLOB is key to solve the protection of whistleblowers
Messmer 2014 writer and consultant for the Palma Sola legal group (Ellen
Messmer is also the senior editor at Network World, an IDG website, where she covers news
and technology trends related to information security. “NSA's civil liberties impact to be
measured by federal watchdog” Pub. March 5, 2014 Network World Online; Lexis Academic
Accessed 7/15/15 DH)
A government watchdog group tasked with overseeing whether actions the President's executive office takes to combat terrorism don't throw civil liberties overboard in the process is taking aim at the National
PCLOB) is the federal agency within the
executive branch that's expected to independently review anti-terrorism efforts to see if they comply with established law and to
ensure "liberty concerns" are addressed. Some think a privacy group so close to the President
would only be a "rubber-stamp" operation. But the PCLOB surprised more than a few when its recent 238-page report bluntly
condemned the NSA surveillance program collecting bulk telephony call records as illegal, saying it should be shut down. Now the PCLOB is
turning its attention to "PRISM," the purported NSA surveillance program that has come to light through leaks to the media from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
Security Agency's "PRISM" data-collection surveillance program. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (
"Our responsibility is to provide advice to the President," said David Medine, chair of PCLOB, speaking on a panel at the recent RSA Conference in San Francisco. He said the group hopes to be able to issue its
report on PRISM within the next few months. The group is obtaining information about PRISM from various agencies, including the NSA, and the private sector. Medine notes the
members have top-secret clearances,
PCLOB, whose five
can gain access to surveillance court decisions, agency officials and can even see program
demonstrations. PRISM is a secret NSA program in which high-tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and Facebook, among others, must cooperate by providing data on end users to the NSA. PRISM
has been described in various ways by journalists, mainly from The Guardian, New York Times and Washington Post, who were given top-secret documents from Snowden directly, though sometimes only
PowerPoint slides. "There's a lot of inaccurate reporting in the media" Medine remarked about what he's seen in the news about PRISM in comparison to what the PCLOB is learning. Though he didn't go into
detail about how news reporting on PRISM may be off the mark, he suggested that news stories are sometimes simply reporting older information as current, for example. In any event, the PCLOB hopes to issue
its own findings on the NSA PRISM program fairly soon, though the PCLOB itself, composed of lawyers, is somewhat hobbled by the fact that only Medine is a full-time member and the four other board members,
split between Democrat and Republican party representation, do this part-time while holding down regular jobs. This part-time aspect of running the board puts a strain on what can be done, some PCLOB
members acknowledge, though some, such as James Dempsey, think it's a good model for oversight. As regards, PRISM, "I hope in our report we can be more clear about how that works," Dempsey said during
the panel discussion at RSA Conference. Though the PCLOB was created through federal law in 2007, it only really got into working gear last May -- right before the Snowden leaks began -- when Medine was
The group anticipates there will be many more privacy and civil
liberties issues it will take up, not all of them related directly to NSA Internet surveillance. Medine thinks the group could one day take on the privacy and civil liberties
implications of drones used by the government. In addition, the question has come up whether the PCLOB could play the role as a "safe haven"
appointed as its chair after a Congressional review process.
for "whistleblowers " to share information about government programs they think violate
civil liberties. Medine is open to this idea of the group being "the central place to go" for whistleblowers in this regard.
Independently, the FCC is bad—it wrecks accountability and risks
corruption as the FCC attempts to control aspects of the “media”—
exposure is key to bring public awareness to controversies
MacKenzie 2014 Reporter for Newsmax (Drew, “FCC Whistleblower Pai: News Bias Study
'Suspended,' Not 'Canceled'”, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/fcc-media-biasconstitution/2014/02/24/id/554521/)//AN
FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai, who blew the whistle on the federal agency’s plan to study
purported bias in the news , says the survey has been "suspended," not canceled as the FCC has said. The Federal
Communications Commission declared last week that it had shelved a controversial survey on how
newsrooms cover various news stories, which was derided by critics as a threat to the First
Amendment right of press freedom. Urgent: Do You Approve Or Disapprove of President Obama's Job Performance? Vote Now in
Urgent Poll But in explaining the decision, FCC spokeswoman Shannon Gilson said that "the pilot will not be undertaken until a new study design is
final," suggesting the program could be brought back at a later date. "It's suspended, and the way I like to think about it is [how] you would think about
a baseball game being suspended," Pai told "The Steve Malzberg Show" on Newsmax TV. "It’s not being canceled, it could come back," he said
Monday. "The good thing is that the FCC has said that any study along these lines will not involve government researchers going into newsrooms and
asking questions about a perceived station bias or how they decide to cover certain stories, not others, whether they're covering the critical information
needs that people need to know. "But nonetheless,
we need to remain vigilant to make sure that any future
study doesn't intrude on that core constitutional freedom of the press . The devil's going to be in the
details, and if they decide to go ahead with this study, you can rest assured that I'll be watching to make sure that nothing like this is attempted again."
Pai had revealed earlier this month to The Wall Street Journal that the
FCC planned to infiltrate newsrooms with the
potential that media organizations would eventually be pressured into covering certain
stories.
But he told Newsmax that
the agency, as part of its apparent plan to intrude on media coverage, had twisted a
provision of the law that requires the FCC to report to Congress every three years on barriers that businesses face when they're trying to get into the
communications industry and the broadcasting business. "As I looked over the study design, it seemed to me that some of the questions and some of
the purposes had nothing to do with that report. I mean, they're trying to figure out what a station's perceived bias is or whether reporters have been
told by management not to cover certain stories," Pai said. "I mean, that has nothing to do with barriers to entry, and that's one of the reasons why I got
a little bit concerned, especially because this was an initiative that none of us voted on. This wasn't decided by a vote of all the commissioners, and it
was important to bring public awareness to this issue."
2NC Solvency
Your own solvency ev says that Congress needs to amend the organic
statute of NSA law to comply with oversight mechanisms for the FCC—
proves the CP would solve and the aff wouldn’t
Healey, 14 - J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School (Audra, “A Tale of
Two Agencies: Exploring Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal
Communications Commission”, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 67,
December)
The lack of oversight of NSA data collection practices will continue to be problematic moving forward, as national security is an
ongoing concern and technology is a large part of life in a modern society. There
is need for effective and
transparent oversight of the NSA’s data collection. As such, Congress should act by amending the
organic statutes of both the NSA and the FCC to provide the FCC with oversight authority over
the NSA, and by allowing the FCC to participate as amicus curiae with the FISA Court. 1.
Congress should amend the NSA organic statute to provide for collection of data by the
FCC . The NSA needs transparent and easily understood oversight. While it should not have to disclose national security
information, the agency should be required to disclose basic statistics, such as how much
information it is gathering, similar to Recommendation 9 in the second PCLOB Report. 118 This would at least illustrate to
the public, via the FCC, that the NSA is targeting its surveillance at legitimate threats to national security—rather than performing
blanket surveillance of all Internet users. Further, these
reforms would comport with the PCLOB’s
enumerated Recommendations.119 As of now, “lawmakers and the public do not have even a rough estimate of how
many communications of U.S. persons are acquired under section 702.”120 Because the NSA is required to target foreign
communications in order for its surveillance to be lawful, 121 an annual snapshot showing the volume of its surveillance will help
foster some degree of transparency, 122 helping assure citizens that their privacy is not being intruded upon, without hampering
legitimate national security efforts. 123 This expanded role for the FCC in relation to the NSA should be codified by Congress.
First, Congress should amend the NSA’s organic statute to require the agency to comply
with FCC requests for data . Additionally, while the FCC does not have the security clearance to review the substance
should require the
NSA to provide targeting statistics that could be reasonably disclosed, or at least preliminary statistics that could focus
the FCC’s inquiry. This new legislation is all that is necessary to facilitate oversight on the NSA side, as the FCC will require
most of the congressional authorization.
of the surveillance, such clearance is not necessary on an agency-wide basis. Instead, Congress
NB Impact: Democracy
Whistleblowers good- key to preserve democracy
Macintyre ’13 Linden MacIntyre (born May 29, 1943) is a Canadian journalist, broadcaster and novelist. He has won eight
Gemini Awards, anInternational Emmy and numerous other awards for writing and journalistic excellence, including the 2009
Scotiabank Giller Prize for his 2009 novel, The Bishop's Man. Well known for many years for his stories on CBC's the fifth estate, in
2014 he announced his retirement from the show at age 71. His final story, broadcast on November 21, 2014, was "The
Interrogation Room" about police ethics and improper interrogation room tactics.[1] 10-31-2013, "Why whistleblowers are crucial for
democracy: Linden MacIntyre," No Publication, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/why-whistleblowers-are-crucial-for-democracy-lindenmacintyre-1.2288168
The conscientious public servant, having agreed verbally with the reporter that the conflict of interest in his department is egregious,
has privately explained how it works - and has now nervously consented to make available a document that will authenticate the
story. There is a brief encounter in a busy public square. An envelope appears out of one briefcase, disappears into another. A
silent whistle has been blown. That was an actual transaction that occurred on an overcast autumn day in 1977. A crooked mayor
lost his job because of it. It's a scenario that has played out many times. A provincial cabinet minister once handed me a devastating
analysis of a hugely expensive public project. I had it for a weekend, it was about 150 pages long. Trusted friends and I
laboriouslycopied the entire document on a typewriter before I gave it back - and started to report its contents. Another leak: an
associate in Ottawa drove to a residential address where, by arrangement, an envelope was recovered from a private mailbox. The
document retrieved from that mailbox was instrumental in derailing a secret process to licence an agricultural drug of dubious value
and demonstrated peril. That’s the way the whistle blew in “the old days.” Now the
revolution in technology has
simplified the process and amplified the whistle to a degree that would have been
unimaginable even 20 years ago. The secret diplomatic pouch is now potentially
transparent, as demonstrated by an outraged U.S. army private, Bradley/Chelsea
Manning, who co-operated with Julian Assange and Wikileaks to blow the whistle on a
global scale. And even the agencies of espionage are now publicly accountable for their
tactics - all because a young civilian named Edward Snowden found some of their
activities abusive and corrupt. The names Assange, Manning and Snowden are associated with a transformation in
the vulnerability of institutions in both the public and private realms. Institutions gather, store and analyze vast amounts of
information about individuals and other institutions. The process, even when intentions are benign, is nonetheless invasive. The
purpose of the information gathering is, in one rendering, to protect us from each other and ourselves. But it is also for the purpose
of manipulation, to influence how we vote and spend and think. And so, people of a certain moral profile who have access to the
information will be offended and some will risk liberty and life to let us in on what the institutions know about us. That’s the way the
world has worked since people first discovered the utility of information and the power of secrecy. In a memorable scene from the
movie The Fifth Estate, a journalist opines that speeches in the British House of Commons were once so secret that people caught
leaking them to the public were hanged for it. Not exactly true - but the Commons debates were conducted secretly, and people
went to prison for reporting them in pamphlets. Public outrage, fired by whistleblowing, eventually put a stop to secrecy in
parliament. The modern pamphlet is a blog or tweet, the brown envelope is now a tiny thumb-drive with the information-carrying
capacity of a truckload of paper documents. And from the opposing perspective, technology has also enabled institutions to delve
deeply into private lives for law enforcement, commerce and the vague new project known as “public safety”. Technology has
changed, but human nature hasn’t and that’s a good thing. The
human tendency to be offended by abuse torture in a secret prison, a lie told under oath to fool the public, squandering of public
treasure - remains a vital force in conscientious people. And we witness their responses
with sufficient frequency to remind the advocates and practitioners of secrecy that they
are vulnerable, too. They're at the mercy of basic human instincts (be they narcissistic or
humanitarian), and the technology that makes their secrets more accessible and portable than
at any other time in human history. The furious response to Manning and Wikileaks and Snowden underscores the
impact of the message in their actions just as it obscures a fundamental question: Why did they do what they did and for whose
benefit? There was no possibility of personal gain and almost certainly they faced the prospect of severe punishment. They have
been accused of recklessness and treachery. Extremists have called for their deaths. Manning will spend decades in prison. Both
Julian Assange and Edward Snowden are fugitives from a prosecution that would be familiar to a Guantanamo detainee. Maybe
they were delusional. But the information inherent in the act of whistleblowing is perhaps more useful than the sordid details in the
documents they leaked. What
we know shapes what we think. What we think determines our
behaviour. There will always be clandestine efforts to manage what we think and thus
control how we behave as consumers and as citizens. But there is also a fundamental
human impulse to resist manipulation and, because secrecy is essential to manipulation
and control, there will always be individuals who will rebel against it. The English philosopher
Jeremy Bentham put it strongly - but his words have been embraced in principle and
often quoted by politicians and jurists while making and interpreting our laws: “In the
darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have full swing.” In another
essay more than 200 years ago, Bentham said, “Secrecy, being an instrument of
conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular government”. Those are words
that whistleblowers live by, which makes them auditors of governance and guarantors of
our democracy.
Democracy prevents war and promotes economic growth.
Lagon ’11 Mark P. Lagon is Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) Program
at Georgetown University. He teaches MSFS courses on Ethics and Decision-Making, and on the UN and Global Institutions. He is
also Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for
the United States and the International Community A Markets and Democracy Brief; http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promotingdemocracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090
Stakes in Democracy Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build
support for strategic policies. Yet there
are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the
world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism.
Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of
this truth. Democracies
often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a
panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that
established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists”
advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of
character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However,
durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes
similar international conduct for governments. There has long been controversy about whether democracy enhances economic
development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history
will likely show that
democracy yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of
the past three years, democracy’s elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These
elements include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and
rule of law to foster predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good
governance as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such as India and Brazil and
raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield political
freedoms may be reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship between political and
economic liberalization. Finally,
democracy affords all groups equal access to justice—and equal
opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy. Democracy’s support for pluralism prevents
human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being squandered. Indeed, a shortage of
economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed significantly to the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism
is also precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world.
NB Impact: Corruption
Corruption causes poverty and kills the economy - increases income
equality and reduces public revenue.
Tanzi 98 Vito Tanzi is an expert economist with extensive experience in academia, government and international institutions.
In addition to serving as a senior consultant to the Inter-American Development Bank from 2003-2007, Tanzi has consulted for the
World Bank, the United Nations, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Organization of American States. Tanzi’s extensive research and writing
credentials include the authorship of nearly 20 books, published in several countries, as well as many editor credits, and hundreds
of articles in professional economic journals. His recent works on Latin America include Taxation and Latin American Integration
(edited with A. Barreix and L. Villela, Harvard University 2008) and The Charm of Latin America: Economic and Cultural Impressions
(New York: 1Universe Inc. 2010). He holds a B.A. (1959) and M.A. (1961) in Economics from the George Washington University as
well as an M.A. (1963) and Ph.D. (1967) in Economics from Harvard University. Corruption Around the World: Causes,
Consequences, Scope, and Cures Pgs. 582-584 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867585?seq=24#page_scan_tab_contents
Qualitative Effects of Corruption on the Economy Corruption
reduces public revenue and increases
public spending. It thus contributes to larger fiscal deficits, making it more difficult for
the government to run a sound fiscal policy. Corruption is likely to increase income
inequality because it allows well-positioned individuals to take advantage of government
activities at the cost of the rest of the population. There are strong indications that the changes in income
distribution that have occurred in recent years in previously centrally planned economies have partly been the result of corrupt
actions such as nomenklatura privatization. Corruption
distorts markets and the allocation of resources
for the following reasons, and is therefore likely to reduce economic efficiency and
growth. It reduces the ability of the government to impose necessary regulatory controls
and inspections to correct for market failures. Then the government does not
satisfactorily perform its regulatory role over banks, hospitals, food distribution,
transportation activities, financial markets and so on. When government intervention is motivated by
corruption, as for example when the government creates monopolies for private interests, it is likely to add to the existing market
failures. It distorts incentives. As already mentioned, in a corrupt environment, able individuals allocate their energies to rent seeking
and to corrupt practices and not to productive activities. In some cases, the resulting activities have a negative value added. It acts
as an arbitrary tax (with high welfare costs). Corruption's random nature creates high excess burdens because the cost of searching
for those to whom the bribe must be paid must be added to the cost of negotiating and paying the bribe. Also, the contractual
obligations secured by the payment of a bribe are more likely to be violated when corruption is decentralized. It reduces or distorts
the fundamental role of the government in such areas as enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. When a citizen
can buy his or her way out of a commitment or out of a contractual obligation, or when one is prevented from exercising one's
property rights because of corruption, this fundamental role of the government is distorted and growth may be negatively affected.
It
reduces the legitimacy of the market economy and perhaps also of democracy. In fact, the
criticisms voiced in many countries, especially in transition economies, against democracy and the market economy are motivated
by the existence of corruption. Thus, corruption
may slow down or even block the movement toward
democracy and a market economy. Finally, corruption is likely to increase poverty because
it reduces the income earning potential of the poor. In many countries (e.g., Ukraine, Russia, and
Indonesia), enterprises especially small ones-are forced by public officials to pay to make things happen or even to keep bad things
from happening. Often these payments must be made if the enterprise is to remain in business. In Indonesia, there is a term for
these payments ("pungli") and, according to a recent report, these payments may raise the costs of doing business for small
activities by as much as 20 percent of total operating costs (see Sjaifudian, 1997). This is equivalent to imposing very high sales
taxes on these enterprises. Similar information has been reported for Russia (Shleifer, 1996) and for Ukraine (Kaufmann, 1997), but
the problem may be much more widespread.
Economic Decline causes a nuclear war which kills is all- Multiple
Instances
Harris and Burrows ‘9 Dr. Mathew J. Burrows serves as the Director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight
Initiative in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He was appointed Counselor to the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) in 2007 and Director of the Analysis and Production Staff (APS) in 2010. As Director of APS, Burrows was responsible for
managing a staff of senior analysts and production technicians who guide and shepherd all NIC products from inception to
dissemination. He was the principal drafter for the NIC publication Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, which received
widespread recognition and praise in the international media and among academics and think tanks. Jennifer M. Harris is a senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Council, Harris was a member of the policy planning staff at the U.S.
Department of State responsible for global markets, geo-economic issues and energy security. In that role, Harris was a lead
architect of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Economic Statecraft agenda, which launched in 2011. Before joining the State
Department, Harris served on the staff of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, covering a range of economic and financial issues.
“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrows.pdf
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of
intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to
believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects
on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of
multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the
twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the
ways in which the potential for greater
conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the
report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities
even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will
decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is
reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge
will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of
descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training
procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that
become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not
inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external
powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable
deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East
with a nuclear Iran. Episodes
of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a
nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red
lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of
potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and
mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in
achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of
strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times,
and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than
defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience,
such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.
Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure
their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example,
to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even
actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security
concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue
water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets
may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it
also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia
and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between
states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
NB Impact: Accountability
lack of government accountability causes military aggression and total war
Roberts, 2013
(Paul Craig, Dr. Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury for Economic Policy in the Reagan Administration. He was
associate editor and columnist with the Wall Street Journal, columnist for Business Week and the Scripps Howard News Service. He
is a contributing editor to Gerald Celente's Trends Journal. He has had numerous university appointments. His book, The Failure of
Laissez Faire Capitalism and Economic Dissolution of the West is available here. His latest book, How America Was Lost, has just
been released and can be ordered, August 13, 2013 “Humanity Is Drowning In Washington's Criminality,” OpEd News,
http://www.opednews.com/articles/Humanity-Is-Drowning-In-Wa-by-Paul-Craig-Roberts130813-17.html, Accessed: July 12, 2015, YDEL)//AN
If an American citizen lies to a federal investigator, even if not under oath, the citizen can be arrested, prosecuted, and sent to prison. Yet, these same federal personnel can lie to Congress and to citizens with
. Whatever the American political system is, it has nothing whatsoever to do with
accountable government. In Amerika no one is accountable but citizens, who are accountable not only to law but also to
impunity
unaccountable charges for which no evidence is required. ¶ Congress has the power to impeach any presidential appointee as well as the president. In the 1970s Congress was going to impeach President
Richard Nixon simply because he lied about when he learned of the Watergate burglary. To avoid impeachment, Nixon resigned. In the 1990s, the House impeached President Bill Clinton for lying about his¶
sexual affair with a White House intern. The Senate failed to convict, no doubt as many had sexual affairs of their own and didn't want to be held accountable themselves. ¶ In the 1970s when I was on the Senate
staff, corporate lobbyists would send attractive women to seduce Senators so that the interest groups could blackmail the Senators to do their bidding. Don't be surprised if the NSA has adopted this corporate
practice.¶ The improprieties of Nixon and Clinton were minor, indeed of little consequence, when compared to the crimes of George W. Bush and Obama, their vice presidents, and the bulk of their presidential
appointees. Yet, impeachment is "off the table," as Nancy Pelosi infamously declared. Why do Californian voters send a person to Congress who refuses to protect them from an unaccountable executive branch?
Who does Nancy Pelosi serve? Certainly not the people of California. Most certainly not the US Constitution. Pelosi is in total violation of her oath of office. Will Californians re-elect her yet again? Little wonder
What is the purpose of the domestic surveillance of all
Americans? This is surveillance out of all proportion to the alleged terrorist threat.
America is failing.¶ The question demanding to be asked is:
The US
Constitution is being ignored and domestic law violated. Why? Does the US government have an undeclared agenda for which the "terrorist threat" is a cover? ¶ What is this agenda? Whose agenda is more
No citizen is secure unless government is accountable
to the Constitution and to law. It is an absurd idea that any American is more threatened
important than the US Constitution and the accountability of government to law?
by terrorism than by unaccountable government that can execute them, torture them,
and throw them in prison for life without due process or any accountability whatsoever .
Under Bush/Obama, the US has returned to the unaccountable power of caesars, czars, and autocrats. ¶ In the famous play, "A Man For All Seasons," Sir Thomas More, Chancellor of England, asks: So, you
would have me to cut down the law in order to chase after devils? And what will we do, with the law cut down, when the devil turns on us?¶ This is the most important legal question ever asked, and it is seldom
asked today, not in our law schools, not by our bar associations, and most certainly not by the Justice (sic) Department or US Attorneys. ¶ American conservatives regard civil liberties as mere excuses for liberal
judges to coddle criminals and terrorists. Never expect a conservative Republican, or more than two or three of them, to defend your civil liberty. Republicans simply do not believe in civil liberty. Democrats cannot
.
conceive that Obama -- the first black president in office, a member of an oppressed minority -- would not defend civil liberty. This combination of disinterest and denial is why the US has become a police state ¶
Civil liberty has few friends in government, the political parties, law schools, bar associations, or the federal judiciary. Consequently, no citizen is secure. Recently, a housewife researched online for pressure
cookers looking for the best deal. Her husband was searching for a backpack. The result was that a fully armed SWAT team appeared at the door demanding to search the premises and to have questions
answered.¶ I am always amazed when someone says: "I haven't done anything wrong. I have nothing to fear." If you have nothing to fear from the government, why did the Founding Fathers put the protections in
the Constitution that Bush and Obama have stripped out? ¶ Unlike the Founding Fathers who designed our government to protect the citizens, the American sheeple trust the government to their own demise. ¶
Glenn Greenwald recently explained how the mass of data that is being accumulated on every American is being mined for any signs of non-terrorist-related criminal behavior. As such warrantless searches are
the use
of the surveillance justified by the "war on terror" has already spread into prosecutions
of ordinary criminals where it has corrupted legal safeguards and the integrity, if any, of
the criminal court system, prosecutors and judges.¶ This is just one of the many ways in which you have much to fear, whether you think you
illegal evidence in a criminal trial, the authorities disguise the illegal way in which the evidence is obtained in order to secure conviction based on illegally obtained evidence.¶ In other words,
are doing anything wrong or not. You can be framed for crimes based on inferences drawn from your Internet activity and jokes with friends on social media. Jurors made paranoid by the "terrorist threat" will
convict you.¶ We should be very suspicious of the motive behind the universal spying on US citizens. The authorities are aware that the terrorist threat does not justify the unconstitutional and illegal spying. There
have been hardly any real terrorist events in the US, which is why the FBI has to find clueless people around whom to organize an FBI orchestrated plot in order to keep the "terrorist threat" alive in the public's
mind. At last count, there have been 150 "sting operations" in which the FBI recruits people, who are out of touch with reality, to engage in a well-paid FBI designed plot. Once the dupes agree, they are arrested
as terrorists and the plot revealed, always with the accompanying statement that the public was never in any danger as the FBI was in control. ¶ When 99 percent of all terrorism is organized by the FBI, why do
we need NSA spying on every communication of every American and on people in the rest of the world?¶ Terrorism seldom comes from outside. The source almost always is the government in power. The
Czarist secret police set off bombs in order to blame and arrest labor agitators. The Nazis burned down the Reichstag in order to decimate the communists and assume unaccountable power in the name of
An alleged terrorist threat is a way of using fear to block popular objection to the
exercise of arbitrary government power. ¶ In order to be "safe from terrorists," the US
population, with few objections, has accepted the demise of their civil liberties, such as
habeas corpus, which reaches back centuries to Magna Carta as a constraint on government power. How, then, are they safe from their government? Americans today are in the same
"public safety."
position as the English prior to the Great Charter of 1215. Americans are no longer protected by law and the Constitution from government tyranny. ¶ The reason the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution was
to make citizens safe from their government. If citizens allow the government to take away the Constitution, they might be safe from foreign terrorists, but they are no longer safe from their government.¶ Who do
you think has more power over you, foreign terrorists or "your" government?¶ Washington defines all resistance to its imperialism and tyranny as "terrorism." Thus, Americans who defend the environment, who
defend wildlife, who defend civil liberties and human rights, who protest Washington's wars and robbery of the people on behalf of special interests, all become "domestic extremists," the term Homeland Security
has substituted for "terrorist." Those who are out of step with Washington and the powerful private interests that exploit us, other peoples, and the earth for their profits and power fall into the wrong side of Bush's
In the United States independent thought is on the verge of
being criminalized as are constitutionally guaranteed protests and the freedom of the
press. The constitutional principle of freedom of speech is being redefined as treason, as aiding an undefined enemy, and as seeking to overthrow the government by casting aspersions on its motives
black and white division of the world: "you are for us or against us."¶
The power-mad inhabitants of Washington have brought the US so close
to Gestapo Germany and Stalinist Russia that it is no longer funny. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to see the difference.¶ The neoconservatives have
and revealing its secret misdeeds.
declared that Americans are the "exceptional" and "indispensable people." Yet, the civil liberties of Americans have declined the more "exceptional" and "indispensable" that Americans become. We are now so
.
Neoconservatives have given Washington a monopoly on right and endowed its military
aggressions with a morality that supersedes the Geneva Conventions and human rights. Washington, justified by its
exceptional and indispensable that we no longer have any rights ¶ And neither does the rest of the world. Neoconservatism has created a new dangerous American nationalism.
"exceptionalism," has the right to attack populations in countries with which Washington is not at war, such as Pakistan and Yemen. Washington is using the cover of its "exceptionalism" to murder people in many
countries. Hitler tried to market the exceptionalism of the German people, but he lacked Washington's Madison Avenue skills.¶ Washington is always morally right, whatever it does, and those who report its
crimes are traitors who, stripped of their coddling by civil liberties, are locked away and abused until they confess to their crimes against the state. Anyone who tells the truth, such as Bradley Manning, Julian
Assange, and Edward Snowden, are branded enemies of the state and are ruthlessly persecuted.¶ How does the "indispensable, exceptional nation" have a diplomatic policy? How can a neoconized State
Department be based on anything except coercion? It can't. That is why
Washington produces nothing but war and threats of
war .¶ Wherever a person looks, whatever a person hears, it is Washington's threat -- "we are going to bomb you into the stone age" if you don't do what we want and agree to what we require. We are
going to impose "sanctions," Washington's euphemism for embargoes, and starve your women and children to death, permit no medical supplies, ban you from the international payments system unless you
relent and consent to being Washington's puppet, and ban you from posting your news broadcasts on the Internet.¶ This is the face that Washington presents to the world: the hard, mean face of a tyrant.¶
Washington's power will survive a bit longer, because there are still politicians in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America and in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the NGOs in Russia, who are
paid off by the almighty dollar. In exchange for Washington's money, they endorse Washington's immorality and murderous destruction of law and life. ¶ But the dollar is being destroyed by Quantitative Easing,
and the domestic US economy is being destroyed by jobs offshoring.¶ Rome was powerful until the Germans ceased to believe it. Then the rotten edifice collapsed. Washington faces sooner or later the same
fate. An inhumane, illegal, unconstitutional regime based on violence alone, devoid of all morality and all human compassion, is not acceptable to China, Russia, India, Iran, and Brazil, or to readers of this
the lawlessness and lack of humanity in
Washington, which murders more people as I write, is no longer acceptable to the rest of the world, not even to its European
column.¶ The evil that is Washington cannot last forever. The criminals might destroy the world in nuclear war, but
puppet states, despite the leaders being on Washington's payroll.
AT: “CP is the Squo!”
No, you’re wrong—in the un-underlined part of your ev, it says the PCLOB
recommendations already happened BUT for DIFFERENT ISSUES, NOT
FOR THE FCC—our CP is distinct
Healey, 14 - J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School (Audra, “A Tale of
Two Agencies: Exploring Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal
Communications Commission”, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 67,
December)
Additionally the PCLOB report calls for a similar oversight scheme.108 The
PCLOB , in its first report, calls for the
government to work with Internet service providers and other companies that regularly
receive FISA production orders to develop rules permitting the companies to voluntarily
disclose certain statistical information .109 Additionally, the PCLOB recommends that the
government publicly disclose detailed statistics to provide a more complete picture of
government surveillance
operations.110 The PCLOB also recommends that independent experts as well as
telecommunications service providers help assess at least one data collection technique.111 The FCC regularly interacts with these
companies in its own rulemaking proceedings, and would therefore be in a position to facilitate independent expertise being utilized
in assessing the efficacy of the collection.112 This is not only because the agency works with the companies and the infrastructure
involved already, 113 but also because the FCC’s general technical expertise places the agency in a position to consider what types
of statistics would be helpful to the public. The need for expertise in determining the technical aspects of whether the data being
collected is authorized is not limited to DOJ and NSA efforts, but extends to the FISA Court.
AT: Perm Do Both
Makes no sense --- you can’t implement PCLOB as an oversight mechanism and the FCC
the same time --- it’s one or the other-- either that or it severs --- voting issue for making
the aff a moving target
AT: Perm Do CP
The perm is Entirely Severance – the CP includes a different agent not specified in the
plan text –not specifying makes the aff unconditional –
First is Ground---Aff should be prepared to defend the entire plan text, PIC’s prove the plan is a bad idea
in at least one instance.
--Most cp’s are pics – the ability to test the agent is destroyed if we can’t run pics
--Key to checking extra topical plan planks
Second is Education –
--It forces better plan writing – the aff will write their plan more strategically
--Depth over Breadth – focuses the debate on specifics of the policy which is better for
topical education.
--Lit checks abuse – their entire Solvency advocate is about PCLOB and FCC oversight
and recommendations
Err neg on theory – aff gets first and last speech and infinite prep.
Not a voter, reject the argument not the team.
AT: Links to PTX
Congress likes the PCLOB
Hattem 5/15/15( Hattem is a correspondent and journalist for The Hill; Lawmakers want stronger privacy board,
http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/242208-lawmakers-want-stronger-privacy-board, 5/15/2015, AJZ)
A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House and Senate wants to strengthen the
government’s small privacy watchdog. Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Tom Udall (D-N.M.), and Reps. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii)
the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) and make its five board seats full-time positions. “ By giving
and Trey Gowdy (R-S.C.) introduced legislation this week to expand the authority of
the board a broader mandate and more authority, Congress can better protect the
privacy and civil rights of law-abiding Americans ,” Wyden said in a statement. “Our country must
strike the delicate balance between protecting our national security and our civil
liberties,” echoed Gowdy. “Many Americans are rightly concerned the pendulum has
swung too far away from our civil liberties.” The PCLOB was created in 2007 following a recommendation of
the 9/11 Commission, but has long been considered toothless. While the chairman — who was only seated in 2013, after waiting for
Senate confirmation since 2011 — is a full-time position, the four other board members serve part-time. The board gained some
new visibility in recent years, however, following the disclosures of Edward Snowden. In January of 2014, it issued an explosive
report calling the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of U.S. phone records illegal. A federal appeals court agreed that
the program was illegal last week, and Congress is in the middle of a debate over how to renew or reform the NSA.
FREEDOM Act was written to respond to PCLOB report—proves it’s a
bipartisan issue
Sensenbrenner 2014, US Congressman,(Jim Sensenbrenner, US Congressman, co-author of the USA FREEDOM Act.
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=367530. January 23, 2014. )
the
president’s hand-picked panel and now the PCLOB agree that bulk collection of Americans’ phone
records has come at a high cost to privacy with little to no benefit to our national security. Section
215 was designed to obtain business records relevant to an authorized terrorism investigation. The PCLOB
acknowledges the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone records does not meet that criteria and
concludes the program is not legally justifiable. It also raises Constitutional concerns, citing the First
and Fourth Amendments. This report adds to the growing momentum behind genuine, legislative
reform. The USA FREEDOM Act is narrowly tailored to strike the proper balance between privacy
and security. And if brought to the floor for a vote, it will pass with broad bipartisan support. The president has
As I’ve said since June, I am extremely troubled by President Obama’s misinterpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Both
failed to deliver on his promises of transparency and the protection of our civil liberties. It is up to Congress to rein in abuse and
restore trust in our intelligence community.
****Aff Answers
Links to PTX
FCC sparks a fight—the most recent controversies prove
Brodkin 2015 Writer for Ars Technica (Jon, “New tactic in war on net neutrality: Strip FCC of
enforcement funding FCC Republican asks Congress to slash his agency's budget request.”,
http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/03/new-tactic-in-war-on-net-neutrality-strip-fcc-ofenforcement-funding/)//AN
FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai has
taken his fight to Congress. Today, Pai asked the House of Representatives to strip the FCC of
funding it needs to enforce net neutrality rules. "Congress should forbid the Commission from
using any appropriated funds to implement or enforce the plan the FCC just adopted to regulate the
Internet," Pai said in prepared statements for an FCC budget hearing. "Not only is this plan bad policy; absent outside intervention, the
Commission will expend substantial resources implementing and enforcing regulations that are
After losing the battle against net neutrality rules at the Federal Communications Commission,
wasteful, unnecessary, and affirmatively detrimental to the American public. " Republicans
continue attack on FCC's net neutrality rules . Pai is one of two Republicans on the FCC. The three-member
Democratic majority voted in favor of the net neutrality order. The decision reclassified broadband as a common
carrier service and imposed net neutrality rules that prevent Internet service providers from blocking or throttling content or prioritizing content in
exchange for payment. "This is a costly endeavor for the agency, one that will end the permissionless innovation that has spurred the Internet’s
explosive growth up until today," Pai
said, going on to call it a "lose-lose proposition for companies and
consumers." Wheeler, who also testified at the hearing, defended the rules. Responding to claims that net neutrality rules don't address any
actual behavior by ISPs, Wheeler pointed out that Comcast was caught interfering with BitTorrent traffic in 2007 and that Verizon last year planned to
throttle its users who have unlimited 4G data plans until Wheeler objected. The FCC's budget request is appropriate,
Wheeler also said. "Since 1994, our financial return to the government has equaled 13 times our combined operational costs," he said. "For every
dollar generated by the FCC, our agency uses only eight cents for its operations." Wheeler described how the latest spectrum auction raised $41
billion, including $20 billion to reduce the country's deficit and billions to fund a nationwide public safety communications network. "To build on this
progress, and fulfill our statutory responsibilities, the Commission is requesting $388 million in general spending authority derived from Section 9
regulatory fees for our overall non-auction costs, up from $339.8 million in FY 2015," Wheeler said. "In addition, we are requesting an auctions cap of
$117 million, an $11 million increase from last year, as well as the transfer of $25 million from the Universal Service Fund (USF) to cover our costs for
that program. These are well-considered requests that reflect necessary operational demands and the unique circumstances of this budget cycle." The
fate of the budget request is still up in the air, but Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John Thune
(R-SD) last week said it "raises eyebrows, particularly when American households continue to
do more with less in this stagnant economy."
PCLOB oversight is extremely controversial—policymakers hate the
PCLOB because they called Section 215 illegal
Aftergood 6/10/15 directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy (Steven, “House
Intelligence Bill Would Limit PCLOB Oversight”, http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/06/hpscipclob/)//AN
The House
Intelligence Committee inserted language in the pending intelligence authorization bill that would bar
access by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board ( PCLOB ) to classified information pertaining to covert
action. “Nothing in the statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access to
information the executive branch deems to be related to covert action,” according to the new Committee report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for
FY 2016 (section 306), published yesterday. To the extent that covert action is employed against terrorism and is therefore within the scope of
PCLOB’s charter, the House
Committee action would preclude PCLOB oversight of the implications of
such covert actions for privacy and civil liberties. That “unduly restricts” PCLOB’s jurisdiction, according to Rep. James
Himes (D-CT), a member of the House Intelligence Committee who unsuccessfully sought to modify the provision. It is possible that there
is some tacit rivalry between PCLOB and the congressional intelligence oversight committees,
particularly since the PCLOB found that the Section 215 program for collection of telephone
metadata was unlawfully implemented while the oversight committees had approved and
embraced it.
(The recurring failure of the intelligence oversight committees to accurately represent broader congressional and public
perspectives over the past decade is a subject that remains to be addressed.) By contrast, the same House bill directed that the DNI shall provide the
Government Accountability Office with the access to information that it needs to perform its authorized functions. The relevant directive (ICD 114) “shall
not prohibit the Comptroller General [i.e., the head of the GAO] from obtaining information necessary to carry out an audit or review at the request of
the congressional intelligence and defense committees.” The new House Committee measure may be gratuitous in any event, since the PCLOB is an
executive branch agency and is already subject to the authority of the Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, and
to regulate access accordingly. The PCLOB has recently posted a plan for its review of two counterterrorism-related activities governed by Executive
Order 12333. “The Board plans to concentrate on activities of the CIA and NSA, and to select activities that involve one or more of the following: (1)
bulk collection involving a significant chance of acquiring U.S. person information; (2) use of incidentally collected U.S. person information; (3) targeting
of U.S. persons; and (4) collection that occurs within the United States or from U.S. companies,” the PCLOB plan said. Yesterday, Senators Dianne
Feinstein and John McCain introduced an amendment to the 2016 defense authorization act “to reaffirm the prohibition on torture.” The amendment
would limit interrogation techniques to those included in the unclassified Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Appendix M). And it would require regular review of
“to ensure that Army Field Manual 2-22.3 complies with the legal obligations of the United States and reflects current, evidence-based, best practices
for interrogation that are designed to elicit reliable and voluntary statements and do not involve the use or threat of force.” The amendment had not yet
been voted on as of yesterday.
AT: Case
Solvency
1NC Solvency Answers
There’s a solvency deficit to the aff—even if they establish FCC oversight,
they don’t change the way the NSA functions, which means the NSA will
keep doing what they’re doing—Congressional amendment of NSA organic
statute is key
Healey, 14 - J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School (Audra, “A Tale of
Two Agencies: Exploring Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal
Communications Commission”, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 67,
December)
The lack of oversight of NSA data collection practices will continue to be problematic moving forward, as national security is an ongoing concern and
technology is a large part of life in a modern society. There
is need for effective and transparent oversight of the
NSA’s data collection. As such, Congress should act by amending the organic statutes of both the NSA
and the FCC to provide the FCC with oversight authority over the NSA, and by allowing the FCC
to participate as amicus curiae with the FISA Court. 1. Congress should amend the NSA
organic statute to provide for collection of data by the FCC . The NSA needs transparent and easily
understood oversight. While it should not have to disclose national security information, the agency should be required to
disclose basic statistics, such as how much information it is gathering, similar to Recommendation 9 in the
second PCLOB Report. 118 This would at least illustrate to the public, via the FCC, that the NSA is targeting its surveillance at legitimate threats to
national security—rather than performing blanket surveillance of all Internet users. Further, these
reforms would comport with the
PCLOB’s enumerated Recommendations.119 As of now, “lawmakers and the public do not have even a rough estimate of how
many communications of U.S. persons are acquired under section 702.”120 Because the NSA is required to target foreign communications in order for
its surveillance to be lawful, 121 an annual snapshot showing the volume of its surveillance will help foster some degree of transparency, 122 helping
assure citizens that their privacy is not being intruded upon, without hampering legitimate national security efforts. 123 This expanded role for the FCC
First, Congress should amend the NSA’s organic statute to
require the agency to comply with FCC requests for data . Additionally, while the FCC does not have the
security clearance to review the substance of the surveillance, such clearance is not necessary on an agency-wide basis. Instead, Congress
should require the NSA to provide targeting statistics that could be reasonably disclosed, or at least preliminary statistics
that could focus the FCC’s inquiry. This new legislation is all that is necessary to facilitate oversight on the NSA side, as the FCC will
require most of the congressional authorization.
in relation to the NSA should be codified by Congress.
PCLOB conditions solves the entirety of the aff – that’s their solvency
author
Healey, 14 - J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School (Audra, “A Tale of
Two Agencies: Exploring Oversight of the National Security Administration by the Federal
Communications Commission”, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 67,
December)
IV. HOW THE FCC SHOULD ADDRESS THE NSA SURVEILLANCE: IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION Congress is equipped to
enact legislation codifying FCC oversight of the NSA by virtue of both current law and the PCLOB’s recommendations. First, the
Telecommunications Act can serve as the basis for the FCC to take action to further develop its protection of consumers on the
Internet, Moreover, there has been some movement in Congress calling on the FCC to take action regarding the NSA phone
database, indicating the possibility of the FCC taking up an oversight role.116 Further, Congress gave the FCC broad investigation,
regulatory, and enforcement powers, as well as the privacy-focused directive of implementing Consumer Propriety Network
Information protection.117 Additionally, the first PCLOB Report calls for extensive changes in the NSA and FISA Court regime while
the second report calls expressly for industry input and expertise: the FCC could facilitate some of the suggested changes through
its subject matter expertise. Even as the FCC is set up to facilitate the PCLOB recommendations, Congress needs to codify the
legal authority for the FCC to do this specifically. Granting express legal authority is key, as organic statutes of agencies determine
what a given agency can and cannot do. Congressional authorization would be a logical outgrowth of both the FCC’s regulatory
interests and current legal recommendations regarding NSA oversight. A. Congress should amend the organic statutes of the FCC
and NSA and encourage participation in the FISA Court. The lack of oversight of NSA data collection practices will continue to be
problematic moving forward, as national security is an ongoing concern and technology is a large part of life in a modern society.
There is need for effective and transparent oversight of the NSA’s data collection. As such, Congress should act by amending the
organic statutes of both the NSA and the FCC to provide the FCC with oversight authority over the NSA, and by allowing the FCC to
participate as amicus curiae with the FISA Court. 1. Congress should amend the NSA organic statute to provide for collection of
data by the FCC. The NSA needs transparent and easily understood oversight. While it should not have to disclose national security
information, the agency should be required to disclose basic statistics, such as how much information it is gathering, similar to
Recommendation 9 in the second PCLOB Report.118 This would at least illustrate to the public, via the FCC, that the NSA is
targeting its surveillance at legitimate threats to national security—rather than performing blanket surveillance of all Internet users.
Further, these reforms would comport with the PCLOB’s enumerated Recommendations.119 As of now, “lawmakers and the public
do not have even a rough estimate of how many communications of U.S. persons are acquired under section 702.”120 Because the
NSA is required to target foreign communications in order for its surveillance to be lawful,121 an annual snapshot showing the
volume of its surveillance will help foster some degree of transparency,122 helping assure citizens that their privacy is not being
intruded upon, without hampering legitimate national security efforts.123 This expanded role for the FCC in relation to the NSA
should be codified by Congress. First, Congress should amend the NSA’s organic statute to require the agency to comply with FCC
requests for data. Additionally, while the FCC does not have the security clearance to review the substance of the surveillance, such
clearance is not necessary on an agency-wide basis. Instead, Congress should require the NSA to provide targeting statistics that
could be reasonably disclosed, or at least preliminary statistics that could focus the FCC’s inquiry. This new legislation is all that is
necessary to facilitate oversight on the NSA side, as the FCC will require most of the congressional authorization. 2. The FCC’s
organic statute should be amended to allow the FCC authority over NSA data collection and participation in the FISA Court. To
enact a solution based on FCC oversight of NSA data collection, Congress should pass legislation allowing the FCC to collect
information from the NSA, and to allow the FCC to submit its findings about this data to congressional oversight committees as well
as the FISA Court. While novel, this solution is in keeping with the PCLOB recommendations, particularly the recommendation
emphasizing the need for the NSA to publicly disclose the scope of its surveillance.124 Moreover, it is not uncommon for agencies
to have oversight authority over other agencies.125 Thus, this type of inter-agency accountability could be codified to provide the
FCC with oversight authority over NSA data collection. Congress should first authorize the FCC to request certain types of data from
the NSA. Similar to the PCLOB’s recommendation,126 this data, rather than being substantive, would be statistical; for instance, it
might include data and the basic context surrounding how many communications providers from which the NSA is collecting
metadata, or how many email contact lists the NSA is gathering.127 This would thereby provide oversight over the relevancy
problem, wherein the NSA collects information in such wide swaths so as not to be tied to any particularized inquiry.128 The FCC
would therefore be in a position to review the volume of information, while keeping it confidential. The legislation should also include
authorization for the FCC to interact with the other oversight bodies. Congress should give the FCC the authority to send any of the
statistics that the agency finds problematic to the FISA Court and the relevant congressional committees, and should provide for the
FCC to be informed of proceedings implicating data collection over which the FCC would be granted authority. Additionally,
Congress should provide a mechanism for the FCC to liaise with Congress on a regular basis specifically about the NSA data
collection since it involves sensitive information: for instance, setting out regular reports or allowing Congress to send inquiries to the
FCC as needed on the technical aspects of the NSA’s methods of data collection. The language could also allow for public comment
on NSA collection to some extent, modeled on the current FCC notice and comment procedures. The FCC could thereby ask for
generalized comments without disclosing the exact nature of its inquiry. Thus, the FCC could solicit public comment on the
underlying idea of NSA surveillance as it relates to the communications infrastructure and incorporate valid comments in its
representations to the relevant oversight mechanisms. This would enable the FCC to incorporate comments by carriers and
consumer interest groups into the oversight process and allow some degree of public participation without sacrificing national
security. Moreover, the legislation must include a mechanism for protecting national security information. The FCC has knowledge
about the underlying infrastructure where the data is coming from as well as experience dealing with sensitive information.129
However, there are valid concerns in disclosing any sort of information implicating national security. To that end, Congress may wish
to consider adding a position in the FCC for an intelligence officer with clearance who can look into relevance when the amounts of
data raise a red flag in the FCC’s internal process for reviewing the data. Moreover, placement of a member of an NSA staffer in the
FCC would facilitate inter-agency cooperation and dialogue about data collection. For enforcement, in order to preserve national
security, Congress should avoid providing the FCC any mechanism to call the NSA before it via hearing. However, the FCC would
be able to report specially to the House and Senate committees, as well as petition the FISA Court as amicus curae. Additionally, if
the PCLOB wants to stay involved and keep developing oversight,
Congress should provide an avenue for the
FCC to call forth another PCLOB investigation should the need arise. 3. Congress should allow
outside parties to petition the FISA Court. Congress should follow the PCLOB Recommendation to allow
outside parties, to petition the FISA Court to put forth independent views. The PCLOB
recommendation about FISA Court operations would allow for public comment.1 30 While
there are logistical problems with allowing other parties before the court, the
PCLOB suggests that a Special
Advocate could advise the FISA Court whether amicus participation would be helpful in
a given case. Input from outside sources—and, in particular, the FCC—would be useful
in terms of providing technical insights into the impact of NSA surveillance on
telecommunications.
In particular, the FCC could be among the independent viewpoints incorporated in the continuing
if Congress decides to provide limited
the FCC, providing volumetric data or technical expertise, could help act as a bridge
between the public, parties in the communications field, and the court. The FISA Court itself considers
process of evaluating upstream and “about” collection. 133 Moreover, even
amicus participation,
each and every surveillance application fastidiously, but the public needs to have the same confidence in the court’s impartiality and
rigor as those government actors who interact with or serve on the court.134 While there is need for secrecy due to national security
concerns, there
is also the need for the court to take into account a greater range of views and legal
arguments, as well as receive technical assistance and legal input from outside parties.135 The
PCLOB report indicates that, while there are difficulties in inviting amicus participation by parties lacking national security clearance,
such as the FCC, the fact that it has been done in one instance indicates that it is possible to invite participation from outside parties
without infringing upon national security.136 Moreover, as mentioned above, it may be useful for Congress to create a position at
the FCC in which national security clearance is granted. Not only would this create a safeguard for the integrity of national security
information, but this would provide for a person who can be called before the FISA Court who could be exposed to the facts of a
given case, and using the data that has been collected and/or analyzed by the FCC, could provide insight into a particular instance.
Therefore, Congress should encourage the FISA Court to use its ability to appoint technical experts as well as passing legislation to
allow for more amicus participation by outside parties.137
Congress should enact legislation following the
PCLOB recommendations with an eye towards focusing on the FCC as an expert by
enacting legislation for the FCC to participate as amicus curiae before the FISA Court.
V.
CONCLUSION The FCC is in a position to provide oversight and transparency to the NSA Internet monitoring scandal. As an
agency tasked with regulating the technology and communications sectors, the FCC has been keeping up with the infrastructure
and development of technology vis-à-vis the Internet as it pertains to its congressional mandate and its own regulations. Moreover,
there would not be an intrusion onto national security efforts because only the volume of information collected would be disclosed.
The current crisis in public confidence shows that there is a place for the FCC to be an integral part of the oversight process. The
FCC would focus the inquiry of the congressional oversight committees and provide the FISA Court with much-needed outside
perspective and technical assistance, while simultaneously giving the public some comfort and adding transparency to the process.
This inter-agency monitoring could increase accountability and public confidence in a way that traditional oversight mechanisms
cannot: thus, the FCC is in a unique position to add value to the oversight of the NSA and Congress should pursue codifying this
solution.
FCC Answers
FCC Fails: Trust
FCC can’t solve for perception. Past failures and bad public relations
means no one will trust FCC in the future
Stirland ’08 – Writer on technology and society for CNN, POLITICO, New York
Post, and other news sources (Sarah Lai, March 13, “Report: FCC Is a Massive
Bureaucracy That Can’t Handle Complaints Against Telcos,”
http://www.wired.com/2008/03/report-fcc-is-a/)//DWB
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS Commission does an appalling job of tracking
complaints about telecommunications services and resolves only a tiny fraction of them,
according to a new report released Thursday by a congressional auditing agency. "Limitations in FCC’s current approach for
collecting and analyzing enforcement data constitute the
principal challenge FCC faces in providing
complete and accurate information on its enforcement program," write the authors of the Government
Accountability Office’s progress report on the FCC’s enforcement efforts between 2003 and 2006, the latest dates for which data
was available.¶ The GAO conducted its investigation of the Republican-led agency between November 2006 and December 2007 at
the request of Rep. Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts) who is the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet. ¶ "These limitations make it difficult to conduct trend analysis, determine program effectiveness, allocate Commission
resources, or accurately track and monitor key aspects of all complaints received, investigations conducted, and enforcement
actions taken," they conclude. ¶ ¶ The FCC’s
enforcement bureau uses five separate databases and
"manually searches tens of thousands of paper case files to track and monitor the extent
to which each of its divisions takes enforcement action within its statute of limitations requirement for
assessing fines or the time it takes to close an enforcement case," they say. The FCC received about 454,000
complaints between 2003 and 2006. The agency responded to most of the complaints with a
letter of acknowledgment. It investigated 10 percent of those complaints over those three
years, the GAO says.¶ It concluded that 39,000 of those investigations, and less than 10 percent of them ended with an
enforcement action, according to the GAO.¶ The majority — 83 percent of the investigations — resulted in no
enforcement action.¶ The GAO says it can’t determine what happened to the rest of the complaints, nor could it determine
why the FCC didn’t take enforcement actions in those 83 percent of cases because the agency doesn’t collect its information on the
investigations systematically.¶ The GAO’s overall conclusion: The
FCC needs to set itself measurable goals
for its enforcement bureau and to develop the tools to more systematically track its
enforcement efforts.¶ The powerful chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee said Thursday that the
FCC had "abdicated its duty to protect consumers."¶ In a statement issued Thursday, Rep. John Dingell (DMichigan) promised that his committee would "exercise vigorous oversight to ensure that consumers have adequate protections and
that the FCC performs its duties in an effective and timely manner." Most of the complaints over the three years concerned
telemarketers violating the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, according to the GAO. The complaints were against
telemarketers violating consumers’¶ do-not-call requests and calling during "prohibited hours."¶ The GAO ran its report by the FCC’s
enforcement bureau before it published its findings.¶ Not surprisingly, the FCC rejected the GAO’s conclusions.¶ In an undated
letter, the agency’s enforcement bureau chief, Kris Anne Monteith, said that the report was riddled with errors, based on outdated
information, and also did not look at all of the information that was available. ¶ "During Chairman [Kevin] Martin’s tenure, the
Commission has undertaken more than 3,400 enforcement actions," Monteith writes. "These enforcement actions have resulted in
assessing more than $65.7 million in fines, forfeitures, and consent decree payments — including more than $43 million in 2007
alone, which the GAO acknowledges is the highest annual amount since the enforcement bureau was created in 1999." ¶ Monteith
also states in the letter that the GAO overstates the number of investigations there were concluded with no enforcement action.¶
The GAO included the letter in its report but stuck to its guns. The data about the FCC’s enforcement actions that the GAO
investigators had access to wasn’t reliable, according to the authors of the report. Markey used the opportunity to promote a
wireless communications consumer-protection bill he introduced in late February.¶ "Without
an effective FCC
enforcement program, consumers are left out in the cold," he said in a statement. "Moreover, the GAO’s
report makes clear that any legislation establishing national consumer protection rules for the wireless market must have
the FCC chairman is
under investigation by the House Energy and Commerce Committee. On Wednesday, Dingell and
meaningful, supplementary enforcement at the state level."¶ The report arrives at the same time that
the committee’s top Republican, Joe Barton, asked Martin to produce volumes of work-related documents within two weeks.¶
Staffers on the committee are investigating allegations from current and former FCC
employees that Martin is mismanaging the agency.¶ Agency heads are known to bend with the political
winds in D.C., but Martin has garnered an especially strong reputation for exercising tight control over decisions
made at the FCC during his tenure — which has sparked resentment among staffers.¶ Over
the years his style of management has become so well-known that Martin himself even joked about it himself during an annual
dinner in front of several hundred telecommunications lobbyists and a few unhappy FCC staffers.
FCC = Bureaucracy
The problem isn’t governmental overreach, it’s Bureaucratic overreach.
Massive alt cause to privacy violations. Turns the case
Salas 3/16/15 – Works in private security and is an author for Voices of Liberty, a mutlichannel network advocating for issues of liberty and freedom (Christopher, “Bureaucracy or
Congress: Pick Your Poison,” Voices of Liberty,
http://www.voicesofliberty.com/article/bureaucracy-or-congress-pick-your-poison/)//DWB
Government has the power to completely control the lives of people. It can steal your money,
regulate you out of house and employment, or in extreme cases, end your life. But there is another entity that can
do just as much damage and often unbeknownst to the citizenry: the Bureaucracy.¶ Just this
past week can serve to remind us of the overreach and goals of bureaucracy. First, we have the recent FCC ruling regarding net
neutrality. The
FCC has taken it upon themselves to correct a problem that doesn’t exist and
might not in the future. Secondly, the BATFE is proposing a reclassification of a type of ammunition used in the popular
Ar-15 style firearm; this reclassification will likely end up banning this type of ammunition. I will not go into details regarding these
developments as there are plenty of articles that can break them down more than is the scope of this article. ¶ Instead, this article will
unelected officials are making decisions on our behalf that they either have
no right to make or don’t need to. For instance, the FCC made a ruling to a problem that does
not exist and might not. The private sector can easily figure an answer to this issue should it arise, the issue mainly
simply point out that
being that some ISPs may charge more for using their bandwidth than they would charge others. I am sure that this private sector,
which has turned the Internet into what it is today, which has done more with data than anyone thought possible, could easily figure
this out. There is so much that has been said from a pro or anti net neutrality stance that the whole conversation is hard to navigate
through. The
government should have waited to see how the situation would have played
out. But I suppose that is not in the interest of government; to let others decide for
themselves.¶ The other issue is the BATFE deciding to reclassify a type of ammunition based on whether it can penetrate
body armor or not. If it can, then it would be banned for civilian use on the basis that it can be used against the body armor worn by
police officers. A big issue with this is that it is a clear violation of the 2nd Amendment. Those that seek to completely erase the 2nd
Amendment will point out that nothing regarding ammunition is present in the Bill of Rights. However, if you understand what it is the
Framer’s were referring to, what they had just gone through with the American Revolution, and what they had written prior,
concurrently, and after the Constitution was written, then it becomes clear: Government can not destroy or impede the right of
people to have firearms and actually be able to use that firearm for it’s intended purpose. Restrictions on firearms, magazine
capacities, ammo types, etc. are an attempt by government to destroy or impede one from using that firearm for it’s intended
purpose. Plain and simple.¶ While
we can elect our own representatives to government who will
hopefully do what they said they would do and hopefully listen to his/her constituents,
we can not elect the bureaucrats. While there is plenty of discussion promoting or damning bureaucracies, I am of
the mind that in today’s United States the bureaucracies are often staffed by partisans who will
interpret the various laws and directives it has according to their own goals and
interests. Some are necessary and beneficial (NASA is an example) but they might be able to be outdone with the right minds
and money in the private sector (Elon Musk and Space X.) However, some are not so necessary and beneficial that they have
grossly expanded their dominion with overlapping responsibilities (DEA, BATFE, FBI.) Most, if not all, of
the departments
should either be done away with or have their authority/funding slashed. We have
enough troubles with Congress eroding our liberties; we don’t need a shadowy,
unelected body aiding and abetting them.
FCC Fails: Delays
FCC can’t solve perception. Constant delays means no chance for
solvency.
Wallsten 2/9/15 - Vice President for Research and Senior Fellow at Technology Policy
Institute (Scott, “Administrative Procedures, Bureaucracy, and Transparency: Why Does the
FCC Vote on Secret Texts?” Technology Policy Institute, pp. 1-16)//DWB
On February 9, 2011 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a proposed rule¶ that included, among many other
provisions, capping the Universal Service Fund at $4.5 billion.1¶ The FCC voted to approve a final order on October 27, 2011. But
when the order was finally¶ released on November 18, 2011, the $4.5 billion ceiling had effectively become a floor, with the¶ order
requiring the agency to forever estimate demand at no less than $4.5 billion.2 Because¶ payments from the fund had been
decreasing steadily, this floor means that the FCC is now¶ collecting hundreds of billions of dollars more in taxes than it is spending
A unique quirk of the FCC rulemaking process
makes it¶ impossible to find out. Unlike other federal agencies, the FCC does not make
public the text of¶ the rules on which it is voting at the time of the vote. Instead, at the time of the
on the program.¶ How did this bait and switch happen?
vote the bureau in¶ charge of writing the order is given “editorial privileges” to continue working on the order, ¶ which is then released
days, weeks, or even months after the vote. As a result, there is no way to¶ know what changed between the vote and the final
rule.¶
This approach to rulemaking raises obvious transparency questions since the public
has no way¶ of knowing whether the changes between the vote and publication in the
document detailing the¶ new rules are truly editorial or of a more substantive nature.3 The
FCC has steadfastly asserted a¶ right to keep secret the text of the documents it votes on. In response to a Freedom of ¶ Information
Act request by the Associated Press in 2008, the FCC
argued that it had no¶ obligation to make public
these texts on the somewhat puzzling grounds that they were¶ “predecisional.”4¶ To be sure,
it is unlikely that major aspects of rules have been changed between the vote and¶ publication. Long comment periods on proposed
rules mean that large changes would surely be¶ noticed. Nevertheless, minute details of regulations can matter and can be tweaked
to benefit¶ interest groups. The lack
of transparency in the voting process means it is never
possible to know¶ if the commissioners actively approved the order as ultimately
implemented. While we cannot determine which, if any, constituencies benefit or lose during the time between¶ vote and
publication, it is possible to evaluate whether any observable factors are related to¶ delays between vote and publication. To do so, I
assemble a dataset of all “major”5 orders passed¶ from 1994 through 2013, including information on the delay in days, chairman,
commissioner¶ votes, length of the order, issues covered, bureau responsible for the order, outside comments ¶ filed with the FCC,
and the number of ex partes—notices of direct, nonpublic, communication¶ (typically in-person meetings) between FCC staff or
commissioners and an interested party.¶ 6¶ A great deal has been written about the objectives of regulatory agencies, their
incentives, and¶ their relationships with Congress and the courts.7 We know little empirically, however, about ¶ how the mechanics of
an agency’s rulemaking process itself affects votes and regulatory¶ outcomes. This feature of the FCC can provide some insight into
an agency’s internal workings¶ and how those workings can affect outcomes. In particular, I ask how this unique approach to¶
the FCC did not
always delay publication as a matter of course. From¶ 1934 until the 1970s, the mean delay between vote
rulemaking developed and what factors affect the delay between vote and release.¶ First, the data show that
and publication was about one day and the¶ median delay was zero days. In the 1970s the typical delay began to increase radically,
and while¶ it has fallen since then,
delays still remain the norm , especially for major orders.¶ Second,
using a two-stage instrumental variables approach to examine major orders since 1994, I¶ find first that the number of ex partes
(notices of private meetings between interested parties and¶ FCC officials) filed before the vote is correlated with a smaller share of
commissioners voting¶ “yes” on the order. A lower share of “yes” votes translates to a longer delay between vote and ¶ publication.
Delays differed significantly across chairman, with the longest delays (since 1994)¶ occurring under Kevin Martin and the shortest
under William Kennard and Julius Genachowski.¶ I find no statistically significant difference in delay across bureaus, although
commissioners are¶ most likely to vote yes on orders covering public safety than any other topic while orders that¶ cover spectrum
have significant longer delays than orders on other issues. The length of the¶ order, as measured by the number of paragraphs in it,
is not correlated with voting outcome or¶ delays.¶ Broadly speaking,
the results suggest that different chairmen
orchestrate the rulemaking process¶ differently and that the more controversial the order,
the fewer commissioners vote yes and the¶ longer the delay between vote and
publication. One reasonable explanation is that orders on¶ more important and controversial issues
are more likely to be challenged in court and, all else¶ equal, the FCC is more likely to
lose such cases. As a result, the Commission has a greater¶ incentive to make sure important and controversial orders are
carefully written in order to if not¶ avoid a court challenge, increase its chances of winning one. The lack of correlation between the
length of the order and the delay suggest that “editorial privileges” are not granted merely to¶ copy edit a document.
FCC Fails: Secrecy
The FCC doesn’t allow for the public to view bills passed until well after the
actual passage. That destroys perception and guarantees circumvention.
Wallsten 2/9/15 - Vice President for Research and Senior Fellow at Technology Policy
Institute (Scott, “Administrative Procedures, Bureaucracy, and Transparency: Why Does the
FCC Vote on Secret Texts?” Technology Policy Institute, pp. 1-16)//DWB
Although transparency
is recognized as a cornerstone of any regulatory agency, the U.S.
Federal¶ Communications Commission does not allow the public to see the text of orders
subject to¶ commission vote. Instead, commissioners vote, grant the relevant agency bureau “editorial¶ privileges” and
then later—sometimes months later—release the order publicly. Ostensibly this¶ procedure is to allow the bureau
to check the text for typos and other editorial mistakes, but of¶ course there is no way to
know what changes between the vote and publication if nobody can see¶ the original text
subject to a vote.¶ This paper assembles data on publication delays on every FCC order back to 1934 and detailed¶ data on
major orders from 1993 through 2013. The data show that the custom of delay between¶ vote and publication began in the 1970s;
prior to that orders were released immediately¶ following the vote. A two-stage model also reveals significant differences across
chairman in the¶ share of yes votes and delays and that more controversial orders as measured by the number of ¶ private meetings
by interested parties held with FCC officials prior to the vote is related to fewer¶ commissioners voting in favor of the order, with a
smaller share of yes votes translating into¶ longer delays between vote and publication. Meanwhile, the length of the order is not
correlated¶ with either the share of commissioners voting in favor or the length of the delay. ¶ Generally
speaking, the
data suggest that despite detailed instructions in the Administrative¶ Procedures Act, the
chairman can have significant influence on the rulemaking process. More¶ importantly, the data
suggest that “editorial privileges” are granted for more than mere¶ copyediting. More
controversial orders yield more dissent and longer delays, implying either that¶ commissioners engage in
substantive negotiating following a vote or that the commission pays¶ extra attention to
the details of an order the more likely they believe it will be challenged in¶ court.
FCC Fails: Obama Controls
Obama has control over FCC decisions – net neutrality proves.
Knutson 3/17/15 – Staff Reporter at The Wall Street Journal (Ryan, “FCC Chairman Says
Obama’s Net Neutrality Statement Influenced Rule,” The Wall Street Journal,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fcc-chairman-says-obamas-net-neutrality-statement-influenced-rule1426616133)//DWB
Republican lawmakers grilled the nation’s top telecommunications regulator Tuesday, accusing him of caving
to pressure from the White House to regulate the Internet as a public utility.¶ Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler acknowledged that President Barack Obama
influenced the agency’s effort to set new “net neutrality” rules when he called in November for the
utility approach, known as Title II.¶ But Mr. Wheeler said he was more influenced by the market’s lack
of reaction to Mr. Obama’s statement. Stocks of Internet service providers didn’t tank, companies bid nearly $45
billion for wireless licenses in an auction that closed in January, and carriers like Sprint Corp. said a Title II approach wouldn’t harm
investment.¶ “The
President’s focus on Title II put wind in the sails of everyone looking for
strong open Internet protections,” Mr. Wheeler said.¶ Net neutrality is the principle that all traffic on the Internet
should be treated equally.¶ Mr. Wheeler’s appearance in front of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee is the
first of as many of five hearings on Capitol Hill over two weeks. His next appearance is Wednesday, with the Senate Commerce
Committee.¶ The meetings focus on Mr. Wheeler’s decision to regulate broadband Internet service under Title II of the
Communications Act, the same potentially restrictive rules that govern the phone system. ¶ The FCC has pledged to refrain from
adopting onerous provisions such as price controls. But critics including many in the telecom and cable industries, as well as
Republicans on the commission, have said Mr. Wheeler risks hurting an industry that works well and that a future commission might
not choose to be so hands off.¶ The FCC, meanwhile, has been searching for a legal basis to enforce equal treatment of Internet
traffic after previous attempts were throw out by the courts.¶ Tuesday’s hearing centered on how Mr. Wheeler’s approach shifted
over the course of the past year. When the FCC raised the issue in 2014, it considered a lighter-touch approach for basing its legal
Rules ultimately passed by
the FCC last month were more aligned with the president’s view.¶ Committee Chairman Rep. Jason
authority. In November, Mr. Obama said he preferred a tougher approach, known as Title II.
Chaffetz (R., Utah) said the FCC’s Office of Inspector General had opened an investigation into how the agency adopted its rules.
The Inspector General’s Office declined to comment.
K Links
Neolib Links
FCC reliance on economic data leads to poor decision making and stifles
room for democratic discourse.
Blevins and Brown ’10 - Director of Undergraduate Education in the Greenlee
School of Journalism & Communication at Iowa State University AND Associate
professor in the
School of Media Arts and Studies at Ohio University (Jeffery Layne, Duncan H.,
“Concerns about the Disproportionate Use of Economic Research in the FCC’S
Media Ownership Studies from 2002–2007,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic
Media 54(4), pp. 603–620, EBSCO)//DWB
The present analysis demonstrates that the FCC’s
ownership studies from 2002–¶ 2007 disproportionately
relied on economic research. Consequently, the analysis¶ addresses two important questions: (1) what may the
FCC overlook if it relies mostly¶ on economics research in the formation of media
ownership rules? And (2), if¶ the FCC included research from a broader range of scholarly fields, might that¶ research have
suggested another course of action, rather than further relaxing media¶ ownership rules? Accordingly, the literature cited in the two
sets of studies the FCC¶ released as part of its 2002 and 2006 proceedings were compared with the citations ¶ in two draft reports
that the agency excluded from official release. The academic ¶ fields each study referenced were also noted.¶ In raising these
questions the authors emphasize two things. First, it is not suggested¶ that the FCC should ignore economics research. Second, it is
recognized that¶ all economics studies are not based necessarily on identical premises or lead to the¶ same conclusions. However,
it is argued that relying
overwhelmingly on economic¶ research may not be a sufficient basis
for FCC decision making on policy issues such¶ as media ownership limits. As media scholar and trained
economist, Gomery (2000,¶ p. 508) wrote, it should be accepted that ‘‘economic behavior and cultural
action¶ are intertwined, and that people are conditioned by culture, and then change and¶
respond. This feeds into the economics, particularly when that economic system¶ is the production and distribution of that very
culture.’’ Clearly, media ownership¶ concentration raises important issues that economists are ideally placed to answer. ¶ But these
issues also raise cultural questions, and concerns about the role of the¶ media in the
democratic processes. With these latter topics it is believed that the¶ FCC’s failure to effectively
incorporate media research into its policymaking process¶ will exclude issues beyond the kind
of issues that an antitrust review would raise.¶ For this reason the authors believe that the FCC is required to go
beyond these¶ economic issues and consider other factors as well. For instance, there is a long¶
tradition of media research that focused on the role of the media in the democratic¶ process but, at least since the early 1980s in the
United States, a growing body of¶ media research emphasized the role of the media in both reflecting and refracting ¶ cultural issues
(Williams, 2003). The concern
is that the FCC’s disproportionate¶ reliance on economics
research narrows the forms of expert knowledge on which¶ policymaking relies in ways
that could potentially harm democratic discourse and¶ cultural debate.
The FCC has historically grounded its decisions on a purely economic
basis – reducing people to nothing but consumers ready to be exploited
and reinforcing neoliberal hierarchies
Blevins and Brown ’10 - Director of Undergraduate Education in the Greenlee
School of Journalism & Communication at Iowa State University AND Associate
professor in the
School of Media Arts and Studies at Ohio University (Jeffery Layne, Duncan H.,
“Concerns about the Disproportionate Use of Economic Research in the FCC’S
Media Ownership Studies from 2002–2007,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic
Media 54(4), pp. 603–620, EBSCO)//DWB
This study revealed how the FCC
used research that mostly drew on the discipline¶ of economics
to justify its decision to relax several media ownership rules. In at¶ least one case a draft study produced by FCC staff
that drew on a much broader¶ range of scholarship, and reached conclusions that would have challenged the FCC¶ majority’s
preference to relax the rules, was not made public. Moreover,
the FCC¶ largely ignored the huge volume of
comments it received from the public despite the¶ fact that those comments were almost
unanimous in opposing the FCC’s proposed¶ relaxation of the rules (McGregor, 2006). This left two
questions to be answered:¶ what is the FCC missing by focusing on economics, and why does it matter?¶ The authors emphasize
the need for additional perspectives beyond economics¶ because, as Aufderheide (1999, pp. 108–109) indicated, it is ‘‘crucial to
assess¶ the viability of the association between the public interest and a competitive environment,’’ ¶ especially given that media
systems transmit not only entertainment,¶ but also information and culture. The problem
presented here is that the reliance¶ on research literature and methodologies disproportionately from the
discipline¶ of economics is that media markets are different from other markets in several¶ important ways. The
media may enhance the democratic discourse in a society¶ and, even in television programs that are
dismissed by many as mere entertainment,¶ they contribute to an understanding of who we are as a
society, what we value,¶ who are our friends, and our enemies. They both contribute to the culture and¶
reflect it. They are, in effect, cultural industries. Even former FCC Chair Fowler, ¶ known for the statement that television was just
another household appliance—¶ a toaster with pictures—acknowledged in the Texas Law Review article that the¶ marketplace may
not supply all of the media products a society might need (Fowler¶ & Brenner, 1982); (see also Brown, 1994). Gomery, a media
scholar who trained¶ as an economist, struck a similar cautionary note in a roundtable discussion held by the FCC in 2001 to
announce the start of its first review of media ownership¶ rules. Gomery argued that one
should question a ‘‘pure
free market approach which¶ assumes that efficient operation represents the
paramount—and often the sole goal,¶ for any media enterprise’’ (Federal Communication
Commission, 2001, October 29:¶ np). Society may need, and therefore require, more of those media enterprises, ¶ especially those
licensed to serve the public interest, convenience and necessity, ¶ such as broadcasting.¶ To illustrate the suggestion that the FCC’s
disproportionate use of economic¶ literature and approaches in its media ownership studies led the agency to ignore¶ important
issues, one has to return for a moment to the third study of the 2007¶ studies titled ‘‘Television Station Ownership Structure and the
Quantity and Quality¶ of TV Programming’’ (see Appendix B for URL to the full text). This study, conducted ¶ by a faculty member in
a department of economics at a major U.S. university notes,¶
‘‘Executive Summary,’’ the author¶ explains that the focus
‘‘our approach is decidedly economic.’’ In the
is on ‘‘economic measures of programming
quality.’’¶ We have two measures. First, we measure quality by the number of households¶ who choose to watch a program (as
measured by the Nielsen television rating)¶ as a share of households that have access to that programming. This captures ¶ the idea
that for programming that is free to households (i.e., broadcast television¶ programming or cable television programming after
purchasing access to a¶ bundle of networks), higher quality programs will garner higher ratings. Second, ¶ we measure program
quality by the number and length (in minutes and seconds)¶ of advertisements included on that program. This captures the idea that
the more¶ advertisements included in a program, the less enjoyable it is for viewers to watch¶ that program. (p. 2)¶ However, there is
also a rather telling footnote to this basis for measuring program ¶ quality:¶ As discussed further below, there are many other ways to
interpret ‘‘quantity’’¶ and (especially) ‘‘quality’’ in television markets. We chose these definitions for¶ two reasons. The first was data
economic¶ measures of program quality fit best with economic
measures of program quantity¶ and aesthetic measures of program quality are both
subjective and difficult to obtain¶ on a broad scale. The second were idiosyncratic preferences and training:
a noneconomist,¶ or an economist with a less empirical perspective, might well have¶ selected alternative
measures. (footnote #3, pp. 2–3)¶ Defining what programming serves the public interest is difficult, but relying on a¶ definition
complementarity [sic] and availability:
based solely on the size of the audience and the lack of advertising is ¶ simply a return to the proposition of former FCC Chair Fowler
helps¶ to rationalize a
neoliberal faith in the wisdom of market forces to ensure that the¶ public interest is being
served. Therefore, by relying on this economic definition of¶ what constitutes quality in a television program, it is argued the FCC
that what interests¶ the public defines the public interest (Fowler & Brenner, 1982), and thus
was missing a¶ great deal. Why does this matter? Napoli (2001, p. 18) noted that the FCC’s mission statement ¶ declares the
agency’s dual role ‘‘to encourage competition in communications¶ markets and to protect the public interest,’’ indicates that
market and public interest¶ objectives are not necessarily always congruent, or ‘‘the inclusion
of both terms¶ would not be necessary.’’ McChesney (2008, p. 421) explained one important way¶ that market and public interest
objects are different:¶ The media
system is not simply an economic category; it is responsible for
transmitting¶ culture, journalism, and politically relevant information. Fulfilling those needs¶ is
mandatory for self-governance: : : : Indeed, in many media markets the primary¶ audience is not the general public, but advertisers.
This changes the nature of the¶ media market considerably. It introduces a layer of commercial vetting of content ¶ : : : and it gives
media tremendous incentive to appeal to those audience members ¶ that the advertisers wish to reach. In general, advertisers
are interested in people¶ with disposable income, so the reliance upon advertising magnifies the class bias¶
in media content: : : : It is a poison pill for democratic governance. ¶ Thus, it is clear that the type of theoretical
knowledge espoused in study three¶ of the 2007 studies may be inadequate from a perspective
outside economics.¶ And, it can be reasonably concluded that more research from academic
disciplines¶ that privilege the role of media in society would have affected the FCC’s
media¶ ownership policy had they been featured more in the process.¶ While economic research is
certainly relevant to any consideration of media¶ ownership rulemaking, and should be included in the FCC’s policymaking process,¶
the analysis presented here raises critical questions about whether it should¶ be the primary basis for public interest determinations.
A more diverse array of¶ scholarly perspectives is needed, and more input from the public is suggested.¶ While McGregor (2006)
noted that public comments in the review process did¶ not supply the types of information the FCC uses to justify its policy
decisions,¶ the outpouring of public opinion did influence many members of Congress. When¶ House and Senate office staff was
flooded with a burst of public comments about¶ media ownership rules, many members of Congress began to pay attention (Scott, ¶
2004). It would be a refreshing
change if the FCC paid more attention to the public¶ it purports
to serve, and not circumscribe media ownership as just an economic¶ issue.¶ However, shortly
after appointment as FCC Chair, Julius Genachowski seemed¶ to privilege the role of economics when announcing his senior staff
for the Office¶ of Strategic Planning. Genachowski’s statement professed
the need for ‘‘sound economic¶
analysis,’’ but did not mention media scholarship, nor journalism, and only¶ made a
passing reference to ‘‘consumers,’’ not the ‘‘public’’ (Federal Communications¶ Commission, 2009, July
22, p. 1). If this is an indication of how the FCC will¶ approach its media ownership rules in the future, little may change.
Imperialism Links
Regulations of telecommunications grounded in Western ideals results in a
new form of imperialism. Breaking down these devotions to Western
thought is key to foster global cooperation.
Price ’94 - Director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Global
Communication Studies (December, Monroe E., “The Market for Loyalties:
Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances,” The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 667-705, http://www.jstor.org/stable/797114)//DWB
National identities are, of course, quizzical imaginings: a combination of¶ the aesthetics of
patriotism, romantic searches through the past, and the¶ reinvention of old myths for
sometimes benign, sometimes malevolent¶ purposes. They can change rapidly. The nation state has
always been, as Eli¶ Noam has written, "at tension with cross-border allegiances-whether¶ proletarian
international solidarity, rebellious youth culture, international¶ financial capital, or ethnic
minorities." 165 Now, however, new networks can¶ weaken national cohesion while strengthening and internationalizing
particular¶ allegiances (often among globally distributed communities). Noam notes, "It ¶ is difficult for a state to extend its powers
beyond traditional frontiers, but it¶ is easy for the new networks to do so."166 Thus, the audiocassettes with the ¶ recorded voice and
message of the exiled Ayatollah that were smuggled from ¶ France to revolutionary strongholds in Iran immediately transported the
fiery¶ zeal of the Ayatollah and helped unite opposition to the Shah. Radio
gave to¶ the people of Moscow the sense
that they were a community, stronger and¶ more independent than the organizers of the reactionary coup. The lesson¶
demonstrated by these examples is not only one of freedom; it is also the¶ lesson of imperiled narratives and
susceptible regimes. A global market for¶ loyalties increasingly supplements its local
counterparts, and participants in the¶ local markets tend, as in the market for goods, to
be increasingly transnational.¶ Great corporations, religious entities, and programmers of signals bind together¶
scattered ethnic populations and others with defined interests.¶ The global drama of the programs and narratives that have been
beamed¶ through the skies as a technique of the new era may have been captured best ¶ by the gifted Polish journalist and author
Ryszard Kapuscinski. Although¶ describing Iran's turn to Khomeini after Westernization under the Shah, his ¶ words have a more
general truth: A
nation trampled by despotism, degraded, forced into the role of an¶ object,
seeks shelter, seeks a place where it can dig itself in, wall¶ itself off, be itself. This is
indispensable if it is to preserve its¶ individuality, its identity, even its ordinariness. But a whole nation¶ cannot emigrate, so it
undertakes a migration in time rather than in¶ space. 167¶ In this passage Kapusciniski was writing of resistance to messages from
the¶ West, a "walling in" that must use every technique possible to block the¶ compelling, attractive, permeating voices from without.
This atavistic theory,¶ this
turn against modernity, also suggests one of the strong motivations,¶
conscious or not, for the West to project the enveloping narratives of its¶ contemporary
radio and television. There is a key here to the importance of the¶ stories that are pumped into the transition societies and
the periphery of the¶ developed world, a key to the impact of the dream factories of Hollywood on¶ the villagers of the Carpathians,
pub keepers in Wales, shepherds in the¶ Basque country, or workers in Azerbaijan. The rhythm and music of Western ¶ radio and
television push modernity against competing forces. Alan Rusbridger¶ of The Guardian caught this "full surreality of the New Media
World Order"¶ in a village located an hour from New Delhi.'68 There, while young people¶ chant at the temple of the monkey-god,
Hanuman, the family of Yogbal¶ Sharma watches MTV with its legseg, lipstick, kisses, jeans, fast cars, beaches, ¶ cafes, drink, [and]
waterfalls," a representative sample of Star TV fare.169 In¶ the years to come, Rusbridger observes, children will choose whether to
spend¶ Tuesday evening singing to Hanuman or watching Dynasty.`70¶ Imagine
a world of hyperbolic
interactivity, a home shopping network not¶ just of consumer goods, but of ideologies
and movements. In this mythological¶ telecommunications future, the boundaries that
will count will be the footprints¶ of satellites and the reach of computer system operators.
They will demarcate¶ the sway of the empires of production exerting their influence over the fealties ¶ of mere consumers. It is a
future in which the Third World becomes even¶ more marginalized, unless it becomes more of a market for goods and¶ therefore
more relevant to the producers and distributors of imagery. The¶ wiring of the world, and the expansion of the technology that
enables the¶ allegiances of consumerism, is akin to establishing the infrastructure for¶ resource extraction in the colonies of old.
Modern broadcasting devices, once¶ the perfect instruments for capturing loyalties and
maintaining the state, are¶ becoming consummate devices for undermining the
established order. The new¶ technologies and the mechanisms that are evolving for their
exploitation are reducing the capacity of existing states to regulate political discourse.
Even in¶ an era of more limited broadcast entry, some argued that Radio Free Europe,¶ Radio Liberty, and Voice of America helped
destabilize the Soviet regime. If¶ abundant
channels become easily accessible, universally
available, and used by¶ powerfully charismatic, unmediated voices, then the potential for
novel,¶ widespread, populist alliances will certainly be realized. Whether the¶ competitors will be the
industries of faith, the distributors of blue jeans and¶ alcohol, or empires yet unborn, the point remains the same. The ascendancy¶
of the new players, the new media structure and allegiances, will weaken and¶ ultimately replace the now-reigning oligopolies. It is in
this transformed market¶ for loyalties that the possibilities, however dim, of global
coordination and¶ regulation must be realized.
FCC regulation determines the good and evil in society and constructs the
ideal notions of community. The government continually lies to itself about
this control in an attempt to maintain political loyalty.
Price ’94 - Director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Global
Communication Studies (December, Monroe E., “The Market for Loyalties:
Electronic Media and the Global Competition for Allegiances,” The Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 667-705, http://www.jstor.org/stable/797114)//DWB
The day-to-day work
of shaping and regulating the broadcast market for¶ loyalties falls to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an¶ organization with a tight and traditional
relationship with Congress, the White¶ House, and the industry it oversees. While the
Communications Act of 1934¶ prohibits the FCC from engaging in censorship,95 the very process of¶ licensing radio and television
stations acts as a major constraint on the¶ competition for loyalties.96 Competition for federal licenses and the¶ requirement of a
renewal (every three years in television's "golden age")¶ inevitably affect the range of views expressed. While that range has been
quite¶ wide, and renewal of licenses is typically automatic, the
possibility that a¶ valuable asset could be lost
is an effective argument for conformity. The¶ powers of the FCC , Congress, and the White House
have all been used as¶ weapons in the battleground for competing notions of the good,
the ideal¶ model for organizing and directing society, basic ideas of cohesion, and the¶
definition of community .97¶ Government-mediated actions have had important consequences for the¶ narrative of
national identity.98 During the McCarthy era, the authority of Congress and the FCC was enlisted to
sanitize the airwaves of left-wing¶ sentiment. In the 1960's, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon
used¶ the "fairness doctrine" and the licensing process to intimidate broadcasters who ¶ challenged their views. Nixon, for instance,
sought to punish The Washington¶ Post by threatening the economic security of the television stations owned by¶ its parent
company.99 Nixon also sought to reduce the central power of public¶ broadcasting because, in his view and that of Vice President
Spiro Agnew, the¶ noncommercial system was creating allegiances hostile to conservative ¶ values."? In the 1980's, through the
introduction of preference rules, the¶ FCC sought, at least cosmetically, to assure minority ownership of broadcast¶ media on the
understanding that ownership has implications for on-screen¶ narratives.'0' In addition, during the 1960's and 1970's, groups used
the¶ FCC's licensing process-which permits challenges to the renewal of a¶ broadcaster's license-to change the practices (in terms
of employment and¶ representation of groups) of licensees and networks.'02 In these ways, to the ¶ extent they could manage to
bring the power of the state behind their¶ perspectives, law
and regulation were deployed to strengthen the
interests of¶ one interest group or another and to limit entry by ideological
competitors.'03¶ Despite widespread government involvement in the market for loyalties,¶ American jurisprudence
is deep in denial of the relationship between government and imagery. The most recent
example is Justice Kennedy's¶ opinion for the Court last term in Turner Broadcasting.'O" The Court's¶
decision upheld (albeit narrowly and grudgingly) the power of Congress to¶ mandate by statute that cable operators use some of
their abundant channels¶ to transmit the signals of both commercial and noncommercial over-the-air¶ broadcasters.'05 Justice
Kennedy could only reach
this result by including an¶ account of broadcasting regulation that, at
least from the point of view of those¶ concerned with "public interest" considerations, devastatingly rewrote the¶
history of federal practice. The issue before the Court was whether Congress¶ could require cable operators to carry
one set of speakers (broadcasters such¶ as NBC or PBS) at the expense of cable networks such as Disney or Discovery ¶ or
CNN.'06 To
satisfy his own reading of the First Amendment, Justice¶ Kennedy needed to
demonstrate that the statute was content-neutral'07 by¶ showing that there was no content-related basis for
either federal broadcasting¶ regulation or the congressional obligation imposed on cable operators. As a¶ result, Justice Kennedy
pushed aside long-standing congressional efforts to¶ make broadcasters publicly
accountable. By reconstructing the past to show¶ that the FCC had only minor functions with respect to the impact of¶
broadcasting on society, Justice Kennedy avoided the notion that broadcasters ¶ have a special content-related purpose in society.
According to Justice¶ Kennedy, "the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to¶ ordain any particular type of
programming that must be offered by broadcast¶ stations."''08 Furthermore, "given the minimal extent to which the FCC and¶
Congress actually influence the programming offered by broadcast stations, it ¶ would be difficult to conclude that Congress enacted
must-carry [rules] in an¶ effort to exercise content control over what subscribers view on cable¶ television. "'09¶ To be sure, the FCC
has never been a very heavy regulator of the¶ television medium and has been subject to intense criticism for its occasionally¶
sweetheart relationship with the industry. The FCC has also been at the¶ deregulatory end of its administrative scale for the last
commercial licensees have¶ felt indirect as
well as direct pressure from the government to give meaning to the 1934 Act's terms "public
convenience, interest, or necessity.""0¶ Whether Congress can exert such pressure in the future is another
fifteen years.¶ Throughout the history of broadcasting, however,
matter,¶ given the Court's view that the existence of scarcity, now apparently resolved, ¶ justified whatever morsel of regulatory
power previously existed.¶ From the perspective of maximizing freedom, the description of federal¶ power contained in Turner
Broadcasting is a desirable one, even if it is not¶ authentic. Its problematic nature, however, comes to the fore where the issue ¶ of
Here is an area in which¶ the government, through
subsidy, licensing, and congressional oversight, plays¶ an active role in the marketplace
for loyalties. One could consider public¶ television a preeminent example of government
trying to determine what¶ voices must be added to the mix, either for reasons of justice
or to provide¶ outlets for expression that help legitimate the status quo. But here, too, Justice¶
Kennedy was rigid and narrow in his description of the relationship of¶ government to content. As questionable as was
the Court's "history" of the¶ relationship between the FCC and commercial broadcasting,
its review of the¶ function of noncommercial television was even more puzzling. Given the
public or noncommercial television is concerned.
last¶ decade of tumult, sweat, congressional interference, and use of funding¶ priorities to shape public broadcasting, it probably
came as a surprise to public¶ broadcasters that "the Government is foreclosed from using its financial¶ support to gain leverage over
any programming decisions.""' Congress can¶ require cable systems to carry public broadcasting stations because they¶ augment
something called a free broadcasting service, and no other¶ reason-quality, education, impact on children, multiculturalism-is
relevant.¶ Indeed, Justice Kennedy stated that if any other reason had been relevant to¶ Congress, the statute might have raised
serious constitutional problems."2