“Revisiting the war-weariness hypothesis: A citizen-level analysis”
Emily Stull
Western Political Science Association Conference
April 21, 2010
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Abstract
The war-weariness hypothesis, which argues that a state grows weary of war and
thus avoids it in the future, has consistently been regarded as one of the most intuitive
hypotheses in international relations. However, despite much attention, scholars have
repeatedly found little empirical support. In this paper, I re-analyze war-weariness
through a comparative lens, arguing that the appropriate dependent variable for testing
war-weariness is the change in vote share for the ruling party. Since war-weariness is
manifested in the population rather than at the level of leaders, the effects of warweariness can only be measured through the one primary means through which a
population can affect policy change: the election.
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The war-weariness hypothesis, which argues that a state grows weary of war and
thus avoids it in the future, has consistently been regarded as one of the most intuitive
hypotheses in international relations. However, despite much attention, scholars have
repeatedly found little empirical support for its effects. In this paper, I argue that the lack
of empirical support is not indicative of the presence or absence of war-weariness, but
rather a result of empirical analyses that are not actually testing for the presence of warweariness. Therefore, I attempt to analyze war-weariness from a different perspective
here, specifically asking How does war-weariness affect democratic nations?
In this paper, I argue that, when appropriate theoretical rigor is applied to the warweariness hypothesis, a different dependent variable emerges as the appropriate means by
which to test it. Previous studies have examined the presence of future conflict as an
indicator of whether war-weariness is enacting any effect in the conflict at present.
However, I argue that the appropriate variable to test war-weariness is instead the change
in vote share for the leader and his/her ruling party in subsequent elections after the war.
I contend the dependent variable of vote share is more appropriate than future conflict
after developing a theory of how war-weariness manifests itself in democratic nations and
concluding that war-weariness is actually a population-level effect. Thus the most
appropriate dependent variable is one that the population itself can control, in this case
vote choice, rather than one over which the population exerts little control, that being
future decisions to go to war. When this dependent variable is derived from the theory, we
see different empirical results that actually provide evidence for a war-weariness affect
among democratic populations.
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In this paper, I first discuss the previous research that surrounds the war-weariness
hypothesis. In the second section, I will turn to exploring and developing a theory of warweariness specifically in democratic nations, and discuss how this theory leads us to test
vote choice as a dependent variable rather than the presence of future conflict. In the third
section, I will develop a research design to appropriately test for the presence of warweariness in democratic states and, finally, I will present preliminary results from my
analysis.
Previous research
Previous literature that examines the war-weariness effect has relied primarily on
case studies and anecdotal evidence, as promises of empirical support have proven false.
While scholars often cite examples of war-weariness, such as the U.S. lack of military
involvement following its defeat in Vietnam, little to no empirical evidence has been
discovered for an overall war-weariness effect on the actions of leaders. In this portion of
the paper, I will provide a brief discussion of the literature to date that surrounds the warweariness hypothesis.
The idea of a temporary war-weariness effect stemming from long and drawn-out
wars was proposed by Richardson (1960). This idea was further advanced by Beer (1981),
who suggested that wars are “fought by grandfathers, that their sons are immune, and that
their grandsons are more pugnacious” (Beer 1981: 4-5). Other scholars attempt to find
evidence for war-weariness by examining whether the previous war was won or lost
(Blainey 1973; Levy 1982; Levy and Morgan 1986). Although these scholars recognize that
overall, previous wars could decrease the likelihood of future wars because of war-
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weariness, they maintain that this effect is more likely if the previous war was lost, rather
than won. If the previous war ended in victory, they argue that the likelihood of future war
could actually increase, as the military confidence of the nation would soar. Empirical
evidence for this alteration of the hypothesis, however, could not be found (Levy and
Morgan 1986). In fact, some studies found that if a nation lost a war, the duration between
the lost war and the subsequent war was actually shorter than if the previous war had
ended in victory (Singer and Cusack 1981).
More recent studies that focus on the outcome of the previous war include Rasler
and Thompson (1999), Bennett (1999) and Nevin (1996). Although Nevin find slight
support for a greater propensity to initiate conflict following a victory in at least the past
two wars, the effect is slight and inconsistent across time. Bennett finds fairly strong
support for a greater propensity to pursue war in the future if the previous wars ended in
victory, but his analysis is limited to the Soviet Union’s actions during the Cold War.
Therefore, while this analysis appears to negate the war-weariness hypothesis in its
entirety, Bennett’s results cannot be adequately generalized to other states.
Other studies examine the differences in the effects of war-weariness across regime
types. Garnham (1986) hypothesizes that democratic regimes and autocratic regimes will
experience the effects of war-weariness in different ways, an assertion with which I agree.
He argues that democratic states are more likely to display evidence of war-weariness than
autocratic states, citing the general assertion that democratic states are overall more
peaceful than autocratic ones. However, he finds no evidence to support this conclusion.
Evidence of war-weariness, in any form, cannot be found in either type of regime.
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The most recent and empirically rigorous examination of the war-weariness
hypothesis was conducted by Pickering (2002), in which he examines how decision-makers
learn from past victories and defeats. He finds a U-shaped relationship, in which both a
series of victories and a series of losses are expected to increase the likelihood of future
conflict initiation. Although Pickering admits this provides little support for warweariness, he concludes that leaders do base actions on past victories or successes.
A Theoretical Refinement
The lack of theorizing about war-weariness and how it manifests itself is a possible
explanation for the lack of empirical support found by scholars. The concept itself is even
referred to as the war-weariness hypothesis rather than the war-weariness theory,
signifying its lack of theoretical development. Instead of directing attention toward
developing strong theoretical logic, scholars have generally focused on manipulating the
hypothesis empirically in an effort to find support. However, the lack of empirical support
found for such an intuitive hypothesis prompts us to take a step back from empirical
manipulations and first examine the theoretical story behind war-weariness and how it is
applied in different situations. In this section, I will develop a theory of war-weariness as it
applies in democratic states.
The basic hypothesis of war-weariness states that wars make countries ‘war-weary,’
which creates incentives for these countries to avoid war in the future. The underlying
assumptions of this hypothesis include the high cost of war that a population suffers, both
financially and psychologically, as well as the overall assumption that a state grows tired of
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extended warfare, rather than continually pursuing it. It requires a state currently engaged
in war to tire of it, as opposed to relishing it.
Rushing to find support for this highly intuitive hypothesis, scholars have tested for
the presence war-weariness by examining the presence or absence of conflict in the future.
Previous studies have concluded that if conflict occurred at any later point in time, warweariness was not present. However, after re-examining the theoretical story that warweariness tells, I propose that the presence of conflict in the future does not negate the
presence of war-weariness at the present.
Following the example of Garnham (1986), I consider democracies separately from
autocracies, as they are likely to experience the effects of war-weariness differently.
Therefore, different theoretical logic is required. The effects of war-weariness in autocratic
and semi-authoritarian regimes, while certainly important, are beyond the scope of this
paper.
When examining the key actors in the story of war-weariness, scholars in the past
have focused on decision-makers. I propose, however, that the primary actor is the
citizenry. The theoretical story surrounding the citizenry begins with the decision to go to
war, made by the leader or leaders. The war could either be initiated by the democracy or
chosen as a path of defense against an attack. While initial support from the citizenry could
differ based on these two distinctions, it is quite possible that it might not. Whether the
war is initiated or a defensive response, a leader will attempt to generate public support
before the war is undertaken.
After the war begins, costs start to accrue. Unlike previous scholars, however, I
argue that these costs are felt most in the citizenry, rather than at the level of leaders.
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Although a leader could experience a drop in approval ratings and possibly suffer in future
elections, the primary and most damaging costs of war are felt at the level of the
population. It is here that the extensive financial and psychological effects of war are felt
most deeply. Economic conditions may suffer, jobs may be lost, and the trauma
surrounding the loss of soldiers cannot be adequately measured. Thus, war-weariness is a
population-level theory.
Because war-weariness is population-level, we must limit the repercussions and
effects of it to what the population can actually control. If war-weariness begins to display
itself, the population does not have the options a leader enjoys. It cannot decide to end the
current war or forego war in the future. It can protest in an attempt to make its opinions
known, but ultimately, the most substantial power it has is found in the polling booth. If
protests and other similar mechanisms are not effective, the population’s most powerful
tool is to vote out the leader or party that took it to war in the first place. This leads me to
my hypothesis:
H1: The presence of war-weariness decreases the vote share of the ruling party in subsequent
elections.
Research Design
To test this hypothesis, I use data on elections from 33 parliamentary democracies
from 1945-1997. Due to data constraints, I only examine parliamentary democracies,
although the use of election data from presidential systems would certainly provide a more
complete picture and I plan to gather this data in the future. I use a simple OLS model, due
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to time constraints, although in the future I would like to include a two-stage model as well,
as this may provide a more accurate analysis.
My dependent variable in this model is the change in vote share for the ruling party
from the previous election to the current election. This effectively measures the
ramifications of war-weariness as presented in the theoretical section. If a population is
war-weary, the most effective mechanism through which this is expressed is the ousting of
the party that chose war initially. The dependent variable is measured at the first election
after the war began. If the war continues through multiple elections, it is continually
measured until the first election after the conclusion of the war. For example, suppose a
country involved itself in a war that lasted from 1957-1965 and elections occurred every
four years, including 1955, 1959, 1963 and 1967. The first dependent variable would be
measured at the 1959 election, as this is the first election after the decision to go to war.
However, because the war continues through the next election, the dependent variable is
also measured at 1963. Finally, it is also measured at the 1967 elections, as this is the first
election after the war ended. Because war-weariness could still be fresh among the
population, I include these elections as well. However, the number of wars with a duration
long enough to require this type of measurement are few.
My primary independent variable of interest is the involvement of a democracy in a
war. Data on war occurrences are taken from the Correlates of War project. A war is
defined between two or more actors, and the war must result in at least 1,000 battle
deaths. For purposes of this project, I code only inter-state wars, wars between two or
more state actors, and do not include intra-state or extra-state military action. However, if
these were to be included, I believe my results would be even stronger. I code the presence
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of war as a dichotomous variable, with 1 signifying the presence of war prior to or during
an election and 0 signifying the absence.
I also include battle deaths sustained during the war by the democracy, as this factor
is likely to influence whether the presence of war leads to the presence of war-weariness.
While this measure is currently somewhat crude, as more research must be done to
determine the total death count at subsequent elections for those wars that span multiple
election cycles, it is hardly counter-intuitive to assert that a population is sensitive to its
own soldiers being killed in war. This variable is also taken from the Correlates of War
project.
I also include independent variables that have been proven to effect elections in
previous research. Economic conditions are accounted for with a measure for inflation in
the year preceding the election. Although unemployment would likely be a better
indicator, data on unemployment is unavailable for my entire time period. Therefore, I use
a measure of inflation. As stated, this variable is included at time t-1 in order to account for
economic conditions leading up to the election.
The total number of parties in the government is included as well, as this is likely to
affect the vote share in subsequent elections. In addition, I include a lagged dependent
variable to capture any autocorrelation that is likely to exist, as the vote share of the ruling
party in the previous election is likely to impact the vote share in the current election. I
also include a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a Cabinet changed before an
election took place. This variable is included because voters are less likely to punish a
ruling party if the Cabinet changed mid-term. Finally, I include a full set of country
dummies to control for differences across electoral systems.
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Empirical findings
Table 1 shows the preliminary findings of how war-weariness affects democratic
elections. All independent and control variables are reported, but only country dummies
significant at the .10 level are reported. Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
Table 1
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Coeff.
P>|t|
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Presence of war
-4.51
0.020
(1.92)
Battle deaths sustained by democracy
.000
0.923
(.000)
Inflation
-0.064
0.244
(0.05)
Total number of parties in government
-0.015
0.975
(0.464)
Previous vote share of ruling party
-0.11
0.001
(0.033)
Cabinet change mid-election term
0.014
0.976
(0.464)
Spain dummy variable
-5.6
0.064
(3.008)
Constant
4.24
0.076
(2.38)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
n = 242
R-squared = 0.196
Although these results are somewhat crude and preliminary, we can see the
significant effect of war-weariness on the vote share of the ruling party in elections
following war. Significant at the .02 level, we see that the presence of war decreases the
vote share of the ruling party by 4.51 points. Intuitively, this means that if a leader decides
to go to war, his party will suffer a loss of 4.51 points of the vote share in the next election.
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Considering the small margin by which many elections are won, this is not an insignificant
amount. It appears that democratic populations do indeed experience war-weariness and
punish their leaders through the only mechanism available to them.
Battle deaths sustained by the democratic state is surprisingly insignificant.
However, this is probably due to poor measurement. As previously stated, I had no
immediate way of determining the level of death count that had been reached at different
points in the war. For example, if a war began in 1955, ended in 1962, and 2 elections
occurred during that time period, I had no way to determine different death counts for each
election. Thus the effect of death counts is most likely grossly underrepresented.
We also see that inflation is in the predicted direction, although it is not statistically
significant. This does trouble me to some degree, as economic factors are perhaps the best
indicator of a population’s vote choice. In the future, I will need to examine my data more
closely and determine what is causing the insignificance of inflation.
We also see that the total number of parties in government and cabinet change midelection term are insignificant. Although both are in the expected direction, with greater
numbers of parties decreasing vote share for the ruling party and a Cabinet change midelection term increasing the vote share for the ruling party, both are highly insignificant.
This again may be due to data limitations, or perhaps the effects were simply not as strong
for these particular elections. More work must be done in the future in order to determine
their true effects on vote share.
The most significant independent variable is that of previous vote share for the
ruling party. Interestingly, this variable is negative, implying that previous vote share is
decreased by approximately -0.11 points in the next election. Although the magnitude of
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this variable is small, it is intuitive that a ruling party will receive a slight decrease in its
overall vote share throughout elections, particularly if the election was won by a large
margin.
Finally, the only country dummy variable that was significant represented Spain.
The baseline category for these dummy variables was the United Kingdom, thus this
variable indicates that on average, Spain sees a drop in over 5 points of vote share for the
ruling party relative to the United Kingdom. This may indicate that more electoral
volatility exists in Spanish politics than in United Kingdom politics. As the United Kingdom
has only three main parties, this is likely the case.
Conclusions and Implications
In this paper, I attempted to apply theoretical rigor to the original war-weariness
hypothesis to determine how war-weariness truly affects democratic states. I determined
that war-weariness is a population-level effect, which led me to test for its presence in the
only mechanism through which a population can control the likelihood of current and
future warfare: the election. I find that war-weariness is displayed at the population level,
and democratic populations do indeed punish leaders for the decision to go to war.
This analysis is certainly not without its limitations. First, the results are
preliminary and incomplete. In order to gain a better understanding of how war-weariness
affects democratic nations in general, we must gather data and test war-weariness in
presidential democracies as well as parliamentary systems. However, I believe that the
inclusion of presidential systems will not dilute my results, but will actually strengthen
them. In presidential systems, the clarity of responsibility is higher than in parliamentary
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systems, which allows the population an easier ‘finger to point’ when attempting to punish
leaders through the ballot box.
Better measures of several of my control variables are needed as well, in order to
better control for domestic factors that exert large influences on election results. Finally, I
hope to develop a more advanced coding scheme of the presence or absence of war in the
future, as the dichotomous variable only tells us that some kind of penalty is enacted if a
leader chooses to go to war. However, this penalty will not be the same across all wars. By
creating and including measures that indicate the severity of the war, we can gain a better
picture of how much leaders are punished based on the characteristics of the war. These
measures could include better indicators of the number of deaths a state sustains and the
financial expense of the war.
Other improvements possible to this paper involve the inclusion of other types of
wars. The current analysis includes only inter-state wars, which severely limits the
analysis, as the occurrence of inter-state wars has been relatively low since World War II.
By including and differentiating between all military actions, whether civil wars, extra-state
wars such as responses to terrorism, or all military involvement, which would include
actions such as humanitarian interventions, we would be able to gain a more complete
picture of how democratic populations respond to different types of wars. Furthermore,
distinctions between the initiation of a war by the democratic leader and a defensive
response to an attack by another state or terrorist group may be treated differently. This
inclusion would also give us a better picture of the effects of war-weariness.
Overall, the implications for democratic leaders seem fairly clear. It appears that
democratic populations do grow war-weary and choose to punish the leader or ruling party
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that took them to war initially. Leaders of democratic nations should be particularly
cautious when evaluating a decision to go to war, as their population is likely to punish
their party in the next election.
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