Hitler's motives for re-militarising
the Rhineland in 1936
• No military installations or garrisons were
permitted on the left bank within 50km of the
right (the East) bank of the River Rhine. This
was due to the treaty of Versailles, it was to
give France a sense of security.
• The Rhineland situation left Germany in a
weak position against France.
• The Abyssinian affair distracted Britain, France
and the league of nations so Hitler thought that
he could taking over the Rhineland without
much conflict.
• Hitler assumed that Britain and France were
too busy concentrating on Mussolini to pay him
any attention.
• Due to tensions with Italy the French had been
moving large numbers of troops away from
their frontier with Germany.
• One fifth of the French army had been sent to
the Alps and Tunisia.
Hitler's motives for re-militarising
the Rhineland in 1936
•Hitler said, speaking to the Reichstag on the 7th of March 1936
that Germany felt totally defenceless on their western frontier due
to the strong defences of the French on their frontier.
•In response to the Locarno Treaty being approved by the French
Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) on the 27th February 1936,
Hitler moved 22,000 troops into towns beyond the West Bank of
the Rhine on the 7th of March 1936
•Hitler had been warned by his army that it was not strong
enough to push ahead with re-militarisation should the French
resist.
•Hitler did accept this and said that “the 48 hours after the
march into the Rhineland were the most nerve racking
of my life. If the French had then marched into the
Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our
tails between our legs.”
•Hitler was influenced by the Manchurian crisis and the
Abyssinian
French Reaction
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The French felt that Hitler was provoked by Russia and were advised not to take
actions on its own.
The French government took a year to decide on how they would respond to Hitler.
The Germans were able to take the Rhineland from the French without conflict due to
the French’s lack of confidence in :
- fear of provoking war with Germany
- fighting a war against Germany without the support of Britain and Belgium
The French wanted the help of the British but an indecisive result forced the French
into deciding on their own.
The indecision lasted until February 1936 when the French foreign minister Flandin
suggests that a formal complaint be made to the League of Nations.
There was tension in the French Government, many hypothetical situations were
discussed including a deal that would allow the Germans to occupy the Rhineland if
they agreed not to stockpile weapons and build permanent structures. The French
still failed to agree on a plan for defence and continued their policy of appeasement.
When Hitler moved his troops into the Rhineland, he caused mass confusion with the
French Defence Department, as they could not contact the British Defence Officials
because they are on holiday.
Initially the French, the French did nothing to stop the Germans, whilst their
ambassador tried to contact the British Officials, but they wanted to delay
involvement for as long as possible, forcing the French to make a decision.
British reaction
•Many individuals in British politics agreed with the French that the Francosoviet treaty had provoked Hitler.
•They were Concerned about Nazi aggression however it was hoped that
conciliatory approach might persuade Germany to re-enter the league and
resume the aims of disarmament.
•British ministers thought that the military defeat of Hitler could lead to
communist takeover in Germany.
•There was popular belief that hitter had been to severely punished at
Versailles.
•Stanley Baldwin felt that military intervention would be ‘out of proportion to
what Germany had done’.
•The British government were more afraid of communism over the Nazism.
Why did the British do nothing about the
re-militarisation situation of the
Rhineland?
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There are several reason to explain the British lack of reaction:
Hitler claimed he was justified
Britain was angry about the French alliance with Russia signed in 1935
The British felt that Hitler had some justification in claiming that
remilitarisation was a defensive move to balance the mood
France consulted Britain and lodged protests with the League. Prime
Minister Stanley Baldwin said that Britain lacked the forces to back its
guarantees to France and that public opinion would not allow it.
In Britain it was thought that the Germans were merely walking into "their
own back yard".
Hugh Dalton, a Labour Party MP who usually advocated stiff resistance to
Germany, said that neither the British people nor Labour would support
either military or economic sanctions.
Evaluation
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Hitler had significantly improved his status. Over the next two years the
Germans built defences and within 18 months their rate of rearmament
passed that of Britain and France. He did not agree to an Air Force Pact with
Britain. He began to think he was infallible.
France continued to strengthen the Maginot Line in an attempt to safeguard
against future German aggression.
France's alliance with Britain became strained due to Britain's refusal to
stand up to Germany.
French alliances with eastern European countries were undermined as
France concentrated solely on defence against possible German
aggression.
Germany and Italy formed the Axis alliance, between Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany in July 1936.
Hitler signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1936 which
formed an anti-Communist alliance between the two nations.
Britain promised France and Belgium help if they were invaded (reaffirming
Locarno).
Britain began rearming its military forces.
In the Council of the League, only the Soviet Union proposed sanctions
against Germany. Hitler was invited to negotiate and proposed a nonaggression pact with the Western powers.
Historiography
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The British historian Sir Ian Kershaw argued, in his biography of Hitler, that
the initial reasons for the decision to remilitarize in 1936 as opposed to 1937
were due to Hitler's need for a foreign policy triumph to distract public
attention from the major economic crisis which gripped Germany in 1935–
36.
Some historians debate the relation between Hitler's decision to remilitarize
the Rhineland in 1936 and his broad long-term goals . Those historians
such as Klaus Hildebrand and the late Andreas Hillgruber who believe it
was an "intentions" interpretation of German foreign policy see the
Rhineland remilitarization as only one "stage" of Hitler's step-by-step plan or
world conquest.
Those historians who take a "functions" interpretation see the Rhineland
remilitarization more as Hitler’s unplanned response to the economic crisis
of 1936 as a cheap and easy way of restoring the regime's popularity. As
Hildebrand himself has noted, these interpretations are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Hildebrand has argued that though Hitler did have a set
plan for world domination, that his plan was highly improvised and were
influenced much by both the international stage and occurrences that were
often not under Hitler's control.
Historiography
•Historians such as William L. Shirer in his
books The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
(1960) and The Collapse of the Third
Republic (1969) (writing without benefit of
access to the French documents of events,
which were not opened until the mid-1970s)
have claimed that France, despite possessing
superior armed forces compared to Germany at
this time, was psychologically unprepared to use
force against Germany.
•American historian Stephen A. Schuker has
examined the relevant French primary sources
and has rejected Shirer's claims as the work of
an amateur historian writing without access to
the primary sources, and has found that a major
factor on French policy was the economic
situation.
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