The Politics of Population Change
Eric Kaufmann
Professor of Politics, Birkbeck
College, University of London
What of Unevenness?
• World is not one cultural and political unit. If it
were, no problem
• Power has shifted from empire to nation, from
the rulers to the people since 1776/1789
• Spread of democracy (starting 18th c, esp.
post-1980s)
• A battle of numbers. Getting a majority now
counts, i.e. Iraq, Syria, Bahrain…
Uneven Growth Between:
•
•
•
•
•
World Region/Civilization
Nation
Ethnic group
Religion
Regions within a nation
International
Conflict
•Hedley Bull claims 100
million a threshold for
Great Power
•‘Boots on the Ground’
continues to matter as
does scale economies for
military procurement
•Perceptions matter as
much as reality
•Rise of China?
Countries’ population as % of Britain
400%
350%
300%
Russia
250%
U.S.
Germany
200%
France
150%
100%
50%
0%
1800 1850 1870 1900 1913
Demography and Ethnic Conflict:
Northern Ireland
• "The basic fear of
Protestants in Northern
Ireland is that they will
be outbred by the Roman
Catholics. It is as simple
as that." - Terence O’
Neill, Unionist PM of
Northern Ireland after
resigning, 1969
G uatam ala S O
sq km )
P o p u la tio n d e n s ity (in d iv id u a ls p e r
0
D enm ark S O
G uatam ala P op D ens ity
(W orld B ank )
D enm ark P opulation
D ens ity
G uatam ala P op D ens ity
(U N P D )
260
0
240
100
220
1
200
200
180
2
160
300
140
3
120
400
100
4
80
500
60
5
40
600
20
6
0
S u rv iv in g O ffs p rin g
Developing World Transition More Rapid
Ye a rs s in c e o n s e t o f d e m o g ra p h ic tra n s itio n
• At the end of the demographic transition Denmark 5 times
greater population, Guatemala up to 24 times greater
population.
Internal Racial Demographic Change:
California, 1970-2030
California's Population by Racial Category, 1970-2030
100%
80%
60%
Asian
Hispanic
40%
Black
20%
0%
1970
White
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
UK: A Multiracial Future?
Age Structure (‘Youth Bulge’)
• More young people – dependency ratio poverty
• More young people – unemployment poverty
• More young poor unemployed people –
recruits for ethnic, class, religious violence
• More young poor unemployed people –
elite/middle class fear – autocracy
• Aging population brings different effects
Young age structure,
rather than Islam or
poverty, is most closely
related to democracy
Expansion of Islam;
Decline of Animists and Seculars
Past and Projected Global Religious Affiliation
(World Religious Database)
45
40
35
30
1900
25
1970
20
2000
15
2025
10
5
0
Christian
Muslim
Hindu
Nonreligious +
Atheist
Other
Eurabia?
Proportion of Muslims in Austria's under-15 Population, 2000-2100
60
Current Muslim
Fertility
40
30
20
Muslim Fertility
Converges to
Average by 2030
10
01
21
96
20
91
20
86
20
81
20
76
20
71
20
66
20
61
20
56
20
51
20
46
20
41
20
36
20
31
20
26
20
21
20
16
20
11
20
06
20
01
0
20
Percent Muslim
50
Direct Effect:
Ultra-Orthodox Salford
vs
mainstream Jewish
Leeds
Conclusion
• Not just how much population, but how it is
distributed across political, ethnic, religious
units
• Uneven growth and transition, coupled with
numbers increasingly counting for power
• Shifting within and between states
• Both numbers and age structure affect politics