Egypt Neg
Egypt Says No To Plan
Egypt will say no – aid lacks credibility and is viewed as too Western
Democracy Digest, 11 (6/14, “Egyptian officials attack democracy assistance, as NGOs challenge
‘troubling’
transition.”
http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/egyptian-officials-attack-democracyassistance-as-ngos-challenge-troubling-transition/)
The Egyptian
authorities are reportedly incensed that democracy assistance is being made directly
available to civil society, human rights and other pro-democracy groups, denying the authorities a right of
veto. But civil society groups are more concerned that the current transition process will prolong instability, damage the economy
and allow unrepresentative parties to draft a new constitution “in accordance with their own narrow interests.” Senior government
officials cautioned non-governmental organizations that accepting U.S. funds undermined Egypt’s security, raising
concerns that the authorities are continuing the Mubarak regime’s strategy of denying space and resources to democratic forces.
“We’re still ruled by the Mubarak regime without Mubarak,” according to Negad el-Borai, who heads a rule of law and human rights
group. “Even though there has been a change at a certain level of the system, the system is still there,” said a U.S. official. Some
leftist and Islamist groups are vehemently opposed to U.S. and other Western funding, viewing
assistance as external interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, while others are understandably
protective of the Jasmine Revolution’s home-grown character. “We don’t want the American’s
money now and we don’t need it to have democracy,” one activist told Bikya Masr. “For all our
problems, this is our country and as the world saw, we can take care of ourselves,” another said.
Egypt says no –
a) Ties to Mubarak and questionable motives.
Bill Lindner, writing for the Islam Times, “Seeking Independence From American Influence, Egyptians overwhelmingly Reject U.S. Aid,”
7/12/2011, http://www.islamtimes.org/vdcaayna.49nym1gtk4.html
After activists complained that seeking loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank compromised the country's sovereignty,
Egypt backed off seeking loans from them. For decades, foreign aid that Egypt received from the U.S. and elsewhere has come with conditions
regarding how such money is spent. Many Egyptians interpret the conditions of its foreign aid as making the country beholden to western interests.
Former President Hosni Mubarak's regime received more than $50 billion from the U.S. during his three decade reign and Egyptian revolutionaries want
to shed the "puppet state" stigma that engulfed them under Mubarak's dictatorial rule. Under Mubarak's dictatorship, money received from the U.S.
assured -- among many other things -- that Egypt upheld an unpopular peace treaty with Israel, and that the Suez Canal would be kept open for
facilitating American military operations in Iraq and the region. Pro-Democracy
Egyptians want to replace the stigma of
its former bought-and-paid-for multi-decade dictatorship with a new model based on
Democracy where people have a say in the country's government and foreign policy issues. Naqui el
Ghatrifi, a former Egyptian ambassador turned liberal politician in Egypt's new Justice Party, told McClatchy News that "The U.S. was keen to
manipulate the political situation in Egypt, and this was disastrous for Egypt and the United States" (link:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/29/116747/egypt-rejection-of-us-aid-a-sign.html). el Ghatrifi went on to note that Americans have to support
real democracy in Egypt, which in the short term could be a little painful, but it will lay the groundwork for the future where Egypt can be an equal
partner with the U.S., not an agent. But refusing U.S. aid isn't enough with Egypt reeling from the effects of the riots and protests, and some in Egypt's
political spectrum believe Egypt should start adopting more effective development plans for agriculture and industry, and that a new vision for Egypt's
economic development is needed. Riots and protests have taken a toll in Egypt's economy which has crashed its stock market, scared off investors,
resulted in bank closures that lasted for weeks, and virtually crippled tourism. Egyptian finance officials are trying to find ways to fix Egypt's economy
that don't involve foreign aid to cover a reported $28.5 billion deficit. While breaking itself off from western aid, Egyptians are reportedly strengthening
ties with Persian Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which gave Egypt a conditional-free gift of $500 million. Alliances like this are growing in
the wake of the Arab Spring protests (link: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/29/116747/egypt-rejection-of-us-aid-a-sign.html). The
U.S.
has been criticized for being slow to support the Arab Spring protests. In spite of struggling to
recover, polls are showing that an overwhelming majority of Egypt's population rejects foreign
aid, especially from the U.S. According to the McClatchy report, a Gallup poll found that 75 percent of Egyptians
oppose U.S. aid to political groups, and 68 percent think the United States will try to exert direct
influence over Egypt's political future. In fact, both U.S. and Egyptian officials say Egypt's
government is hesitant to receive American technical assistance or election observers for its
upcoming vote and the anti-aid strain is permeating almost everything in Egypt's political scene.
U.S. interference in their country’s politics and the slow pace of the process towards democracy aren’t the only things frustrating Egyptians.
Frustrations at the slow pace of change and the slow pace of trials for the policemen and officials accused of killing and ordering the killing of their
relatives since Egypt's revolution have resulted in more riots and clashes in Cairo's Tehrir Square between Egyptian security forces and more than 5,000
protestors. More than 590 were injured according to witnesses and medical officials (link: http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/06/29). The
clashes began when police tried to clear a sit-in at the state-TV building, which included families of those killed during Egypt's revolution earlier this
year. Police showed up and attacked the families outside the Balloon Theatre in Agouza where a planned memorial service for the families was taking
place and the clash ultimately spilled into other parts of the city. According to witnesses, the protest gained momentum and made its way into Tahrir
Square, and ultimately to the interior ministry. Protestors were chanting "Down with the military junta." Egyptians
have such a
conscious disdain for America's lavish support of Mubarak's dictatorship for the past 30 years
and many elements of Mubarak's regime are still present in the governing authorities (link:
http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2011/06/14/egypt-rejects-u-s-democracy-funding/). U.S. intervention in Egypt's internal
affairs would ensure that they remain in place. Is Egypt's rejection of U.S. aid a sign of things to come?
b) National sovereignty
Allen
Michael
, writing for Democracy Digest, “Democracy assistance and the Arab Spring: solidarity vs. sovereignty?” 7/6/
http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/07/democracy-assistance-and-the-arab-spring-solidarity-vs-sovereignty/
2011,
But the
recent announcement that USAID would re-allocate 40 percent of its post-25 January
US$155 million budget for Egypt to democracy and governance programs provoked a critical
response from the government in Cairo and from local political actors who charged the US with
violating national sovereignty and interfering in domestic political affairs. “There is a difference
between your development partners extending a helping hand and beginning to interfere in
what is essentially national affairs,” said Abdel Malek. “USAID in particular crossed that line.”
c) Stigma
Paul Richter and Jeffrey Fleishman, staff writers for the Los Angeles Times, “U.S. pro-democracy effort rubs many in Egypt the wrong
way,” 8/10/2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/10/world/la-fg-us-egypt-20110811
The April 6 movement has had contacts with U.S. organizations but denies taking aid. Ali Selmi, deputy prime minister for political affairs, said Monday
that the
government "rejects any outside funding for Egyptian movements under the guise of
supporting democracy." Nongovernmental groups are increasingly fearful of accepting help
from abroad, said Fady Phillip, a member of the Maspero Youth Movement. "It's become part of the culture. The army
is creating this hypersensitivity, and no one wants to be accused of being a spy." The fingerpointing is especially provocative at a time when conspiracy theories claim that the U.S., Israel
and other foreign forces are seeking to hijack the revolution.
SCAF backlash
The military will backlash against any group receiving assistance from the US.
Leila Fadel and Ernesto Londono, staff writers for the Washington Post, “Military stokes xenophobia in Egypt,”
7/30/2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/military-stokes-xenophobia-inegypt/2011/07/28/gIQAFnGjjI_story.html
Facing mounting challenges and spreading unrest, Egypt’s
interim military rulers have resorted to an old
tactic: Blame the foreigners. In recent weeks, military leaders have charged that protesters
demanding reforms and a speedy transition to democracy are working at the behest of foreign
agents attempting to stoke divisions within Egyptian society. Security forces have detained a number of foreigners — including at
least five Americans — and accused them of spying for Israel or the West. The ruling Egyptian generals have also criticized recent
offers of foreign aid and decried what they call attempts by the United States and other countries to meddle in Egypt’s nascent
democracy. “It’s the kind of rhetoric that resonates very strongly with Egyptians ,” said Heba Morayef, a
Cairo-based researcher with Human Rights Watch. “Egyptians are very proud of being Egyptians.” Ousted President Hosni Mubarak’s
intelligence officers often used xenophobic rhetoric to deflect domestic criticism, Morayef said. The recent tactics are more
pervasive and blunt, she said. Egyptian
activists say the efforts to stoke xenophobia could be a pretext
to crack down on groups that have become increasingly critical of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces. “The military council is deliberately creating an atmosphere of deep suspicion and hostility
toward anyone that dares criticize its performance,” said Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights. Military leaders have in particular sought to disparage the April 6 movement, one of the most active in the mosaic
of groups that brought down Mubarak in February. Army officers have asserted that the group’s members received military training
in Serbia and are receiving U.S. funding — allegations that the group denies and the military has not publicly substantiated. For
any group seeking U.S. assistance, there’s a risk of being treated as suspect.
No solvency – the military won’t give up its power.
Alastair Su, writing for the Harvard Political Review, “Unmasking Egypt’s True Villain,” 2/20/2011, http://hpronline.org/world/the-middleeast/unmasking-egypts-true-villain/
Unfortunately, I fear that Egypt’s
revolution hardly counts as a victory for Fukuyama’s thesis. The removal
of Mubarak from power does not guarantee a transition to a properly functioning democracy,
and many have been guilty of romanticizing the recent events in Egypt. In his op-ed for Project Syndicate, Chris
Patten called it “a glorious example of the indefatigable courage of the human spirit”– an example of lofty rhetoric that ignores Egypt’s fundamental
problems. The
basic fact is this: Egypt’s military still commands too much power for the revolution
to effect any genuine or significant changes. For a democracy to function effectively, there
needs to be a formal separation in civil-military relations. If this does not happen, the
institutions of a country will become inherently instable, as the country’s reins will ultimately be
in the hands of the military, not its civilians. Currently, the relationship between Egypt’s
military and the state can best be described as a parasitic one. While Egypt’s military provides
the country stability, it undermines the state’s long-term interests by refusing privatization of
the economy, and withholding political power from its citizens.
Solvency
Egypt’s society is already mobilized – there is nothing more we can do to help.
Anne Mariel Peters, assistant professor in the department of government at Wesleyan University, “Why Obama shouldn't increase democracy aid
to Egypt,” 2/14/2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/14/why_obama_shouldn_t_increase_democracy_aid_to_egypt
The United States should promote democracy in Egypt, and the Obama administration has shown itself to be receptive
to the idea. Yet increasing democracy and governance funding (or cutting aid altogether) is not the way to do
it. The great irony of democracy and governance programs is that they will only be followed by desired
democratic outcomes precisely where they are not needed: in environments where society
already faces positive incentives to collectively organize as an opposition movement. If nothing else,
the past three weeks demonstrate that Egyptians do not need foreign money, consultants, or
democracy and governance programs to collectively organize and exert their demands; they simply
needed a pooled set of grievances, digital and print media for communication purposes, and a big push from the "Tunisia effect." Egyptian
society is already mobilized, and the degree to which it can organize itself is a function of how well it can manage to coordinate a wide
variety of interests. This is not a matter of writing party platforms, distributing newsletters, or observing Western parliaments, but Egyptians' ability to
negotiate among themselves. And if
the generals decide to hold on to power, there is little that democracy
and governance funding can do.
US assistance is perceived as anti-revolutionary, gutting Egypt’s democratic potential.
Sean Collins, freelance journalist writing for Spiked Magazine, “Message to America: Hands off Egypt!” 2/2/2011, http://www.spikedonline.com/index.php/site/article/10153/
But who are Obama or Clinton to set conditions on how Egypt should ‘transition’? Maybe those ‘Egyptian people’ they continually refer to have other
ideas. Maybe they are not inclined to listen to leaders of the country that has supported their despised dictator for so long. Even though the Obama
administration is deeply involved in Egypt, some are calling on it to do more. These critics have heard the message ‘it’s up to the Egyptian people’ and
think it is far too passive a posture for Washington to adopt. Across
the spectrum, there are calls for the US to get
more engaged in shaping the outcome in Egypt. On one side, there are the traditional foreign-policy types who speak
unashamedly of American interests and of adopting an anti-Islam stance, rather than promoting democratic rights. They urge the administration to be
active – either to bolster Mubarak or to find someone else to do the America’s bidding. In particular, this group is raising fears that Egypt will become
another Iran, or that elections will result in support for Islamists, like Hamas in Palestine. On the other side, there are those who fully support
democratic rights in Egypt and who want to see the US play a leading role in bringing about democratic change. As many put it, the US should place
itself ‘on the right side of history’. These advocates criticise the White House for not going far enough, for not calling for Mubarak to step down. The
conservative journalist, Claire Berlinski, for instance, writes in Ricochet: ‘Every bit of my heart, as an American and a human being and someone who
deeply believes in democracy and human rights, is on the side of Egyptians who want exactly the rights and freedoms and opportunities all Americans
take for granted. And we should say so to Mubarak: Do not touch another hair on the head of another protester, or you will face the wrath of the
United States.’ The
reality, however, is that Washington has been far too involved in Egypt, to the
detriment of the much-praised Egyptian people. Calling on the US to be the responsible daddy and sort things out among
the squabbling kids is unrealistic as well as patronising. Alex Pareene in Slate rightly bemoans that ‘our national narcissism is
infecting every corner of the debate’ on Egypt. The common thread linking all sides is a call for the US to act: ‘People on CNN
and people on Twitter both demand that Barack Obama and the State Department “do something” about the demonstrations. Announce our support
for democracy! Use diplomatic voodoo to make Mubarak step down! Prop up a new Egyptian leader and somehow make this revolution spread to
Iran!’ What’s arguably even more problematic is that it
appears that this appeal to Washington to take the lead is
affecting the outlook of the Egyptian opposition. The New York Times reported on Monday that Muslim Brotherhood and
secular oppositionists had agreed that Mohamed ElBaradei, the former UN inspector, would represent them. The Times begins by admitting that
ElBaradei represents no one but himself – ‘lacking in deep support on his own’ - but goes on to say that ElBaradei ‘could serve as a consensus figure for
a movement that has struggled to articulate a programme for a potential transition. [The selection of ElBaradei] suggested, too, that the opposition was
aware of the uprising’s image abroad, putting forth a candidate who might be more acceptable to the West than beloved in Egypt.’ ‘Acceptable to the
West’: that’s the criteria for a new leader? Mubarak has announced that he will step down in September; the timing of his departure is also the work of
American intervention. As Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times says, such intervention, even though it takes an antiMubarak form, could harm the democratic moment in Egypt: ‘This choreography - sending former
diplomat Frank Wisner to get Mubarak to say he won’t run for reelection - will… come across in Egypt as collusion between
Obama and Mubarak to distract the public with a half step; it will be interpreted as dissing the
democracy movement once again. This will feed the narrative that it’s the United States that
calls the shots in the Mubarak regime, and that it’s the United States that is trying to
outmaneuver the democracy movement.’ The future really is up to the Egyptian people. They were the ones who courageously
took to the streets and put the possibility of Mubarak’s departure and the introduction of democracy on the agenda in the first place. They remain in
the driver’s seat – they will tell Obama and Clinton when the next elections will be held, not the other way around. No
good can come
from calling on Washington to play a greater role in Egypt, for whatever end. The US has done
plenty of damage for far too long; the best thing it can do now is get out of the way.
Egypt isn’t a model – not key to regional democracy.
Diamond, 11 (Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, Democracy Promotion and the
Obama Doctrine Do you see Egypt as a lynchpin for the spread of democracy in the region?, April 8, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-andpolitics/democracy-promotion-obama-doctrine/p24621)
It's overwhelmingly the most important country in the Arab world. It's by far the largest. It's been culturally and politically a pace setter throughout
history. The diffusion effects that could emanate from Egypt are therefore naturally more powerful. At the same time, it's
too much to
argue that as Egypt goes, so goes every last hope for democratic change in the region. It is
certainly possible to imagine that Egypt will not get through the difficult passage from
authoritarianism to the kind of pseudo-democracy that's swirling around now toward a genuine democracy any time soon. It may
become stuck in transition, or even reverse. At the same time, Tunisia could successfully navigate the passage.
And perhaps we will be surprised to find democratic change in Morocco, although I think the king's reform
plans are probably insincere. It's difficult to forecast. These countries move to their own rhythm and dynamics.
Election Assistance
Egypt won’t allow election assistance.
Michael Allen, writing for Democracy Digest, “Egypt’s military rejects foreign election monitors,” 7/20/2011,
http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/07/egypts-military-rejects-foreign-election-monitors/
Egypt’s military rulers today ruled out international monitoring of upcoming parliamentary
elections, insisting that foreign observers “will infringe national sovereignty.” The Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces approved a draft law for parliamentary elections, delayed by two months from September to November. “The delay was in response to
demands by various political forces, parties and groups established after the revolution to have more time to get organized,” said Mamduh Shahin, a
member of the SCAF. The army will announce the precise date for the polls by the end of next month, he said. The
elections will be
supervised by the judiciary, not the Interior Ministry, widely perceived to have manipulated
results to the advantage of the former ruling National Democratic Party under the former
regime. Half of the 504 seats in the lower house will be contested only by workers and farmers, the SCAF announced, and voters will be allowed to
vote after showing their national ID. Card. Egyptian civil society groups will be allowed to monitor the elections
which will take place in stages, with voting on different days in three regions, in order to ensure
transparency. “This is a good step. It’s a positive guarantee for judicial supervision,” said political scientist Mustapha al-Sayyid. “Holding
elections over three stages allows the judges to be present. “Parliamentary elections in 2005 were the first to be held under judicial supervision and
those were the elections that led to the Muslim Brotherhood coming into parliament.”
Any support for a specific party backfires and undermines our credibility
Carothers, 11 – vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Program (Thomas, 2/24. “How Not To
Promote Democracy In Egypt.” http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/02/24/how-not-topromote-democracy-in-egypt/156)
As the U.S. government assesses the uprisings across the Middle East and scrambles to support Egypt's fledgling democratic
transition, many ideas are on the table. One
notably bad proposal is already being heard frequently in
Washington: that to help Egypt prepare for elections we should support not just the
development of political parties - a reasonable though sensitive undertaking - but favor one side of the party
spectrum. That is, of course, the secular liberal side we feel comfortable with. This is a recipe for trouble. Former
ambassador Martin Indyk recently called for the U.S. government "to mobilize funding for the well-oiled American democracy
promotion machinery that can help Egypt's youthful secular forces organize for the coming elections." Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (RFla.) has said that "engaging the Muslim Brotherhood must not be on the table." Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.) noted that we
should not tell Egyptians who can participate in their political life, but that, nevertheless, "our job is to create an alternative" to the
Muslim Brotherhood. A
perennial tension in supporting democracy abroad is maintaining a clear line
between bolstering key democratic principles - such as political openness and fair competition - and trying to
shape particular electoral outcomes. When we begin to choose favorites from a field of political
competitors and seek to give them a boost, we step over this line. Not only do such efforts at
engineering electoral outcomes undercut our credibility, they also usually backfire against the
very people we are trying to help. Witness the futility of the efforts of U.S. diplomats in Iraq to
throw U.S. weight behind certain candidates or parties during the various elections since
2005. If Egyptians decide to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the next presidential and parliamentary elections - a
decision they will make through their own constitutional reform process - we will have to make a clear choice if we wish to aid
Egypt's political party development. Either we open our programs to all legally registered nonviolent parties, or we stay away from
political party support. It is possible that the Brotherhood may choose not to take part in whatever U.S. party training programs we
offer. (These are likely to focus on party organization, campaign methods and other basics.) But then again they might, and that
would not be so bad. The National Democratic Institute, operating with U.S. government funds, has been an active, effective
supporter of political party development in numerous Arab countries for the past 10 years. It has frequently included Islamist parties
in its activities, such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, and Islah in Yemen.
That inclusion has not hurt U.S. interests and has led to many fruitful dialogues between Arab political Islamists and
Americans. While carrying out research in Indonesia in 2004, I was struck to learn that the International Republican Institute was
including in its multiparty training programs the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a conservative Islamist party known at the time for
organizing fiery anti-American demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy there. Neither the IRI representative in Jakarta, with whom
I spoke, nor PKS officials expressed concern about this relationship. I asked the vice president of the PKS why his party was working
with a U.S. government-funded organization affiliated with the Republican Party, at a time when a Republican-led U.S. government
was being denounced by Muslims around the world for the invasion of Iraq. He expressed admiration both for U.S. Republicans'
political skills and the fairmindedness with which they approached Indonesia's political scene. It is good that the U.S. government
has woken up after decades of support for dictatorship in Egypt and is ready to stand on the side of democracy. We should be
acutely aware, however, that unlike
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, local political actors in the Arab
world harbor enormous and often bitter skepticism of our democratic bona fides. Our proautocracy record in the region is well-known, and our new stance is still taking shape: Shortly after
President Obama said his government stands ready to assist Egypt in its pursuit of democracy, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike
If we want to help
democracy take root in Egypt, our "job," to use Berman's term, is first to begin building our own
credibility. Proceeding on the basis of democratic principles such as openness and inclusion
rather than political favoritism and exclusion would be a good way to start.
Mullen visited the Gulf to "reassure" America's autocratic allies there of continued U.S. friendship.
Answers to Muslim Brotherhood Affirmative
Solvency
Plan can’t solve – Muslim Brotherhood takeover is inevitable.
Stanley Kurtz, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, “Inside Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” 9/6/2011,
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/276382/inside-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-stanley-kurtz
The Brotherhood’s top-down discipline isn’t perfect. In certain instances since the revolution, younger members
have been able to influence the group’s direction. But Trager shows why a significant breakaway by supposedly more moderate
younger members is highly unlikely. The
Muslim Brotherhood is planning to contest nearly half the seats
in the upcoming parliamentary election (through the nominally distinct Freedom and Justice Party), and Trager
thinks the Brotherhood is likely to win the “vast majority” of these seats. The Brotherhood has
also moved aggressively to ally with — actually, co-opt — a select group of secular parties, leaving the
Brotherhood likely to emerge as the most powerful force in the new assembly. Trager also shows that
what the Muslim Brotherhood means when they call their goals “moderate” bears little relationship to what Americans mean by
that word. The Brotherhood claims that being moderate signifies renouncing violence, denouncing terrorism, and refusing to work
with jihadists. Yet Trager’s interviews reveal almost universal exceptions to these rules in the minds of Brotherhood members for
Israelis, Americans, and Brits, whose countries are considered “gangs that kill children and women and men and destroy houses and
fields,” and are thus appropriate targets for violence. Trager wants the United States to help Egypt’s liberal parties reach the rural
masses, in hopes of blunting what he sees as the
Brotherhood’s otherwise unstoppable appeal to the religious
a wan hope. Even Trager admits that Egypt’s secular political parties are either
“too new to be known or too discredited by their cooperation with the previous regime.” He adds:
hinterlands. That seems
“Concentrated within the small percentage of Internet-using, politically literate Egyptians, their numbers are surprisingly small.”
Realistically, the only force in Egypt capable of keeping the Muslim Brotherhood and the broader Islamist movement in check is the
military. Egypt’s military is now engaged in a complicated dance of cooperation and competition with the Brotherhood, outlined
capably in another new Foreign Affairs article, “Commanding Democracy in Egypt,” by Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor. These two
articles from the latest issue of Foreign Affairs can be combined with Amr Bargisi’s piece in The Weekly Standard on the rise of an
Islamist candidate for Egypt’s president to create a disturbing trilogy. True, Bargisi expresses the hope that stewardship of Egypt’s
rapidly deteriorating economic situation may discredit Islamism. Even so, the
weakness of Egypt’s secular parties, as
well as their seldom reported but very real deficit of authentic liberalism, leaves little hope that
a continued Egyptian economic meltdown will somehow produce the liberal renaissance the
revolution itself could not.
The US is toxic – any group that accepts assistance becomes discredited.
Joel Brinkley, staff writer for SF Gate, “How 'democracy' got to be a dirty word,” 4/5/2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-0405/opinion/17193126_1_democracy-promotion-moroccan-king-advance-democracy
So it may come as a surprise to learn that neither President Obama
nor Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has
even uttered the word democracy in a manner related to democracy promotion since taking
office more than two months ago. The State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has put out 30 public
releases, so far, and not one of them has discussed democracy promotion. Democracy, it seems, is banished from the Obama
administration's public vocabulary. "They're trying to recalibrate," said Kenneth Wollack, president of the National Democratic
Institute, one of those government-funded organizations. And no wonder. By now, everyone knows that former President George
W. Bush despoiled the word. Right now
it is toxic. Much of the world still believes that when the United
States talks about democracy promotion, its intent is to impose it, as in Iraq. As Bush put it, his mission was
to "end tyranny in the world" and replace it with democracies. Didn't that tell dozens of leaders worldwide that Bush's aim was to
drive them from office? No wonder this policy caused so much acrimony. Last week, Obama abandoned Bush's lofty goal of imposing
a Western-style democracy on Afghanistan and instead said America's mission was simply to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban. That's
all. Bush is gone, but the damage he caused remains. Vice President Joe Biden, speaking in Europe a few weeks ago, offered one of
the very few references to democracy promotion to be heard from any Obama administration official, and it was principally a
rebuke. "Our administration," he said, "will advance democracy not through the imposition of force from the outside, but by
working with moderates in government and civil society to build those institutions that will protect that freedom." An obscure
German study of democracy promotion in Morocco, a monarchy, tells the story behind Biden's remark. Almost alone among the
Arab states, Morocco's leaders voiced enthusiasm for Bush's Middle East democracy initiative while offering little that would temper
the absolute authority of the Moroccan king. The German study, published late last year, found that "contrary to popular
expectations, there has been no popular backlash against democracy promotion in Morocco to date," adding: "All Moroccan actors,
from Islamists to feminists, are involved in some form of international collaboration." At the same time, however, the study found a
blanket "refusal to cooperate with the U.S. government" on democracy promotion. One Moroccan NGO leader told the researchers:
"It is
indeed a poisoned chalice for serious NGOs that think they serve a good cause by
accepting American aid, but then end up losing their souls and becoming discredited." Doesn't
that sound like making a pact with the devil? The researchers completed that study just before Obama took office. But Lorne Craner,
head of the International Republican Institute, another government-funded democracy-promotion agency, said that even
today,
"overseas it is tougher. If I could trade for the anonymity we had in the '90s," before Bush took office, "I would do it in a
minute." And Craner was a Bush administration assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor until 2004.
Craner's group conducts public-opinion surveys on democracy-related issues in numerous countries, and then presents government
leaders with the findings. But even this relatively benign strategy is viewed with deep suspicion.
Moroccans of all political persuasions, quoted in the study, called the studies unprofessional. Even the political party that was shown
to be most popular in one of the polls said it was harmful, politically, and urged the institute not to do any more polling. Finally, the
Moroccan government, saying it was concerned about "American meddling in Moroccan affairs," proposed a law to curtail political
polling. In
the Middle East, particularly, memories are long. Just think about Iran's retort to
Obama's public overture for better relations last month. Iran cited grievances stretching back
half a century. For democracy promotion, the United States will wear the stench of the Bush
strategy for many years.
New electoral laws make it impossible for liberal candidates to win – NONE of their ev
assumes this.
Eric Trager, The Washington Institute's Ira Weiner fellow, “Egypt's New Elections Laws: Another Democratic Setback,”
9/27/2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3401
Egypt's complicated new parliamentary laws, which the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
endorsed today, represent the latest setback for the country's democratic prospects. By
perpetuating the individual candidacy system for one-third of the parliament, the new laws virtually ensure that the
former ruling party will be well represented in the next legislature. Meanwhile, the proportional
representation voting system, which will determine the other two-thirds of the parliament, will
likely include a provision for a "largest remainder system," making it virtually impossible for
small parties to compete with larger, mostly illiberal parties. Background Since 1976, Egypt has regularly held
tightly controlled multiparty parliamentary elections. During the Mubarak era, these votes enabled the regime to create the
impression of democratic legitimacy while it otherwise manipulated the system to ensure a parliamentary supermajority for the
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). From 1990 through November 2010, the elections were based on a two-member-district
system, with each of Egypt's 222 districts electing one "professional" and one "worker" to parliament. This structure helped the
regime control electoral outcomes at the local level, alongside tactics such as deploying police forces to shut down specific polling
stations, permitting regime-preferred candidates to buy votes or stuff ballot boxes, and ordering State Security to exclude
prospective candidates without garnering national attention. The relative smallness of the districts further bolstered a clientelist
system that benefited the NDP: candidates' electoral fortunes often depended on their ability to provide services to their
constituents, and NDP candidates typically won thanks to their enhanced access to government services. Since Mubarak's ouster in
February, however, most opposition parties have demanded that the two-member system be replaced by a proportionalrepresentation system, under which parliamentarians are seated according to the percentage of votes that their party receives
nationwide. Opposition parties fared relatively well when this type of system was in place from 1984 to 1990, winning roughly 20
percent of the vote compared to less than 10 percent in most elections thereafter. A nationwide proportional-list system would also
give the many new parties that have formed since February a chance to win some seats: most of these parties are quite small and ill
prepared to establish the kind of concentrated, local organization necessary for competing under a district-based system. Yet the
SCAF and the transitional civilian government have resisted pressure to scrap the district-based model, arguing that an electoral
system based exclusively on proportional representation would unconstitutionally exclude independents. To provide space for
independents, Egyptian authorities initially hinted that the new system would be split evenly between proportional and districtbased voting. But on Monday, the government responded to ongoing opposition pressure by announcing that two-thirds of the new
parliament would be elected through proportional voting and one-third through the district system. A Recipe for the Ruling Party's
Return Although it is tempting to view yesterday's decision as a major concession, the details of the new voting system suggest an
effort to reconstitute authoritarian rule. Under the terms of the new elections law, only independents can vie for the one-third of
parliamentary seats chosen at the district level. Former NDP parliamentarians -- who are now independents because the party has
been disbanded -- are therefore expected to be the most competitive candidates in the district-based races. Despite the NDP's
unpopularity and the strong public support for prosecuting Mubarak regime officials, many former NDP parliamentarians retain
strong reputations in their districts given their prior provision of services to their constituents. The enlargement of individual
electoral districts will further bolster former NDP candidates. Under the new system, 83 districts are covered by individual
candidacy, compared to 222 under the previous system. Since candidates in the district-based elections cannot draw on the
organizing capabilities of a political party, larger districts significantly advantage wealthier candidates -- many of whom either joined
or supported the NDP during the Mubarak era. Former NDP legislators -- or their relatives -- are likely to fare particularly well in
Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta, where large families that typically aligned with the NDP under Mubarak still dominate political life.
Blocking Small Parties? Although the district-based component of the new electoral system is the most obvious avenue through
which the former ruling party might return to power, it is hardly the only threat to Egypt's democratic prospects. The party-list
elections that will determine the other two-thirds of parliament have also been structured in favor of larger, illiberal factions. The
official election bylaws have yet to be released, but reports suggest that the party-list elections will be based on district-wide voting,
with winners determined using the "largest remainder system." According to this method, only those parties that meet or exceed
the quota of votes for a given district will be able to win seats. For example, in a district with five seats, a party must win at least 20
percent of the vote to gain a seat; even if a party finishes within the top five, none of its candidates will be seated if it does not cross
the 20 percent threshold. If this system is enacted, it will significantly hamper newer parties in the next parliamentary elections.
The local nature of these party-list elections -- as opposed to the nationwide systems in other
democracies -- makes it unlikely that small and still-forming parties will be able to compete
effectively. Even in those districts where they might field multiple candidates, they would have trouble surpassing the relatively
high thresholds that the largest remainder system implies. At the same time, the party-list structure significantly
advantages the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) faction that remains
Egypt's only political force with significant organizational capabilities (apart from former NDP
parliamentarians). Although the MB recently announced that it would run for only 40 percent of the parliamentary seats, it will
likely dominate a much larger share of the legislature through its stewardship of the National Democratic
Alliance for Egypt -- an electoral bloc that has attracted more than thirty parties hoping to benefit from the MB's political prowess.
Most of these smaller parties stand to win only a handful of seats, however, because the Wafd
Party, the MB's primary partner in the alliance, is likely to run for an additional 33.5 percent of
the seats. These percentages may grow even larger, especially if the new election laws lead more parties to jump
on the MB's bandwagon. For example, the Egyptian Bloc -- a coalition of mostly liberal and leftist parties -- has just signaled that it
might want to run in tandem with the Democratic Alliance, providing further indication that the presumptive new system heavily
favors the Brotherhood. While MB leaders prefer an electoral system that scraps district-based elections entirely and thereby limits
the former NDP bloc's likelihood of success, Freedom and Justice Party leader Saad al-Katatni stated that he has "no objections to
the new amendments." The MB
is therefore likely to push its partners in the Democratic Alliance to
accept the new format, since they stand to benefit by holding elections as soon as possible -before potential competitors organize effectively.
The MB will moderate now – strategic engagement.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, a former diplomatic correspondent for USA Today and former
Cairo correspondent for The Economist, “Keeping up with Mideast changes,” 7/5/2011,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/58347.html
Second, on Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
said that U.S. officials will be allowed to have
contact with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood — granddaddy of all Middle Eastern Islamic political movements. “We
believe, given the changing political landscape in Egypt,” Clinton said at a new conference in Budapest, “that it is in the interests of
the United States to engage with all parties that are peaceful, and committed to non-violence, that intend to compete for the
parliament and the presidency.” For years, U.S. officials had been barred from any contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, even after
it renounced violence in the 1970s. The group remained technically outlawed and U.S. diplomats feared the wrath of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak if they contacted its representatives. I remember U.S. diplomats in Cairo in the mid-80s sheepishly
debriefing American reporters, who met regularly with Brotherhood members. Under the Bush administration, U.S. officials in Cairo
were allowed to meet Muslim Brothers, who had been elected as independents to the parliament. While Clinton portrayed U.S.
policy as a continuation of “the approach of limited contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood that has existed on and off for about five
or six years,” it extends beyond that to a blanket recognition. By
expanding the range of permissible official
contacts, Clinton was belatedly acknowledging the major role the Brotherhood is likely to play in
post-Mubarak Egypt. She demonstrated that Washington realized banning talks would limit future U.S. influence in the Arab
world’s most populous state. U.S. recognition of the Brotherhood also sends a signal to other Islamic
movements and parties in the region – like Hamas – that U.S. hostility is not implacable. It can change if
these groups renounce violence. It was U.S. refusal to accept Hamas’s victory in 2006 Palestinian legislative elections – which the
Bush administration had aggressively promoted – that discredited U.S. democracy promotion efforts throughout the region. Now
democracy is breaking out on its own — and U.S. policy is struggling to catch up. Taken together, these two announcements
demonstrate that Washington is able to distinguish between sworn enemies of humanity — like Al Qaeda — and groups that have a
genuine constituency and future in the Muslim world. This is crucial as the Arab spring moves into a summer and fall of party politics
and elections. President Barack Obama, in his 2009 Cairo speech, promised “a new beginning between the United States and
Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam
are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles — principles of justice and
progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.” The governments that emerge in the Middle East are unlikely to be of
America’s choosing and may well include groups that espouse policies that Washington dislikes. But at least, U.S.
officials will
be able to talk to all the major players and not engage in self-defeating boycotts. That is the best way
to defeat Al Qaeda and build U.S. influence with the Middle East’s new leaders.
U.S. Assistance = Kiss of Death
Specifically true for Egypt.
John L. Esposito, University Professor and Founding Director of the Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding, “When Words
Fail: Rhetoric vs. Action in American Public Diplomacy,” 7/26/2011, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47349
Gallup's 'Egypt from Tahrir to Transition' underscores the extent to which clinging to a failed narrative risks the temptation to
"encourage" or influence a specific outcome in Arab elections which will validate the concerns of Egyptians and others in the Arab
world. Two-thirds of Egyptians
surveyed think the U.S. will try to interfere in Egypt's political
future as opposed to letting the people of the country decide alone. A similar number disagree that the
U.S. is serious about encouraging democratic systems of government in their region. Like all people, the people of Egypt,
especially those who most admire America's democratic principles, want to forge their political
future independently. Almost 90% of Egyptians, who see the U.S. as a political model for their
country, oppose U.S. aid to political groups in their country, more than those who hold this view among the
general public (75%). Perhaps as a result, 52% of Egyptians oppose accepting economic aid as a whole -- 43% among those who
believe Egypt should look to the U.S. model of democracy. The lack
of progress in Palestine uniquely undermines
US claims to be a force for freedom and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. As Gallup Polling (Oct 2008), pre Gaza
war, found: as important as the closing of Guantanamo was to significantly improve attitudes toward the United States, it did not
match the high level of support for U.S. pressure on Israel. Majorities of citizens in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Lebanon said that increasing pressure on Israel would improve their view of the United States "very significantly." Against the
backdrop of Middle East uprisings that have intensified animus toward Israel and growing momentum for global recognition of a
Palestinian state, American officials
are struggling to balance national security interests against the
need to adapt to a transformative movement in the Arab world. No longer can America afford to forego its
own interests in favor of an intransigent Israel that ignores U.S. views on things like settlements. Many bright, talented
individuals are profoundly affected and changed by what they see and experience as endless
occupation, oppression, corruption and injustice in the Arab world and in Israel-Palestine. They see a history of
Western powers, particularly the US, supporting and aiding autocrats and Israeli governments
and policies and using power and military force to threaten, invade and "occupy" Muslim lands.
So too, the perception and realities of occupation and injustice in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Palestine continue to be
a catalyst heavily exploited in the rhetoric and ideologies of terrorist organizations. Obama should not spend American political
capital on convincing Euro-powers to vote down the Palestinian initiative at the UNGA. While steadfastly assuring Israel’s security,
the U.S. needs to let Netanyahu feel Israel’s growing isolation in the international community.
The MB will use the plan to discredit liberal organizations, killing their election chances.
Mohamed Abdelbaky, an Egyptian journalist who specializes in democracy and human rights, 8-25-2011, “The Crisis of
External Fudning of Egyptian Civil Society,” FIKRA Forum, http://fikraforum.org/2011/08/the-crisis-of-external-funding-of-egyptiancivil-society/
Domestically, the peril of crisis is that foreign
funding could become a weapon wielded by Islamic
movements and former regime loyalists to tarnish the image of the secular movement in Egypt,
which is vying at present for a ‘civil’ (i.e., secular) Egyptian state and trying to prevent a system of religious,
autocratic rule. In a statement by Rafik Habib, Vice President of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, Habib stated,
“U.S. funding for civil society organizations that help parties build their capacities is intervention in support of the secular trend to
fortify them against the Islamic trend in Egypt.” The Brotherhood subsequently issued an official statement on August 18 to
investigate this funding and to determine the legality of human rights organizations receiving foreign funding. To
be certain,
the use of these accusations by the Islamist trend will have a negative impact on liberals at the
voting polls in upcoming parliamentary elections, particularly given the extensive media
coverage the subject has received, to a much bewildered public.
Credibility Advantage
Statistical and historical modeling proves – increasing democracy assistance elicits negative
returns to our credibility.
Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Democratization in the 21st Century: What Can the United States Do?”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and
International Relations, Summer/Fall 2007,
While democracy assistance has been effective, its potential is probably limited. Only if the relationship
between democracy aid and democratic reform is linear would massive additional technical assistance help displace autocratic regimes more quickly,
but linearity is unlikely. More
likely are declining returns to democracy assistance, or even negative
returns in some countries once the donors’ visibility exceeds some threshold level. At the
current level, the United States has already lost credibility as a pro-democracy actor in many
corners of the globe. 27 Should low-key advising and training become more ambitious, it might
trigger a political backlash that would impede rather than help democratization. Democracy and
governance technical assistance is also much less effective depending on where it is going. The Pittsburgh/Vanderbilt team
considered regional influences in its model. The coefficients suggest democracy and governance
aid lacked a discernible effect in southwest Asia and northeast Africa—precisely where the democracy
deficit is largest. 28 Similar results were found in the Athens University research paper, which controlled for whether a country had a majority
Muslim population. The coefficient for this variable was negative and statistically significant, confirming
the broad view that Muslim countries are particularly resistant to democratic reform. 29
Link shield – there is only a risk we lose credibility in the Middle East.
Andrew Terrill, Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, 6-27-2011, “The Arab Upheavals and the Future of the U.S. Military Policies and Presence in the Middle East
and the Gulf,” SSI, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Arab-Upheavals-and-the-Future-of-the-USMilitary-Policies-and-Presence-in-the-Middle-East-and-the-Gulf/2011/6/27
In an insightful if sardonic comment, leading Middle East military analyst Anthony Cordesman
has stated that the
primary export of this region is blame.3 This statement particularly applies to the United States. The United
States will probably be heavily criticized by regional opinion leaders no matter what it does or
fails to do in response to the Arab Spring. Many of the regional opinion leaders making charges
against Washington will be the same regardless of the policy, although they may vary the level of shrillness
based on actual political preferences. Moreover, intense U.S. involvement in any crisis will usually be
denounced more intensively than aloofness (which will also be criticized). Arab public opinion usually
has a default position of opposing Western intervention anywhere in the region, but there are
exceptions. To some extent, the creation of a United Nations sponsored No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya was one of these exceptions,
since it was preceded by an Arab League call for such a measure, and the U.S. only played a limited and brief combat role before
other states assumed the most high visibility operational combat roles. Leading Arab nations such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia have
not participated in the NFZ, although some smaller Arab states have done so, and Qatar has been so involved with helping the
Libyans it has emerged as something of a “hero-nation.”
Alt causes massively outweigh the plan.
Kim R. Holmes, a former assistant secretary of state, is a vice president at the Heritage Foundation, “Muslim World still antiWestern Despite Obama,” 7/27/2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/07/muslim-world-still-anti-westerndespite-obama
Here’s the rub: The
U.S. can try to do the right thing like removing genocidal regimes and
abandoning oppressive authoritarians such as former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, but it does little or
nothing to change Muslim views of America. Muslims claim to want more democracy, of which America is the
standard bearer, but their anti-American complexes and grievances are so huge that they are forever
trying to find some third Muslim way that ignores hundreds of years of historical experience, born
mainly in the West, of what works and what doesn’t. This
is not about who’s right or wrong. We can argue with
could disappear
tomorrow, and we would still have a problem. The root of the problem is a great historical
divide, going back centuries, which will not be easily manipulated by public diplomacy programs
or expressions of good will. This is a problem to be managed, not solved. No amount of Obama-like
engagement will change Muslim public opinion about America and the West. They hold their
views for historically complex reasons, which more often than not are reflections of their
internal problems rather than objective reactions to what we do.
Muslim nations all day long about our support for Israel, but it won’t make any difference. In fact, Israel
US assistance causes radicalism and guts our credibility.
Fran Belisle, prof. of polisci at Coastal Carolina University, commenting on “W&M prof among 100 academics signing letter to Obama,”
1/31/2011, http://www.vagazette.com/articles/2011/02/02/news/doc4d46a9084013b376808385.txt
While democratic reforms in the Middle East should be applauded, Professor Tamara Sonn’s
letter to President Obama
requesting that the President “publicly acknowledge those reforms will not be advanced by
Mubarak or any of his adjutants” is short sighted and harmful to democratic reforms in the
region and US Foreign Policy worldwide. For the United States to publicly support the reformers
would cause an immediate loss of credibility for what began as a purely Egyptian/Middle
Eastern movement and have it appear as if the reformers were influenced by the West. Any hint
of Western influence would not only vilify the reformers in the eyes of those who distrust the
United States, but also serve as a platform to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood and solidify
President Mubarak as a counter to a mob who is now supported (and incited) by the West. Additionally,
while Washington accurately believes that Mubarak’s time has come and it is in Egypt’s best interest for him to depart, these are conversations that
need to be handled through diplomatic channels and behind closed doors. We must not forget that even though Mubarak is a dictator, he has been an
ally of the United States and a source of stability in a region where instability has global repercussions. It is not wise diplomacy to publicly call for the
ouster of a leader who has been a steadfast ally for thirty years. A much better option is to do what President Obama has been doing, which is publicly
state that a country can and should choose its own course and its own future, while privately putting pressure on Mubarak to resign.
The military will backlash against any group receiving assistance from the US.
Leila Fadel and Ernesto Londono, staff writers for the Washington Post, “Military stokes xenophobia in Egypt,” 7/30/2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/military-stokes-xenophobia-in-egypt/2011/07/28/gIQAFnGjjI_story.html
Facing mounting challenges and spreading unrest, Egypt’s
interim military rulers have resorted to an old
tactic: Blame the foreigners. In recent weeks, military leaders have charged that protesters
demanding reforms and a speedy transition to democracy are working at the behest of foreign
agents attempting to stoke divisions within Egyptian society. Security forces have detained a number of foreigners — including at
least five Americans — and accused them of spying for Israel or the West. The ruling Egyptian generals have also criticized recent
offers of foreign aid and decried what they call attempts by the United States and other countries to meddle in Egypt’s nascent
democracy. “It’s the kind of rhetoric that resonates very strongly with Egyptians ,” said Heba Morayef, a
Cairo-based researcher with Human Rights Watch. “Egyptians are very proud of being Egyptians.” Ousted President Hosni Mubarak’s
intelligence officers often used xenophobic rhetoric to deflect domestic criticism, Morayef said. The recent tactics are more
pervasive and blunt, she said. Egyptian
activists say the efforts to stoke xenophobia could be a pretext
to crack down on groups that have become increasingly critical of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces. “The military council is deliberately creating an atmosphere of deep suspicion and hostility
toward anyone that dares criticize its performance,” said Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights. Military leaders have in particular sought to disparage the April 6 movement, one of the most active in the mosaic
of groups that brought down Mubarak in February. Army officers have asserted that the group’s members received military training
in Serbia and are receiving U.S. funding — allegations that the group denies and the military has not publicly substantiated. For
any group seeking U.S. assistance, there’s a risk of being treated as suspect.
Foreign assistance doesn’t generate credibility or good will towards the US – if anything, its
effect is negative.
Ken Adelman, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and arms control director in the Reagan Ronald's administration, “Not-So-Smart
Power,” 4/18/2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/18/not_so_smart_power?page=full
Huge recipients of U.S. foreign aid -- Egypt, Pakistan, and the like -- voted no more in tune with
American values than similar countries that received no, or less, U.S. foreign aid. Instead, their votes
correlated closely with those of Cuba, which wasn't a big foreign-aid donor. That finding, surprising at the time, remains true. Four of the
largest U.S. foreign-aid recipients today -- Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan -- all take
contrary positions on issues of critical importance to the White House. South Vietnam once got gobs -- gobs
upon gobs -- of U.S. foreign aid. That didn't help much. Likewise with Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Zaire (now the "Democratic" Republic of the Congo), and
other "friendly" (read: graciously willing to take U.S. money) countries. The
conclusion seems clear: The relationship
between "the United States' ability to positively influence events abroad," as Nye puts it, and the
amount of U.S. foreign aid a country receives is unclear at best. For decades now, the United
States has been the No. 1 foreign-aid donor -- it has given the most money to poor countries -- so
it can't move up any on that scale. But this hasn't translated in making America the most
popular or most influential country around the world. Quite the contrary.
Topicality
A. Interpretation – Democracy assistance transfers support to pro-democracy groups
Richard Lappin, PhD candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies at the
University of Leuven at Belgium, 2010. “What We Talk About When We Talk About Democracy
Assistance: The Problem of Definition in Post-Conflict Approaches,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & SECURITY STUDIES, Vol 4 Iss 1
By the end of the 1990s, the term ‘democracy assistance’ had acquired increased and extensive usage in
academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of the development programmes and foreign policies of
Western countries Yet, despite this growing recognition, the term
has rarely been clearly or
comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically
understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other
terms can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used umbrella term of
‘democracy promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants including ‘development aid,’ ‘political
aid,’ ‘democracy support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ and ‘support for democratic
development’ (Burnell 2000c: 3) As such, it is critically important that researchers are
cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy assistance by different
people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term. Indeed, if
we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach, both in theory and in practice, will
ultimately be undermined. Democracy assistance can be most accurately defined as the non-profit transfer
of
funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are already
working towards a more democratic society (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) These transfers are usually funded
through governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for International Development
(DfID) The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral agreements Chief amongst the IGOs are the
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American
States (OAS) The most prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL) In
addition, within a given country, there will
also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral
commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political
parties.
B. Violation – the Muslim Brotherhood is not democratic.
Anti-Defamation League, “Muslim Brotherhood (1),” 2011, http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/muslim_brotherhood_1.asp
Ideology The Muslim Brotherhood's theology is based on the doctrine of salafiyya: the belief that present-day Muslims have been
corrupted and must return to the pristine form of Islam practiced at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Many
Muslim
Brotherhood members believe in a radical application of Jihad, which was developed by their ideological
leader Sayyid Qutb. Qutb advocated a violent and belligerent approach to the concept of Jihad. This ideology was adopted by
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, and Hamas. The group motto is: "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Koran is
our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope." The
Muslim Brotherhood aspires to
establish a caliphate unifying all the Muslim nations. Goals Establishing theocracy in Egypt, the
Middle East, ultimately worldwide.
Answers to “Plan is Neutral”
We control uniqueness – we don’t support any political parties now.
Abdel-Baky, 11 (Mohamed Abdel-Baky, Reiterating the differences,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1061/eg1.htm)
El-Assar said that Egyptians were opposed to "foreign interference", adding that "it is a matter
of national sovereignty."
"The problem is that there has been a misunderstanding about US democracy assistance," said
Bassem Samir, an activist. "These are not grants for political parties, and the US may not fund
any foreign political parties.
And there’s no assistance period.
Khalidi 9-19
(2011 – this card is from Monday and hit Lexis on Friday night– Rashid Khalidi is Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia
University and author of "Palestinian Identity" (Columbia University Press, £20) and "The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian
Struggle for Statehood" – New Statesman – September 19, 2011 – lexis)
The euphoria of the Arab spring is giving way to gloom as autumn is upon us and one Arab country after
another appears to be in crisis. Bright optimism has evaporated in the face of the daunting challenges of a transition to
democracy in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, regime repression and the potential for full-blown civil war in Yemen and Syria,
police-state tactics and sectarian tensions in Bahrain and, elsewhere, the stalling of popular efforts to achieve democratic
reform and social justice. Nevertheless, events of the past nine months have changed the Arab world in many ways. Among the
changes has been the re-emergence of a unified Arab public sphere, visible in slogans and organising methods that have spread from
country to country; transnational contacts (largely by means of new media) between young organisers and activists all over the Arab
world; and the ubiquity of Arabic satellite television coverage of the events. Another is the revival of elements of pan-Arabism that
malicious observers had long asserted were passé (if, they claimed, they ever existed). These elements include a deep, popular
concern with the question of Palestine and a constant interaction between the Palestinian political/cultural worlds and Palestine's
Arab hinterland. We saw the former in demonstrations in Cairo in support of the Pal-estinians and in hostility to the shabby dealings
of Hosni Mubarak's regime with Israel. It is also visible in other Arab countries, as popular sentiment is released from the straitjacket
of repression. Partly as a consequence of these developments, the Arab upheavals have contributed to unblocking the situation in
Palestine, which had appeared frozen for the better part of a decade. This has come about in spite of the absence of popular
protests against a status quo that most Palestinians find stifling. Nothing like the upsurges experienced in some Arab capitals has
taken place in Palestine. This is largely because of the unique situation that the Palestinians find themselves in. Unlike other Arab
peoples who won their independence decades ago, the Palestinians have yet to liberate themselves from colonial rule. Indeed, they
are among the world's last few remaining victims of ongoing classical colonialism. Among the consequences are the lingering effects
of the 1948 expulsions of over half the Palestinian people from their homes, unceasing Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem since 1967, and the restriction of Palestinians within a tight matrix of control, whether they live in Israel, or in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in neighbouring Arab countries. At the same time, the Palestinians are burdened with a
political structure that is derived in part from moribund remnants of their own political traditions, such as the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO), and partly the work of sleek figures in expensive suits working for others' agendas, such as the Palestinian
Authority (PA). This peculiar system is nearly as dysfunctional and as dominated by external powers as any Arab regime. Palestinians
are thus trapped between the repression wielded by others and that generated by two Palestinian "authorities" whose origins lie in
the Oslo Process (one of them exists in the West Bank, and the other in Gaza). Neither has sovereignty, real jurisdiction or full
authority, but both have the capability to imprison and torture. These Pal-estinian and non-Palestinian systems of control often work
in tandem, with the Israeli occupation and the Ramallah-based PA engaging in security liaisons; equally, there is close co-operation
between the Israeli and Jordanian security services (as there was between Israeli and Egyptian intelligence under Mubarak). It is
therefore not as straightforward for the Palestinians to move against such amorphous mech-anisms of control as it was for the
Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Syrians to oppose their respective regimes. Even so, the Arab spring has had a powerful impact on
the situation in Palestine. Palestinians demonstrated in the territories of both of their supine authorities, the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. They did so while adapting the slogan of the Arab revolutions - Al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam, which means "The people
demand the fall of the regime" - into the catchy Al-sha'b yurid inha al-inqisam: "The people demand the end of the split" (between
Fatah and Hamas, between the two authorities and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). These demonstrations, though
quickly repressed, represented the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians. They are fed up with the split, the
partisan spirit of both leaderships and their lack of strategic vision for liberation. The Palestinians rightly argue that such a division
serves nothing except the occupation and the personal interests of some who benefit from the status quo. The revolutionary events
in the Arab world were amplified by their indirect effects on Palestine. These included the collapse of the Egyp-tian regime, one of
the mainstays of the Fatah-dominated PA, and the weakening of the Syrian regime, a major supporter of Hamas. Each of the major
Palestinian factions was deprived of some or all of the backing it received from a primary ally. The new Egyptian regime, whose
immediate predecessor had worked tirelessly to prevent inter-Palestinian reconciliation, made the reunification of the Palestinian
national movement a primary plank of its foreign policy. At that point, both of the main Palestinian factions, under pressure from
Palestinian public opinion, had no choice but to reconcile. This has so far amounted to little more than a papering-over of their
differences, and many challenges lie in the way of real reconciliation but it marks the first movement away from debilitating, interPalestinian conflict since 2007. Needless to say, US and Israeli policymakers were displeased by this turn of events: Palestinian
division and dependency are central to their Middle Eastern strategy. The Arab spring also provoked an unprecedented initiative by
refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the occupied territories on 15 May 2011 in commemoration of the 63rd anniversary of the
Naqba, the destruction of most of Palestinian society in 1948. On this occasion there were simultaneous marches to the armistice
lines of Syria and Lebanon with Israel, as well as towards crossings from the Gaza Strip and West Bank into Israel. Scores of unarmed
demonstrators in Syria and Lebanon were shot at by Israeli snipers. Although, in both places, groups under Syrian influence tried to
benefit from the Palestinian uprising, this was, in its conception and organisation, a grass-roots effort by refugee groups inside and
outside the occupied territories, collaborating for the first time using the internet and social media. In form and in content, it was
clearly inspired by the examples of the Arab revolutions. Other examples of civil society activity include the growing movement for
boycott, divestment and sanctions; protests along the Israeli wall designed to steal land from West Bank villages such as Bil'in; and
activism in Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem such as Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan, which are targeted by the Israeli state for takeover
behind a screen of well-funded settler groups, "development" plans, archaeological digs and myriad forms of bullying, harassment
and legalised theft. The role of such civil society groups is not new in Palestinian history. The Palestinians have never had access to
the mechanisms of a state of their own and, due to the weaknesses of the PLO and the PA, they have long had to depend on the
strength of civil society and the ties of solidarity that have developed among a people inured to hardship. This has been visible from
the 1930s, when grass-roots activism set off the 1936-39 revolt (to the surprise of the old leadership), through to the uprisings of
1987 and 2000, which were also initiated at the grass roots and took the political leadership by surprise. Another change for the
Palestinians has been the partial opening up of the Egyptian border with the Gaza Strip at Rafah. This constitutes an important shift,
given the Mubarak regime's diligence in keeping the Rafah crossing nearly completely sealed, under its collaboration with Israel's
land and sea blockade of the Strip after the Hamas takeover in 2007. The impact of this is largely psychological, as the crossing is
open to people only (and then partly so). Gaza's economy is still suffering badly from the siege, despite more widespread smuggling
through the ubiquitous tunnels since the fall of the Mubarak regime and an easing of the onerous Israeli restrictions on passage of
goods, following the negative media fallout for Israel after the Mavi Marmara flotilla fiasco in 2010. The publication this month of a
UN report that justified the Israeli naval blockade while criticising Israeli military tactics did not diminish the damaging impact of this
incident for Israel: its ties with Turkey continued to deteriorate. The ransacking of the Israeli embassy in Egypt on 9 September
exposed the breakdown in relations between Tel Aviv and Cairo in the post-Mubarak era. Turn away In this Palestinian landscape,
subtly reshaped in the wake of the Arab upheavals, the PLO and PA in Ramallah have proposed
obtaining UN
membership for Palestine. This has arisen in spite of the realisation by all concerned that such a course involves
huge challenges. Among these is the likelihood of a US veto in the Security Council (Security Council approval is a
necessary preliminary to a membership vote in the General Assembly); the expectation of ferocious retaliation by Israel and the US
Congress; and the probability that, whether it fails or succeeds, this measure will leave Palestinian public opinion dissatisfied, as it
will not change most Palestinians' experience of occupation or exile. There has been criticism of the approach by some Palestinians,
who fear that it will diminish the role of the PLO, the internationally recognised representatives of all Palestinians, to the benefit of
the PA, which can only legally claim to represent those living in the West Bank and Gaza, and which is largely dependent on the
occupation for its continued existence. The Obama administration appears
determined to confront this
Palestinian initiative at the UN in spite of the damage this will inflict on the already tarnished image of the US. A few
months ago, when the media were reporting breathlessly on the Arab spring and Americans
were supportive of the upsurge, there might have been more reluctance to contemplate such an
open split with the views of the Arab world. As media attention and US public opinion on the
region turn sour or turn away, and as the US presidential elections approach, this caution has
gone out the window.
Promises aid are just lipservice – no money.
Egypt Today, 11 (Fertilizing the Grassroots, July 10, http://wwww.egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:278)
Even with the ouster of Mubarak, it is unlikely that international funding for civil society will
increase significantly. “They don’t have money to spend, that’s the thing,” Shehata says. “There’s a lot
of talk but very little implementation. So again, the dynamic is not necessarily going to be hugely affected by these
efforts, because in the final analysis, they tend to be very, very meager. Neither the EU nor the US is committing
substantial resources to this project.”
No Egypt aid – not being delivered.
DemDigest, 9-7 (International support lacking for Tunisia and Egypt’s transitions, 9-7,
http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/09/international-support-lacking-for-tunisia-and-egyptstransitions/)
The international community is failing to support the two Arab states arguably best placed to secure a
democratic transition, reports suggest. “Tunisia and Egypt have received only a fraction of funds promised
by the international community to support their transition to democracy, the Financial Times reports.
In may, Western democracies, Arab states and multilateral agencies promised $20bn to support economic reform in Egypt and
Tunisia. “As
of today, [we have received] nothing,” said Jalloul Ayed, Tunisia’s finance minister.
Even impartial policies like the plan will be perceived as American meddling – causes backlash.
Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “America Shouldn't Hijack Egypt's Revolution,”
3/9/2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/09/america_shouldnt_hijack_egypts_revolution
Washington has a long wish list for the new Egypt. Despite its baggage-laden history with the country, the United States wants Egypt
to be democratic, economically successful, and a reliable ally. It wants Cairo to regain its luster as a regional leader so that it may
bring its considerable diplomatic weight to bear as an interlocutor on Arab-Israeli affairs and a counterweight to Iran's regional
ambitions. The United States also wants Egypt to serve as a model for political reform, inspiring countries throughout the Arab world
toward a more just political order. This ambitious vision is unlikely to be fully realized, but if Egyptians achieve only a portion of their
revolutionary aspirations, the Middle East will be a better place. Policy
analysts and democracy-promotion
specialists are already racing to formulate a strategy that matches substantial resources to these
lofty aims. They want to provide technical assistance to help Egypt develop political parties,
impartial electoral laws, judicial independence, and legislative oversight. They also have plans for
economic reform, which include U.S. assistance for debt relief and incentives for foreign investment and increased bilateral trade.
Sounds wonderful -- in theory. But it's time to tap the brakes on these grandiose plans, for there
are significant
drawbacks to a robust American role in post-Mubarak Egypt. If Washington is to realize its goals, it should approach
the country's coming transformation with a lighter touch and a certain amount of humility. The main reason is that Egyptians
remain distrustful of Washington and its intentions. Why shouldn't they be? Successive
administrations -- Republican and Democratic alike -- supported and benefited from their close ties to Mubarak. Even
George W. Bush, who pressed Mubarak hardest to undertake reforms, never penalized him for his stubborn resistance to change. A
high-profile approach to Egypt's transition will consequently raise suspicions about
Washington's intentions and goals, complicating efforts to develop the kind of relationship with the new Egypt that
President Barack Obama's administration wants. Happily, anti-Americanism was not the main theme of the millions of Egyptians
who took to the streets in late January and early February. But Americans should draw no conclusions from the absence of anger
directed toward Washington during the 18 heady days of demonstrations. The
political dynamics of the new Egypt
will encourage the country's leaders to diverge from Washington, if only to establish their
nationalist credentials. Prime Minister Essam Sharaf and Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi have already signaled that they will
split from their predecessors and the United States on the Israeli blockade of Gaza and on Egypt's relationship with Iran.
Even if the plan itself is neutral, we will pick favorites eventually.
Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “America Shouldn't Hijack Egypt's Revolution,” 3/9/ 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/09/america_shouldnt_hijack_egypts_revolution
Even if Washington pledges its total neutrality in Egyptian politics, a bold and public democracypromotion effort could quickly lapse into support for one party, group, or movement. U.S.
officials will be sorely tempted to gravitate toward liberal elements within the revolutionary
movement, such as Ayman Nour's al-Ghad party, the newly licensed al-Wasat party, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, and a host
of independent figures. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that Congress will remain neutral should the Obama
administration choose to work with the Nasserists and the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which
maintain views on Egyptian foreign policy, especially when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict,
that are inimical to American interests.
Counterplans
Egypt Investment CP
Text: The United States Federal Government should provide a 39-cent tax credit to American
companies for each new dollar they spend on technical assistance for political organization in
Egypt.
CP solves better than the aff
WERKER AND MUZINICH ‘8 (Eric, is an Associate Professor in the Business, Government, and the
International Economy Unit and a Marvin Bower Fellow at Harvard Business School, AND***
Justin Muzinich is an adviser to a nonprofit group focused on nonproliferation, June 2, “A Better
Approach To Foreign Aid”, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5767)
Congress should provide a 39-cent tax credit to American
companies for each dollar they invest in certain developing countries rather than
Using this domestic initiative as a template,
distributing all foreign aid to foreign governments. For example, instead of giving $ 3.9 million of
aid to the government of Mali, Congress should grant a $3.9 million tax credit to an American
company for building a $10 million factory in Bamako. The cost is exactly the same to taxpayers — the $3.9 million is
simply going to a private company rather than a foreign government. Substituting tax credits for traditional foreign aid
would have three simple and powerful benefits. A principal advantage is that Mali now receives $ 10 million rather
than $3.9 million in development finance. The impact of the incremental $6.1 million on regular Malians could be substantial. For those who clamor for
this is a cost-neutral way of making a real difference. Another benefit is that money
distributed to developing countries will be spent more prudently. As the economist Jeffrey Sachs has
more aid,
noted, of every dollar given to sub-Saharan Africa, only about 44 cents is actually directed toward economic development. The rest goes to debt
service, consultants, and humanitarian emergencies. And after those expenses are subtracted, the remaining money is further reduced by
mismanagement and corruption. Yet while
government bureaucracies may be notorious for inefficient
spending (or worse), American markets reward companies if they use capital efficiently.
Because private companies are focused on the bottom line, they will be much more
protective of money they invest than government officials, which means more of the aid
will reach its intended destination. Combining more total aid with more efficient spending, there could be a severalfold
increase in development dollars deployed. A third important advantage of involving the private sector is that
doing so will help to build institutions in developing countries. Institutions, such as a functioning market
economy, a fair and enforceable legal system, and basic infrastructure, are vital to development. Yet traditional foreign aid, if it focuses
on institution-building at all, does so from the top down. For instance, many U.S., World Bank, and imf grants require countries to adopt political or
does not rely on a genuine desire by
constituents within states to reform. There is clearly a desire to get free money. But since many of the
economic reforms in order to receive aid. The trouble with this approach is that it
states would not undertake reforms without the promised aid, reform occurs largely because it is externally mandated. This may work to some degree,
system of tax credits will
slowly fuel a desire within states to build growth-friendly institutions. When U.S.
companies invest in developing countries, they will foster institution-building in a host of
ways. As they interact with local businesses and governments, there will be a formal
transfer of knowledge. Malian contractors might learn from U.S. engineers how to build better buildings. More informal idea-sharing
but institution-building is more likely to succeed if states want to do it rather than if they are told to. A
will also occur. When American businessmen share meals with Malian political leaders, they will exchange thoughts about what sorts of legal and
political reforms would encourage businesses to invest. Furthermore, U.S. companies will, out of self-interest, demand a better business environment.
For instance, after making an initial investment in Mali because of tax credits, General Electric might be more likely to increase its presence in the
country if the government invests in infrastructure, such as its road and sewage systems. Tax
credits thus take seriously the
notion that in order for reform to succeed over the long run, there must be a genuine demand
for institutional development from constituents within a country rather than only from
government bureaucracies on high. In sum, tax credits for U.S. companies promise more aid, less
waste, and the hope of better institution-building than government-to-government assistance.
The next question is how a system of tax credits should be designed — which sorts of investments should qualify for credits, which countries should be
eligible to benefit from them, and what the total size of the program should be.