IR201 Introduction to International Relations
Paul Bacon
Spring 2012
Lecture notes: David Shambaugh’s ‘seven perspectives’ on Chinese foreign policy
What follows is a summary of the key points from the article by David Shambaugh, one
of the most respected commentators on Chinese foreign policy. Please read these notes
in preparation for the multiple choice questions in section one of the exam. I have also
added an essay question on this article to the exam. If you want to do the essay, you
should of course read the whole article! The article is available on the webpage.
Since 2009-2010, China has become tougher towards many of its neighbours in Asia, as
well as the US and the EU.
Even some of China’s ties in Africa and Latin America have become more strained, and
China’s global image has declined since 2007.
China’s new posture is in part the product of a continuing and intense internal debate.
It reflects a current agreement between conservative and nationalist elements in the
Chinese leadership to toughen up policy, and throw China’s weight around where
necessary.
There is currently domestic agreement, but China is a deeply conflicted rising power,
with a number of competing possible international identities.
The foreign policy-making process has become more complicated than ever before, with
many new voices and actors.
As a result, from the outside, China’s foreign policy can seem to be diverse and
contradictory.
It is necessary to understand the different perspectives on foreign policy being debated
within China, to anticipate China’s increasingly contradictory and multi-dimensional
behavior in international relations.
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Each of the perspectives or orientations has different policy implications for the US and
other concerned actors.
Although in the past there has been disagreement concerning whether China is only a
developing country, or only a regional power, in recent years the discourse has become
about what kind of great power China should be.
China is acutely sensitive to the ‘rise and fall of the great powers’ argument. A major
television documentary was broadcast on the subject in 2006.
Both masses and elites in China have been pre-occupied in recent years with
anticipating the dilemmas of being a rising power.
Despite authoritarianism, the internal debate about Chinese foreign policy has been
diverse and robust.
China has no single foreign policy identity today, but rather a series of competing
identities.
China was comparatively unprepared for its new international status, and its rise has
been much more rapid than was anticipated within China.
According to Shambaugh, there are seven distinct perspectives. These are sometimes
contradictory, and sometimes complementary.
These are:
Nativism
Realism
Major Powers
Asia First
Global South
Selective Multilateralism
Globalism
The spectrum ranges from isolationist tendencies at the top, to full engagement in global
governance and institutions at the bottom.
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In between the two extremes, other schools of thought progress from more realist to
more liberal orientations.
China could be said to have a schizophrenic personality.
There are many millions of netizens who are vocal, active and Nativist.
The Chinese government is quite sensitive to this hyper-nationalist element of public
opinion.
Mass nationalism reinforces the Nativist-Realist center of gravity amongst the elite.
(But, ‘a lot of thunder but little rain’).
Realism influences the majority of elite opinion.
More specifically, the majority of government officials support the Major Powers
perspective, including, Shambaugh claims, Hu Jintao himself.
Asia First supporters have a lot of work to do. The Chinese administration has alienated
many regional actors, including Japan, South Korea, and numerous ASEAN countries.
US foreign policy during this period in Asia has been sophisticated and successful.
The Selective Multilateralist School is pushing for a self-interested, tactical and
selective engagement in global governance.
Although China has benefited enormously from the global liberal order, it does not
share many of the ideas behind it.
China will involve itself internationally only when it benefits China, rather than out of
any broader philosophical commitment.
Globalist voices within China have fallen silent since 2008, and this perspective has lost
the debate, for now.
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The centre of gravity lies on the top of the spectrum, anchored on the Realists, but with
a strong pull from the Nativists, and a weaker pull from the Major Powers and Global
South schools.
Government officials in the Foreign Ministry, the Central Committee’s International
Department and Foreign Affairs Office are pragmatically centred between the Major
Powers and Global South schools.
However, government officials must respond to Nativist and Realist voices in society,
the military, and the Communist Party.
Since 2009, China has become an increasingly realist, narrowly self-interested nation,
seeking to maximize its own comprehensive power.
China recovered quickly from the financial crisis, has growing energy consumption
needs, is experiencing rising nationalism, has a looming leadership transition, and
distrusts the Obama administration.
China’s realist posture plays directly into the hands of the realist and conservative
camps in the US. These camps see China as a rising military power, a mercantilist
economic power, a more assertive regional power, and a less co-operative global
partner.
More liberal US analysts have grown disillusioned at China’s recent behavior.
Some have suggested that the US must respond to a realist China with realist methods.
However, there is a danger that this will create an ‘action-reaction’ cycle, similar to
those that we witnessed in the early 20th century.
Tough US policies will generate tough Chinese policy responses.
The US needs to be more sophisticated and develop a more complex strategy.
For the foreseeable future, Chinese behaviour will appear inconsistent, and China will
send conflicting messages, but with a predominantly realist and troubling character.
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