Army 2020: Rationale for the
Redesign
Major General K D Abraham
IISS
20 November 2012
Army 2020 : Why Necessary?
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Same tasks but 20% smaller Regular Army (fiscal context)
Continuing the logic of the SDSR
An end to enduring stabilisation in Afghanistan
Independent Commission on Reserves:
• Revitalize the Reserve: TA to 30K trained strength
• Better Defined Roles
• Connect with society through the Reserve
• Withdrawal from Germany
• Force Development and enduring lessons from operations
The core purposes of the future Army
Contingent
capability
for defence and
deterrence
Overseas
engagement
and capacity
building
UK engagement
and homeland
resilience
Principal Force Development Deductions
• Separating the strategic from the tactical level – and resetting the
brigade and divisional levels of command accordingly.
• Armoured infantry as the core capability on which manoeuvre is
built with armour organized for intimate support.
• Institutionalizing the integration of ‘soft effect’ into manoeuvre.
• Resetting the precision / suppression balance of fires.
• Broadband connectivity to more points of presence.
• ISR integration / layering and the importance of understanding
rather than simple situational awareness.
• Organizing for joint, inter-agency and multi-national integration.
• End to end approach to supply and distribution.
SDSR
“…direct more non-operational defence engagement overseas
towards conflict prevention, security sector reform and
capability building in priority countries, including through:
establishing new training teams; running joint exercises;
attaching senior civilian policy advisers to foreign defence
ministries, and increasing our arms control engagement…
…plan our conflict prevention work several years ahead and to
deliver more cross-government support to long-term conflict
prevention and stabilisation programmes…”
Defence Planning Assumptions
SDSR/Defence Policy requires our forces to be structured to
conduct simultaneously:
• A single non-enduring complex intervention
• A single non-enduring simple intervention
• An enduring stabilization operation
or
Three non-enduring operations (eg one simple
and two complex interventions)
or
At best effort, a non-enduring operation of up to
three brigades, within a divisional context (noting
that a warning time under 12 months is likely to
limit best effort to two brigades)
Use of Reserves in an Integrated Army
• Reserves will provide:
 Specialism (eg doctors, cyber, linguists).
 Capabilities that do not require significant collective
training to retain their readiness (principally the support
and service support areas).
 Combat Arms – principally for resilience and regeneration
– but useable in formed bodies on lower risk, straight
forward tasks given adequate notice.
• Complement not supplement to Army: no longer a Strategic
Reserve designed for use in extremis.
• Graduated readiness: feasible and deliverable roles.
Army 2020 Constituents
• Reaction Forces:
• 1 x divisional HQ:
• 4 x brigades (3 x Armoured Infantry and 1 x
Air Assault)
• Adaptable Forces:
• 1 x divisional HQ
• 7 x infantry brigades
• Force Troops: 10 x combat support and combat
service support brigades to support both RF
and AF.
Force Troops and Logistic Support
Force Troops
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1st Artillery Brigade
8th Engineer Brigade
1st and 11th Signals Brigades
1st Intelligence and
Surveillance Brigade
 2nd Medical Brigade
 104th Logistic Support Brigade
 Security Assistance Group
Divisions
 101 Logistic Support Brigade
 102 Logistic Support Brigade
Security Assistance Group
Functions
• Proponency for developing expertise in the fields of overseas
military assistance to stabilisation/peace-building/state-building
focusing on prevent.
– Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE)
– Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
– Military capacity-Building (MCB)
• Subject matter experts to the land chain of command and Defence
on stabilisation, specifically strategic, operational and tactical
planning.
• Remain the defence and land POC for the UK Govt. Stabilisation
Unit.
• Connected into the Single Intelligence Environment.
What the Adaptable Force is for:
A pool of forces to deliver:
• Endurance on stabilisation operations
• National resilience
• Defence engagement
• Engagement with UK civil society
• Structural and institutional resilience:
regeneration
• Best effort
Routine use of Reserves in an ‘integrated Army’
Taking account of demography
Transformation Requirements
An Adaptable Army
 Being prepared routinely to change the structure as circumstances require:
political, economic, threat...
 Tactical adaptation: to meet a broader range of tasks.
 Operational adaptation: to the specific mission requirement.
 Strategic adaptation: ability to regenerate mass and scale: deterrence
requirement.
An Integrated Army
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Establishing a framework of strategic partnerships with private and public
sector employers.
A basing plan that is optimized geographically and matched to civilian
employers.
Appropriate legislation and liability to allow predictable use.
The “offer” to reservists and their families.
A2020 Risks:
 Assured Support from Reserve:
 Resource
 Decision Making
 Cultural
 New reliance
 Operationalizing Defence Engagement .
 Institutional and Cultural Adaptability.
 Internal Balance: combat vs combat support and combat
service support.
Discussion