HOW DID STALIN TRIUMPH AS
LEADER OF THE USSR?
It was Stalin’s opportunism, ruthlessness and cunning that resulted in his triumph as undisputable
leader of the USSR by 1929. As General Secretary of the Communist Party, he abused the power at his
hands and entrenched support. By posthumously deifying Lenin, Stalin emphasised a connection
between himself and the revered leader, making it difficult to oppose him. By damaging the images of
his rivals and providing an appealing alternative to their policies, Stalin eliminated opponents, until he
remained the sole successor of the Soviet Union.
Stalin’s sly manipulation of the power within his hands as General Secretary of the Communist Party
from 1922 boosted his ability to triumph as leader. His efficiency and reliability in his previous
positions as Commissar of Nationalities, then Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate,
led Lenin to confidently appoint him to the Secretarial position. Stalin had become the only party
member to belong to the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat – giving him the ability to assert
his influence in all governmental areas, as he became a primary link between the party, the state, and
the country overall. Most importantly, as Secretary, Stalin composed the list of candidates from which
the leaders of local Party organs were selected. As American historian Adam Ulam indicated, he
exploited the system at his hands by establishing his own supporters throughout government to
increase his leverage. It was suggested by various historians, including Issac Deutscher1 in 1949, that
even though appointed members may not have initially been Stalin supporters, their lucky
circumstance was such that it was difficult not to develop a sense of “gratitude and obligation”2 to
Stalin. However, as recently illustrated by historian Sarah Davies, Party organisations had the power to
refuse proposed candidates, and there was insufficient direct involvement on the part of the Secretary
to “generate personal loyalty”3. This difference in interpretation is undoubtedly due to Davies’ access
to a greater deal of archival evidence, particularly those released following Stalin’s death. Despite this
contention, it is largely agreed that Stalin’s position as General Secretary was crucial in the emergence
of his influence and rise to power.
Stalin’s manipulation of power went unnoticed, until his overwhelming authority was undeniable and
irreversible. The Party did not acknowledge him as a potential successor, and rivals did not recognise
him as threatening. His running of the mundane governmental activities gave the impression that he
was a competent Secretary and nothing more. Stalin was dull and “boring”4, from a poor educational
background, and almost always quiet in debates until his confidence grew in the late 1920’s. Trotsky’s
zealous approach and powerful position as Commissar of War generated the fear of his succession to
Lenin amongst the Party – hence they were distracted from the dangerous Georgian. Arguably, it was
Trotsky’s intellectual snobbery that caused him to underestimate Stalin and dismiss him as a
“mediocrity”. The mere fact that Stalin was overlooked as a potential successor proves his cunning –
and it was this quality that brought his triumph as leader of the USSR. [They all expected Lenin’s
successor to be a theoretician – and in this respect Stalin was clearly not a threat – Kochan/Abraham]
1
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin: A Political Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949.
Thomas, David; McAndrew, Mark. Russia: Soviet Union 1917-1945, p.125. Rydalmere: Hodder Education, 1995.
3
Davies, Sarah; et al. Stalin: A New History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
4
As described by Stalin’s personal secretary from 1923-25, Boris Bazhanov. Quoted in: Seaton, Albert. Stalin As Warlord,
p.79. California: Batsford, 1976.
2
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HSC Task Two: Stalin
Modern History 2010
Stalin reinforced his support base by associating himself with the posthumous deification of Lenin.
Stalin was prominently involved in Lenin’s funeral, as he organised the embalmment and display of
Lenin’s body in Moscow’s Red Square. Stalin stood by the side of the coffin as thousands of mourning
Russians payed their respects – subsequently strengthening the connection between his and Lenin’s
ideals in the eyes of the public. Where his rivals associated themselves with Lenin as an equal comrade,
Stalin deified Lenin and implied himself as his “disciple”. The publication of Stalin’s books Foundations
of Leninism and Problems of Leninism in 1924 hardly went beyond codifying Lenin’s ideas. However,
these widely read books established Leninism as a creed, and Stalin as the sole deserving successor of
the USSR. At the Congress of Soviets on 26 January 1924, Stalin presented a speech in which he
repeated, “We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, to honour thy command.” In this “quasi-religious tone”5
as termed by historian Paul Dukes, Stalin emphasised his reverence for Lenin, and again put him on a
God-like pedestal. These adroit moves in identifying himself with Lenin not only strengthened his
public appearance and support, but also rendered fellow Party members reluctant to oppose his views,
as doing so implied their criticism of Lenin.
Stalin’s alternative to worldwide revolution, entitled ‘socialism in one country’, emphatically increased
his support. Introduced in December 1924, the theory promoted the concentration of socialist efforts
solely in the Soviet Union. This was against Marxism, Leninism, and Trotskyism; all believed that
capitalist European countries, such as Germany, must experience revolution to create a worldwide
comradeship. Stalin’s alternative appealed to Party members, as it seemed more pragmatic and
realistic, as the notion of world spread socialism was becoming distant. The concept of ‘socialism in
one country’ gathered the support of nationalists, as it was suggestive of Russia’s independent
capabilities – if the country simply utilised the forceful methods which were in place during the Civil
War, industrialisation and the economy would drastically improve. Stalin exploited the creed of
Leninism to gather support for this idea. In 1915 Lenin wrote, "Unevenness of economic and political
development is an unconditional law of capitalism. From here it follows that the victory of socialism is
possible at first in a few capitalist countries or even in one taken separately.” Stalin altered then
incorrectly quoted this as, “the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is less
developed in the capitalist sense." As indicated by historian Robert Daniels, ‘Socialism in one country’
is an epitome of Stalin’s ability to adapt policy and doctrine to the circumstance at hand. By
reinterpreting Marxist-Leninism to suit his intended direction of government, he justified himself to
the Party and concreted a basis for compliance and support. By adding an “ideological dimension” 6 to
his authority, Stalin was exceptionally nearing his goal of triumphing as leader of the USSR.
Stalin’s political pragmatism and cunning manoeuvres against the Left then Right oppositions
ultimately brought his triumph as successor of Lenin’s mantle. United by their fear of Trotsky’s
succession, Stalin formed a triumvirate with leftists Zinoviev and Kamenev by late 1923, despite their
differences. Zinoviev and Kamenev avidly attacked Trotsky in the press and at meetings until his image
was permanently damaged. Trotsky’s absence from Lenin’s funeral further damaged his following, and
by 1925 he was forced to resign from his post of Commissar of War – leaving him virtually powerless.
As their purpose had been served, Stalin severed his alliance with the Leftists, and sided with Bukharin
and the Right opposition. Bukharin was the editor of Soviet newspaper Pravda – this was utilised to
publish damaging articles in which they criticised the radicalism of the Left opposition. In desperation,
Zinoviev and Kamenev allied with their erstwhile enemy Trotsky in a bid to defeat Stalin. Though, as
supported by historian David Christian, by this time it was too late to act against Stalin’s accumulation
of power. As Stalin’s backing increased, so did his rivals’ dissent – and so Stalin used the party law
against factionalism to ensure the removal of these opponents. By late 1927, all three were removed
5
6
Dukes, Paul. A History Of Russia c.882-1996 (Third Edition), p.235. London: Macmillan Press, 1998.
Service, Robert. A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, p.157. London: Penguin Books, 1997.
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HSC Task Two: Stalin
Modern History 2010
from the Communist Party, along with seventy-five of their supporters. By 1929, his former right-wing
allies Rykov and Tomsky lost their Commissariat positions, and Bukharin was dismissed from the
Politburo. As highlighted by historian Elizabeth M. Roberts, Stalin’s rivals were so preoccupied with
attacking each other that they didn’t even realise how threatening he was until too late. As a result of
his sly political approach, Stalin had ruthlessly removed rivals and secured the primary spot as Lenin’s
successor.
Stalin’s triumph as leader of the USSR was largely creditable to his opportunistic and cunning
character. His deceiving appearance allowed him to exploit the political power in his grasp until his
authority irreversible. His manipulation of Lenin’s writings and death made it easy for old Bolsheviks
and the population to support him, and difficult for the minority of dissenters to oppose him. These
factors, along with his pragmatic approach to policy and strategic outmanoeuvring of rivals, indeed
secured Joseph Stalin’s triumph as the undeniable leader of the USSR by 1929.
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HSC Task Two: Stalin
Modern History 2010
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Service, Robert. A History of Twentieth-Century Russia. London: Penguin Books, 1997.
 Christian, David. Imperial and Soviet Russia. London: Macmillan Press, 1986.
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1962.
 Kochan, Lionel; Keep, John. The Making of Modern Russia. London: Penguin Books, 1997.
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 Kort, Michael. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. USA: Franklin Watts, 1992.
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 Hingley, Ronald. Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend. London: Hutchinson &Co Ltd, 1974.
 Ziegler, Charles. E. The History of Russia. USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999.
 Proctor, Helen. Ruling Russia: From Nicholas II to Stalin. Melbourne: Longman Australia, 1995.
 Laver, John. Joseph Stalin: From Revolutionary to Despot. London: Hodder Headline, 1993.
 Roberts, Elizabeth Mauchline. Stalin: Man Of Steel. London: Methuen Educational Ltd, 1968.
 Hasler, Joan. The Making Of the Soviet Union. New York: Longman Group UK Ltd, 1989.
 Thomas, David; McAndrew, Mark. Russia Soviet Union 1917-1945. Rydalmere: Hodder
Education, 1995.
 Hingley, Ronald. Russia: A Concise History. London: Butler & Tanner Ltd, 1972.
 Morcombe, Margot; Fielding, Mark. Russia in Revolution. Ryde: McGraw-Hill Australia, 2003.
 Churchward, L. G. Soviet Socialism: Social And Political Essays. Published by Routledge, 1987.
 Daniels, Robert V. The End Of The Communist Revolution. Published by Routledge, 1993.
 Zuehlke, Jeffrey. Joseph Stalin. Published by Twenty-First Century Books, 2006.
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HSC Task Two: Stalin
Modern History 2010