We are now
closer than
ever to the
goal of China’s
national
revival. We
are more
confident
and better
equipped than
ever to realize
this goal.
global asia Feature Essay
70
global asia Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2014
Xi Jinping, ‘Pragmatic’
Offensive Realism
and China’s Rise
By Zhang Baohui
Former Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping, who launched China’s
bold economic reforms, focused
first on building up China’s
economic power, aware that
any overt pursuit of Chinese
military power would unsettle
other countries.
It was a priority that his two
immediate successors shared.
But with President Xi Jingping’s
call for the realization of “the
China dream,” China now ranks
the pursuit of military power as
a priority alongside economic
power. Zhang Baohui explores
the complex ramifications for
China’s foreign policy.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, via a series
of new slogans, has generated speculation on the
future direction of China’s foreign policy. It is
therefore important to understand his concept of
China’s role in world affairs and the implications
of his policies and strategies for international
relations. While Xi’s personal vision and style
may account for some differences from his predecessors, the observed and predicted changes
may also reflect China’s rising power. In this
regard, Xi’s foreign policy may be consistent with
the expected behavior of a rising power, but his
worldview could generate independent impacts
on China’s future posture in world affairs.
In general, Xi has revealed a strong inclination
toward an offensive realist approach through
his goal to return China to the top of the global
power hierarchy and his emphasis on the role
of military power in China’s rise. But this realist
inclination is shared by the leaders of many great
powers, past and present, who aspire to achieve
a favorable spot for their countries in the international system.
Moreover, while Xi has professed a stronger
resolve to defend China’s “core interests,” he
has also demonstrated the ability to pursue cautious and flexible diplomacy in a complex world.
As a tough but pragmatic realist, Xi is strategically using diplomacy to redefine China’s relations with the US and rebuild its image among its
neighbors.
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global asia Feature Essay Xi Jinping, ‘Pragmatic’ Offensive Realism and China’s Rise
1 For Xi’s China Dream speech, see “Xi Jinping zai canguan fuxing
zhilu zhanlan shi qiandiao chengqian qihou jiwang kailai jixu
zhaozhe zhonghua minzu weida fuxing mubiao fenyong qianjin”
(At the ‘Road to Revival’ Exhibition, Xi Jinping Stressed Continuous
Efforts to Realize the Grand Goal of a Great Rejuvenation of the
Chinese Nation), People’s Daily, Nov. 30, 2012.
2 Ibid.
3 See Edward Wong, “Xi Pushes for Pursuit of ‘Chinese Dream,’”
International Herald Tribune, Dec. 11, 2012.
4 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Usual Origins of
America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
p. 5.
5 For a recent assessment of the future distribution of power in the
global system, see US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends
2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence
Council, 2012); World Bank, Global Development Horizon 2011
— Multipolarity: The New Global Economy (Washington, DC: World
Bank Publications, 2011).
Xi’s China Dream:
its material capabilities. A rising power inevitaNationalist or Realist?
bly aspires for more. Thus, Xi’s ambition to restore
On Nov. 29, 2012, less than two weeks after tak- China to its former glory reflects its rapid ascending over the top position of the ruling Chinese ance in the international system, particularly off
Communist Party, Xi Jinping and six other mem- the back of its strong economic growth over more
bers of the Standing Committee of the Politburo than three decades.
visited “The Road Toward Renewal” exhibition at
Recent international assessments all indithe National Museum of China. There, Xi outlined cate that China’s economy is rising faster than
his idea of the “China Dream,” which involves expected.5 Until recently, the general opinion
“the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 1 was that US dominance could continue until
As the first and most significant political slogan 2050.6 However, following the 2008 global
of the new administration, the idea of the China financial crisis, China’s high-speed growth and
Dream symbolizes Xi’s vision for China’s future the appreciation of the renminbi have led to a
and its place in the world.
re-evaluation of predictions for the convergence
During his speech, Xi emphasized the humilia- of the economic power of China and the United
tions suffered by China since the 19th century due States. Now, it is expected that China’s gross
to its weakness and backwardness. He suggested domestic product (GDP) could surpass that of the
that China is nearing the end of a period of con- US sometime between 2017 and 2025, dependtinuous striving for rejuvenation that began with ing on whether the predictions are based on purthe Opium Wars. “We are now closer than ever to chasing power parity (PPP) or the US dollar’s
the goal of China’s national revival,” he said. “We market exchange rate.
Therefore, Xi’s stated goal of a great revival
are more confident and better equipped than ever
is not based on nationalistic fervor. Instead, it
to realize this goal.” 2
This seemingly nationalistic vision led to spec- reflects the realistic ambition of a rising state that
ulation among observers of China that the new is about to claim its place at the top tier of the
administration’s foreign policies might demon- international power hierarchy. This realist interstrate distinctive characteristics that reflect Xi’s pretation of Xi’s intentions is significant, because
own vision and worldview. In particular, there it could lead to different predictions regarding his
was conjecture that Xi might have a more nation- preferences, worldview and policies.
In contrast to a classical realist interpretation
alistic mind-set than his predecessors.3 His later
comments on China’s uncompromising defense of of Xi’s China Dream slogan, which links his bold
its core interests and his championing of a strong vision for China to its rising power, the concept of
offensive realism, which emphasizes the effects
military seemed to support this perspective.
However, there may be alternative interpreta- of the anarchic international structure, offers
tions of Xi’s China Dream and his goal of returning an alternative understanding of his goals and
the country to the center of the world stage. Real- motives. According to John Mearsheimer, the
ism argues that a state’s relative power defines anarchic nature of international relations forces
its foreign policy. As Fareed Zakaria puts it in his states to try to maximize their power.7 In particustudy of the rise of the United States as a world lar, states attempt to increase their power in relapower, “capabilities shape intentions.”4 From this tion to other states to achieve a position of greater
perspective, a state’s goals tend to expand with security. Therefore, all great powers are revision72
global asia Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2014
6 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “American Primacy in
Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp.
20-33.
7 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
8 See BBC, “What Does Xi Jinping’s China Dream Mean?” June 5,
2013, at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22726375.
9 For this interpretation of US grand strategy during the unipolar
era, see John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The National
Interest, January/February 2011, pp. 16-34. Also, Christopher
Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940
to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
The truth is that Xi is a realist who
has a more complex understanding of
China’s rise than his predecessors did.
Unlike Chinese leaders before him, Xi
may question China’s ability to realize
its great national revival without
military conflict with other states.
ist, because they all attempt to change the bal- gan, the BBC interviewed Liu, who claimed that
ance of power in their favor, the ultimate goal China’s new leader shared his dream of making
being to become the most powerful country in the China the world’s dominant power.8
international system.
Such an offensive realist understanding of
From this perspective, Xi’s goal of returning Xi’s vision for China implies that he is no differChina to the top of the global power hierarchy ent from the leaders of many other great powers,
could reflect an offensive realist motive in that present and past, who have all aspired to attain
one must have power to have security and that a favorable spot for their countries in the intermore power leads to more security. For example, national power hierarchy. Indeed, as American
in his China Dream speech, Xi specifically men- scholars have argued, the US itself pursued a
tioned the Chinese adage that “backwardness grand strategy of hegemony during the unipolar
invites aggression,” which has defined China’s era after the Cold War.9 They point out that the
understanding of its abuse by imperialist pow- administrations of US presidents Bill Clinton and
ers since the 19th century. This essentially offen- George W. Bush both articulated a national secusive realist understanding of power and security rity strategy aimed at preventing the rise of a peer
still underlies thinking on international relations challenger. Both also pursued policies, such as
missile defense and expansion of the North Atlanamong China’s elites.
Looking from this angle, Xi’s China Dream slo- tic Treaty Organization (NATO), to maximize US
gan may show affinity with a book of the same power advantages over other great powers.
These origins of Xi’s China Dream slogan are
title written by Liu Mingfu, a People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) strategist. Liu’s book, published in critical to understanding his vision of China’s role
2010, promotes an unambiguously offensive real- in world affairs. Alternative interpretations lead
ist agenda for China in world affairs by specifi- to different expectations of China’s future goals
cally calling for it to become the world’s most pow- and behavior. For instance, a nationalist intererful country with the most powerful military, all pretation could lead to less sanguine expectafor the purpose of protecting China’s national tions. In this context, a nationalistic leader consecurity. When Xi proposed his China Dream slo- sumed by China’s past humiliations and aided
73
global asia Feature Essay Xi Jinping, ‘Pragmatic’ Offensive Realism and China’s Rise
10 For Xi’s southern tour in December 2012, see “Xi Jinping zai
Guangzhou junqu kaocha shi qiangdiao jianchi fuguo he qianjun
xiang tongyi nuli jianshe gonggu guofang he qiangda jundui”
(“During His Inspection of the Guangzhou Military District, Xi
Jinping Emphasized the Unity of ‘Rich Country, Powerful Military’
and Continuous Efforts to Strengthen National Defense”), People’s
Daily, Dec. 13, 2012.
11 Ibid.
12 For a good analysis of Deng’s grand strategy, see Avery
Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and
International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
13 For a classic statement on the issue, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory
of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Weaveland Press, 2010).
by its rapidly expanding power could favor more economic power over military power. As a result,
aggressive scenarios that threaten the security China’s rise followed a primarily liberal internaof other countries. In contrast, a realist under- tional strategy that emphasized economic modstanding could lead to more benign expectations ernization, technological changes and integraof China. While it seems logical to conclude that tion with the world market. In fact, Hu Jintao’s
China’s rising power indicates expanding goals greatest theoretical legacy was his idea of “scienand ambitions, good realists are also capable of tific development,” which emphasized sustainimplementing cautious and pragmatic policies. able economic progress.
Deng’s emphasis on economic power reflected
In fact, as discussed later, recent Chinese foreign
policies in various contexts indicate that Xi is a not only his appreciation of the importance of
China’s economy to its rise, but also his underpragmatic realist.
standing of the potential international backlash if
military power was assigned equal importance in
A Harder Realist
Xi Jinping has also demonstrated two important Beijing’s grand strategy. Deng was acutely aware
realist characteristics: his emphasis on military of the diplomatic challenges facing a rising China,
power, and his tough position on external con- particularly if the international system was characterized by a unipolar order.12
flicts that involve China’s core interests.
Soon after outlining his China Dream vision, Xi
Xi has now modified Deng’s strategic tenets
made a grand tour of southern China and used by emphasizing the parity of the twin goals of a
the occasion to highlight his other ideas for a ris- rich country and a powerful military. The China
ing China. On Dec. 8 and 10, 2012, Xi visited mili- Dream and China’s return to the top of the intertary units of the Guangzhou Military District and national power hierarchy depends on both ecodelivered an important message to the PLA.10 He nomic and military power. This reflects a true
said that while the basis of the China Dream is a realist understanding of international relations,
great revival of the Chinese nation, for the PLA and it differs from the hitherto rather liberal
“it is the dream for a powerful military.” As he international strategy that focused on economic
emphasized, “To achieve the great rejuvenation modernization as the pathway for China’s rise.
Xi’s view represents a classic realist approach.
of the Chinese nation, we must steadfastly champion a unified goal of a rich country and powerful Indeed, realists past and present have emphamilitary.” Further, Xi stressed that a powerful mil- sized the importance of military power. In their
conception, as long as the international system
itary “must be able to fight and be able to win.”11
Xi’s recognition of the equal importance of a is anarchic, security remains the No. 1 priority
rich country and a powerful military is an impor- for states.13 Only a powerful military can protant modification of the Chinese grand strategy. tect states from external threats to their security.
Two decades ago, Deng Xiaoping advised China Therefore, realists tend to see military power as a
to focus on economic modernization as the path- higher priority than economic power in the comway to national revival. His successors, Jiang plex array of comprehensive national capabilities.
Zemin and Hu Jintao, maintained the same stra- According to offensive realists like Mearsheimer,
tegic focus. Although neither neglected the mod- military power defines power itself, while ecoernization of the Chinese military, both Jiang nomic capabilities merely represent a state’s latent
and Hu adhered to Deng’s tenets that prioritized power.14 Although Xi does not prioritize the mili74
global asia Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2014
14 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 55-56.
15 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030.
16 See “Xi Jinping genhao tongchou guonei guowai liang ge taju
gangshi zou heping fazhan daolu the jichu” (Xi Jinping: Further
Integrate the Domestic and International Fronts and Harden the
Foundation for the Road of Peaceful Development), Xinhua, Jan.
29, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2013-01/29/c_114538253.htm.
17 See John Garnaut, “Xi’s War Drums,” April 29, 2013, at
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/xis_war_drums.
tary over the economy, he has nonetheless modified Deng’s strategic tenets by assigning them
equal importance.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that
Xi has abandoned China’s strategy of a peaceful
rise. In many occasions Xi has re-stated China’s
adherence to it. The truth is that Xi is a realist
who has a more complex understanding of China’s rise than his predecessors did. Compared to
Chinese leaders before him, Xi is more astutely
aware of the uncertainties and instabilities of a
realist world. After all, Xi assumed leadership
amid heightened tensions between China and
Japan that almost brought them to the brink of
war. Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao faced the
same scenario. Therefore, Xi’s emphasis on military power should not be detached from the context of his political succession.
Moreover, Xi’s vision of China as a world-class
economic and military power is no different from
the standard viewpoint of American leaders, who,
without exception, emphasize the importance
of maintaining US military dominance. Indeed,
according to the US National Intelligence Council’s future power assessment, although the US
must learn to live in an increasingly multipolar
world, it must strive to maintain its military superiority.15 Democrats and Republicans alike share
that goal. This obsession with military supremacy
explains why the US spends nearly 5 percent of
its GDP on the military. This far exceeds the military expenditures of other great powers, including China, which is estimated to spend around 2
percent of its GDP on defense.
Therefore, Xi’s view on the role of the military
in safeguarding China’s security is no different
from that of American leaders. They all exhibit a
realist’s concern for security in an anarchic international system. Nonetheless, a militarily powerful China could try to resolve disputes with other
countries in its own favor. So while Xi’s empha-
sis on military power reflects normal state behavior in an anarchic international system, it could
trigger concerns among other countries — and
already has in the case of maritime disputes with
Japan and several Southeast Asian nations.
In addition to his appreciation of the role of
military power in China’s “great rejuvenation,”
Xi has professed a stronger resolve to defend China’s core national interests. At a Politburo meeting on Jan. 28, 2013, Xi emphasized that while
China will adhere to the path of a peaceful rise,
it “will not sacrifice its rightful and legitimate
interests. No other countries should expect us to
trade away our core interests. Nor should they
expect us to swallow the bitter results of injuries
to our sovereignty, security, and development.”16
This statement by Xi has been interpreted as the
toughest to date regarding China’s core interests. According to some analyses, Xi’s comments
indicate that China is willing to go to war to safeguard its legitimate interests, even though doing
so would inevitably have negative consequences
for its economic prosperity.17
Indeed, by the time of this statement, Xi had
already demonstrated his credentials as a tough
defender of China’s core interests. Before assuming leadership at the end of 2012, Xi had been
responsible for orchestrating China’s response to
Japan’s planned nationalization of the disputed
Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in
Japan. According to reports, Xi co-ordinated different elements of China’s foreign policy and security establishments to deliver a forceful counterattack in case Tokyo disregarded Beijing’s warning
and tried to complete the nationalization process.
When the Japanese government nationalized
the islands in September, ships from China’s
maritime security agencies immediately entered
the Japanese-controlled waters around the
islands. Since then, China has maintained a regular presence in the area, which is supposed to
75
global asia Feature Essay Xi Jinping, ‘Pragmatic’ Offensive Realism and China’s Rise
18 See Jane Perlez, “China Hints at Limits to North Korea Actions,”
The New York Times, April 7, 2013.
19 For a Chinese analysis of the concept, see Dong Chunling,
“Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi lu zai jiao xia” (The Path to the
Sino-US New Type of Great Power Relations), Shijie zhishi (World
Affairs), No. 9, 2013, pp. 52-53. Dong is a scholar at the Academy
of Contemporary International Relations.
20 For Xi’s summit statement, see “Xi jinping tong meiguo
Xi’s view on the role of the military in
safeguarding China’s status is no different
from that of US leaders. They all exhibit a
realist’s concern for security in an anarchic
international system. Nonetheless, a
militarily powerful China could try to
resolve disputes with other countries
in its own favor, by force if necessary.
be under Japan’s administrative control. Moreo- at Boao in April 2013, Xi said that China would
ver, China has adopted a tough position in nego- not tolerate anybody who stirred up trouble at its
tiations over the islands. Beijing has insisted that doorstep. The message was clearly directed at the
Tokyo must first acknowledge the disputed sta- leaders in Pyongyang.18
tus of the islands before the two countries can
In addition to this stern warning, Xi took action.
resume meetings at a summit level. Although For the first time, China cracked down on North
the government of Japanese Prime Minister Korea’s assets in Chinese banks. It also began to
Shinzo Abe has repeatedly called for such talks, implement United Nations sanctions with greater
Xi has not budged.
earnestness, erecting tougher border checks on
To many Chinese, China’s response was timely, goods exported to North Korea. Finally, it has
appropriate and forceful. They believe that Bei- been reported that Xi refused to approve a visit
jing has fundamentally undermined the old sta- to Beijing by the North Korean leader Kim Jung
tus quo, represented by Japan’s de facto admin- Un unless Pyongyang were to take concrete
istrative control over the islands, and thereby measures to improve the tense security situation
achieved a major victory in the territorial dispute. between the two Koreas.
While Xi demonstrated his “toughness” in
To many observers, Xi’s reaction to the latest
defending China’s core interests during the recent provocations by North Korea was far more forceSino-Japanese conflict in the East China Sea, he ful than that of previous Chinese leaders. He
has also taken a tough approach to Beijing’s ally showed Pyongyang that Beijing would not tolerNorth Korea, whose unruly behavior has jeopard- ate troublemakers. Most important, he backed
ized China’s national interests. When the North up his words with actions that could cause genuKorean regime conducted its third nuclear test ine pain to North Korea. The recent relaxation of
and began to use a threatening tone toward Seoul, Pyongyang’s position on North-South relations
Xi proved that he was unwilling to tolerate Pyong- has shown the impact of Xi’s tougher approach to
yang’s troublemaking. At an international forum the Korean Peninsula.
76
global asia Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2014
zongtong obama kaishi zhongmei yuanshou huiwu” (Xi Jinping and
US President Obama Began the Sino-US Summit Meeting), June 8,
2013, at www.world.huanqiu.com/regions/2012-06/4013509.html.
21 For recent changes in China’s South China Sea position, see
“Wang Yi tan nanhai xingwei zunze zhong fang chi jiji kaifang
taidu” (Wang Yi on the South China Sea Code of Conduct: China
Holds an Open and Positive Attitude), Aug. 5, 2013, at www.world.
huanqiu.com/regions/2013-08/428917.html.
A Flexible Realist
blunt force of US strategic rebalancing. If this was
While Xi has demonstrated toughness in defend- the purpose, then Xi might have succeeded. Coming China’s core interests, he has also shown him- pared with 2011 and 2012, when the pivot was
self to be an adroit diplomat who can pursue prag- promoted with fanfare, today Washington has
matic foreign policies in multiple dimensions. assumed a milder tone. The administration of US
This is reflected in China’s policy toward the US President Barack Obama, from the president to
and in its relations with neighboring countries.
his chief foreign policy and defense officials, has
While the US pivot toward Asia has been widely dampened its earlier rhetoric and reemphasized
criticized for potentially adding to the strategic co-operation with China. The June 2013 summit
mistrust between the US and China and inten- was an example of this change in tone.
sifying their security rivalries in the Asia-Pacific
Another possible explanation, propounded by
region, China’s actual response has been rather many US foreign policy experts, is that Xi’s ambidifferent. Instead of forceful counterattacks on tion for China’s return to the top of the internathe diplomatic and security fronts, China has tional system has motivated him to seek diplotried to forge a closer relationship with the US matic equality with the US. Under this interpretathrough a “new type of great power relations.”
tion, a new type of great-power relationship that
This unexpected Chinese response to US stra- emphasizes mutual respect for core interests and
tegic rebalancing shows Xi’s flexibility as a real- power-sharing in a new world order will establish
ist. It has been widely reported that Xi has a the perception that China and the US now belong
strong personal interest in this new concept in to the same tier of great powers. Indeed, China
US-China relations, which seeks to establish a has confined this new concept to Sino-US bilatspecial relationship between the two great pow- eral relations. This differentiation between Chiers that emphasizes co-operation and shuns stra- na’s relations with the US and its relations with
tegic rivalry. According to some Chinese analy- other major powers may reveal Xi’s suspected
ses, China has opted for a soft response to the US goal of elevating China’s international status to
pivot to deflect and diffuse the effects of great- new heights through a de facto G-2 framework.
power rivalry.19
Regardless of Xi’s motives, he has proved to be
China has launched intensive efforts to sell this a leader who can pragmatically adapt his realist
new concept to the US. The June 2013 summit in tendencies to the real world, where US primacy
California provided one such opportunity. Dur- still exists in various aspects of international relaing his meeting with the media, Xi used a prear- tions. While Washington is unlikely formally to
ranged question from a Chinese reporter to elabo- embrace this “new type of great-power relations,”
rate at length on China’s vision for this new type Xi has succeeded in rolling back the harsher
of great power relationship. He stressed China’s effects of the pivot by turning it in a milder and
sincerity in not wanting to challenge US pri- gentler direction.
The other area in which Xi has shown himself
macy in the Asia-Pacific region and outlined the
expected benefits of working together as a team.20 to be a flexible and pragmatic realist involves
There are different interpretations of why China’s position on the disputes in the South
Xi has invested so much diplomatic capital in China Sea. In the spring and summer of 2012,
this concept. One view is that China used a soft there was a serious escalation when China and
response to the pivot to deflect and diffuse the the Philippines faced off at the Scarborough
77
global asia Feature Essay Xi Jinping, ‘Pragmatic’ Offensive Realism and China’s Rise
global asia Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2014
22 For China’s renewed emphasis on “good neighbor” policies, see
“Wang Yi: tongguo yiouhao xieshang chuli tong dongmeng guojia
cunzai di maodun” (Wang Yi: Resolving Conflicts with ASEAN
Countries Through Friendly Consultations), June 25, 2013, at
www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/06-25/4968312.shtml.
Shoals. At certain points, Beijing even hinted at operational level and in specific contexts. Xi has
the possibility of using force. In the end, China proved himself to be a diplomat who can survey
used its superior civilian maritime forces to gain the strategic landscape and make necessary and
control of the disputed area. However, since pragmatic adjustments in China’s foreign policy.
the second half of 2013, Xi’s China has shown Whereas Xi stands firm in certain contexts, such
greater willingness to reengage Southeast Asia as the territorial dispute with Japan, he is capable
with the aim of rebuilding its image there. Pre- of using diplomacy to resolve China’s foreign polmier Li Keqiang and foreign minister Wang Yi icy challenges on other fronts.
have made multiple visits to the region to disThe recent oil rig spat between China and Vietpense economic aid and to articulate a more con- nam near the Paracels Islands should not indicate
ciliatory message regarding the conflicts in the that Beijing has abandoned its recent engagement
South China Sea. Xi himself visited Malaysia and strategies toward the ASEAN. The fact is that
Indonesia in October 2013. During his speech to China has long claimed sovereignty over the Parthe Indonesian parliament, Xi outlined his vision acels and its 1974 naval victory over South Vietfor “a community of common destiny” that pro- nam consolidated its control over this group of
motes cooperation and shared interests among islands. China has consistently argued that it has
East Asian countries.
the legitimate right to explore oil in its own terAn important Chinese signal has been its will- ritorial waters surrounding the Paracels Islands.
ingness to pursue negotiations over a Code of Nonetheless, this unexpected spat with Vietnam
Conduct in the South China Sea. 21 Although has caused some neighboring countries to doubt
China joined the ASEAN Declaration on the Con- China’s sincerity over peaceful resolution to South
duct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, China Sea conflicts.
not much progress has been made in implementing a legally binding Code of Conduct. Part of Leading China to Center STAGE
the reason has been China’s lack of interest in Xi’s term will end in 2022. By then, it is highly
so-called multilateral solutions to the South likely that China will have surpassed the US as
China Sea disputes. Beijing has insisted in the the largest economy in the world. In this sense, Xi
past that countries with disputes should resolve will lead China into a new era of world politics,
with the country commanding the center stage of
them bilaterally.
Therefore, in the context of US strategic rebal- international relations.
As a realist motivated by the China Dream, Xi is
ancing, Xi’s administration has shown greater
interest in smoothing China’s relations with expected to seek a greater voice and a larger role
ASEAN. The recent “diplomatic charm” offensive for China in world affairs, especially as its power
is an outcome of China’s renewed focus on so- further increases. In this regard, there will be
called neighborly relations, which were neglected uncertainties about China’s intentions and behavduring 2012 due to the US pivot and the conflict ior. As China ascends in the global power hierarchy, other countries will worry because, after all,
with Japan in the East China Sea.22
China’s re-engagement with ASEAN and its realists base their foreign policy goals on power.
new flexibility on the South China Sea disputes Xi’s current pragmatism in foreign policy may
indicate that while Xi is a tough defender of Chi- well be the result of China’s current disadvantage
na’s national interests, he can be pragmatic on the in relative power versus that of the US.
78
Toward the end of his tenure, when China is US. While China will certainly become the largexpected to have further narrowed the power est economic and financial power in the world,
gap with the US, Xi’s foreign policy may be differ- the US may still maintain an advantage in milent. By that time, China may have already estab- itary power. This new bipolar order may help
lished primacy on the western side of the Pacific. restrain China’s ambition and limit the scope of
What will the China Dream be then? Will China the China Dream.
aspire for regional hegemony? These questions
are difficult to answer now, but it is possible that
the China of the future will act differently from
the China of today. As realists say, great pow- Zhang Baohui is Director of the Center for
ers always act like great powers. However, Chi- Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University,
na’s future power is likely to be balanced by the Hong Kong.
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